Joint Statement on Insider Threat Mitigation

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The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

April 01, 2016

     Gift Basket on Mitigating Insider Threats

This gift basket records the intent of Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Republic of Korea, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States and INTERPOL to establish and implement national-level measures to mitigate the insider threat. 

Insiders generally possess access rights which, together with their authority and knowledge, grant them far greater opportunity than outsiders to bypass dedicated nuclear and radiological security elements or other provisions such as safety systems and operating procedures.  Insiders, as trusted personnel, are capable of methods of defeat that may not be available to outsiders.  As such, insiders—acting alone or in concert with outsiders—pose an elevated threat to nuclear security.

To establish an integrated, graded approach to mitigating insider threats, nuclear and radiological security programs should include national-level and agency- or facility-specific Insider Threat Mitigation policies and programs, training and awareness activities, and collaboration between facility-level organizations. The Insider Threat Mitigation Program should include strong control and accountability measures for special nuclear material that rigorously assess and continually monitor insider human reliability, deter insiders from theft/diversion, limit their access, and provide prompt detection of theft/diversion.

  1. States commit to supporting the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to develop and implement an advanced, practitioner-level training course on preventive and protective measures against insider threats. 

The IAEA, with the assistance of Member States, has developed and implemented a basic training course to help mitigate insider threats.  With support from partner Member States, and in response to IAEA basic insider threat mitigation course participant survey responses, States will support the IAEA with the development of an advanced, practitioner-level training course on preventive and protective measures against insider threats.  This more advanced course will provide member states with hands-on training, guidance documents and related self-assessment and training materials. Similar in format to the IAEA’s International Training Course on Physical Protection, the course could be piloted in Member States with appropriate facilities, and then transitioned to Nuclear Security Support Centers and Centers of Excellence (NSSC/COEs) in partner States. The training course will focus on physical protection of materials, facilities, and sensitive information from insider threats, as well as Nuclear Material Accounting and Control (NMAC), trustworthiness program, nuclear security culture, and other methodologies to protect against theft of nuclear materials and sabotage of facilities. Future instructors from NSSC/COEs would receive special preparatory training, and then help teach the pilot course and both regional and national NSSC/COEs may adapt the courses as appropriate to meet the threat-based needs of the Member States.

  1. States will implement measures to mitigate insider risks using a risk-informed graded approach by taking actions that may include one or more of the following:
  • Developing and implementing a national-level policy on insider threat mitigation, identifying all relevant stakeholders and information sources, and implementing agency-specific training and education.
  • Developing or maintaining an outcome focused regulatory approach that will assist those responsible to think more holistically about security risks and mitigations.
  • Taking specific steps to facilitate collaboration and information sharing among relevant national organizations (e.g., facility security, human resources, personnel security, national security, counter-intelligence and law enforcement).
  • Establishing or strengthening NMAC programs for nuclear security purposes, and regulations for implementation, including, for example,
    • Systems to identify nuclear material status, movement, and changes. These may include appropriate NMAC software, secure electronic data transfer between facilities and to the national or regional level, and established national- or regional-level plans to respond to suspected theft/diversion;
    • Facility-level Material Control & Accountability (MC&A) programs to detect theft/diversion through modern nuclear material accounting system software, including peer review of software;
    • Regional-, National-, and facility-level programs to conduct performance tests, self-assessments and peer reviews to assess and enhance effectiveness of insider threat mitigation programs to include NMAC systems.
  • Establishing a nuclear security regime for protection of materials and facilities from insider activities, including, for example:
    • Development and implementation of a training program to mitigate insider risk to include topics such as the importance of the individual in recognizing and preventing insider threats; physical protection systems used to secure materials at facilities and in transit; insider analysis, prevention, and mitigation; and how to develop trustworthiness programs;
    • Physical protection systems used in protection of materials and facilities;
    • Nuclear security culture;
    • Methodologies to protect against protracted and abrupt theft of nuclear materials; 
    • Procedures for materials transfer;
    • Protection of materials at the target;
    • Access (e.g. two-person) rules and other administrative and technical measures against insider threats;
    • Defined physical protection design objectives and/or measures as they relate to sabotage and the potential insider threat; and
    • Maintaining good cyber hygiene procedures such as protective monitoring on cyber estate and ensuring user privileges are relevant and appropriate to their current role.
  • Establishing insider trustworthiness programs that can include:
    • Defining eligibility requirements;
    • Clearly identifying and documenting roles and responsibilities;
    • Conducing background checks;
    • Initial and ongoing:
      • Vetting of personnel by law enforcement agencies;
      • Medical and psychological testing;
      • Drug and alcohol testing;
    • Detecting and reporting aberrant behavior;
    • Process for no-fault self-reporting any condition that may affect an individual’s ability to conduct security responsibilities and for reporting any other security concerns;
    • Providing personnel assistance programs to help mitigate life stressors that can impair ability to conduct security duties; and,
    • Regular security awareness training, including cyber security.

Joint Statement on LEU Fuel Bank

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Joint Statement by the Leaders of Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Norway, People's Republic of China, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden, UAE, UK and USA on the Low Enriched Uranium Bank in Kazakhstan

 

Noting the importance of development of an international Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) bank as one of the mechanisms for assurance of supply of nuclear fuel that is designed to provide Member States with an additional level of assurance for the front end of the fuel cycle;

Noting the outstanding efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in establishing an IAEA LEU Bank in Kazakhstan;

Noting that Kazakhstan has an exemplary record of contributing to nuclear nonproliferation and international peace;

Noting the significant financial contributions of all donors to the IAEA LEU Bank, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the United States, the European Union, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Norway, United Arab Emirates, and the World Nuclear Transport Institute;

The leaders of Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Norway, People's Republic of China, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden, UAE, the UK, and the USA gathered in Washington, D.C. on the occasion of the fourth Nuclear Security Summit, subscribe to the following statement:

We would like to highlight that the IAEA LEU Bank is part of a global effort to create an assured supply of nuclear fuel to countries in case of disruptions to the open market or other existing supply arrangements for low enriched uranium;

We note the significant progress that has been made over the past several months towards establishing the IAEA LEU Bank, particularly:

Signature of the Agreement between the IAEA and the Russian Federation for the transit of IAEA LEU and equipment through Russian territory to and from the IAEA LEU Bank in June 2015; and,

Signature of the Host State Agreement between IAEA Director General Amano and Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Idrissov on 27 August 2015;

We acknowledge that the legal framework for the IAEA LEU Bank with Kazakhstan is now fully in place and we look forward to moving ahead with full-scale implementation; and

We look forward to the IAEA LEU Bank operating in a safe and secure manner.

Joint Statement on Maritime Supply Chain Security

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2016 Nuclear Security Summit

Maritime Supply Chain Security Joint Statement 

Over the past decade, many countries have deployed radiation detection systems at their seaports as a key component of their national approach to combating nuclear and radiological smuggling.  These systems have detected numerous nuclear and other radioactive materials out of regulatory control (MORC) - some that pose security risks and others that just pose risks to public health and safety, or are of regulatory concern(e.g. contaminated goods and orphan sources).  Due to the complexity of the maritime system and the many stakeholders involved, it is clear that national, regional and international coordination in both the public and private sector is needed to secure this vector and enable the permanent removal of these materials from the maritime supply chain. 

With this in mind, 15 countries, nine international organizations, three terminal operators, and several academic representatives participated in a workshop from 16-18 November 2015, co-sponsored by the United States and the United Kingdom, focused on promoting radiation detection in the maritime supply chain and developing enhanced measures to permanently remove materials found out of regulatory control.  This workshop was in fulfillment of a commitment made at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in a joint statement on maritime supply chain security.  Workshop participants acknowledged that detection systems are an important tool in a nation’s approach to locating and securing MORC and identified a set of best practices and recommendations. 

Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Georgia, Israel, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States endorse the following best practices and recommendations identified at the November 2015 workshop.

Best Practices

Nations with detection programs have agreed to continue to share technical advice, lessons learned and best practices with one another and with those nations seeking to implement and sustain detection systems.  Specific examples of best practices include:

  1. Plan for long-term sustainability of systems early in the process of developing and deploying radiation detection programs; 
  2. Establish a comprehensive "end-to-end" regulatory framework that provides the necessary framework and authorities to all stakeholders involved in the detection, notification and response to materials found out of regulatory control;
  3. Implement and institutionalize regular training and adaptive exercises that address evolving threats, operational challenges and security strategies of detection systems to verify that roles and responsibilities are clearly understood and that all relevant stakeholders maintain a state of readiness;
  4. Take appropriate national-level measures at the material’s origin, in accordance with the IAEA Code of Conduct on Radioactive Sources, to ensure that radiological materials are controlled at the point of origin and prevented from entering the maritime supply chain.
  5. Take appropriate measures to ensure that detected nuclear other radioactive materials are placed back under control in either the country responsible for the detection eventor the country of material origin, as appropriate; and
  6. Report incidents involving MORC to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) in a timely manner and seek other formal and informal mechanisms to share information on detections, trends, and challenges in addressing MORC with regional and international partners.

