National Statement: Egypt (Arabic)

كلمة مصر أمام قمة الأمن النووي الرابعة

واشنطن

(31 مارس- 1 أبريل 2016)

السيد الرئيس،

شاركت مصر في أعمال قمة واشنطن للأمن النووي لعام 2010، استجابة لمبادرة الرئيس أوباما التي أطلقها لمعالجة تهديدات ومخاطر الأمن النووي. وقد حرصت مصر أيضاً علي المشاركة بفعالية في القمم التالية لقمة واشنطن والتي عقدت في سول عام 2012، ثم في لاهاي عام 2014 بما في ذلك كافة الاجتماعات التحضيرية التي عقدت ما بين القمم الثلاث.

وبانعقاد قمة واشنطن 2016، فإن مسار الجهود الدولية والوطنية الذي استمر لستة أعوام كاملة، يستوجب تقييماً مكتملاً بهدف استشراف وتحديد سبل التحرك المستقبلي، خاصة في ظل ما شهده هذا المسار على مدار هذه السنوات من جهد وفكر ومبادرات لتعزيز الأطر الوطنية والإقليمية والدولية لتطوير مفهوم الأمن النووي وتعزيز ثقافته، وذلك في الإطار الأشمل لسعي المجتمع الدولي نحو تدعيم نظام منع الانتشار، إسهاماً في تحقيق الأمن والاستقرار الدوليين.      

         لقد أكدت مصر دائماً دعمها ومساندتها للجهود المبذولة في مجال الأمن النووي سواء تلك التي كانت نتاجاً للقمم الثلاث السابقة أو التي خلصت اليها مسارات التعاون الثلاث أو ما ارتبط بمجالات التعاون الثنائي. ومع ذلك، فإن الرؤية المصرية إزاء موضوعات الأمن النووي تحكمها الاعتبارات والثوابت التالية:

أولاً: أن التعامل الأمثل مع موضوعات الأمن النووي يظل مرتبطاً ارتباطاً وثيقاً بضرورة معالجة قضايا الأمن النووي من منظور شامل تسمح بتطبيق إجراءات الأمن النووي علي كافة المواد النووية دون استثناء وفي مقدمتها تلك المستخدمة للأغراض العسكرية، خاصة الأسلحة النووية.

ثانيا: أن أي تقدم حقيقي في مجال دعم الأمن النووي يستلزم تحقيق تقدم فعلي في جهود نزع السلاح النووي، فإذا كان المجتمع الدولي قد أولى إهتماماً خاصاً بالأمن النووي خلال السنوات الماضية، فمن الأجدر والأولى أن توجه جهود المجتمع الدولي من الآن فصاعداً لتحقيق نقلة نوعية في مجال نزع السلاح النووي. فالوضع الأمني دولياً وإقليمياً لا يسمح بأي حال أن تترك برامج ومنشآت نووية دون نظام للضمانات أو رقابة دولية قادرة علي النفاذ إلي هذه المنشآت النووية. ويقودنا ما تقدم إلي التأكيد مجدداً علي الأولوية التي توليها مصر لإنشاء المنطقة الخالية من السلاح النووي في الشرق الأوسط، والتي باتت أمراً ملحاً يستوجب توافر الإرادة السياسية للمجتمع الدولي لاتخاذ ما يلزم من خطوات فعلية لتنفيذ القرارات الصادرة عن مؤتمرات المراجعة لمعاهدة منع الانتشار في هذا الشأن.

ثالثاً: يظل الحق الأصيل للدول في الاستخدام السلمي للطاقة النووية أحد الركائز الأساسية الثلاث لمعاهدة منع الانتشار النووي، ومن ثم فإن تطبيق إجراءات الأمن النووي لا يجب بأي حال أن تمس هذا الحق الأصيل للدول سواء من خلال تقييد هذا الحق أو فرض أية مشروطية عليه، فمفهوم الأمن النووي في نهاية الأمر يعد هدفاً تعاونياً وليس تقييدياً.

رابعاً: أن مسئولية الإضطلاع بتنفيذ إجراءات الأمن النووي إنما هي مسئولية خالصة للدول الأعضاء، تلتزم بها طوعياً إتساقاً مع تعهدات والتزامات الدول وفقاً لقوانينها وتشريعاتها الوطنية.

خامساً: تعد الوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية هي الجهة القادرة علي تحمل المسئولية الرئيسية، والدور الريادي في تنفيذ إجراءات الأمن النووي لما يتوافر لديها من موارد وخبرات علمية وعملية متراكمة تؤهلها بشكل أساسي من تنفيذ ومتابعة إجراءات الأمن النووي، وتقديم المساعدة الفنية للدول الأعضاء إن طلبت ذلك.

السيد الرئيس،

         في ضوء التحديات التي تواجهها مصر في مجال الطاقة، وبالنظر إلي العوائق المرتبطة بالمصادر التقليدية للطاقة، أعلنت مصر في 15 نوفمبر 2015 عن إنشاء أول محطة نووية في منطقة الضبعة تضم أربعة مفاعلات بطاقة إنتاجية 1200 ميجاوات لكل مفاعل، وبتكلفة مالية تبلغ حوالي 10 مليار دولار، وذلك في إطار برنامج نووي سلمي يهدف إلي توطين التكنولوجيا النووية للأغراض السلمية، وإنتاج وتوفير الطاقة الكهربائية التي يتزايد الاحتياج إليها في عمليات التنمية الاقتصادية.

         وضماناً لنجاح هذا المشروع، اهتمت مصر بتوفير أقصى درجات ومعايير الأمن والأمان النوويين، وإخضاعها للمراجعة الدورية وعمليات تقييم مستمرة من منطلق تحمل مسئولية الدولة للأمن والأمان النوويين.

وفيما يتعلق بالشق الخاص بالأمن النووي، فقد قطعت مصر شوطاً كبيراً في هذا المجال شمل تطوير الإطار التشريعي والرقابي باصدار قانون تنظيم الأنشطة النووية والإشعاعية رقم 7 لسنة 2010، وإصدار لائحته التنفيذية عام 2011، وكذلك تطوير نظام الحماية المادية للمفاعلين البحثيين والمنشآت التابعة له، فضلاً عن تطوير الكوادر البشرية ودعم أوجه التعاون الدولي من خلال الإنضمام لعضوية الشبكة الدولية لتعليم الأمن النووي التابعة للوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية، كما تم الإنتهاء من إعداد الخطة المتكاملة لدعم الأمن النووي، بالتنسيق مع الوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية، والتي جاءت تتويجاً لهذه الجهود ودعماً لدور الجهات الوطنية المصرية في أداء مهامها ذات الصلة بالأمن النووي.

         وختاماً وفي ضوء التأكيد علي أن مصر إدراكاً منها بأن دعم نظام منع الإنتشار يسهم في تحقيق المزيد من الأمن والاستقرار الدوليين، فإنها سوف تواصل جهدها في العمل علي تحقيق التوازن المطلوب بين الركائز الثلاث لهذا النظام المتمثلة في نزع السلاح النووي، ومنع الإنتشار، وحق الدول في الإنتفاع من الإستخدامات السلمية للطاقة الذرية دون قيد أو شرط.  

         أود أن أشكركم، سيادة الرئيس، علي استضافة قمة الأمن النووي الأخيرة في واشنطن، ونتطلع إلي المزيد من التعاون مع الولايات المتحدة ودول المجتمع الدولي لتحقيق المزيد من الأمن والاستقرار.

National Statement: Egypt

Egypt Statement at the fourth Nuclear Security Summit

 Washington D.C.

(32 March – 1 April 2016)

Mr. President,

In line with our longstanding support of initiatives aimed at strengthening the international non-proliferation regime through collaborative and multilateral mechanisms, Egypt's participation in the 2010 Washington Summit on Nuclear Security came as a positive response to President Obama's initiative on dealing with the threats and dangers related to nuclear security. Egypt has also been keen to effectively take part in various following meetings to build on this initiative, including the Seoul 2012 and the Hague 2014 summits, as well as various preparatory meetings in-between those landmark conferences.

The convention of the Washington 2016 Summit is indeed a new milestone on our path to enhance national, regional and international cooperation frameworks in the field of nuclear security. Over the past six years, much thought and engagement, as well as many initiatives have been invested by the international community towards this end to enable states to uphold their responsibilities in consolidating the very culture of nuclear security. It is time for an honest appraisal of our collective efforts in this regard, guided by the shared objective of strengthening the non-proliferation regime, and, in-turn, enhancing international peace and stability.

Egypt has always emphasized its full support of international efforts to implement the results of the three previous summits, and in so doing our vision for the international community's collective cooperation in the field of nuclear security has always been guided by a number of key principles that I would like to once again re-iterate before you today:

First:

We believe that nuclear security issues are best dealt with within a comprehensive framework that provides for the implementation of nuclear security procedures on all nuclear materials without exception. This most certainly includes materials used for military purposes, and especially those used for the making of nuclear weapons.

Second:

Achieving real progress towards supporting nuclear security is closely connected to progress achieved towards nuclear disarmament. In conjuncture with the notable focus on issues related to nuclear security over the past few years, the international community is required to prioritize achieving a qualitative shift in its effort towards the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament. For within the current regional and international security environment, it is both dangerous and absurd to allow certain nuclear programs and facilities to remain outside the umbrella of the comprehensive safeguard system without effective international monitoring, verification, or access. This leads us to stress once again the fundamental importance Egypt attributes to the establishment of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East. Establishing the Zone is indeed a matter of utmost urgency that requires the consolidation of the international community's political will to fully implement respective NPT review conference decisions in this regard.

Third:

The inalienable right to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear power remains one of the three pillars of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The implementation of nuclear security procedures should in no way put conditions on, or limit the ability of states to exercise this right. Ultimately, nuclear security is a cooperative and not a restrictive objective.

Fourth:

The ultimate responsibility for the implementation of nuclear security procedures lies with member states. Such implementation should remain voluntary and in conformity with the respective state's internal legislations, as well as with its international obligations.

Fifth:

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the most qualified international entity to take the leading role in the implementation of nuclear security procedures. The Agency's resources and accumulated scientific and practical experiences will be invaluable in providing needed technical support to member states in this context, should they so request.

Mr. President,

In light of the challenges Egypt faces in the energy sector, and given the challenges traditionally related to relying on conventional sources of energy, we have announced plans last November to build our first nuclear power station in the 'Al-Dabaa' region.

The Power station, which will be the core of a nuclear program that aims at embedding nuclear know-how for peaceful purposes, will include four nuclear reactors that have a capacity of 1200 Megawatts each, with an estimated total cost of ca. USD 10 Billion.

As part of our effort to secure the success of this major project, Egypt has put special emphasis on ensuring the highest degree of conformity with nuclear security and safety standards. In the field of nuclear security especially, Egypt has taken important steps to upgrade current legislative and institutional frameworks, including the promulgation of law 7 of2010 and its executive regulations, upgrading material protection systems of our two existing research reactors and their facilities, intensifying capacity-building activities and training of our human resources in the field, enhancing international cooperation through the accession to the IAEA's International Network for Nuclear Security Education, and, not least, the finalization of a compressive national plan for nuclear security support, in collaboration with the IAEA. These steps represent a clear demonstration of the awareness by our national institutions of the fundamental significance of upholding their responsibilities related to nuclear security.

In conclusion, and as Egypt re-iterates its belief in the mutually supportive connection between an enhanced international non-proliferation regime and international peace and stability, we remain committed to working towards preserving the needed balance between the three pillars of that regime: Nuclear Disarmament, Non-proliferation, and the inalienable, unconditional and limitless right of states to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

National Statement: Finland

                 GENERAL STATEMENT BY FINLAND

NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT 2016, WASHINGTON

Nuclear Security work will continue after Washington Summit in five existing international fora, among others, that are already very active in this field: the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Nations, Interpol, Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and Global Partnership. Finland is committed to strengthening global nuclear security and to implementing the Communiqué and the five Action Plans to be suggested for the Summit.

It is crucial that the momentum to improve nuclear security is retained after 2016. Finland supports the initiative to establish a contact group to assess implementation of nuclear security commitments, including those made during the Nuclear Security Summit process. The IAEA’s international conference on nuclear security and its Ministerial segment in December 2016 will be an important opportunity to show the continuing political support for our important mission. Wider ownership of nuclear security objectives is needed. An inclusive approach in the follow-up is the best way to increase participation in our joint effort. 
Further progress has been made in securing nuclear materials, in strengthening national systems and in enhancing regional and international cooperation since the beginning of the Nuclear Security Summit process. This is largely due to the political will mobilised through the Summits. Unfortunately, the international security environment has recently deteriorated. Work done in the NSS process has been timely and effective. However, the importance of securing the continuum of this work is clearer than ever.   