Recommendations:

  1. Seek opportunities and mechanisms to enhance communication between public and private stakeholders regarding the responsibilities and obligations associated with the removal of MORC from the maritime supply chain and to ensure feedback mechanisms for all parties in the ultimate resolution of MORC cases, as appropriate;Develop technical and operational solutions to reduce alarms from innocent, naturally occurring radioactive material (“NORM”) to protect commerce and to focus resources on detecting materials of concern;
  2. Request that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continue to study technical and operational issues related to detection operations through cooperative research projects and other mechanisms as appropriate;
  3. Request that INTERPOL continue and enhance current efforts to ensure that threat information flows from law enforcement to front line officers (i.e. Customs and Border Protection) involved in detection operations;
  4. Request that the World Customs Organization (WCO) expand its efforts to deploy a common communication platform between customs organisations, which could be leveraged to facilitate timely information sharing in member states on detections, trends and challenges in addressing MORC; and
  5. Investigate whether the WCO or other appropriate organisations could expand their efforts to facilitate information sharing that goes beyond customs organisations to regulators or other applicable organisations in order to allow all those organisations involved in the detection and removal of MORC to share timely information, ensure that material is permanently removed from the supply chain and correctly disposed of. 

The United States and the United Kingdom will document and share these and other best practices and recommendations with the international community. 

Joint Statement on National Nuclear Detection Architecture

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Nuclear Security Summit 2016

Statement on National Nuclear Detection Architectures

Introduction

This gift basket records the intent of Finland, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Georgia, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Morocco, Mexico, Norway, Philippines, Singapore, Spain, United Kingdom, United States, Vietnam and INTERPOL to demonstrate their commitment to develop national-level nuclear detection architectures and strengthen regional efforts as an effective capability in combating illicit trafficking and malevolent use of nuclear and other radioactive materials. An integral part of this commitment is international cooperation to promote key architecture elements and principles as well as to address common challenges and mitigation strategies.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has a central role in nuclear security worldwide, including in the field of nuclear detection and cooperation.  Other international fora support international cooperation on nuclear detection, most notably, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT).  Similarly, the Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction assists in providing practical assistance on nuclear and radiological security, upon state’s requests, and so supports the work of the IAEA.

IAEA

Through its Nuclear Security Programme, the IAEA supports States in their efforts to establish, maintain and sustain an effective nuclear security detection architecture. The IAEA has adopted a comprehensive approach to nuclear security and has elaborated guidance of major importance[1].  These publications aim at advocating the development and improvement of a nuclear security detection architecture that integrates comprehensive detection capabilities and measures and associated resources to improve a nation’s ability to detect nuclear and radiological threats.  

GICNT

Nuclear detection is a core nuclear security objective for the GICNT. GICNT activities bring critical added value to nuclear detection work through identifying cross-cutting issues, suggesting new solutions and promoting inter-disciplinary and inter-agency cooperation.

Good practices related to nuclear detection are shared, collected and developed under the auspices of the GICNT. They can contribute to producing, assessing and updating IAEA publications.  Frequent scenario-based discussions, table-top exercises and field exercises of the GICNT enhance expertise and skills of members of the global nuclear security community.

Commitments

On the occasion of the 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit, we the parties to this Statement reaffirm our commitment to improving further our national detection architectures with the goal to combat illicit trafficking and to prevent malicious acts.

We commit ourselves to efficient use of available nuclear detection resources as well as to avoiding duplication of work between IAEA, GICNT and other relevant bodies.

We further reaffirm our commitment to the IAEA’s recommendations, giving particular attention to the following principles:

  • An effective nuclear security detection architecture should be derived from a comprehensive, integrated detection strategy prepared by the State; 
  • The national nuclear security detection architecture should take into consideration that individual organizations’ roles in the fieldof detection are unambiguously clear;
  • Nuclear security culture is an effective tool that can strengthen the efficiency of the nuclear security detection systems; 
  •  Implementation should account for and integrate border and interior detection capabilities.

We reaffirm, also, our determination to maintain our contributions to the development of the IAEA’s guidance document in the field of detection.

To promote and improve international awareness and understanding of the importance of a national-level nuclear detection architecture, we also advocate and support the work of the IAEA’speriodic review workshops during which participating nations can share good practices and lessons learned and discuss challenges, mitigation strategies, and long-term sustainability approaches.  The IAEA will conduct the first such workshop in Seam Reap, Cambodia in April 2016. 

GICNT Partners joining to this Statement reaffirm their commitment to actively participate and contribute to nuclear detection work that takes place in the Global Initiative. 

[1] As a critical part of this approach, the IAEA published Nuclear Security Series No. 21; Implementing Guide on Nuclear Security Systems and Measures for the Detection of Nuclear and other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control. 

Joint Statement on Nuclear Terrorism Preparedness and Response

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Joint Statement on Supporting Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism

Preparedness and Response Capabilities 

Subscribed by Australia, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, Norway, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the United Nations and INTERPOL.

A nuclear terror event anywhere in the world would have devastating human, environmental, economic, and political consequences. Building on the Summit’s nuclear terrorism prevention and nuclear and radiological material security accomplishments and efforts, wethe Parties to this statement recognize the need for ensuring adequate nuclear emergency preparedness and response capabilities.  Such capabilities contribute tofurther reducing not onlythe risks posed by nuclear or radiological terrorism (hereafter, “nuclear terrorism”), but also the risks posed by other malicious activities or accidents involving nuclear or radiological materials and facilities.Ensuring preparedness in National capabilities to counter and respond to nuclear terror acts is a critical task for all Nations, as exemplified by the Scenario-Based Policy Discussions successfully completed by participating nations as part ofthe 2016 Summit.  Nuclear terrorism preparedness requires a range of activities to establish,enhance, sustain, and exercise the capabilities necessary to counter and respond to nuclear terror incidents. Nuclear terrorism response requires a range of technical, operational, and communications capabilities toprovide coordination and resolution of the incident, as well as mitigatingits consequences.

Consistent with the Nuclear Security Summit goal of reducing the threat posed by nuclear terrorism and furthering the 2014 Hague Summit Communique pledge to “maintain effective emergency preparedness, response, and mitigation capabilities,”we the parties to this statementrecognize that ensuring adequate nuclear terrorismpreparedness and response capabilities complements international nuclear security efforts.  We also recognize that adequate nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities contribute to strengthening the interface between nuclear safety and security, and serve as a potential deterrent to attack.

Nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities include the following capabilities:

  • National policies and plans:Establish and maintainadequate National response plans and policies regarding preparedness, response, and mitigation of incidents and threats of nuclear terrorism, including guidance forlocalplanning in responding to such threats and incidents.
  • Technical expertise and capabilities:Identify, confirm, assess, and respond to nuclear terror incidentsand threats, including radiological characterization and assessments to inform protective actions, emergency medical training and response support, and decontamination tools and training.
  • Public communications and education: Develop and maintainstrategic communications and effective public messaging providing not only public safety awareness and emergency readiness in the event of a nuclear terror incident but also mechanisms and procedures for ensuring prompt dissemination of public safety information to potentially affected communities.
  • Sustainment of capabilities:  Sustain necessary capabilities through continuing education, training, and exercises involving National and local officials and multinational partners charged with nuclear terrorism preparedness, response, or associated decision-making.
  • International coordination and assistance mechanisms: Per the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Convention on Assistance in the Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, and other relevant international legal instruments, and considering multilateral mechanisms and initiatives such as offered by the United Nations (UN), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), INTERPOL, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and the Global Partnership (GP) against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction,establish mechanisms for requesting and/or providing (as appropriate):
    • Nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capacity building, 
    • As required, post-event mutualassistance offered by the State Partiesof the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency,
    • Government-to-Government coordination and communication in the event of nuclear terrorism.

Recognizing that an act of nuclear terrorism anywhere in the world would have global impacts affecting all Nations, wethe parties to this statement affirm ourwillingnessto cooperate to strengthen National and international nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities.  We agree on the following commitments in support of this objective:

  • Ensure adequate National nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities at home.  We the parties to this statement reaffirm our National commitment to establish and maintain the National-level capabilities required for nuclear terrorism preparedness and response.We also commit to conductcomprehensivenuclear terrorism preparedness and response drills, incorporating roles and responsibilities at the National and local levels to foster strong interagency cooperation across law enforcement, medical, technical/scientific, and policy agencies.  We commit to strengthen our National interagency coordination, cooperation, and information-sharing mechanisms needed in this regard, to support whole-of-government crisis response.
  • Support sharing relevant resources, expertise, and good practices, in order to strengthen global nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities, including relevant post-event mutual assistance.  Consistent with our respectiveinternational legal obligations,we the parties to this statementagree in principle to support--at the bilateral level, upon request--relevant expertise, training, or other related resources supporting nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilitieswith interested states, as well as offer relevant post-event mutual assistanceincluding through the IAEA Response and Assistance Network (RANET). We recognize that requests for bilateral assistance must be evaluated by the States involved on a case by case basis and would be subject to availability of resources, legal considerations, and other concerns.  However, we the parties to this statement recognize the importance of supporting nuclear terrorismpreparedness and response capacities and thus encourage bilateral and multilateral dialogue and coordination on how best to assure adequate global preparedness and response capabilities.As such, we also commit to making available relevant expertise or experience via international and multilateral effortsas the UN, IAEA, INTERPOL, GICNT, and the GP.  National Points of Contact will be provided, in addition to IAEA, INTERPOL, GICNT, and GP points of contact,to support the coordination and evaluation of requests and offers of assistance.
  • Support for international best practice guidance on preparedness and resilience objectives and the specific capabilities needed to meet them, as published by the organizations listed above,including the IAEA Nuclear Security Series 15 - Nuclear Security Recommendations on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control, the IAEA Safety Series GSR Part 7 on Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism’s Fundamentals for Establishing and Maintaining a Nuclear Security Response Framework ,which build on the aforementioned core competencies We the parties to this statement recognize these documents as an excellent foundation for States wishing to establish or sustain baseline nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities, and actively support the broadest possible international application and use of these documents.
  • Share lessons learned from real world incidents (i.e., nuclear and radiological incidents, materials out of regulatory control, significant all hazards-related emergency response efforts, etc.) that have implications for or applications to nuclear terrorism preparedness, response, and mitigation, in order to incorporate this experience into Preparedness and Response capabilities nationally and internationally.
  • Encourage and support National and State/local-level full field and table-top exercises aimed at ensuring nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities.  As appropriate, participating countries to the exercises will encourage reciprocal, bilateral observation of National and transborder exercises, with a view towards sharing good practices in sustaining preparedness and response capabilities, while ensuring confidentiality of sensitive information.We the parties to this statementcommit, as far as resources permit, to host, observe, or support the development and implementation of radiological emergency management exercises (REMEX) under the GICNT’s Response and Mitigation Working Group.  REMEXs emphasize the importance of international cooperation in preparedness and resilience by providing the opportunity for two or more governments to collaboratively exercise response capabilities for nuclear terrorism with bilateral or multilateral scenarios.  REMEXs also provide a venue for sharing the good practices and lessons learned from other national and State/local-level exercises encouraged under this gift basket.  

Joint Statement on Nuclear Training and Support Centres

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Joint statement on

Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres / Centres of Excellence 

Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, the United Kingdom, the United States, Vietnam, INTERPOL and the United Nations

 

Italy hosted the 2014 Gift Basket on Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres/Centres of Excellence (NSSC/CoE) following the 2012 Gift Basket hosted by the United States.  The 2014 Gift Basket attracted a large number of co-sponsoring Summit participants promoting the importance of nuclear security training and support centres, and the value of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres Network (NSSC Network) in strengthening international and regional cooperation and collaboration.  Now that the IAEA NSSC Network is maturing and a number of nuclear security training and support centers are being established, these centres can play an increasingly important and active role in promoting nuclear security.  These centres help meet domestic nuclear security needs, and can also provide an important platform for sharing resources and meeting needs on a regional basis, thus strengthening and sustaining the global nuclear security architecture.

In support of the IAEA NSSC Network and nuclear security training and support centre sustainability, the participants to the 2016 Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres / Centres of Excellence Gift Basket intend, within available resources, to support the following activities.

Strengthening of the IAEA NSSC Network

•    Nuclear security training and support centres not yet a member of the IAEA NSSC Network commit to join the Network and make every effort to take part in the IAEA NSSC Network activities, including meetings.

Establishment of regional networks

•    Building upon the establishment of the Asia Regional Network through the IAEA NSSC Network, establish additional networks with nuclear security training and support centres in the same region and mechanisms of regional coordination to promote best practices, exchange training experiences, share curricula and other activities on a regional basis. 

•    In collaboration with the IAEA NSSC network, share experiences in training with centres outside their region.

Strengthening nuclear security training and technical support programmes

•    Improve the quality of training by conducting peer review exchanges with other nuclear security training and support centres and by making use of the IAEA NSSC Network as a mechanism to promote peer-review exchanges.

•    Use IAEA material/guidance as a mechanism to achieve consistency in the technical content of the training programmes on nuclear security and participate in IAEA Train-the-Trainer activities to build a network of instructors qualified to deliver IAEA training course materials. 

•    Organize and be active participants in the development and running of nuclear and radiological security scenarios and exercises.

•    Share experiences and nuclear security training with other training centres and centres of excellence, as appropriate, as well as lessons learned through the IAEA NSSC network and IAEA Nuclear Security Information Portal (NUSEC).

•    Use IAEA material/guidance to support training programmes in key technical topics such as nuclear security culture, nuclear material accounting and control, computer security, transportation security, and insider threat mitigation. 

•    As appropriate, consider certification of nuclear security training and support centre training programmes, as per ISO 29990 and/or utilize applicable ISO best practices to support continuous improvement.
  
•    Collaborate with the Global Partnership’s Centre of Excellence Sub-working Group to implement this Gift Basket as noted in the Global Partnership Nuclear Security Summit Action Plan.

Sustainability

•    Focus attention on and build mechanisms to ensure the sustainability of nuclear security training and support centres, including developing business plans and e-learning tools, conducting needs analysis and regular evaluation of effectiveness, and identifying required financial, administrative and human resources.

•    Provide training, technical and scientific support to competent authorities to strengthen long-term sustainability of domestic nuclear and radiological security regimes. 

•    Broaden and strengthen international cooperation with the United Nations, especially United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540-related efforts, with INTERPOL, the Global Partnership, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and others.

Cooperation

•    Collaborate with educational institutions that teach nuclear security subjects to include nuclear security culture. Continue, improve, and expand the NSSC Network’s collaboration with the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN).

•    Cooperate in the area of research and development with national and international institutes to promote scientific advancements in nuclear security and continuous engagement of the scientific communities.

•    Engage industry and civil society through constant dialogue on the importance of nuclear security.

•    Promote public confidence in nuclear and radiological security.

Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004)

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Joint Statement on

Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)

2016 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.

Recognizing that United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 (2004) and the United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to UNSCR 1540 (hereinafter “1540 Committee”) are key parts of the international legal architecture for States to prevent and combat nuclear terrorism.

Noting that the full implementation of UNSCR 1540 is a long-term endeavour that requires both political and technical action at national, sub-regional, regional and international levels.

Recalling the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué and Work Plan, the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué, the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué, and the follow-up Resolutions of UNSCR 1540, particularly UNSCR 1977 (2011), which underscored the important role of UNSCR 1540 in strengthening global nuclear security and reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism.

Noting that the 1540 Committee will be completing  its second Comprehensive Review in 2016 on the status of the implementation of UNSCR 1540, as set forth by UNSCR 1977 (2011). This Review provides an opportunity for the 1540 Committee to take stock of national and international progress in implementing UNSCR 1540 since the previous Comprehensive Review in 2009, and to put forward key findings and recommendations that will contribute to more effective implementation of UNSCR 1540.

Welcoming the contributions of States for updating and submitting reports on national implementation of UNSCR 1540 with the view of the 2016 Comprehensive Review on the implementation of UNSCR 1540.

Reaffirming our commitment to the Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540 delivered at the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit.

Noting that since the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit, co-signatories have advanced national efforts to further the implementation of UNSCR 1540 by providing support for the 1540 Committee’s main areas of work, including, inter alia: monitoring implementation of the Resolution; providing capacity building assistance at the technical level to requesting States in implementing their UNSCR 1540 obligations; preparing and submitting UNSCR 1540 National Implementation Action Plans; organizing or supporting regional and sub-regional training seminars, exercises and initiatives; convening workshops to help facilitate the implementation of UNSCR 1540 into national legislation; conducting outreach to stakeholders in industry, civil society and academia; and strengthening cooperation with regional organizations such as the African Union, ASEAN, the Caribbean Community, and the European Union.

*  *  *

We, the Governments of Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States, with the support of the United Nations, the European Union and INTERPOL, reaffirm our commitment to the full and universal implementation of UNSCR 1540, including the implementation of obligations to enhance the security of nuclear materials worldwide in line with the objectives of the 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué and institutional Action Plans. We reiterate our support for the activities of the 1540 Committee and the Group of Experts. We also reaffirm our commitment to fully implement UNSCR 1540 in our respective States, in areas where we have not already done so, and further undertake to:

1.       Work with and provide information to the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts for the 2016 Comprehensive Review on the status of the implementation of UNSCR 1540;

2.       Consider providing additional support and assistance in fulfilling the Action Plan in support of the United Nations, particularly actions aimed at facilitating national and regional implementation of UNSCR 1540 and its nuclear security obligations, with a view to helping requesting States to fully implement UNSCR 1540 by 2021, as referenced in the UNSC Presidential Statement of 7 May 2014;

3.       Encourage states to submit reports on national implementation of UNSCR 1540 on a regular basis, and focussing outreach on states yet to submit a first report to the 1540 Committee;

4.       Advocate for international, regional, and sub-regional organizations that have not yet done so to designate a Point of Contact (PoC) or coordinator on the implementation of UNSCR 1540 in order to facilitate regional approaches to assisting States in implementing their UNSCR 1540 obligations and enhance coordination for their UNSCR 1540 implementation efforts;

5.       Consider providing funding, where feasible, to organizations requesting for supporting their PoCs or coordinators for the implementation UNSCR 1540;

6.       Enhance coordination through outreach events with a wide range of domestic stakeholders such as industry, parliamentarians, civil society and academia, and develop appropriate ways to inform these stakeholders of their obligations pursuant to domestic laws relating to the implementation of UNSCR 1540;