Past years Finland has raised several topics to the discussions. This time we would like to emphasise the importance of cyber security, the importance of nuclear security culture, the importance of sharing information, including intelligence, and the importance of nuclear security activities within the IAEA. In addition, we would like to highlight the importance of safe, secure and sustainable disposal of nuclear waste, in which Finland is a forerunner in the world. 

Information and cyber security has been a cross cutting theme throughout the preparations of this Summit. We have realised the magnitude of the challenge. If not adequately addressed, vulnerability to cyber attacks grows as nuclear facilities move to digital systems. This threat does not respect the distinction between civilian and military use of nuclear materials. Terrorists and criminals can be as powerful as national states.

Nuclear security culture is about the human and organizational factors in our effort. A developed security culture in the nuclear field means that the entire chain of national actors is able to identify risks, prevent and to respond to them. A working inter-agency cooperation is part of good nuclear security culture. We believe this is one of the strengths of the Finnish national system. 

Finland has recently designed a model of a nuclear security detection architecture, which is based on the right combination of personnel, technology, and an integrated timely operation of all authorities involved. Information on this inter-agency model is available, and we are very willing to discuss it further with any interested partner. Developing national level nuclear detection architectures and capabilities, and strengthening regional efforts are prerequisites for an effective international cooperation in combating illicit trafficking and malevolent use of nuclear and other radioactive materials. Finland coordinates a Gift Basket on National Nuclear Detection Architectures to this Summit. We are grateful of support many other NSS-countries have shown to this initiative. 

Sharing nuclear security-related information, intelligence and other information, is a necessity in combating nuclear terrorism.  Even though the confidentiality of this information has to be taken into account, the confidentiality shouldn’t be used as an excuse for not sharing information which is possible to share. Finland is pleased to note that Summit Communiqué also recognises the value of information sharing. Be it about nuclear detection or sharing information, it is important to have exercises both at national and at international level to be sure that our systems function as they should.

IAEA’s essential responsibility and the central role in nuclear security activities are unanimously agreed among the Nuclear Security Summit participants. We are confident that this continues to be visible also in practice. We must ensure that the work carried out under the IAEA umbrella, among others, has the resources it needs. Continuing funding also from the regular budget of the IAEA is necessary. The NSS IAEA’s Action Plan notes that it is important to enhance nuclear security within the IAEA and achieve a suitable balance between the IAEA’s nuclear security program and the nuclear safety program. Finland warmly supports this target.

Another national project relevant to the agenda of this Summit is the safe and secure disposal of nuclear waste. Finland issued construction license in 2015 for the spent nuclear fuel geological disposal facility Onkalo. It is the first construction license ever issued for the disposal facility globally. The Onkalo will meet strict and appropriate security requirements and uses advanced technology developed mainly in Finland. The disposal facility can be ready for operation in 2023. Responsible use of nuclear energy takes into account future generations and one part of it is to take care of security, safety and safeguards of disposal of nuclear waste. This is an issue which all countries using nuclear energy have in front of them at some point.  
National nuclear security systems will not reach their full potential without cooperation at the international level. Finland promotes wider ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and of the Amendment made in 2005 to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. This amendment will make the Nuclear Material Convention decisively more effective. 

Threat of nuclear terrorism and the need to address it through international cooperation has been in the focus of the Summit series from the very beginning. We have done good work and it is easy to recognize the four Nuclear Security Summits as an outstanding process in addressing global challenges. Finland would like to thank President Obama personally for launching Nuclear Security Summit process, and the United States for leading preparations for this Summit. Finland has supported the objectives of the Nuclear Security Summit process since the beginning and will continue to do so. 

National Statement: Germany

The 2016 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington is a welcome occasion to take stock of what we have achieved in the past six years. Looking back at President Obama’s Prague speech in 2009 and the subsequent Nuclear Security Summits in Washington in 2010, in Seoul in 2012, and in The Hague in 2014, and at developments since, we can proudly note that the international community has come a long way in strengthening nuclear security globally. Germany has been engaged in the Nuclear Security Summit process right from the beginning. A lot has been achieved, both nationally and globally, but the challenges posed by the dangerous combination of terrorism, proliferation of weapons and materials of mass destruction and regional conflicts remain.

In this context North Korea´s ongoing nuclear and ballistic missile programs as well as its proliferation activities represent a great danger and are blatant violations of several UN-Security Council resolutions.

Nuclear security must be seen in the larger context of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty. Action to ensure non-proliferation is as important as enhancing nuclear security systems. While we call for tangible progress in the field of nuclear disarmament in the near future, close and effective cooperation to combat the risks of nuclear proliferation and to bolster our defenses against the threats emanating from terrorism are tasks we all need to work on.

Germany is proud to be part of this initiative.

Germany has decided to phase out nuclear power but respects the sovereign right of each country to choose its own energy mix and supply. Germany will in any case be involved in nuclear power for many years to come, since German nuclear power plants will not cease production until 2022 and nuclear safety is still extremely relevant with regard to nuclear power plants in neighboring countries. Thus, safe nuclear technology and close cooperation with our partners will remain high on Germany’s agenda.

Germany is now focusing on the back end of the fuel cycle. Dismantling shut down nuclear power plants and treating and disposing of the radioactive waste will take several more decades. Germany will continue to attach particular importance to nuclear security. Our high level of nuclear security will be maintained and, if necessary, strengthened and enhanced.

As one of the leading countries in research and technology, Germany is also engaged in nuclear research. Worldwide, there are several research reactors and neutron sources which rely on Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) fuels. High performance research reactors play a vital role in scientific research, materials testing and the production of medical radioisotopes. Although high value capabilities cannot be replaced by the tools available at present, a group of Nuclear Security Summit countries (Belgium, France, Germany, the Republic of Korea and the United States) have reaffirmed their shared will to cooperate and ultimately convert their relevant reactors to LEU fuel as soon as this becomes technically and economically feasible. Germany has been actively working together with partners to develop and adapt new high-density LEU fuels and will continue to do so. To give just one example, Germany, France and Belgium, supported by the European Commission and in close cooperation with their US counterparts, continue to cooperate in the HERACLES consortium, focusing on testing and developing a U Mo dispersion fuel. We are also looking into the industrial pathway to ensure that as soon as a technically suitable, economically viable LEU fuel with adequate performance (compared to HEU) is identified and is commercially available, the conversion process for the facilities will be initiated.

At the same time, Germany has worked with the United States since 1996 to return to the US more than 128 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) which is no longer used for research purposes. A significant amount of plutonium and HEU was returned to the US at the beginning of 2016. Germany acknowledges the contributions that have been made by the US Department of Energy, the IAEA and all other international stakeholders to bring this project to such a successful conclusion.

Irrespective of nuclear energy, there is another challenge that requires global attention: the increasing use of radioactive sources for beneficial purposes in medicine, industry, research and education. Many factors influence this development, such as globalization, economic interdependencies and the use of new and increasingly complex technologies. These developments are accompanied by an increasing potential for malicious acts or malevolent use of these sources. Therefore, secure protection of radioactive sources is required. Serious incidents with orphaned sources have demonstrated the danger associated with radioactive sources. Germany fully supports the Joint Statement introduced by France at this summit on strengthening the security of high activity sealed sources. In order to contribute to advancing the discussion on how to further proceed with radioactive sources security, Germany will host an international workshop on the question of whether the Code of Conduct for Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (CoC) is adequate for its designated purposes. The workshop will take place from 13 to 15 September 2016 in Berlin.

The use of computer-based systems in physical protection systems, nuclear safety systems, and nuclear material accountancy and control systems at nuclear facilities continues to grow and presents an ever more likely target for cyber-attacks. To enhance the computer security measures at the German nuclear facilities, Germany has therefore tightened its regulations by developing and adopting new nuclear security guidance on computer security.

Nevertheless, computer security is a global challenge. Therefore, Germany welcomes the IAEA efforts to enhance computer security at nuclear facilities as evinced by the IAEA International Conference on Computer Security in a Nuclear World in June 2015. Germany actively supports the IAEA in its leading role and in enhancing the Nuclear Security Series by issuing nuclear security guidance on computer security. Moreover, Germany on a bilateral basis intensively exchanges knowledge and experience regarding the German Design Based Threats (DBT) and guidelines on computer security. Germany and other industrialized countries maintain a high level of nuclear security and have a wealth of expertise in this field. It is all the more important to support other countries in their efforts to strengthen nuclear security, enhance the interface between safety and security and improve the security culture in the nuclear field.

It was both a privilege and a pleasure for Germany to hold the 2015 G7 Presidency and thus be the Chair of the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction – the G 7’s largest expert group which currently includes 30 active members. At a time when regional conflicts rarely remain confined to a particular region, multilateral dialogue and cross-border cooperation on concrete projects are more vital than ever. Germany hosted three Global Partnership Working Group meetings, which provided an important forum for exchange among experts to improve the way we identify, discuss and respond to biological, chemical, nuclear and radiological threats. The Global Partnership provides an efficient framework for coordinating ongoing projects and putting forward new ideas. Together with our friends and partners in the Global Partnership, we are convinced that we can make a difference if we unite our efforts and work with the necessary resolve.

One of the priority issues during our Chairmanship was the situation in Ukraine with regard to the nuclear security challenges. Nuclear security measures are a very complex matter in peaceful times, but in crisis situations they can become serious challenges. Based on a request by the Ukrainian government for assistance in its efforts to manage a broad range of urgent chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) risks, the Global Partnership swiftly decided to assist the Ukrainian authorities in reducing immediate CBRN threats. For example, in 2015/2016 Germany contributed to the implementation of security measures in Ukrainian power plants by providing technical expertise and assistance amounting to more than 5 million euros.

Nuclear security must remain a high priority for all of us after the 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit. The 2016 Action Plans aim at giving nuclear security an even stronger profile in the relevant international organizations and initiatives and call for better coordination of their various programs and actions. This constitutes a major cornerstone in our strengthened nuclear security architecture and thus enhances the importance of all three pillars of the Non Proliferation Treaty.

Making progress on nuclear disarmament remains a matter of urgency. Non-proliferation efforts are equally urgent, and are most effective when they involve all actors, including industry. Germany has been actively involved in promoting and implementing UNSCR 1540 since its adoption. Back in 2011 Germany initiated the Wiesbaden Process which seeks to be the interface between government and industry. Listening to the concerns and proposals of industry representatives will help make the implementation of UNSCR 1540 more effective. Today, Germany is proud that the Wiesbaden Conference has become a brand name in non-proliferation efforts.

The comprehensive review of UNSCR 1540 due in 2016 will set the stage for even more effective implementation of the resolution. The fourth Wiesbaden Conference in November 2015 has delivered a strong input in this regard by formulating concrete recommendations on how to further improve cooperation between governments and industry. Germany will introduce this report into the comprehensive review discussion and stands ready to continue the work done in the Wiesbaden process.

It is in our common interest for the Nuclear Security Summit series to lead to sustainable and tangible results which aim at strengthening the international nuclear security architecture - with the IAEA playing a central coordinating role. Summit members have worked out plans as to how they will advocate for further nuclear security action in relevant international organizations and initiatives. Individual member states have agreed on joint action on particular topics like forensics in nuclear security, cyber security of industrial control and plant systems at nuclear facilities, mitigation of insider threats, activities and cooperation to counter illicit trafficking in nuclear and radiological material, security of radioactive sources, nuclear security training, nuclear and radiological terrorism preparedness and response-capabilities. These activities will need to continue for years to come.

Germany is grateful to all Nuclear Security Summit host nations – the United States, the Republic of Korea and the Kingdom of the Netherlands – for their hospitality and their essential contribution towards fostering international cooperation and raising public awareness of a pressing issue.

Germany will remain engaged in nuclear security issues at home and abroad and is looking forward to enhanced cooperation with international partners and organizations on the basis of the achievements of the Nuclear Security Summit.

National Statement: Italy

NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT

 (Washington, 1 April 2016) 

ITALY’S NATIONAL STATEMENT

The Nuclear Security Summit has impressively moved forward the global dialogue on nuclear security, by adding a high level political dimension to the technical one and strengthening the nuclear security architecture, both domestically and internationally.

It has broadened the understanding and awareness of the nuclear terrorism threat, induced countries to increase physical nuclear security measures, reduce nuclear material stocks and sites, and intensify international cooperation. The Summit has forced through many decisions that might otherwise have languished for years.

Italy is firmly committed to keep the Summit’s legacy alive, included in its Final Communiqué, and to follow through the Action Plans, and the Gift Baskets that we support.