7.       Consider organizing joint exercises at the national, regional or international levels that demonstrate ways of reinforcing national and regional capacities and international cooperation for better implementation of UNSCR 1540, and encourage the participation of relevant international organizations and initiatives;

8.       Advocate for the 1540 Committee to continue to strengthen cooperation with other relevant international organizations and initiatives, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, other United Nations entities, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Material of Mass Destruction (Global Partnership), as well as regional and sub-regional organizations in promoting the implementation of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit institutional Action Plans;

9.       Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to enhance their cooperation with other relevant entities in the United Nations system, such as the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)- and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), including through strengthening the legal framework to prohibit illicit activities, export controls, border security, and other measures that support obligations under UNSCR 1540, and the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate through joint country visits to monitor the implementation of UNSCR 1540;

10.    Consider further enhancing the cooperation between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the UNSCR 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts on strengthening nuclear security, through opportunities such as: enhancing complementarity and reducing duplication, including by using Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans (INSSP) to inform voluntary 1540 National Implementation Action Plans; coordinating with the IAEA’s International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) on outreach to academia relevant to implementing UNSCR 1540 and the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Support Center (NSSC) Network on outreach to nuclear security training centers; exploring establishing a liaison between the 1540 Committee and the IAEA’s Division of Nuclear Security;

11.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to continue collaborative efforts and interactions with INTERPOL regarding assistance requests and training opportunities;

12.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to continue to participate in GICNT exercises, workshops and events that focus on building and enhancing nuclear forensics, detection and response capabilities;

13.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to assist UN Member States to develop strong UNSCR 1540 assistance requests that are sufficiently detailed to support responses from potential assistance providers, including through the Global Partnership. In this context, consideration should be given to strengthening the 1540 Committee’s “match-making” mechanism and coordination with assistance providers, including at the regional level, through the Comprehensive Review of UNSCR 1540;

14.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to assist UN Member States to address new and emerging WMD threats relevant to the obligations and recommendations of the resolution; and

15.    Advocate for increased contributions, where feasible, to the UN Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament Activities dedicated to supporting UNSCR 1540 implementation and the work of the 1540 Committee.

Joint Statement on Sustaining Action to Strengthen Global Nuclear Security Architecture

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JOINT STATEMENT ON SUSTAINING ACTION TO

STRENGTHEN GLOBAL NUCLEAR SECURITY

The Nuclear Security Summit process has led to significant achievements in nuclear security at national, regional, and global levels; but the work of building a strengthened, sustained, and comprehensive global nuclear security architecture – consisting of legal instruments, international organizations and initiatives, internationally accepted guidance, and best practices – requires continuous attention.

We need sustained action and ambition on nuclear security after the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit to address continuing and evolving nuclear security challenges, with the objectives of advancing implementation of nuclear security commitments and building a strengthened, sustainable and comprehensive global nuclear security architecture.

The Governments of Argentina, Armenia, ­­­­­Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Republic of Korea, Romania, Poland, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Vietnam, and the following international organizations: INTERPOL and United Nations, aiming to facilitate cooperation and sustain activity on nuclear security after the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, commit to:

  • Establish a Nuclear Security Contact Group; and
  • Designate an appropriately authorized and informed senior official or officials to participate in the Contact Group.

The Contact Group is tasked with:

  • Convening annually on the margins of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and, as may be useful, in connection with other related meetings;
  • Discussing a broad range of nuclear security-related issues, including identifying emerging trends that may require more focused attention;
  • Promoting and assessing implementation of nuclear security commitments, including those made during the Nuclear Security Summit process, reflected in the four Nuclear Security Summit Communiqués, the 2010 Washington Work Plan, the 2016 Action Plans, national commitments and associated joint statements, and gift baskets;
  • Developing and maintaining linkages to nongovernmental experts and nuclear industry; and,
  • Determining any additional steps that may be appropriate to support these goals.

The Contact Group may also consider and make recommendations to their respective leaders on convening any future Nuclear Security Summits.

We welcome the participation of all countries that subscribe to the goals set out in this Joint Statement and wish to contribute to the work of the Contact Group.

National Statement: Algeria (French)

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SOMMET SUR LA SECURITE NUCLEAIRE

Washington D.C., Etats-Unis d’Amérique

31 mars-1er avril 2016

ALGERIE

INTERVENTION DE MONSIEUR LE PREMIER MINISTRE

1er avril 2016

Monsieur le Président,

Mesdames et Messieurs les Chefs d’Etat et de Gouvernement,

Excellences,

Mesdames et Messieurs,

Je voudrais tout d'abord exprimer, au nom de la délégation algérienne, ma gratitude au Président des Etats-Unis, M. Barack Obama, pour son initiative d’organiser le Sommet auquel nous prenons part aujourd’hui pour mesurer les progrès accomplis dans le renforcement de la sécurité nucléaire depuis le premier Sommet tenu, ici à Washington, en 2010.

Notre réunion, qui regroupe plus de cinquante Etats issus de toutes les régions du monde, autant que les résultats de nos différentes rencontres depuis 2010 sur cette question d’importance majeure, nous offrent l’opportunité de prendre la mesure du risque potentiel lié à l’émergence de nouvelles menaces mettant en cause les matières et sources radioactives avec toutes les conséquences radiologiques pour les populations, les biens et l’environnement. D’où l’impérieuse nécessité de leur prise en charge, de manière adéquate, tant au plan national que dans le cadre d’une coopération multilatérale renforcée.

Les efforts déployés par la communauté internationale pour le renforcement de la sécurité nucléaire depuis le Sommet de Washington 2010, ont permis de converger vers une vision globale de nos Etats qui aspirent à partager des objectifs communs en matière de désarmement nucléaire, de non-prolifération et d’utilisation pacifique de l'énergie nucléaire.

Cette évolution n’a été possible que grâce à la mise en oeuvre d’actions concrètes et durables par nos Etats, conformément à leurs obligations respectives, tant au plan national que régional et international.

Dans ce contexte, je saisis l’occasion qui m’est donnée aujourd’hui pour saluer l’action de l’Agence Internationale de l’Energie Atomique en matière de promotion de la sécurité nucléaire sur le plan international et dont il faut soutenir les efforts, tant son expertise et expérience demeurent, à tous points de vue, essentielles dans le renforcement continu du cadre international de sécurité nucléaire, comme rappelé dans les communiqués respectifs des Sommets de Washington, Séoul et La Haye.

Je voudrais, aussi, souligner l'apport de l'AIEA en matière de prise en charge de la sécurité nucléaire sur le plan international, notamment en ce qui concerne l’élaboration des normes et de la documentation technique y afférente.

Monsieur le Président,

L’Algérie, qui a ratifié la Convention sur la Protection Physique des Matières Nucléaires ainsi que son amendement et la Convention Internationale pour la répression des actes de terrorisme Nucléaire, saisit cette occasion pour réitérer toute l’importance que revêt l’adhésion universelle à l’ensemble des instruments juridiques internationaux qui régissent la sécurité nucléaire.

Outre ces deux instruments qui ont un impact direct sur le renforcement de l’architecture mondiale de la sécurité nucléaire, l’Algérie a souscrit au Code de Conduite de l’AIEA sur la Sûreté et la Sécurité des sources radioactives dont les dispositions sont mises en application depuis plus d’une décennie.

Dans ce contexte et en conformité avec ses engagements en faveur de la paix et de la sécurité internationales, l’Algérie a adhéré également aux instruments juridiques internationaux connexes, notamment les Conventions des Nations Unies sur la lutte contre le terrorisme, le crime organisé, la corruption et le blanchiment d’argent.

L’Algérie, qui accorde une importance particulière aux questions de désarmement, de non-prolifération et de sécurité internationale, a procédé, le 21 mars de cette année, à la signature de l’engagement relatif à l’impact humanitaire des armes nucléaires, confirmant ainsi son soutien aux efforts internationaux en matière de promotion de la paix et de la sécurité internationales.

Monsieur le Président,

Sur le plan interne, mon pays a substantiellement renforcé son cadre législatif et réglementaire par l’amendement du code pénal criminalisant davantage l'utilisation malveillante de matières radioactives et les actes de terrorisme nucléaire. La réglementation régissant la protection physique des installations nucléaires, matières nucléaires et autres sources radioactives est régulièrement revue et révisée, en conformité avec les prescriptions en la matière.

Par ailleurs, le régime des importations, de détention et des exportations des sources radioactives a été renforcé par la mise en place d’un contrôle rigoureux aux frontières, en coordination étroite avec les Institutions nationales concernées.

Toutes ces actions contribuent au renforcement de la mise en oeuvre des dispositions de la résolution 1540 du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies.

Monsieur le Président,

L’Algérie accorde, également, un intérêt particulier au développement des ressources humaines, notamment pour la formation et la sensibilisation des personnels relevant des Institutions et Organismes dont les missions sont en rapport avec la sécurité nucléaire.

A cet effet, nous avons mis en place un Centre de formation et d’appui à la sécurité nucléaire qui permet de répondre aux défis posés par la problématique de la sécurité nucléaire et de valoriser nos capacités nationales pour le maintien d'un régime de sécurité nucléaire inspiré des principes fondamentaux y relatifs.