Whilst terrorists keep on developing new means aimed at threatening our societies and peaceful coexistence, it is imperative for all of us to maintain the momentum triggered by the Summit with a proactive and holistic approach.

We are convinced that, still for many years to come, there will be a need for a continued high-level dialogue on the next steps. This is crucial in order to verify the effectiveness of our efforts and adapt them to the coming challenges.

Although no single forum will be able to fully replace the NSS process, the IAEA represents a major venue and a key actor. Therefore,  we look forward to the  Second International Conference on Nuclear Security, to be held in Vienna next December. Italy, a major contributor to the IAEA regular Budget, the Nuclear Security Fund and the Technical Cooperation Program, actively supports the Agency undertakings related to the strengthening of the international nuclear security framework.

Furthermore, we believe - as suggested by some influential voices - that the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear material can provide the proper mechanisms for a regular  review of our commitment and progress in nuclear security.

We look forward to the entry into force of its 2005 Amendment, that Italy ratified in 2015. More generally, Italy is keenly endorsing and participating in the legal framework related to nuclear security. The ratification of the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) is in progress together with a broader set of norms dealing with the fight against nuclear terrorism.

We are also convinced that widespread nuclear security culture is crucial for our future. For this reason, Italy will carry on its engagement to ensure that nuclear security culture remains a priority in the international and national agenda. To this aim and in view of this Summit, Italy has been promoting the new and more focused Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres Gift Basket.

Its objectives are the strengthening of the IAEA Network and the establishment of regional networks, ensuring the sustainability of these centres and promoting a culture of nuclear security as well as scientific advancements in this domain.

Nuclear security culture is indeed as much essential as the physical protection of nuclear material. For this reason, training and capacity building initiatives should be largely encouraged and sustained.

Moreover, Italy is a founding member of the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, that we look forward to chairing in 2017. Italy also participates in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and is ready to host a meeting of its Nuclear Forensic Working Group next fall.

Finally, Italy has been fully committed to the nuclear materials consolidation and minimization programme. We have made significant efforts together with the United States to eliminate excess Highly Enriched Uranium and Plutonium. Today, the Italian national inventory consists of limited quantities of special nuclear material, currently stored in compliance with the highest international nuclear security standards.

National Statement: Kazakhstan

President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev

Fourth Nuclear Security Summit

Washington, 1 April 2016 

Your Excellencies!

The six-year process of the Nuclear Security Summits creates a new spirit of hope.

I would like to thank President Barack Obama for this historic initiative.

It is certainly a great achievement of your mission as the U.S. President and one of the world leaders.

As we meet today the arrows of the “Doomsday Clock” – the measure that scientists and experts use to judge the closeness of the threat of a nuclear collapse are frozen in a fixed position for the second year in a row.

This is the practical result of our Nuclear Security Summit.

The anti-nuclear component of modern international relations has been significantly strengthened.

First of all, on December 7, 2015 for the first time in human history, the UN adopted the Universal Declaration on the Achievement of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World proposed by Kazakhstan.

I suggested this idea six years ago here in Washington during our first summit.

Secondly, the problem related to the Iranian nuclear program is virtually removed from the global agenda.

Thirdly, the establishment of the Low-Enriched Uranium Bank in Kazakhstan under the agreement with the IAEA is of vital importance.

It allows all countries wishing to develop and use peaceful nuclear energy to do so without violating the non-proliferation regime.

Fourthly, the five nuclear powers signed a Protocol on negative assurances to the Treaty on the nuclear-weapons-free zone in Central Asia.

Finally, security measures to protect hundreds of kilograms of nuclear materials from reaching international terrorists have been consolidated.

It is important to consider how to maintain this format of multilateral dialogue on nuclear security and continue to conduct them on a regular basis.

Dear colleagues!

Despite all efforts, humanity still stands on the brink of nuclear self-destruction.

While the arrows of the “Doomsday Clock” are frozen, they are still at the same point as they were in the most critical period of the Cold War.

The phantom of a global war has again been circling over our planet.

The nuclear non-proliferation process is marking time.

The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty has not yet entered into force.

The testing of nuclear weapons and missiles is happening on the Korean peninsula.

A number of politicians publicly discuss who can “wipe others into nuclear dust” and who can “strike first”.

Many have started to quickly forget a simple truth.

In the nuclear age, no one will win a global war.

All will lose, because our planet will be destroyed!

Humankind’s central task should be to become a world free from the threat of war as a means of interstate relations.

This is the only way we will ensure a breakthrough in promoting genuine and sustainable nuclear security of the planet.

This is the primary meaning of my MANIFESTO “THE WORLD: 21st CENTURY”.

I presented it yesterday at the meeting at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

It will be published and distributed in the United Nations.

In this manifesto, I am proposing to adopt a comprehensive program “21st CENTURY: A WORLD WITHOUT WAR”.

It is important to adapt a regime of non-proliferation and disarmament to contemporary conditions by including into it all the de jure and de facto nuclear states.

It is necessary to reconfigure the international disarmament process and to prohibit the use of scientific discoveries for the creation of new weapons of mass destruction.

Urgent measures are required to reduce would-be conflicts in all the hot spots of the planet.

It is of great importance to overcome such a vestige of militarism as the existence of military blocs.

A necessary condition for a world without war - is, in the first place, a fair paradigm of global competition in the sphere of international finance, trade and development.

Further strengthening of global nuclear security relies on restoring trust and dialogue, especially between nuclear powers.

I sincerely hope that this appeal will be heard by all world leaders.

Ladies and Gentlemen!

The discovery of the energy of atom fission was a fruit of human genius.

But using this discovery for military purposes is the result of artful carelessness of people.

We have a chance to correct this mistake of the 20th century.

I call upon all states not to weaken joint efforts to combat the threat of self-destruction of the planet.

Renunciation of war and nuclear weapons would be an act of supreme wisdom of humanity in the 21st century.

Now, under the auspices of the UN, there is a need to create a counter-terrorism global network with the participation of all nations of the world.

That is the only way we can win this undeclared war.

All of this requires more cooperation between countries and organisations.

It is unthinkable without the trust of all members of the nuclear club.

And it is time to design a new format for that club, where all states that de facto possess nuclear weapons are included.

The new club would take the responsibility for nuclear disarmament.

To those who ignore international solutions, drastic measures of coercion should be applied.

We need a full audit of all international treaties.

We must bring them to a common denominator in line with new realities. Currently in international law there are no clear criteria and standards allowing intervention in affairs of a state and to compel it to comply with adopted agreements.

Some time ago Barack Obama supported the “Global Zero” initiative of a group of politicians and military experts on a phased and total elimination of nuclear weapons by 2030.

An absolute majority of international public opinion stands with this goal for the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons.

In this respect, we believe the holding of nuclear security summits should continue.

This is the only way we can change the world, leaving a safer planet for future generations.

Thank you for your attention!

National Statement: Lithuania

Nuclear Security Summit 2016 – Lithuanian National Statement

The Nuclear Security Summit in Washington marks tremendous efforts and formidable achievements of States in strengthening the nuclear security and accomplishing distinctive progress in the security of nuclear materials. The Summit in Washington also recaps difficult challenges to global nuclear security posed by the evolving threats such as nuclear terrorism.

Lithuania is and will remain strongly supportive of the main objectives of this process:

• to raise awareness of the importance of nuclear security;
• to improve national capacity to prevent, detect, protect and prosecute; and
• to increase global nuclear security through international cooperation. Stronger international institutions and advanced nuclear security culture will undeniably help deter, detect, and disrupt attempts of mishandling of radioactive materials out of regulatory control and of nuclear terrorism.

Lithuania is proud to contribute to the concerted efforts of the international community in fortifying global nuclear security architecture that is all-inclusive, built on international standards, transparent in implementation on all levels, and results in a significant decline in global stocks of the nuclear weapons-usable materials.

In this respect, Lithuania will continue its support to the initiatives undertaken in Seoul on “Activity and Cooperation to Counter Nuclear Smuggling” and on “Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres”. Nuclear Security Centre of Excellence (NSCOE), established in Lithuania in the aftermath of the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul in 2012, has significantly developed its operational capacity in supporting sustainability and effectiveness of the national nuclear security measures and their development. Lithuania is keen to further employ and expand regional potential of the Nuclear Security Center of Excellence as a full-scale capacity-building and training institution in prevention, detection, response, and investigation of nuclear and radiological smuggling.

Diminished use of highly-enriched uranium (HEU), secure nuclear materials, actions to counter nuclear smuggling and collectively improve nuclear security culture, share best practices, and elevate nuclear security are all vital in achieving objectives of Nuclear Security Summits. Underscoring the importance of radiation protection and security of the high activity radiation sources (HASS) and a fundamental commitment to the provisions of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, that are comprehensively implemented in the national legal system as well as in the practice or activities related to HASS, Lithuania is proud to announce its support to the initiative on Strengthening the Security of High Activity Sealed Radioactive Sources.

Adherent to full transparency in implementing all international nuclear security and safety requirements, Lithuania will continue its support to an all-encompassing employment of the IAEA network to ensure transparency among states. Lithuania endorses plans to reinforce enduring international institutions and initiatives that support nuclear security. Strong system of international institutions will enable them to build upon the legacy of the Summits. Lithuania is proud to announce its support to the Gift Basket on Sustaining Action to Strengthen Global Nuclear Security.

In 2016, Lithuania will welcome the IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission with the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) Mission to follow in the year 2017.

Acknowledging nuclear security cannot be upheld with in isolation from nuclear safety, Lithuania reiterates a fundamental and collective international interest to make sure that nuclear security and safety are dealt with in a coordinated and consistent manner to minimize the countless inherent risks of a precarious nuclear safety conditions, reckless international behavior of States and violations of the international nuclear safety requirements at national, regional, and international levels. For this reason, it is vitally important to address both nuclear safety and security without compromising each other, prioritizing the essential need of transparency in securing the nuclear safety.

Lithuania‘s commitment to nuclear security, safeguards and non-proliferation is long standing: a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Lithuania ratified the 2005 Amendment of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) in 2008, has an Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

National Statement: Morocco

Kingdom of Morocco

4th Nuclear Security Summit

  National Statement

« National, International and Institutional Actions to enhance Nuclear Security » 

Washington, March 31st- April 1st, 2016

Mr. Chair,

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen

The Kingdom of Morocco expresses it thanks to the United States of America for hosting the fourth Nuclear Security Summit in Washington DC.

Today more than ever the potential use of nuclear arms or nuclear components has become a real threat to international peace and security. This threat is no longer theoretical or hypothetical, but is a reality.

There are many indications that point to the fact that terrorists have attempted or will attempt to acquire nuclear materials. Such a scenario is terrifying.

The use of radioactive materials to build even the toughest traditional nuclear bomb will have tragic human, economic, and environmental consequences.

The use of radioactive materials to build even tough nuclear traditional bomb will have human, economical and environmental tragic consequences.

Mr. Chair,

Six years after the first Washington Summit held in 2010, we meet today to assess the various common efforts made in the field of nuclear security, in accordance with the “Washington Action Plan” and all issued Summit communiqués.

The Kingdom of Morocco has taken several concrete measures to implement this action plan into its national strategy to combat terrorism, a strategy that is also in accordance with the guidelines of His Majesty the King Mohammed VI. These guidelines call for a proactive and multidimensional approach to combat terrorism and extremism through national measures that will contribute to strengthening of the international nuclear security arsenal.

At the national level, Morocco adopted the following national measures:

1.    Strengthening the legal framework relating to nuclear safety and security through the adoption of law 142-12 on nuclear and radiological safety and security, on September18th, 2014;

2. Submission on July 28th, 2015 to the UNSC committee established through Resolution 1540 of a national report. The report outlines the new approach that implements all of the provisions as called for by UNSC resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1977 (2011);

3.   Adhesion to all international conventions aimed at strengthening nuclear security and safety. Morocco ratified on October 18th, 2015, the Amendment of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM);

4.  Set-up of « the Moroccan Agency for Safety and Security in Nuclear and Radiological Fields ».

As for the various diversified contributions that Morocco has made to strengthening the international nuclear security regime, the following actions were undertaken;

1. An exemplary cooperation between Morocco and Spain has allowed both countries to elaborated an action plan in support of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) to be endorsed during this Summit;

2.  The “Gate to Africa” exercise was co-organized by the Kingdoms of Morocco and Spain to evaluate the capacity of both countries to cooperate jointly in a simulation response exercise. This exercise scenario involves a terrorist act during the transportation of radioactive materials from the port of Algeciras in southern Spain to the port of Tangier-Med in northern Morocco. The outcomes and recommendations of “Gate to Africa” will be shared and presented during this Summit and during the IAEA meeting;

3.  Morocco has also elaborated, since its chairmanship of the GICNT working group on the response and mitigation in 2011, a document on “Fundamentals for establishing and maintaining a nuclear security response framework: A GICNT practice guide.” that was endorsed, by acclamation, during the political meeting of the GICNT, held in Helsinki (June 2015).

4.     This document was based on the results of the Morocco-Spain joint exercise “Remex 2013” held in Madrid (April 2013) and the international exercise “Convex3” named “Bab al Maghrib,” organized in Rabat, in cooperation with the IAEA, on November 27th-28th, 2013;

5.     The nuclear security center of excellence has collaborated with the IAEA and the US Department of Energy in Rabat to organize several training sessions for experts from across Africa and the Middle East, for the sake to promote the nuclear security culture.

Mr. Chair,

The contribution of the Kingdom of Morocco to the strengthening of the international nuclear security system reflects Morocco’s continued commitment to the international efforts undertaken in this regard in full alignment with the vision of His Majesty King Mohammed VI, and his continued call for the reinforcement of multilateral actions through a full respect of the right to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the provisions of non-proliferation regime.

National Statement: New Zealand

NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT 2016

NEW ZEALAND NATIONAL STATEMENT

The potential humanitarian, economic and environmental consequences of terrorists gaining access to nuclear or radioactive materials are so grave that the New Zealand Government is doing all within its power to minimise the possibility of this nightmare becoming a reality.  

In March 2016 New Zealand ratified the two cornerstone nuclear security conventions – the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (A/CPPNM) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT).   We are pleased to make this contribution towards comprehensive and robust global nuclear security architecture.

In the last two years, since the last Nuclear Security Summit in 2014, New Zealand has also taken the following actions:

• Enacted the Radiation Safety Act (2016), which completely overhauls our legislative framework dealing with the safety and security of nuclear and radioactive material;
• Implemented a Code of Practice for the Security of Radioactive Material;
• Hosted the first mission from the International Atomic Energy Agency’s International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS)  to review the security of New Zealand’s nuclear and radioactive materials;
• Contributed over NZ$1 million to international work to improve nuclear security.

Since the Nuclear Security Summit process began in 2010, New Zealand has contributed over NZ$4.6 million to support international efforts to improve nuclear security and secure radioactive materials.  These include contributions to:

• the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Nuclear Security Fund;
• the World Institute for Nuclear Security’s training for workers in the nuclear industry;
• supporting the repatriation of highly enriched uranium;
• projects to provide radiation detection equipment at vulnerable borders;
• radiation detection training;
• regional training in securing radioactive sources.

The Nuclear Security Summit process initiated by President Obama shone a spotlight on the issue of nuclear security and, by focusing leaders’ intense attention, provided the political momentum for future action.

NSS participants have agreed on Action Plans to support this work in the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency, INTERPOL, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction.   The IAEA already has a Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Security set for December 2016.   These initiatives will ensure that the momentum provided by the NSS process is maintained.  

New Zealand will continue to work actively with international partners to keep nuclear and radioactive materials secure and out of terrorists’ hands. 

New Zealand views nuclear security as part of our broader long-standing commitment to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.  We are mindful that much of the most dangerous nuclear material remains in nuclear weapons programmes, not subject to international controls or transparency.  It remains our view that the greatest possible contribution to global nuclear security will be complete and verifiable nuclear disarmament.

Wellington

March 2016

National Statement: Morocco (French)

4ème Sommet sur la Sécurité Nucléaire

 Déclaration du Royaume du Maroc 

Sur :

« Les actions nationales, internationales et institutionnelles pour renforcer la sécurité nucléaire » 

  Washington, 31 Mars- 1er Avril 2016

Monsieur le Président,

Excellences, Mesdames et Messieurs,

Permettez-moi tout d’abord d’exprimer les remerciements du Royaume du Maroc aux Etats Unis d’Amérique, d’avoir abrité les travaux du 4ème Sommet sur la sécurité nucléaire.

L’usage potentiel d’armes ou de composants nucléaires constitue la plus grave menace actuelle pour la paix et la sécurité internationales. Une telle menace n’est ni abstraite, ni théorique.

Tout porte à croire que des groupes terroristes ont tenté ou tenterons d’acquérir des matières nucléaires. Un tel scenario est terrifiant. L’utilisation de matières radioactives pour la fabrication d’une bombe nucléaire, même rudimentaire, pourrait avoir des conséquences humaines, économiques et environnementales catastrophiques.

Voilà pourquoi la coopération internationale est essentielle pour prévenir ce type de menace.

Monsieur le Président,

Six ans après la tenue du 1er Sommet sur la sécurité nucléaire à Washington en 2010, nous nous réunissons aujourd’hui pour procéder à une évaluation des efforts conjoints déployés en matière de Sécurité nucléaire, dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre du « Plan d’action de Washington » et les communiqués  des Sommets antérieurs.

Dans ce cadre, je voudrais rappeler que le Royaume du Maroc a pris plusieurs mesures concrètes pour la mise en œuvre de ce plan d’action, dans le cadre de la stratégie nationale de lutte contre le terrorisme en application des Hautes Orientations de Sa Majesté le Roi Mohammed VI. Ces Orientations qui insistent sur l’importance d’une approche proactive et multidimensionnelle, à travers des mesures nationales et des contributions au renforcement du système international de Sécurité Nucléaire.

Parmi les principales mesures nationales prises par le Maroc, on peut citer :

• Le renforcement de l’arsenal juridique dans le domaine de la sureté et la sécurité nucléaire, par l’adoption de la loi 142.12 du 18 septembre 2014, relative à la sûreté et la sécurité nucléaire et radiologique ;
• La soumission par le Royaume du Maroc, le 28 juillet 2015, de son rapport national devant le comité 1540 du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies, sur la base d’une nouvelle approche consistant en la mise en œuvre de toutes les dispositions de la résolution 1540 (2004) et 1977 (2011);
• La poursuite des efforts visant l’adhésion à toutes les conventions relatives à la sûreté et la sécurité nucléaires, à travers le dépôt, le 18 octobre 2015, des instruments de ratification du protocole de 2005, amendant la convention sur la protection physique des matières nucléaires ;
• La création de l’Agence marocaine de sûreté et de sécurité nucléaire et radiologique comme autorité nationale.

S’agissant de la contribution du Royaume au renforcement du système international de la sûreté nucléaire, celle-ci est riche et diversifiée. Elle s’articule principalement autour des axes suivants :

• Une coopération exemplaire avec des partenaires régionaux et internationaux. En effet, le Maroc et l’Espagne ont par exemple élaboré un plan d’action devant être adopté lors de nos travaux, relatif à l’appui du Sommet sur la sécurité nucléaire aux objectifs de l’Initiative globale pour la lutte contre le terrorisme nucléaire. 
• L’organisation de l’exercice « Gate To Africa », en octobre 2015, en partenariat avec l’Espagne, à travers lequel les deux pays ont testé leur capacité de coordination, par la simulation d’une riposte à un acte terroriste lors du transport d’une source radioactive du port d’Algésiras au Sud de l’Espagne au port Tanger-Med au Nord du Maroc. Les résultats et les recommandations de cet exercice seront présentés lors des travaux de ce Sommet.
• Le Maroc a également préparé, lors de son mandat depuis 2011, en tant que président du Groupe de travail pour la réponse et la gestion des risques radiologiques de l’Initiative globale de lutte contre le terrorisme nucléaire, un document relatif aux « fondements de l’établissement et le maintien d’un cadre de riposte et de réponse nucléaire » adopté à, l’unanimité, lors de la réunion politique de l’Initiative globale pour la lutte contre le terrorisme nucléaire, tenue à Helsinki en juin 2015.
• Ce document constitue un protocole de bonnes pratiques « pour une réponse préparatoire en cas de risques suite à des incidents radiologiques nucléaires ». Il est basé sur les résultats de l’exercice « REMEX 2013 », organisé dans le cadre de ladite initiative durant le mois d’avril 2013, ainsi que de l’exercice international « Convex3 » intitulé « Bab Al Maghrib », organisé conjointement avec l’Agence Internationale de l’Energie Atomique, en novembre 2013.
• L’organisation par le Centre d’Excellence pour la Sûreté nucléaire, à Rabat de plusieurs sessions de formation au profit des experts africains et du Monde arabe, dans le cadre de la mise à niveau des ressources humaines et la promotion de la culture de Sureté nucléaire, en coopération avec l’Agence Internationale de l’Energie Atomique et le Département américain de l’Energie.

Monsieur le Président,

La participation du Royaume du Maroc au renforcement du système international de la sécurité nucléaire reflète son engagement constant visant à contribuer aux efforts internationaux déployés dans ce contexte et ce, conformément à la vision de Sa Majesté leRoi Mohammed VI, qui prône le renforcement de l’action multilatérale à travers la préservation d’un équilibreentre le droit à l’usage pacifique de l’énergie nucléaire à des fins de développement et le strict respect des engagements en matière de non-prolifération des armes nucléaires.

National Statement: Morocco (Arabic)

المملكة المغربية

قمة الأمن النووي الرابعة

البيان الوطني

حول

الإجراءات الوطنية، الدولية والمؤسساتية لتعزيز الأمن النووي

واشنطن، 31 مارس - 1 ابريل 2016

السيد الرئيس،

أصحاب الفخامة و المعالي و السعادة،

تتقدم المملكة المغربية بشكرها الخالص إلى الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية على استضافتها الكريمة لأشغال مؤتمر القمة الرابعة للأمن.

الاستعمال المحتمل لأسلحة أو مكونات نووية يمثل حاليا أخطر التهديدات على الأمن والسلم الدوليين.

مثل هذه التهديدات ليست بالوهمية أو غير محتملة. هناك الكثير من الأدلة تثبت على أن جماعات إرهابية حاولت ولازالت تحاول استقطاب مواد نووية. هذا الاحتمال جد مرعب.

في هذا السياق ان استعمال مواد اشعاعية لصناعة قنبلة نووية ولو تقليدية قد يكون له تداعيات انسانية اقتصادية ومناخية غير مسبوقة.

لهذا فالتنسيق على المستوى الدولي بات من الضروري من أجل استباق هذا النوع من التهديدات.

 السيد الرئيس،

بعد ستة سنوات من قمة واشنطن الأولى (2010) نجتمع اليوم مجددا بعاصمة الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية لتقييم مجهوداتنا المشتركة في مجال الأمن النووي تفعيلا "لخطة عمل واشنطن" وبيانات القمم السابقة.

وفي هذا الإطار، تود المملكة المغربية، بان تذكر أنها اتخذت عدة تدابير عملية لتفعيل هذه الخطة ضمن الاستراتيجية الوطنية للوقاية ومكافحة الإرهاب، تنفيذا للتوجيهات السامية لجلالة الملك محمد السادس، التي تؤكد على المقاربة الاستباقية المتعددة الأبعاد، وذلك عبر المثابرة في اتخاذ تدابير وطنية وإسهامات لتعزيز المنظومة الدولية الأمن النووي.   

ومن بين التدابير الوطنية الأساسية المتخذة:

• تعزيز الترسانة القانونية في مجال الأمن والأمان النوويين، من خلال اعتماد القانون 12ـ142، في 18 شتنبر2014، والمتعلق بالأمن والسلامة في المجالين النووي والإشعاعي.
• تقديم المملكة المغربية، في 28 يوليوز 2015، لتقريرها الوطني أمام لجنة القرار 1540، وفق إجراءات تعتمد مقاربة جديدة ترتكز على تفعيل كل بنود قراري مجلس الأمن 1540 (2004) و1977 (2011).
• استكمال الانضمام إلى كافة الاتفاقيات الدولية المعنية بتعزيز الأمن والأمان النوويين، وذلك بإيداع وثائق المصادقة، يوم 18 أكتوبر 2015، على البرتوكول 2005 المعدل لاتفاقية الحماية المادية للمواد النووية.
• إنشاء الوكالة المغربية للأمن والسلامة في المجالين النووي والإشعاعي، وهي بمثابة سلطة وطنية.