Ce Centre de formation a une vocation régionale qui lui permet de contribuer, de manière effective, au renforcement du réseau international des centres d’appui à la sécurité nucléaire pour le partage des informations et des connaissances.

L'Algérie participe activement à la mise en oeuvre du programme de sécurité nucléaire de l'AIEA qui s’inscrit dans le cadre des différents plans adoptés sous son égide. Elle coopère également avec INTERPOL.

Mon pays a également marqué son adhésion à la mise en oeuvre des fondamentaux de la sécurité nucléaire en initiant un Plan Intégré d’Appui à la Sécurité Nucléaire (INSSP) en collaboration avec l’AIEA. A cet effet, un Comité de Sécurité Nucléaire a été mis en place, en vue de définir l’architecture de sécurité nucléaire nationale ainsi que les mécanismes de coordination inter-institutionnels prévus à cet égard.

Monsieur le Président

Conscient de l’importance des enjeux dans ce domaine, mon pays oeuvre également à l’avènement d’une architecture de sécurité nucléaire globale et durable. A ce titre, nous estimons qu’il est nécessaire d'encourager et de promouvoir une coopération internationale efficace pour améliorer constamment la sûreté et la sécurité nucléaires, en favorisant les échanges en matière d'information, d'expertise et de technologie.

L’initiative du Président Obama a favorisé l’inscription de la problématique de la sécurité nucléaire au premier plan de l’agenda international. Elle a ouvert la voie à une action globale pour l’amélioration de la coopération internationale en la matière. C’est, de toute évidence, le lieu de s’en réjouir et l’Histoire vous retiendra cela.

Je souhaite plein succès à nos travaux et vous remercie de votre attention.

National Statement: Argentina

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La Comunidad Internacional ante los Desafíos de la Seguridad Nuclear

La República Argentina posee una rica historia en el desarrollo pacífico de la energía nuclear y, como tal, ha estado presente en el proceso de Cumbres de Seguridad Nuclear desde su lanzamiento en 2010. Ello demuestra el compromiso de nuestra nación con los esfuerzos multilaterales en aras de un mundo más seguro, libre de terrorismo en cualquiera de sus formas.

El sector nuclear en nuestro país opera conforme los más altos estándares de seguridad física y tecnológica en base a los lineamientos impartidos por las agencias de control nacionales correspondientes. Dada la importancia del rol regulatorio del Estado, se torna indispensable que el mismo mantenga una política de mejoras constantes, tanto desde un punto de vista técnico como político.

En tal sentido, reconocemos la importancia de mantener los logros internacionales alcanzados en materia de seguridad y avanzar en la mejora de las capacidades estatales en aquellas áreas en las que se observa un menor desarrollo relativo. Es por ello que la Argentina apoya la creación de centros de entrenamiento y apoyo en seguridad nuclear, ya que considera muy importante sostener iniciativas que, como ésta, contribuyen a una cultura de la seguridad nuclear.

Asimismo, iniciativas tales como el incremento de la seguridad cibernética en plantas e instalaciones, así como el desarrollo de la forénsica nuclear constituyen ejes centrales de la política de seguridad nuclear de la Argentina y de su compromiso con la agenda multilateral en la materia. En este sentido, cabe destacar el desarrollo nuclear pacífico argentino a lo largo de más de seis décadas, así como los esfuerzos ininterrumpidos en la expansión del empleo de uranio de bajo enriquecimiento en todas aquellas actividades que son susceptibles de llevarse a cabo con ese material sensitivo y en estricto cumplimiento con las directrices del Grupo de Países Proveedores Nucleares (NSG, por sus siglas en inglés).

Una condición indispensable para una sólida política de seguridad nuclear es la existencia de instituciones eficientes, modernas y entrenadas. En este campo, la Argentina dispone desde hace décadas –y dedica esfuerzos constantes a su fortalecimiento– de organizaciones especializadas que velan por mantener las instalaciones y los materiales seguros; al tiempo que garantizan el cumplimiento de nuestro país de los compromisos internacionales. Estas organizaciones son:

·         La Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear, una agencia independiente del Estado, con plena competencia legal y técnica en materia de seguridad radiológica y nuclear, salvaguardias y no proliferación, y seguridad física.

·         La Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica, a cargo de la investigación y desarrollo en el campo nuclear; mantiene y cumple rigurosamente con los estándares internacionales y cultiva una sólida cultura de seguridad. Desde hace casi dos décadas, la Comisión opera en conformidad con los instrumentos internacionales vigentes.

·         Nuestra Cancillería tiene un área específica dedicada a los asuntos nucleares y otras tecnologías de uso dual, que contribuye al seguimiento internacional y la implementación de políticas efectivas en la materia.

·         Por último, es importante destacar que nuestro país cuenta con una fuerza federal de seguridad equipada, entrenada y altamente especializada (Gendarmería Nacional) a cargo de la seguridad de los materiales nucleares, ya sea en situación de almacenamiento, uso o transporte.

Iniciativas de la Argentina en seguridad nuclear

La Argentina forma parte del Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica (AIEA, por sus siglas en inglés) desde el año de su fundación y participa intensamente en los programas e iniciativas que se generan en su seno en materia de seguridad. Asimismo, participa de esfuerzos colectivos como la Iniciativa Global para Combatir el Terrorismo Nuclear (GICNT, por sus siglas en inglés). En este marco, hemos realizado en 2014 un ejercicio binacional de seguridad nuclear junto a la República de Chile, que derivó en la mejora de nuestras capacidades instaladas, al tiempo que aportó enseñanzas de trabajo conjunto contra un fenómeno global. Esperamos continuar trabajando en la misma línea, tanto con Chile como con otros países de la región.

La Argentina, como miembro parte del “Programa Internacional de Reducción de Enriquecimiento para reactores de investigación”, y en consonancia con las recomendaciones de la Conferencia Internacional para la Reducción de la Amenaza Global, realizada en el año 2004, ha convertido sus reactores de investigación a uranio de bajo enriquecimiento, demostrando una política responsable para la eliminación de altos riesgos nucleares y un progreso considerable en lo referente al control y seguridad de materiales nucleares.

Actualmente, nuestro país está llevando una profunda reforma del paradigma de trabajo de las fuerzas federales a cargo de la seguridad nuclear, incorporando nuevas hipótesis de amenazas terroristas tanto en instalaciones como en el sistema de transporte. Así, se proyecta una importante inversión nacional en la modernización del equipamiento de seguridad, al tiempo que se busca mejorar nuestras capacidades de detección en puestos de control aduaneros y fronterizos en base a la cooperación interagencial. En relación a este punto, cabe mencionar la puesta en funcionamiento de un nuevo sistema de control biométrico de pasajeros en todo el país, que permitió mejorar sensiblemente la seguridad de los datos personales registrados. Implica la más importante mejora tecnológica en décadas y permite procesar el ingreso y egreso de personas contra la base de datos centralizada en tiempo real y con un error prácticamente nulo. Contamos con un sistema de pasaportes de los más seguros del mundo, tal como lo certifican las organizaciones especializadas en la materia.

Tomando los aprendizajes y las recomendaciones del reciente ejercicio “Apex Gold”, estamos trabajando en un programa para desarrollar una biblioteca de forénsica nuclear para ser incorporada a la red global de bibliotecas y registros. Por otro lado, la Argentina asumió a partir de junio de 2014 –y por dos años consecutivos– la presidencia del NSG, reafirmando el rol fundamental, y la responsabilidad, de los países proveedores en el mantenimiento de la seguridad nuclear a nivel mundial.

Asimismo, nuestro país ha adoptado una política responsable en materia de gestión de los residuos radioactivos y de los combustibles gastados derivados de la actividad nuclear y sus aplicaciones. Es por ello que nuestro Plan Nacional de Gestión de los mismos busca permanentemente la mejora de la seguridad de las instalaciones con el fin de evitar que sean objeto de actos maliciosos.

La cooperación internacional como mecanismo de prevención del terrorismo nuclear

Los esfuerzos colectivos como el proceso de Cumbres de Seguridad Nuclear deben sustentarse en la cooperación internacional bajo un claro y firme compromiso de los Estados: negarle al terrorismo el acceso a los materiales nucleares susceptibles de ser usados como armas políticas. La Argentina ha sufrido el flagelo del terrorismo en su propio territorio en dos ocasiones y conoce el enorme costo en vidas humanas que el mismo conlleva. Es por ello que el compromiso con la seguridad nuclear no debe ser interpretado como un impedimento al ejercicio soberano de los Estados a la autonomía tecnológica y los usos pacíficos de la energía nuclear, lo cual debe darse siempre en estricto cumplimiento de los compromisos asumidos bajo el Tratado de No Proliferación Nuclear (NPT, por sus siglas en inglés) y demás instrumentos de control regionales e internacionales.

A 25 años de la creación de la Agencia Brasileño-Argentina de Contabilidad y Control de Materiales Nucleares (ABACC, por sus siglas en español), Argentina reafirma su compromiso con el uso estrictamente pacífico de la tecnología nuclear y los esfuerzos concertados a favor de la estabilidad internacional. Constituida a partir de la transición democrática, la ABACC fue el primer enlace de integración entre ambos países, constituyéndose con el tiempo en una fuente de transparencia y construcción de confianza que posibilitó el avance de la cooperación hacia otras áreas de interés mutuo. Este acervo compartido da testimonio de la vocación política de la Argentina y Brasil por asegurar los usos exclusivamente pacíficos de esta energía y la no proliferación nuclear.