أما فيما يتعلق بإسهامات المملكة في تعزيز المنظومة الدولية للأمن النووي: فهي غنية ومتنوعة وتدور حول المحاور التالية:

• تنسيق نموذجي مع شركاء اقليميين ودوليين. في هذا السياق تكلف المغرب إلى جانب اسبانيا بصياغة خطة العمل، المزمع اعتمادها خلال هذه القمة، والتي تتعلق بدعم قمة الأمن النووي لأهداف المبادرة الشاملة لمكافحة الإرهاب النووي.
• تم تنظيم تمرين "بوابة لأفريقيا"، شهر أكتوبر 2015، بشراكة ما بين المملكتين المغربية والاسبانية، والذي تم بواسطته اختبار مدى جاهزية البلدين وقدرتهما على التنسيق، من خلال محاكاة رد على عمل إرهابي أثناء نقل مصدر مشع من ميناء الجزيرة الخضراء بجنوب اسبانيا إلى ميناء طنجة-المتوسط بشمال المغرب، سوف يتم تقديم نتائجه وتوصيات خلال أشغال هذه القمة.
• كما أعد المغرب منذ توليه سنة 2011 رئاسة فريق العمل للاستجابة وإدارة حالات الطوارئ الإشعاعية للمبادرة الشاملة لمكافحة الإرهاب النووي، وثيقة بشأن "أسس إنشاء والحفاظ على إطار الرد والاستجابة" والتي اعتمدت، بالإجماع، خلال الاجتماع السياسي للمبادرة الشاملة لمكافحة الإرهاب النووي، المنعقد بهلسنكي في يونيو 2015. هذه الوثيقة تشكل بروتوكول للممارسات الفضلى "للاستجابة التحضيرية في حالة للطوارئ إثر حوادث إشعاعية نووية «، كما ترتكز على أساس نتائج تمرين «2013 REMEX»، المنظم في إطار المبادرة خلال شهر ابريل 2013، والتمرين الدولي «Convex3» المسمى " باب المغرب"، المنظم مع الوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية خلال شهر نوفمبر 2013.
• نظم مركز الامتياز للأمن النووي بالرباط، في إطار تنمية الموارد البشرية وتعزيز ثقافة الأمن النووي، بتعاون مع الوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية ووزارة الطاقة الأمريكية، العديد من الدورات التدريبية، لفائدة اطر من إفريقيا والشرق الأوسط.

السيد الرئيس،

إن مشاركة المملكة المغربية في تعزيز المنظومة الدولية للأمن النووي ليعكس التزامها الثابت للإسهام في الجهود الدولية المبذولة في هذا السياق انسجاما مع رؤية جلالة الملك محمد السادس القائمة على تقوية العمل المتعدد الأطراف كإطار مناسب وفعال لتنسيق الجهود على المستوى الدولي من خلال ضمان حق تطوير واستعمال الطاقة النووية لأغراض التنمية والتزامات حظر انتشار الأسلحة النووية.  

وشكرا لكم.

National Statement: Nigeria

Federal Republic of Nigeria

NATIONAL STATEMENT

Mr. President,

Excellencies,

Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen,

First of all, I would like to thank President Barack OBAMA and the United States of America for the invitation to the 4th Nuclear Security Summit holding in Washington DC, from 31 March to 1 April 2016. Let me further pay special tribute to you Mr. President for your pace setting initiative and drive that have brought this process to this level. Nuclear terrorism is one of the greatest threats to international security and preventing nuclear terrorism and all forms of terrorism around the globe is of concern to all of us.  

As we begin the 4th Nuclear Security Summit, I wish to reaffirm Nigeria’s commitment to the global fight against the threat of nuclear terrorism and other forms of terrorism in all their manifestations, and our support to multilateral efforts to advance a common approach and commitment to nuclear security at the highest level. Nigeria accords high priority to all global efforts towards ending the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, including nuclear weapons. To this end, Nigeria has since the last Summit in Seoul strengthened the legal framework for fighting terrorism through the adoption in 2013 of an amendment to its Terrorism (Prevention) Act, ensuring the implementation of more robust counter-terrorism measures in the country.

In this regard, Nigeria remains committed to continue demonstrating strong support for the global nuclear security architecture. Nigeria have ratified the Amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM/A); and the International Convention for the Suppressions of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT); and is engaged in a process, together with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), relating to the conversion of its miniature neutron source reactor (NIRR-1)from the use of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU), keeping in mind that minimizing the use of HEU remains an important goal of the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS). Nigeria is committed to the completeness of that process as soon as technically feasible.  

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Nigeria have taken a number of steps necessary for strengthening nuclear security architecture by building up its nuclear and other radioactive material security. Nigeria have developed and commenced comprehensive review and updating of the existing nuclear security regulations as well as drafting of new ones to ensure the safety and security of nuclear materials and other radioactive sources.

The Nigerian Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials Regulations; Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources Regulations; System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material; and the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities; are at various stages of completion of review and updating. With the changing nature of global and national threats, Nigeria in conjunction with relevant stakeholders is currently reviewing the Design Basis Threat (DBT) developed in 2012. This is aimed at guiding holders of nuclear and radiological materials on the appropriate physical protection systems to be put in place.

In the area of performance of Oversight, Nigeria undertakes regular security inspections of facilities to ensure that materials are secured. The inspections are regular and routine in nature and the inspectors are benefitting from requisite training. To this end, Nigeria has established a Nuclear Security Support Centre which is aimed at enhancing human capacity development in the area of nuclear security. The Centre continues to actively interact with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other relevant international organizations to develop and undertake training programmes for stakeholder organizations in 2016 and beyond. The Centre is intended to serve Nigeria and sub-Sahara Africa.

At the same time, Nigeria has developed a programme for search and secure of orphan and legacy radioactive sources. The programme has been established with the ultimate aim of identifying, securing and recovering vulnerable orphan and legacy radioactive sources in the country and to ensure that they are secured to prevent unauthorized access by terrorists and criminals. The Search and Secure programme is a yearly exercise. The latest exercise was conducted in November/December 2015 in three geopolitical zones of Nigeria, and efforts are on-going to acquire more equipment and expertise to ensure efficiency and sustainability of the programme.

The survey of Depleted Uranium (DU) which commenced in 2011 is an on ongoing programme with the latest exercise conducted in November/December, 2015. Nigeria has compiled and submitted earlier reports to the IAEA. The programme is continuing and comprehensive reports will be forwarded to the IAEA accordingly. Nigeria conducts regular inspection of the 234 legacy sources at Ajaokuta Steel Company Limited to guarantee their security pending their transfer to a temporary Radioactive Waste Management Facility, prior to the efforts in a more definitive manner to repatriate them to their country of origin. At the same time, regular inspection is conducted on the disused radioactive sources located at the Temporary Waste Management Facility. Efforts are also being made for their final repatriation to their countries of origin.

Nigeria undertakes regular inspection of NIRR-1 and supports IAEA safeguard inspection of the facility. Nigeria conducts various training and retraining programmes for its Frontline Officers from the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, Nigeria Customs Service, Nigeria Police Force, State Security Service, Nigeria Immigration Service, Federal Fire Service, Federal Airport Authority of Nigeria, Nigeria Ports Authority and the Defence Headquarters of the Nigerian Armed Forces. Frontline Officers are also nominated to attend IAEA organized training courses on Illicit trafficking/border monitoring, nuclear security, physical protection of nuclear and radiological facilities to make them respond to unauthorized acts involving nuclear and other radioactive materials.

Nigeria installed its first Radiation Portal Monitor (RPM) at the Murtala Muhammed International Airport, Lagos in 2008 and put into operation in April 2009. The RPM was donated by the IAEA and meant to prevent accidental or undeclared import and export of radioactive sources as well as checking illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. Three more RPMs have since been procured and discussions are on-going with the manufacturer for the purpose of installing them at strategic ports of entry into the country. A specific airport is designated for import and export of radioactive materials. The Installation of the three portal monitors shall be completed before the end of 2016. Effort is being made to cover all points of entry into the Country. The NSSC shall give training of frontline officers a priority.

To enhance Nuclear Security, Nigeria has reinforced its cooperation with the IAEA; United States Department of State’s Partnership for Nuclear Security (PNS); and the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS); to mention a few. Nigeria actively participated in the WINS professional Certification programmes.

Nigeria is collaborating with Oak Ridge National Laboratory of the United States of America to implement a Human Reliability Programme (HRP) for the Nigerian nuclear industry. A pilot HRP programme is being developed at the Centre for Energy Research and Training, ABU Zaria, and is being facilitated by the ORNL with support from Partnership for Nuclear Security (PNS). The programme is expected to be replicated at other high risk nuclear and radiological facilities in the country.

In addition, Nigeria has signed an agreement of cooperation with the United States Department of Energy (US-DOE) Office of Radiological Security (ORS). The objectives of this cooperation are: to reduce and protect vulnerable nuclear and other radioactive material located at civilian sites; remove and dispose excess nuclear and other radiological materials; and protect nuclear and other radiological materials from theft or sabotage. The cooperation included Physical Security upgrades of some high risk radiological facilities. Nigeria intends to strengthen its partnerships with relevant international organizations to promote capacity building, particularly in the development of the Nigerian Nuclear Security Support Centre, Physical Security Upgrades and HRP Implementation.

Thank you very much.

National Statement: Norway

PM SOLBERG NORWAY STATEMENT

I would like to express my appreciation to President Obama for hosting this fourth Nuclear Security Summit here in Washington D.C., and for his political leadership in the summit process. We are gathered to take stock of our common efforts to secure nuclear material, radiological sources and associated facilities against theft and sabotage. The consequences of a nuclear terrorist attack would be devastating. We cannot allow this to happen.

Nuclear security remains a top priority for Norway. However, improved nuclear security requires not only national and bilateral efforts, but also regional and multilateral efforts. And our common security will benefit from a strong global architecture for nuclear security.

The Nuclear Security Summits have brought political attention to the risk of nuclear terrorism, and we have achieved important results. The securing of nuclear materials has been improved, and many states have returned their material to the supplier state. Moreover, an increasing number of states have signed, ratified and implemented international legal instruments on nuclear security. The summit ‘gift baskets’ have been important drivers for deeper commitment. By emphasising the leading role of the IAEA, the summit process has paved the way for a sustainable global nuclear security architecture in the future. With its authority and expertise in the field, it is natural that the IAEA plays a pivotal role in the nuclear security domain. To do so, however, it needs predictable and sustainable funding.

Legal instruments are crucial. Norway has ratified the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM); we have adopted the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, with its supplementary guidance document; and we have ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT). I will take this opportunity to congratulate the US Government with their ratifications of these two instruments in 2015, which is an important achievement.  We encourage all other states that have not done so to sign and ratify these important legal instruments. Let me add that Norway has also promoted negotiations on the proposed Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT).

Since the last summit in The Hague, Norway has intensified its activities in key areas:

• First, Norway strongly advocates minimising and eliminating the use and stocks of highly enriched uranium (HEU), by converting to non-HEU alternatives. It is especially important when building new reactors to choose technologies that are not based on HEU. Transferring to non-HEU alternatives will reduce the nuclear-weapons-usable material to a minimum. At this summit, Norway is presenting a new initiative for making further progress on minimising and eliminating the use of HEU. We are proud to present a gift basket entitled NSS 2016: Gift Basket on Minimizing and Eliminating the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in Civilian Applications. We are very pleased to see that a large number of countries have subscribed to this gift basket. 
• Second, Norway gives high priority to cooperation with Ukraine on nuclear security issues. At the Hague Summit, Norway and Sweden presented a plan to strengthen this cooperation. This was in response to Ukrainian concerns that the conflict in Ukraine could threaten its nuclear facilities and that radioactive sources could fall into wrong hands. We have since expanded our efforts in Ukraine. Together with the US, we are engaged in various projects on radioactive source security and border control. In addition, we are engaged in wide-ranging bilateral projects with the Ukrainian regulatory authorities. Later this year, Norway will initiate a meeting in the Global Partnership to review the lessons learned from our joint activities in Ukraine and discuss how to take this work further.
• Let me add that Norway has worked consistently to reduce nuclear risks in the High North. Over the past 20 years, Norway has cooperated closely with Russia on nuclear safety and security to resolve the challenges stemming from the legacy of the Cold War. We have allocated USD 230 million to projects in north-western Russia. These funds have made it possible to reduce the threats from one of the world’s largest stocks of poorly secured fissile material. These efforts are ongoing, and in 2017 we will start the comprehensive work of removing spent fuels from around 100 nuclear submarines reactors in Andreeva Bay, the former nuclear submarine service base for Russia’s Northern Fleet.
• Third, among the IAEA’s many important activities, the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) is especially important for nuclear security. IPPAS missions assist states in strengthening their national nuclear security regime and its implementation. Norway hosted an IPPAS mission in 2015, which resulted in a number of recommendations that are to be followed up by the operator and the Norwegian authorities. Let me share three priority areas where we will increase domestic efforts: cyber threats, insider threats, and ensuring good communication and coordination between various government agencies on threat assessments of – and response to – nuclear security incidents.
• Fourth, we must make sure that all nuclear and radiological materials, both civilian and non-civilian, are included in our efforts to strengthen nuclear security. This means that in addition to transferring from HEU to non-HEU fuels, we also need to adopt alternative technologies that do not rely on radioactive material. Preventing unauthorised personnel from having access to high-activity radioactive sources reduces the risk of terrorism involving radiological material. In 2015, Norway finished phasing out the use of high-activity sources in blood irradiators, having gradually replaced them with x-ray based irradiators. These are no longer a security concern.
• Fifth, as a follow up on the 2014 gift basket on Enhancing Radiological Security, Norway recently hosted a World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) workshop on the status of actions taken and challenges encountered by the signatories of the gift basket. Forty-seven participants from seventeen countries together with the IAEA attended this event. They shared valuable experiences, common practices, and lessons learned. The participants represented a wide variety of authorities, organisations and entities.
• Sixth, Norway contributed actively to the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Under the agreement, Iran has committed itself to restricting its stockpile of low-enriched uranium, and Norway provided support for 60 000kg natural uranium and its transportation from Kazakhstan to Iran, amounting to around USD 6 million. This allowed Iran to dispose of its excess low-enriched uranium, which was then transported out of the country. Experts from the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority verified and controlled the transportation of the natural uranium. Norway has also provided extraordinary funding for the IAEA’s monitoring of the implementation of this agreement and its predecessor since 2013. So far, this has amounted to USD 2 million.

Dismantling nuclear weapons in a balanced, irreversible and verifiable manner and reducing the stocks of weapons-usable material are effective ways of preventing nuclear terrorism. Norway has been engaged in nuclear security efforts for many years. We see these efforts as an integral part of our work on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the ultimate goal of a safer world without nuclear weapons.

We need a global system for securing nuclear materials that holds all states accountable to a set of common standards and best practices. We are all responsible for nuclear security, and we must act together.  It is still a matter of the utmost urgency.

Thank you.

National Statement: Pakistan

PAKISTAN’S NATIONAL STATEMENT

Nuclear Security Summit

Washington, 31 March - 1 April 2016

Pakistan is strongly committed to the objective of nuclear security and has been proactively engaged with the international community to promote nuclear safety and security. It has ensured that nuclear and radioactive materials and all related facilities are secured in all places.

The Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process has contributed to improve nuclear security by raising greater awareness about it. The process has reinforced nuclear security culture as an area of special focus. Valuable ground has been covered in strengthening nuclear security architecture worldwide through national efforts.

Nuclear security is a national responsibility. Effective measures taken at the national level contribute to nuclear security internationally.

As a responsible nuclear state, Pakistan takes nuclear security very seriously and accords it the highest priority in its security construct. Our nuclear security paradigm, evolved over the years, is effective and responsive against the entire range of possible threats. Nuclear security regime in Pakistan is dynamic and regularly reviewed and updated.

In line with the commitment made during the 2014 NSS, Pakistan has ratified the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). This is a reaffirmation of Pakistan's confidence in its national nuclear security regime, which is consistent with the contemporary international standards.

Focus on nuclear security should further enhance international cooperation in peaceful applications of nuclear technology. Confidence in safety and security of nuclear and radiological materials and associated facilities should facilitate collaboration in health, industry, agriculture and other sectors.

Post-NSS 2016, focus should be on broadening participation  in efforts towards promoting nuclear security through the platform of IAEA which has primacy and the competence in such matters.

National Nuclear Security Regime

Pakistan's nuclear security regime is based on national legislative, regulatory and administrative framework. The elements of nuclear security in Pakistan include robust command and control system led by the National Command Authority (NCA), rigorous regulatory regime, comprehensive export controls and international cooperation. We follow the principle of multi-layered defence to prevent and effectively respond to the entire spectrum of threats.

Pakistan has established a specially trained, highly skilled and well equipped force that is designed for nuclear security. Dedicated intelligence provides depth to our security architecture. Continuous threat appraisal and institutional reviews are conducted to upgrade response mechanism.

The regulatory regime encompasses all matters related to nuclear safety and security, including physical protection of materials and facilities, material control and accounting, transport security, prevention of illicit trafficking, border controls, and plans to deal with possible radiological emergencies through an elaborate Nuclear Emergency Management System (NEMS).

Pakistan’s export control regime is at par with the standards followed by Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Australia Group.

International cooperation, consistent with our national policies and international obligations, helps in voluntary sharing of best practices and experiences in the security domain.

Centre of Excellence: As part of nuclear security regime, Pakistan’s Centre of Excellence on Nuclear Security (PCENS) has been established. Working together, PCENS, the National Institute of Safety and Security (NISAS) and Pakistan Institute of Engineering and Applied Sciences (PIEAS) provide exhaustive education and training in areas including physical protection, material control and accounting, transport security, cyber security and personnel reliability. These training facilities continue to grow into a regional and international hub, with support of the IAEA.

In collaboration with IAEA, PCENS has conducted several regional and national training courses. Pakistan hosted the annual meeting of the ‘International Network of Nuclear Security Support Centres’ in March 2016, which was the first meeting of the Network held outside IAEA Headquarters, Vienna.

Technical and Scientific support: PNRA and PAEC maintain dedicated units to provide technical and scientific support services at the national level to ensure equipment lifecycle management and to provide assistance in case of any nuclear security event. These units are equipped with necessary laboratory tools, equipment, software and expert support.

Nuclear Safety: Pakistan attaches great importance to nuclear safety at all levels. Safety parameters, emergency preparedness and response, and operators' training protocols and procedures are continuously reviewed and enforced. The approach to ensure safety of nuclear power plants is in accordance with national regulatory system.

IAEA-Pakistan Nuclear Security Cooperation Program: Pakistan has successfully implemented IAEA-Pakistan nuclear security cooperation program. Several projects have been successfully implemented for capacity enhancement in nuclear security.

Nuclear Medical Centres: Security measures at all Nuclear Medical Centres withcategory-l radioactive sources are being upgraded, through IAEA-Pakistan cooperation. Physical protection at a number of Centers using Category-l sources has been upgraded consistent with the IAEA Code of Conduct on Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.

In addition, collaboration with IAEA is an ongoing process for enhancing nuclear security systems and measures at civilian Nuclear Power Plants and Research Reactors consistent with global good practices, such as nuclear security recommendations contained in INFCIRC 225/Rev.5 and other nuclear security documents of IAEA.

Nuclear Emergency Management System: A Nuclear Emergency Management System (NEMS) has been established at the national level to handle nuclear and radiological emergencies. A Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Support Centre (NURESC) and Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Coordination Center (NRECC) provide technical guidance to licensees and users of nuclear and radiation facilities in case of an emergency and coordinate the response. Several training courses for the first responders and emergency response personnel have been conducted for emergency preparedness.

Revision of Pakistan's National Export Control List: The Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified second revision of the ‘National Export Control List’ in 2015. The List, classified on the basis of the European Union's integrated system, covers the scope of export controls maintained by NSG, Australia Group and MTCR.

Combating Illicit Trafficking: As part of its national detection architecture, Pakistan has deployed radiation detection equipment at several entry and exit points to deter, detect and prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials.

International Cooperation: Pakistan has submitted four reports to the UNSCR 1540 Committee. The reports elaborate measures taken by Pakistan for nuclear and radiological security as well as on controls over transfer of sensitive materials and technologies.

Pakistan is a party to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material including its 2005 Amendment, Nuclear Safety Convention, Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, and the Convention on Assistance in case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. Within this framework, Pakistan will continue to contribute to the strengthening of nuclear safety and security.

Pakistan has been working with the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) in different areas, including the development of GICNT guidelines. Pakistan is also a member of UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR).

Future Aspirations: Pakistan has an elaborate programme for harnessing peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We operate power plants, research reactors, agriculture and biotechnology research centers, medical centers, and also employ industrial applications of nuclear technology. Pakistan is proud to have more than 42 years' experience in safe and secure operations of nuclear power plants under IAEA safeguards.

Pakistan believes that safe and sustainable civil nuclear energy is essential to advance its economic development plans. Our Energy Security Plan includes a Nuclear Power Programme 2050, to meet current energy shortfalls and future requirements of a growing population and economy. Towards this end, we envisage generation of nuclear energy of 40,000 MW. To realize this plan, Pakistan seeks international civil nuclear cooperation.

Pakistan is ready to assist interested states with experience and expertise gained in the areas of nuclear power generation, and other applications of nuclear technology, under the auspices of the IAEA.

As a country with advanced nuclear fuel cycle capability, Pakistan is in a position to provide nuclear fuel cycle services under IAEA safeguards, and to participate in any non-discriminatory nuclear fuel cycle assurance mechanisms.

Over the years, Pakistan has streamlined and strengthened its export control regime and enhanced its engagement with multilateral export control regimes. Pakistan has strong credentials to become a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and other multilateral export control regimes, on non-discriminatory basis.

Pakistan’s participation in the entire NSS process reflects its seriousness and strong sense of responsibility. We remain alive to the need for sustained national efforts in the domain of nuclear security.

National Statement: Philippines

REMARKS OF THE

HON. MARIO G. MONTEJO,

SECRETARY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OF THE PHILIPPINES,

AT THE PLENARY SESSION ON NUCLEAR TERRORISM SCENARIOS

2016 Nuclear Security Summit Ÿ Washington, DC, 1 April 2016

Mr. President,

Excellencies,

The threat posed by non-State actors and violent extremists is very real and increasingly complex, and must be addressed through both national frameworks and international coordination.

To reduce this threat, the Philippines has enacted a number of relevant legislation to combat terrorism in all its forms.

We value the effort to pro-actively engage local communities to counter extremism. The Philippines continues to develop its capacity to detect and prevent insider threats from homegrown violent extremists and terror groups, and supports grassroots-based efforts to help communities protect themselves against extremist and terrorist propaganda.

Moreover, the Philippines implements de-radicalization programs through partnerships with local religious leaders and schools, which help improve their capacity to promote moderate views.

More recently, the Philippine Government established an inter-agency group that aims to monitor and prevent Filipino nationals from joining extremist and terror organizations abroad.

In terms of hardware, the Philippines has been continuously strengthening our capability to monitor and detect illicit or unaccounted radioactive material. We have, through the support of the US, installed radiation detection monitors in major ports around the country. Our government plans to install additional monitors at more ports in the near future. We also have portable radioactive detection devices for checking suspect material.  The Philippines has been putting in place an accounting system for all radiological materials.

In terms of facility security, we have installed a high-end security system at our nuclear research institute and in seven (7) hospitals that have high-risk radioactive sources.

Certainly, these domestic frameworks can be further augmented through international cooperation, both at regional and international levels, such as in the UN, APEC and ASEAN. We underscore the importance of the regular exchange of information among countries as a vital tool to thwart terrorist objectives.   

Mr. President,

Excellencies,

This Summit is an opportune time to seriously consider the nexus between nuclear security, and nuclear and radiological safety. As more countries utilize the promise and potential of nuclear energy and widen the applications of nuclear science and technology, we need to complete the circle and exercise responsibility over risks to health, life and peace posed by the residues of our nuclear and radiological activities.

Again, international cooperation and partnership are keys to unlocking global solutions to this latent threat to health, welfare and lives.

Therefore, we call on the universal ratification of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.

As a founding member of the United Nations, an active member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Interpol and the Global Initiative for Combatting Nuclear Terrorism (GCINT), the Philippines believes in a wholistic approach in dealing with the nuclear security issue. Disarmament, non-proliferation, nuclear security and safety should, therefore, go hand-in-hand.

The Philippines is committed to playing an active role in strengthening the nuclear security architecture in the national, regional and global levels.  In 2017, we will be assuming the chairmanship of ASEAN, which may present opportunities for further strengthening and enhancing the nuclear security and safety architecture in our part of the world.

In closing, Mr. President, allow me to give recognition to the excellent work done by your officials in shepherding this Summit through the last six (6) years.

Thank you. 

National Statement: Saudi Arabia (Arabic)

كلمة المملكة العربية السعودية

مؤتمر قمة الأمن النووي 2016م

واشنطن – الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية

يلقيها

معالي د. هاشم بن عبدالله يماني

رئيس مدينة الملك عبدالله للطاقة الذرية والمتجددة

31 مارس- 1 أبريل 2016م

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

(صاحب الفخامة الرئيس باراك أوباما،  رئيس الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية،)

أصحاب الجلالة والسمو والفخامة ملوك ورؤساء وقادة الدول ورؤساء الوفود الموقرين، السيدات والسادة الحضور

يطيب لنا أن نعرب عن امتناننا وتقديرنا لعظيم الجهد الذي بذلته الولايات المتحدة في التحضير لهذه القمة. 