Asimismo, debe señalarse que la tecnología desarrollada para los combustibles de reactores nucleares argentinos y para la producción de radioisótopos en base al uranio de bajo enriquecimiento, han estado presentes en las principales exportaciones tecnológicas del país a través de la empresa INVAP. La utilización de uranio de bajo enriquecimiento asegura los fines pacíficos de las aplicaciones de la energía nuclear, que sumados a la promoción internacional de este tipo de prácticas y tecnologías han contribuido a que la Argentina ostente un destacado perfil internacional en el campo nuclear.

Es en virtud de esta trayectoria histórica que la Argentina considera que los esfuerzos significativos que han venido realizando los países no poseedores de armas nucleares en el campo de la seguridad nuclear, tendrán un éxito relativo mientras la agenda de desarme no sea impulsada con el mismo ímpetu colectivo.

El proceso de Cumbres en su actual formato llega a su fin. Es nuestra responsabilidad compartida que los compromisos asumidos mantengan su vigencia. Por ello, sostenemos la importancia de fortalecer las instancias e instituciones pre-existentes, enriqueciéndolas con los planes de acción que hemos logrado acordar. A tal fin, llamamos a los Estados a establecer un Grupo de Contacto en Seguridad Nuclear que consolide los logros alcanzados y asegure su seguimiento e implementación futuros. De este modo, estaremos contribuyendo a la seguridad de la tecnología nuclear a través de resultados duraderos en el tiempo. 

National Statement: Australia

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The 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit

Australian National Statement

The Nuclear Security Summits have served well to strengthen the global nuclear security architecture and address the threat of nuclear terrorism.  In spite of this, terrorists will seek to exploit the weakest link, misuse technology and take advantage of any lack of international cooperation in their quest to cause catastrophic damage and loss of life. This is why Australia fully supports high standards of nuclear security to prevent the theft of nuclear materials or sabotage of nuclear facilities.

Australia’s commitment to nuclear security, safeguards and non-proliferation is longstanding. Even prior to the first nuclear security summit in 2010, Australia had ratified the 2005 Amendment of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, was already using low enriched uranium technology to fuel its research reactor and produce medical isotopes, was engaging strongly with the IAEA and regionally on promoting high standards of nuclear security, and was a regular contributor to the IAEA’s nuclear security fund since its inception in 2002.

Since the first Washington summit, Australia has ratified the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, hosted an IAEA Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) peer-review mission and has invited the IAEA to conduct a follow-up mission in 2017.  Australia also has repatriated highly-enriched uranium (HEU) to the United States and supported many of the gift baskets and joint statements of supplementary initiatives that are associated with the summits.

Australia has provided over AU$2.4 million to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund since its inception.  Australia calls on all states to ensure that the IAEA has sufficient and sustainable resources to fulfil its central role in nuclear security.

Australia has confirmed its commitment to implement the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Series of guidance documents through its association with the joint statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation. Australia is proud to have been ranked top of the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s global review of nuclear security for three times in succession. Australia is also a leader in the safety and security of radioactive sources, having committed to the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and to the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources, and having conducted a comprehensive outreach program on radioactive source security in South-East Asia and the Pacific.

Australia is further supporting global HEU minimisation efforts by significantly expanding its production of medical radioisotopes for the global market, made exclusively from low enriched uranium (LEU) targets using its LEU-fuelled reactor.

Australia continues to support the IAEA’s central role in nuclear security and also supports and participates in the leadership of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) including by chairing the Nuclear Forensics Working Group.

Australia actively supports the Nuclear Industry Summit on nuclear security. More needs to be done to integrate the nuclear security goals and activities of industry and governments.  Australia welcomes the significant contributions that non-government organisations have made to nuclear security conceptual development and the summit agenda, and welcomes the convening of the NGO Summit “Solutions for a Secure Nuclear Future” held earlier this week. Arrangements beyond the summits must involve the bringing together of government, industry and non-government participants to focus on continued improvement of the global nuclear security architecture and on effective implementation. In this regard, Australia welcomes the IAEA’s convening of a second Ministerial meeting and international conference on nuclear security in December this year.

The imminent entry-into-force of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material is a welcome outcome of the high-level attention to nuclear security gained through the summits. Importantly, this must be followed up with robust implementation of its provisions and a commitment to further improvement at its mandated review conference.

To be comprehensive, nuclear security architecture requires more than ratification of treaties, repatriation of nuclear material, and setting standards and guidelines. It also requires international cooperation and other voluntary measures where states can assure each other that their respective national nuclear security regimes are robust, implemented to a high standard and applied to all nuclear material under its control.

Australia will faithfully pursue the commitments set out in all the summit communiqués and the five action plans delivered at this final nuclear security summit.  This includes support for the institutions and initiatives that will maintain the momentum produced through the summits.

In this regard, Australia will focus on four areas of activity for the sustainment of the nuclear security summit’s objectives and goals, namely through:

·         supporting the existing nuclear security treaties, organisations and initiatives, consistent with and beyond the commitments made in the action plans delivered at this summit;

·         being active in a post-summit contact group to promote the implementation of nuclear security commitments and identify emerging trends that may require more focused attention;

·         involvement in track 1.5 dialogues and programs of government, industry and non-government experts for the enhancement of global nuclear security; and

·         participating in regional initiatives for capacity building in nuclear security.

With this nuclear security summit being the last planned at present, Australia calls on all summit participants to stand by their commitments, maintain vigilance and sustain efforts for the continuous enhancement of the global nuclear security architecture to ensure the security of all nuclear material and facilities.

National Statement: Brazil

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MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERATIVE

REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL, DILMA ROUSSEFF, FOR THE

IV NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT

Washington, April 1, 2016

Dear President Obama,

Dear Heads of State and of Government and representatives of International Organizations and Special Guests,

Dear Ministers,

Ladies and gentlemen,

I congratulate President Obama for having launched, in 2010, this process of reflection on the importance of nuclear security, which led to four Summits and the adoption of national and multilateral Action Plans.

Brazil, which has been taking part in this process since its inception, recognizes the positive outcomes of this reflection, such as the enhanced visibility of the subject of nuclear security and the broad mobilization that it has ensued.

Now that the fundamental principles and the basis for increased international cooperation in this area have been laid down, we consider it important, as we move forward, that the International Atomic Energy Agency give continuity to the process. The AIEA is the only multilateral institution with expertise and experience in matters of nuclear security. It has the capacity to develop, on a global level, an organic, holistic and all-encompassing vision based on the progress that we have made through four Nuclear Security Summits.

The physical protection of nuclear materials and installations and adequate guarantees for exclusively peaceful use of nuclear technology are fundamental if we are to create a favorable environment for developing nuclear energy that benefits humanity.

Today we face the challenge of preventing the possible use of nuclear weapons and materials by non-State actors. Brazil has undertaken national and international actions with a view to countering terrorism. We condemn any act of terrorism, no matter what its pretext, and look with concern upon the possibility that acts of terrorism may be perpetrated with weapons of mass destruction.

This threat must not, however, overshadow the fact that the detonation of a nuclear device by a State would be as catastrophic and illegitimate as the use of these same weapons by non-state actors. As the UN Secretary-General has said so wisely, "there are no right hands for these wrong weapons."

Seventy years after the adoption of the first resolution by the United Nations General Assembly on the elimination of nuclear weapons, the threat of the extinction of humankind still weighs upon the international community. Nuclear weapons are the most lethal, indiscriminate and disproportionate devices ever created by man. They are detrimental to the most elementary foundations of international humanitarian law.

That is why our region signed, in 1967, the Tlatelolco Treaty, which established a Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Latin American and Caribbean countries are proud to have created a vast region free of weapons of mass destruction, which served as an inspiration to similar initiatives in other parts of our planet.

In 1991, also in a pioneering fashion, Brazil and Argentina created the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC, in Portuguese), which allows inspectors to carry out reciprocal inspections of our countries' respective nuclear activities. Throughout its 25-year existence, ABACC has been acknowledged internationally as a model of transparency and confidence-building in the nuclear area.

Before this initiative came into being and as our 1988 Federal Constitution was being drafted, Brazilian legislators inscribed in its Article 21 the principle that "every nuclear activity in the national territory will only be admitted for peaceful uses."

Brazil will not shy away from demanding that all States fully observe the objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, particularly those regarding nuclear disarmament. 

The failure of the 2015 NPT Review Conference has raised serious questions about the future of the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime. These hesitations aggravate the nuclear threat.

The reaffirmation of deterrence doctrines, modernization plans and long-term investments in nuclear weapons programs also serve to undermine the legitimacy of the non-proliferation and disarmament regime. These trends pose serious challenges to nuclear security initiatives. The vast majority of the world’s fissile material—which could be used in nuclear weapons—is located in military facilities which are not subject to any international oversight, information-sharing or confidence-building mechanisms.

Brazil and many other countries consider it essential that we work simultaneously and with determination as we face our challenges in the nuclear area. Besides strengthening nuclear security, we also need to sustain non-proliferation efforts and make rapid progress towards nuclear disarmament, with a view to bringing about a world free of nuclear weapons, or any other weapons of mass destruction.

Guided by this spirit of an overall mitigation of the risks posed by the use of nuclear weapons, Brazil and 15 other participating countries in this Summit will adopt a Joint Declaration with a comprehensive vision of the challenges that we face in the nuclear area.

Forty-five years after the Non-Proliferation Treaty entered into force and twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War, the continued existence of thousands of nuclear weapons constitutes the biggest and most immediate threat to humanity.

The complete elimination of these weapons stands as the sole absolute guarantee against their use, or threat of their use.

Thank you very much.

National Statement: Canada (French)

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SOMMET SUR LA SÉCURITÉ NUCLÉAIRE 2016

DÉCLARATION NATIONALE

 

 

Le Canada reconnaît que le terrorisme nucléaire constitue l’une des menaces les plus graves pour la sécurité internationale. Un seul acte de terrorisme nucléaire ou radiologique pourrait avoir des conséquences catastrophiques sur les plans humanitaire et économique, à l’échelle tant locale que mondiale. Il est de la responsabilité des chefs de file mondiaux de prendre les mesures nécessaires pour éviter qu’une telle situation ne survienne.

 

            Le Sommet sur la sécurité nucléaire a fourni une tribune privilégiée aux chefs de file mondiaux qui leur a permis de prendre des engagements mutuels et de renforcer l’engagement pris au plus haut niveau pour assurer la sécurité des matières nucléaires. De concert, nous avons renforcé les efforts déployés à l’échelon international pour lutter contre le terrorisme nucléaire, amélioré la sécurité des matières nucléaires au niveau mondial et renforcé les institutions internationales qui sont partie intégrante de la structure mondiale en matière de sécurité nucléaire. Le Canada facilite la mise en application d’un cadre multilatéral solide pour la lutte internationale contre le terrorisme nucléaire, notamment des obligations contraignantes pour les États afin de renforcer la sécurité des matières nucléaires, cadrant avec les objectifs du Sommet sur la sécurité nucléaire. Ce quatrième Sommet a été considéré comme un « Sommet de transition » et vise à garantir que les réalisations atteintes soient durables.

 

Le Canada souscrit pleinement aux orientations de transition du Sommet sur la sécurité nucléaire visant à appuyer les institutions de la structure mondiale en matière de sécurité nucléaire : l’Agence internationale de l’énergie atomique (AIEA) qui joue un rôle clé de coordination dans le domaine de la sécurité nucléaire, l’Organisation des Nations Unies (ONU) en tant qu’organisme qui établit des normes, l’Organisation internationale de police criminelle (INTERPOL) en tant qu’organisme qui proscrit et qui lutte contre le crime, l’Initiative mondiale de lutte contre le terrorisme nucléaire (IMLTN) en tant que groupe qui possède un savoir-faire technique et le Partenariat mondial contre la prolifération des armes de destruction massive et des matières connexes (le Partenariat mondial) par lequel les donateurs coordonnent leurs efforts en matière d’assistance afin de traiter les problèmes qui se posent dans le domaine de la sécurité nucléaire. Nous reconnaissons que les engagements continus pris lors du Sommet et que la poursuite des travaux dans les années à venir requièrent une coordination continue. Après le Sommet, le Canada se joindra au Groupe sur la sécurité nucléaire, qui aidera à assurer une transition en douceur en offrant une tribune aux États; cette tribune leur permettra de cerner les lacunes dans la mise en œuvre des engagements pris lors du Sommet et de discuter des menaces émergentes et des enjeux sous-jacents.

J’ai le plaisir de confirmer que le Canada a, soit déjà honoré tous ses engagements nationaux établis lors des trois sommets précédents, ou est sur le point de les honorer, notamment sous la forme d’un financement de 28 millions de dollars pour améliorer la sécurité mondiale dans les domaines nucléaire et radiologique par l’intermédiaire de notre Programme de partenariat mondial. Dans le cadre de ce programme, citons le financement de 5,5 millions de dollars pour améliorer la sécurité physique des installations nucléaires en Asie du Sud-Est, celui de 12 millions de dollars pour prévenir le trafic illicite de matières nucléaires et radiologiques dans les Amériques et au Moyen-Orient et celui de 10,4 millions de dollars pour renforcer la sécurité des sources radioactives en Afrique, dans les Amériques, au Moyen-Orient et en Asie du Sud-Est. Un point important supplémentaire pour le Canada dans la mise en application des engagements pris lors du précédent Sommet a été l’organisation de notre première mission du Service consultatif international sur la protection physique (SCIPP) de l’AIEA en octobre 2015 aux fins d’évaluation de notre programme national en matière de sécurité nucléaire. Le rapport de mission a conclu que le programme national en matière de sécurité nucléaire est solide, résistant et durable. Le Canada encourage les États qui ne l’ont pas encore fait à organiser une mission SCIPP, et salue l’AIEA pour son approche collaborative et globale dans le soutien qu’elle apporte aux États membres à améliorer leur sécurité nucléaire nationale.

Nous prenons également d’autres mesures, à l’échelle tant nationale qu’internationale, qui démontrent notre leadership et notre engagement continus à l’égard des efforts mondiaux pour assurer la sécurité nucléaire et prévenir le terrorisme nucléaire. Le Canada demeure fermement résolu à réduire la prolifération d’uranium hautement enrichi et d’autres matières nucléaires sensibles, comme moyen pour accroître notre sécurité. Outre les engagements pris aux Sommets sur la sécurité nucléaire de 2010 et 2012, nous sommes sur le point de rapatrier l’uranium hautement enrichi provenant des États-Unis. Par ailleurs, l’Université de l’Alberta est en train de prendre des mesures afin d’arrêter son réacteur de recherche SLOWPOKE et de rapatrier son carburant d’uranium hautement enrichi aux États-Unis, ce qui va en réduire l’utilisation au Canada. Pour finir, le Canada a déterminé que les trois quarts de ses stocks de plutonium sont prêts à être éliminés, et il a entamé des discussions avec les États-Unis pour savoir s’ils accepteraient ces matières en vue d’une gestion à long terme. Le reste continuera d’être entreposé de manière sécuritaire et sera utilisé pour soutenir les futurs travaux en matière de recherche et développement.

 

Au-delà des engagements pris au Sommet sur la sécurité nucléaire de 2012, le Canada poursuit le développement de sa capacité nationale en criminalistique nucléaire – un élément clé dans l’enquête sur le trafic illicite des matières nucléaires et radioactives. Nous allons nous appuyer sur notre capacité existante et créer officiellement une bibliothèque dans le domaine de la criminalistique nucléaire ainsi que mettre sur pied un réseau de laboratoires en la matière qui seront en mesure d’appuyer la répression des actes de terrorisme nucléaire et de l’utilisation criminelle de matières nucléaires. Nous allons continuer à partager notre savoir-faire technique dans ce domaine avec d’autres États par le biais d’initiatives comme l’IMLTN.

 

Le Canada consacrera un montant supplémentaire de 42 millions de dollars dans le cadre du Programme de partenariat mondial au cours des deux prochaines années afin d’accroître la sécurité dans les domaines nucléaire et radiologique à l’échelle mondiale :

·       en luttant contre le trafic illicite grâce au renforcement des capacités nationales dans les Amériques et au Moyen-Orient;

·       en améliorant la sécurité physique aux installations nucléaires dans un certain nombre de pays;

·       en favorisant la gestion et l’élimination en toute sûreté des sources radioactives désaffectées dans les pays et régions où l’on relève des besoins en la matière, essentiellement dans les Amériques;

·       en supportant le Fonds de sécurité nucléaire de l’AIEA.

 

Outre ces engagements, le Canada se réjouit particulièrement d’avoir conjointement avec l’Espagne et la République de Corée, renouvelé un engagement sur la promotion de la mise en application complète et universelle de la résolution 1540 du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies (RCSNU). Le Canada est pleinement convaincu que la RCSNU joue un rôle clé dans la lutte contre la prolifération nucléaire par des acteurs non gouvernementaux. Avec le Royaume-Uni, le Canada a dirigé un engagement conjoint sur la formation certifiée relativement à la promotion de la gestion de la sécurité nucléaire. Cet engagement souligne l’importance du World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) et des cours de formation certifiés dispensés par la WINS Academy aux gestionnaires et au personnel œuvrant dans le domaine de la sécurité nucléaire. Conjointement avec d’autres États qui ont fourni un soutien à l’Academy, le Canada encourage l’expansion du programme de certification offert par la WINS Academy.

 

Le terrorisme nucléaire continue d'être une menace à l’échelle mondiale qui requiert non seulement le déploiement d’efforts continus à l’échelle nationale, mais également une coopération internationale soutenue. Le Sommet a été l’occasion d’attirer l’attention des chefs de file mondiaux sur la question de la sécurité nucléaire et cela s’est traduit par des réductions substantielles du volume de matières nucléaires sensibles en circulation dans le monde. L’amélioration de la sécurité des matières nucléaires à l’échelle mondiale reste une priorité absolue pour le Canada. Nous exhortons tous les États, qu’ils aient participé ou non au Sommet sur la sécurité nucléaire, à poursuivre leurs efforts de contribution, au moyen de leurs systèmes nationaux et de toutes les institutions internationales pertinentes.