السيد الرئيس

نجتمع هنا اليوم مرة أخرى بعد ست سنوات على القمة الأولى التي رعيتموها يا فخامة الرئيس لمراجعة ما تحقق من إنجازات ووضع تصور للمرحلة المقبلة. ونأمل أن تساهم مخرجات اجتماعنا هذا في بلورة خطوات تنفيذية لاحقة تسهم في تحقيق الأهداف التي سعت إليها القمة.

لقد كانت المملكة العربية السعودية من أوائل الدول التي دعمت القرارات الدولية ذات الصلة بالأمن النووي، مثل قرار مجلس الأمن رقم 1540 للعمل على منع إساءة استخدام مواد التدمير الشامل للأغراض الإجرامية. لقد قامت المملكة العربية السعودية بالمصادقة على معاهدة الحماية المادية للمواد النووية وعلى التعديلات المتعلقة بها، ونأمل أن يكون بالإمكان إدخال هذه الاتفاقية حيز النفاذ في أقرب فرصة. هذا الى جانب دعم المملكة لمبادرة مكافحة الإرهاب النووي كما أنها طرف في الاتفاقية الدولية لقمع أعمال الارهاب النووي، كما ان المملكة كانت حاضرة بفاعلية وإيجابية في معظم الفعاليات والأنشطة الدولية المرتبطة بالأمن النووي منذ القمة الأولى في واشنطن 2010م، كما نظمت المملكة سلسلة من ورش العمل والندوات ذات الصلة بالمواد النووية والمشعة وبقية المواد الخطرة.

وأولت المملكة اهتماما خاصا بمسألة تطوير البنية التحتية للأمن النووي من خلال إدراك التكامل بين الأمان النووي والأمن النووي والعمل على إدراج الأمن النووي كأحد أهم مكونات هيئة الرقابة في الطاقة الذرية الجاري العمل على إنشائها في المملكة. تحرص المملكة على اتباع أعلى المعايير العالمية للأمان النووي من خلال التنظيم الفعال للأنشطة والممارسات المعتمدة في الطاقة الذرية. وفي هذا السياق، فإن المملكة مستمرة في تفعيل اتفاق الشراكة الاستراتيجية مع “هيئة السلامة النووية والإشعاعية في فنلندا”، كشريك استراتيجي لتقديم الدعم التقني والمعرفة والخبرة الضرورية لتنظيم قطاع الطاقة الذرية في المملكة ولتنمية الموارد البشرية اللازمة لإنشاء هيئة وطنية مستقلة للرقابة النووية.

هذا على الصعيد الوطني، اما في الاطار الدولي فقد قدمت المملكة وستستمر في تقديم الدعم الكامل لكل الأنشطة الدولية في مجال الأمن النووي. فقد نظمت المملكة ورشة العمل الدولية حول القرار 1540 في الرياض في ديسمبر من العام 2010م. وقدمت المملكة في قمة 2012م بسيول تبرعا بمبلغ 500 ألف دولار تنفيذا للفقرة العاملة  رقم 7 من القرار1977 القاضي بتمديد العمل بالقرار 1540 لمدة عشر سنوات. كما سبق أن أعلنت المملكة في العام 2014م عن تبرعها بمبلغ 100 مليون دولار لانشاء مركز الأمم المتحدة لمكافحة الإرهاب.

السيد الرئيس

تولي المملكة اهتماما بالغاً للمنظومة العالمية ذات الصلة بالامن النووي وخاصة للدور المحوري الذي تؤديه الوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية، ولذا فاننا ندعو الجميع الى دعم وتعزيز الامكانات الفنية والبشرية للوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية من خلال انشاء مركز متخصص لمكافحة الارهاب النووي في مقر الوكالة في فيينا بمساهمة ودعم من كل الدول، ويسعدني في هذه المناسبة ان اعلن من منبر هذة القمة عن تبرع المملكة العربية السعودية بمبلغ عشرة ملايين دولار لانشاء ذلك المركز.  كما يسعدني كذلك ان اعلن عن دعم المملكة لمشروع تحديث معامل الوكالة في سايبرزدورف بمبلغ خمسمائة الف يورو.

السيد الرئيس

لقد أعلنت المملكة العربية السعودية عن عزمها تطوير برنامج طموح لاستغلال الطاقة النووية للأغراض السلمية لتحقيق أهداف التنمية المستدامة والمحافظة على الموارد الهيدروكربونية للأجيال القادمة، لذا فإن المملكة بصدد تخطيط برنامجها النووي السلمي بشكل يتوافق كليا مع متطلبات الأمن النووي، كما ان المملكة ملتزمة بتأسيس نظام وطني محاسبي للرقابة والتحكم في المواد النووية والإشعاعية وتبذل قصارى الجهد في تطوير أجهزة الجمارك ومراقبة الحدود وكافة أجهزة انفاذ القانون لكشف ومنع الاتجار غير الشرعي للمواد الخطرة.

السيد الرئيس

إن رؤية المملكة الاستراتيجية تتبنى مبدأ المحافظة على التوازن بين التزامات الدول تجاه قضايا الأمن النووي وبين حق الدول في الاستخدامات السلمية للطاقة النووية. لذلك، فإن المملكة في هذا المقام تلفت النظر إلى القيود المبالغ فيها وغير المبررة على الحقوق الأصيلة في التقنية النووية السلمية بما قد يؤدي إلى أثر سلبي حتى على برامج التعاون المشترك في الأمن النووي ذاته.

كذلك، وعلى نفس القدر من الأهمية، فإن المملكة تعرب عن قلقها حيال تباطؤ تحقيق الهدف الأسمى بالنزع الكامل عالميا للأسلحة النووية واستمرار وجودها وانتشارها.

ولذلك، فإن المملكة ترى ضرورة الاتفاق عالميا حول استراتيجية موحدة للحد من هذه المخاطر من خلال تحجيم مصادر المواد النووية عالية المخاطر وعلى رأسها السلاح النووي ونزعها بالكامل على المستوى الدولي عامة وعلى مستوى الشرق الأوسط بصفة خاصة، وهو ما يمثل في الأصل الهدف الأسمى لجهود الأمن النووي ومنع الانتشار السلاح النووي عالميا.

السيد الرئيس

إن جهود تحقيق غايات الأمن النووي تبدأ بادراك ضرورة تبني المجتمع الدولي بأكمله لما هو قائم بالفعل من معاهدات وأطر قانونية وأخلاقية، ولن يجدي استحداث أطر قانونية دولية وأنظمة جديدة لالزام من هو ملتزم في الأصل بينما يوجد من الدول من لا يتجاوب مع المعاهدات والأطر القائمة الهادفة للوصول إلى عالم خال تماما من الارهاب والسلاح النووي.

وفي هذا الصدد، فإن المملكة تثني على ما توصلت إليه القمة الموقرة من خطط عمل موجهة للأطراف الفاعلة في الأطر الدولية القائمة على شؤون الأمن النووي وعلى رأسها الأمم المتحدة والوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية والانتربول والمبادرة العالمية لمكافحة الإرهاب النووي وتتعهد ببذل أقصى الجهد للمساهمة في تفعيل هذه الخطط. كذلك وتدعو المملكة المجتمع الدولي لتبني هذه السياسات ليتخطى تأثيرها الدول المشاركة في هذه القمة إلى ما نصبو إليه جميعا من أمن نووي عالمي.

وختاما السيد الرئيس

فإننا نأمل، أن تكون هذه القمة الموقرة خطوة بناءة ومثمرة تقودنا نحو مزيد من الخطوات على طريق تحقيق الحماية والأمن والاستقرار للأجيال الحالية والقادمة.

شكرا السيد الرئيس

National Statement: Saudi Arabia

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s speech in front of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit – Washington DC, USA,

delivered by His Highness Dr. Hashim Bin Abdullah Yamani,

President of King Abdullah City for Nuclear and Renewable Energy,

03/31/2016 – 04/01/2016

In the name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate,

His Excellency president Barak Obama - the President of the United States of America, Your Majesties, Highnesses and Excellencies the kings, presidents and leaders of states and the honorable heads of delegations, ladies and gentlemen,

We are pleased to express our gratitude and appreciation for the great efforts exerted by the United States to prepare for this summit.

Mr. President,

Again, we gather here after six years of the first summit, which had been sponsored by your Excellency, to review what had been achieved, and to present a vision for the next phase.  We hope that the outcome of this meeting will result in the emergence of consequent executive steps towards achieving the goals sought by this summit.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had been one of the first countries which supported the international resolutions pertaining to nuclear security, such as the 1540 Security Council Resolution which seeks to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction for criminal purposes. 

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ratified the Convention on the Physical Security of Nuclear Materials and all pertinent amendments.  We hope that the entry into force of this convention can be made as soon as possible.  Besides that, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has supported the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and is part of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.  Since the first summit which was convened in Washington DC in 2010, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been actively and positively present at most of the international activities related to the nuclear security.  It also organized a series of workshops and symposia related to nuclear, radioactive and other hazardous materials.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has paid special attention to developing the infrastructure for nuclear security by the realization of integration between nuclear safety and nuclear security, and by seeking to include nuclear security as one of the most important components of the Supervisory Board of the nuclear energy which is being established at home.  The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is keen to follow the highest international standards for nuclear security by effectively organizing activities and practices approved in the field of nuclear energy.  In this context, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia continues to invigorate the Strategic Partnership Agreement with the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority in Finland, which acts as a strategic partner seeking to provide technical support and the knowledge needed for organizing the nuclear energy sector in the Kingdom, and to develop the human resources needed for establishing an independent national authority for nuclear regulation.

At the international level, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia provided, and will continue to provide, full support for all international activities in the field of nuclear security.  It organized the International Workshop on the 1540 Security Council Resolution in Riyadh in December 2010.  At the Seoul summit in 2012 the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia donated $500,000pursuant to Article 7 of the 1977 Resolution, which extended the execution of the 1540 Resolution for ten years.  In 2014 the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has also donated $100 million for the establishment of the United Nations Center for Counterterrorism.

Mr. President,

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia pays great attention to the global system related to the nuclear security, especially the central role played by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  Therefore, we call on all to support and boost the technical and human capabilities of the (IAEA) by establishing a specialized nuclear counterterrorism center at the headquarters of (IAEA) in Vienna, with contribution and support from all countries.  I am pleased to announce at this summit the Kingdom’s donation of $10 million for establishing that center.  I am also pleased to announce the Kingdom’s donation of 500,000 Euros for the project of modernizing the IAEA laboratories in Saybrzdorf.

Mr. President,

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has declared its determination to develop an ambitious program for exploiting nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in order to achieve the goals of sustainable development and to preserve hydrocarbon resources for the next generations.  Therefore, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is in the process of planning its peaceful nuclear program in a way that utterly conforms to the requirements of nuclear security.  The Kingdom is also committed to establishing a national system for inspecting and controlling nuclear and radioactive materials, and is exerting utmost effort to develop customs and boarder control systems and all law enforcement systems in order to detect and prevent illicit trading of hazardous materials.

Mr. President,

The Kingdom’s strategic vision adopts the principle of maintaining the balance between states’ commitments towards issues of nuclear security and their rights in peaceful use of nuclear energy.  Therefore, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would like in this regard to point to the overstated and unjustified restrictions on the intrinsic rights of peaceful nuclear technology in a way that may negatively affect even joint cooperation programs related to nuclear security itself.  The Kingdom also expresses concern about the slow pace of achieving the ultimate goal of full nuclear disarmament at the international level, and about the continued existence and proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia believes that there is a need for an international agreement on a unified strategy aiming at minimizing these hazards by curbing high risk sources of nuclear materials, most important of which being the nuclear weapons, and by full nuclear disarmament at the international level in general, and at the Middle East level in particular.

Mr. President,

The efforts of achieving the aims of nuclear security start at realizing the need for the entire international community’s adoption of the existing conventions and legal and ethical frameworks.  There is no use of creating new international legal frameworks and systems to obligate those who are already committed, whereas there are other states that do not respond to the existing conventions and frameworks which aim at creating a world entirely free of terrorism and nuclear weapons.

In this regard, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia commends the action plans concluded by this venerable summit and directed towards the key players concerned with nuclear security affairs, led by the United Nations, IAEA, Interpol and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.  The Kingdom is committed to exerting the maximum effort to contribute to invigorating these plans.  It calls on the international community to adopt these policies so that their effect goes beyond the states participating in this summit, and to achieve the international nuclear safety we aspire to.

At the end, Mr. President, we hope that this venerable summit becomes a constructive and fruitful step leading to additional steps towards achieving protection, security and stability for current and future generations.