 

 

National Statement: Canada

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2016 NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT

NATIONAL STATEMENT

CANADA

                                                  

Canada recognizes nuclear terrorism as one of the gravest threats to international security. A single act of nuclear or radiological terrorism could have catastrophic humanitarian and economic consequences, both locally and globally. It is the responsibility of the world’s leaders to take all necessary steps to ensure that this does not happen.

 

            The Nuclear Security Summit process has provided a vital forum for leaders to engage with each other and reinforce commitment at the highest levels to securing nuclear materials. Together, we have enhanced international efforts to combat nuclear terrorism, improved the security of nuclear materials worldwide, and strengthened the international institutions that are integral to the global nuclear security architecture. Canada supports a strong multilateral framework for the global fight against nuclear terrorism, including binding obligations on States to enhance the security of nuclear materials, in line with the objectives of the Nuclear Security Summit. This fourth Summit has been characterized as a “transition Summit,” and will focus on ensuring that the achievements of the Summit process are sustained. 

 

Canada strongly endorses transitioning Nuclear Security Summit lines of effort to the institutions of the global nuclear security architecture: the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which plays a leading role coordinating nuclear security; the United Nations (UN), as the norm-building organization; the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), as a crime-tracking and interdicting body; the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) as a group that develops technical expertise; and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (the Global Partnership), through which donors coordinate their assistance efforts for tackling nuclear security challenges. We recognize that sustaining Summit commitments and ensuring that work continues in the years ahead will require continued coordination. Canada will join the post-Summit “Nuclear Security Contact Group” which will help to ensure a smoother transition by providing a forum for States to identify gaps in the implementation of Summit commitments and discuss emerging threats and issues of concern. 

 

I am pleased to confirm that Canada has either already honoured or is in the process of fulfilling all national commitments made at the three previous Summits, including providing $28 million in funding to improve global nuclear and radiological security through our Global Partnership Program. Examples of this programming include $5.5 million to enhance the physical security of nuclear facilities in Southeast Asia, $12 million to prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological material in the Americas and Middle East, and $10.4 million to promote the security of radioactive sources in Africa, the Americas, the Middle East and Southeast Asia. An additional highlight for Canada in the implementation of previous Summit commitments was the hosting of our first IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission in October 2015, for the purpose of evaluating our domestic nuclear security regime. The mission report concluded that Canada’s nuclear security regime is robust, strong and sustainable. Canada encourages States that have not done so to host an IPPAS mission, and commends the IAEA on its comprehensive and collaborative approach to helping Member States enhance domestic nuclear security. 

 

We are also taking further steps, both at national and international levels, to demonstrate ongoing leadership and commitment to global efforts to advance nuclear security and prevent nuclear terrorism.  Canada remains dedicated to minimizing highly enriched uranium (HEU) and other sensitive nuclear materials, as a means of further enhancing our security. Further to commitments made at the 2010 and 2012 Nuclear Security Summits, we are on-track to repatriate United States (U.S.)-origin HEU. In addition, the University of Alberta is taking steps to decommission its SLOWPOKE research reactor and repatriate its HEU fuel to the U.S., which will further reduce the use of HEU in Canada. Finally, Canada has assessed that approximately three-quarters of its inventory of plutonium is ready for dispositioning, and has initiated discussions with the U.S. to determine whether it would accept the material for long-term management. The remainder would continue to be safely stored and used to support future research and development work.

 

Beyond the commitments made at the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit, Canada is in the process of further developing its national nuclear forensics capability – a key element in the investigation of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials. We will build on existing capacity and formally create a national nuclear forensics library and a network of nuclear forensics laboratories that will be able to support the prosecution of acts of nuclear terrorism and the criminal use of nuclear materials. We will continue to share our technical expertise in this area with other States through initiatives such as the GICNT.

 

Canada will be dedicating an additional $42 million in Global Partnership Program funding over the next two years to continue to improve nuclear and radiological security worldwide by:

·       combating illicit trafficking through strengthening national capacities in the Americas and the Middle East;

·       improving physical security at nuclear facilities in a number of countries;

·       promoting safe management and disposal of disused radioactive sources in countries and regions with identified needs, primarily in the Americas; and

·       supporting the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund.

 

In addition to these commitments, Canada is very pleased to have jointly led a renewal of a gift basket with Spain and the Republic of Korea on the full and universal implementation of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540. Canada strongly believes that UNSCR 1540 is a key component in countering nuclear proliferation by non-state actors. Canada also led a gift basket with the United Kingdom on certified training for nuclear security management. This gift basket underscores the importance of the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) and the certified training courses provided by the WINS Academy for managers and personnel involved in nuclear security. Along with other States that have provided support to the Academy, Canada encourages the further expansion of the WINS Academy’s certification program.

 

Nuclear terrorism remains a global threat that requires not only continued national efforts, but also sustained international cooperation. The Summit process has brought the issue of nuclear security to the forefront of world leaders’ attention, and has resulted in real reductions in the amount of vulnerable nuclear material in the world. Enhancing the security of nuclear materials worldwide will remain a top priority for Canada. We call on all States, whether they have been part of the Nuclear Security Summit process or not, to contribute to these vital efforts, both through their domestic systems and all relevant international institutions.

National Statement: Chile

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STATEMENT BY THE HEAD OF THE CHILEAN DELEGATION, H.E. THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC,

MS. MICHELLE BACHELET JERIA

(NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT,

WASHINGTON, D.C., 31 MARCH & 1 APRIL 2016) 

 

Mr. President,

Chile joins other delegations in expressing our appreciation to the United States for your exceptional direction and organization of this Fourth Nuclear Security Summit. We highlight your leadership in this initiative, which represents an important dimension of the vision expressed in its statement made in Prague to address nuclear threats.

We are convinced that the efforts, and particularly the results of this process, will project in time, granting the international community with more robust global nuclear security architecture.

My country has firmly supported all international efforts to strengthen peace and security in the world, guided by the principle of the indivisibility of international security, where all States – regardless of their power or size – share the responsibility of consolidating a global order, based on cooperation and international law.

In this regard, we believe that cooperation in the field of Nuclear Security is one of the most effective ways for the international community to prevent the potential catastrophic consequences that the malicious use of nuclear and/or radiological material would have in a terrorist attack.

The recent terrorist attacks in Brussels, and in particular, the attempts to enter a nuclear facility, have proven the urgency of addressing the threat of Nuclear Terrorism.

From the start of this process, Chile has sought formulas to advance the consolidation of a legal and political regime to enhance nuclear security. This has entailed doubling the efforts to increase physical security in radioactive materials, generating measures to prevent nuclear smuggling, and the strengthening of international institutions in favor of nuclear security.

This is why we are proud to announce the creation of the Radiological Emergency Security Commission (CONSER), an inter-ministerial and inter-sectoral organism that seeks to generate policies regarding the coordination, preparation, and responses to radiological emergencies caused by accidents or illicit acts.

Moreover, and in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), we have assumed a formal commitment to implement a project for the detection of radioactive material in border points. The project will entail the donation of radioactive-source detection equipment to customs and police authorities, as well as the Chilean Commission on Nuclear Energy, in its capacity as the regulatory entity.

Similarly, during the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul in 2012, my country committed to develop a Nuclear Security Support Center (CASN). We are happy to announce that this project is in the final stage of its execution and will become operational in the coming months. This initiative will focus on the development of human resources in nuclear physical security, resulting in the strengthening of national capacities in the preparation; response; detection; equipment management and mitigation actions regarding radiological emergencies of different origins, involving the participation of people of different levels in security.

With respect to the strengthening and support of multilateral instruments, Chile has stated its commitment with the physical protection of nuclear and radioactive installations against the non-authorized removal of nuclear or radioactive material and acts of sabotage.  Proof of this is the series of treaties and agreements we have joined, such as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its Amendment, which we hope will enter into effect shortly, and which we have strongly promoted in different geographical regions and fora.

We also participated actively in the promotion of the universalization and full implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which continues to be the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime.

Chile is also part of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.

Another action worth noting is our contribution to the minimization of Highly Enriched Uranium. In this regard, Chile has converted its uranium enriching reactors to less than 20% and does not possess highly-enriched nuclear fuel. Furthermore, our country does not consider plutonium separation as part of its activities of the nuclear fuel cycle.  And finally, none of the research and development initiatives consider the use of highly enriched uranium.  

These are some of Chile’s most significant achievements that resulted from our commitment with the goals of the Nuclear Security Summit process. We are convinced that this initiative can contribute to advance the objective of ensuring all nuclear materials.

I would like to thank again the Government of the United States for the intense effort carried out during this Summit, as well as underline the significant momentum this initiative has generated in increasing nuclear security in the world. We are pleased, Mr. President, to contribute our part to reach this common objective.

Finally, we certainly hope that your legacy will constitute the basis for facilitating our common efforts aimed at preventing and confronting the threat of Nuclear Terrorism.

Thank you very much, Mr. President.