Thank you Mr. President   

National Statement: Singapore

REMARKS BY

PRIME MINISTER OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE LEE HSIEN LOONG

AT THE FOURTH NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT, WASHINGTON DC

PLENARY SESSION: NATIONAL ACTIONS TO ENHANCE NUCLEAR SECURITY

Six years ago, we gathered in this same convention centre and pledged to address the threat of nuclear terrorism. We have made good progress since then, bringing us to this fourth meeting and I would like to thank President Obama for his personal commitment and his leadership which has done so much to bring us thus far.

Singapore does not have significant nuclear material or facilities but we still take our responsibilities seriously, because we like every other country can be vulnerable to the nuclear threat. We could be a place where illicit material passes through our port. We could be a target of attack and even if something happens elsewhere beyond our borders, its spill-over effects could affect Singapore’s population.

Therefore, we actively support counter-proliferation and nuclear disarmament in three ways. Firstly, as a global transhipment hub, Singapore is committed to combating illicit trafficking. Since the start of the Nuclear Security Summit process, we have tightened up our export control regime and upgraded radiation screening technology at our ports. We track every case of nuclear fuel transiting through Singapore and from time to time, we have intercepted cargo and confiscated items. In one recent case, we discovered a significant amount of thorium, a radioactive element. It had been imported into Singapore not as nuclear material, but as a contaminant of another chemical used as a coolant for printed circuit boards. Our first border laboratory – “Protective, Analytical and Assessment Facility” – will be operational by this year and it will be able to conduct radiation-nuclear detection and analysis, to interdict illicit activities at the border.

Secondly, Singapore cooperates closely and willingly with international efforts. We participate in the PSI - the Proliferation Security Initiative. We adopt Financial Action Task Force Recommendations to combat proliferation financing. We host the INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation, which fosters information sharing among countries, to counter transnational threats and networks that exploit new technology. The Iranian nuclear dossier is another example. Singapore did our part and fully implemented the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and therefore, we are happy that the matter has been brought to a satisfactory outcome. There had been some expectations that we would go beyond that but as a small, open economy, dependent on the international rule of law in all cases, it would have been very difficult for us to act unilaterally, and exceed what had been mandated by the United Nations.

Thirdly, we encourage countries to reduce nuclear weapons steadily to zero so that they will never be used again, whether by accident or design. I hope this Summit will see countries committing to reduce their nuclear material stockpiles further, which can make for ready terrorist targets. We are very concerned by developments on the Korean peninsula, in particular in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The DPRK continues to develop nuclear capabilities to conduct tests and to raise tensions in North East Asia. If its neighbours respond and feel compelled to move closer to threshold status, it would gravely destabilise the whole region. I therefore urge the DPRK government to refrain from further provocations and to abide by its international obligations and I hope all countries will encourage the DPRK to restrain itself and work towards denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. I am encouraged that the recent UNSC resolution 2270 passed unanimously. All of the P5 members supported it. This sends a strong signal to the DPRK and should make a positive contribution towards a good outcome.

The recent terrorist attacks in Pakistan, Brussels, Iraq, Turkey, France, Indonesia, Egypt, Nigeria – and the list goes on – show that we are all vulnerable to terrorism and doubly so to nuclear terrorism. The ISIS’ English language magazine Dabiq published an article in the 9th issue in May last year, which highlighted a nuclear terrorism scenario where ISIS purchased a nuclear device from the black market to launch a major attack. It shows their intent, and it is a threat which countries must take seriously. Nuclear terrorism may not be the most imminent of the threats we face or the most urgent, but it is a very plausible and believable threat which can easily become a reality and if it ever happens, it would be disastrous. So we must, as an international community, continue to fight against nuclear terrorism and this series of summits, I am confident, has done a significant part to help towards that fight.

Thank you.

National Statement: South Africa

STATEMENT

BY

THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

ON OCCASION

OF

THE NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT

Washington, D.C.

March/April 2016

On behalf of the Government and People of the Republic of South Africa, I wish to express my appreciation to President Obama for hosting the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.  It is fitting that this Summit, which marks the end of the Nuclear Security Summit process in its present format, is again held in Washington, where the first Summit took place in 2010.  

Looking back, I believe that we should be pleased with the high level of political commitment to nuclear security that has been established amongst the States participating in the Nuclear Security Summit process.  Commencing in 2010, the various Summits have forged a common awareness of the importance of nuclear security and have strengthened the nuclear security architecture.

Regrettably, in the recent past the world has again witnessed acts of terrorism.  Our own Continent has also been a regular target for terrorist attacks.  It is clear that such incidents could occur anywhere in the world: in developing or developed countries, and in nuclear weapon or non-nuclear weapon States. Such incidents demonstrate the need to collaborate and work together, recognizing that no country is immune to acts of terrorism.  Addressing the root causes of terrorism in all its manifestations should remain our key priority.  At the same time, in the nuclear arena, we need to continue investing in nuclear security to enhance expertise to deter, detect and combat malicious acts in order to protect nuclear facilities, nuclear material and other radiological substances.     

Nuclear security is a global concern requiring global solutions that involve all States. It therefore follows that the level of nuclear security can only be effectively raised through cooperation in fora where all States can contribute to shaping a truly international response. It is for this reason that South Africa has long advocated for a multilateral approach to promoting nuclear security which upholds the centrality of the United Nations system and respects the principles enshrined in its Charter.  For South Africa, much of the value of the Nuclear Security Summit process has therefore been the politicalsupport generated for the work of existing multilateral bodies, notably that of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

South Africa believes that through a co-operative approach in the relevant multilateral organisations, we can effectively deal with nuclear security risks. We are therefore pleased that after this Summit, we will vest the issue of nuclear security mainly in the IAEA by infusing the gains of the NSS into the IAEA and bringing on board those countries that are currently not part of the NSS process. Although nuclear security remains a national responsibility, the IAEA has an essential role in facilitating and coordinating international cooperation and supporting the efforts of States to fulfil their nuclear security responsibilities.

South Africa remains committed to ensuring and maintaining effective nuclear security measures in respect of all nuclear and other radioactive material, including nuclear facilities in the country, in accordance with its national and international obligations. As South Africa is planning a future expansion to its nuclear programme, nuclear security remains a priority for us.

South Africa welcomes the progress that has been made since our first Summit in Washington D.C. followed by further Summits in Seoul and The Hague in 2012 and 2014. We are committed to the continuous enhancement of nuclear security control measures in accordance with the national threat assessment, as well as global threats, taking into consideration our international obligations. We remain committed to ensuring adherence to our international obligations and implementing nuclear security measures in accordance with our legislation. In this regard, South Africa is a party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and is in the process of ratifying the Amended Convention with the objective of enhancing its obligations related to nuclear security.

South Africa will continue to work together with the international community to enhance nuclear security.  We have installed Radiation Portal Monitors at some facilities and currently we are working with the IAEA to enhance the detection capabilities at our Ports of Entry. In August 2014, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) of the United States of America audited one of our facilities with the objective of assessing security systems. I am pleased to say that the outcome was positive.

Following the FIFA World Cup in 2010 hosted by South Africa, the support we have received from the IAEA (including capacity building and detection equipment) has enabled the country to offer national training courses to law enforcement officials, including operators, to implement nuclear security measures at relevant events. South Africa has hosted and participated in numerous workshops with the objective of enhancing nuclear security at its nuclear installations.

We are continuing with our programme to recover, consolidate and return disused and orphan radioactive sources throughout Africa and some non-African countries. We are also in the process of finalising the establishment of a nuclear forensics capability. As South Africa recognises the need for a Nuclear Security Support Centre to coordinate nuclear security activities in the country, we are committed to establishing such a Centre to ensure sustainability of expertise in the nuclear security field.

Although the Summit process has done much to strengthen nuclear security, we should not forget that in order for the global nuclear security system to be truly effective, it needs to be comprehensive. Even if all civilian materials were fully secured to the highest standards, this would only cover an estimated 15% of the weapons-usable material around the world, leaving a critical gap in the architecture.

It is thus both legitimate and important to also address the issue of the remaining 85%, which is categorized as military materials that are not subject to any international security standards or oversight mechanisms. In this regard, it is important to note that the 2016 Communique reaffirms the commitment of leaders to the shared goals of nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Enhanced nuclear security arrangements for nuclear material and facilities in civilian use and nuclear non-proliferation efforts alone will not eliminate the threat of nuclear terrorism. Progress towards the realization of our shared goal of a world without nuclear weapons can no longer be postponed.  As long as high-risk nuclear material remain outside international oversight, the threat of nuclear terrorism will remain.

Nuclear energy not only provides for the expanded opportunity to generate power for our development, but we also derive benefit from its application in areas such as health, nutrition and agriculture. It is therefore appropriate that the 2016 Communique states that measures to strengthen nuclear security will not hamper the right of States to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

As we are meeting for the last time as participating States in the Nuclear Security Summit process, it is important that we share the outcome of this Summit with other International Atomic Energy Agency Member States, as well as with the Agency and other multilateral organisations. It is trusted that the International Conference on Nuclear Security scheduled to take place in December this year in Vienna, Austria, will serve us well in carrying forward the 2016 Summit’s outcomes and deliverables.

I thank you.

National Statement: Spain

STATEMENT OF SPAIN AT THE NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT 2016 

The Nuclear Security Summit process started in 2010 and represents a landmark in the international community’s efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism. For the first time, a multilateral initiative is addressing new security threats with a preventive approach, in order to avoid terrorist attacks going beyond the conventional forms of terrorism. Moreover, this is an ambitious initiative in which national security capabilities and international cooperation reinforce each other.  Spain, with decades of counterterrorist experience and a wide-ranging nuclear infrastructure, has been from the very outset an active participant in the Summit process.

Throughout all these years, it has become increasingly clear that there is a need for a coherent and effective global nuclear security architecture, based on integrating the efforts and synergies coming from the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency, INTERPOL, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the Global Partnership. As a result of this collective effort five different Action Plans have been submitted to support these multilateral organizations and initiatives to be endorsed by the participating Governments at this Washington Summit.

The Government of Spain would like to take advantage of this opportunity to reaffirm its national and international commitments in priority areas for our national security and for that of other friendly nations.

-          Firstly, we must continue our efforts to foster in Spain a culture of nuclear security, including training activities in cooperation with our law enforcement agencies, the industry and academia. Spain also stands ready to share this experience with other countries. 

• Secondly, we will reinforce our national forensic analysis capabilities on nuclear issues of our State Security Forces.
• Thirdly, we will focus our efforts on developing cybersecurity capabilities, particularly for nuclear facilities, within the framework of the National Cybersecurity Plan.
• The fourth priority area for Spain is nuclear security in maritime transport, including security management at Spanish ports. To this end we will carry out exercises focused on strategic areas, in accordance with the objectives of our Plan on National Maritime Security.
• It is also important to raise awareness, at every level, on the security of radioactive sources, which are very widely used in hospitals and industry across Spain. In addition to promoting the entry into force of the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (1987) and the implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2005), the Government of Spain believes that the implementation and promotion of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Code of Conduct in this area, both at national and international levels, is an issue of vital importance for security, given the high number of these sources in use, and the special nature of management, decommissioning and storage processes.

The Spanish Government attaches great importance to a pragmatic approach in all these areas, which will require conducting practical exercises, both at national level and in cooperation with other countries.

The threat of nuclear terrorism requires a global response. This is why international efforts are so important. In this sense, Spain considers vital our cooperation with the United Nations, the IAEA, and INTERPOL, and we highly value the contribution of other initiatives in this area, including the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and the Global Partnership, which offer adequate and flexible frameworks for international cooperation through a pragmatic approach.

In the recent years, the international community has made important steps against the threat of nuclear terrorism, including the Nuclear Security Summit process.

Spain attaches great importance to Security Council Resolution 1540, and chairs in 2015-16 the 1540 Committee that monitors and promotes the implementation of this resolution. Spain encourages all States to participate in a constructive manner in the 1540 Comprehensive Review to take place this year in order to urgently strengthen the capacity of the international community to face such a threat to international peace and security.

At international level, Spain works within a privileged cooperation framework with the European Union, Latin-American and Mediterranean countries. In recent years, this policy has borne fruits such as the progress made with Morocco through a bilateral Action Plan, launched in collaboration with the IAEA, including noteworthy results as the Gate to Africa exercise in October 2015 on the security of transport of radioactive sources.

Spain and Morocco have made substantial joint progress on combating the risk of nuclear terrorism.  With the Gate to Africa exercise, we have improved law enforcement coordination and response capabilities when addressing a radiological emergency caused by a terrorist attack. Sixty-four observers from the IAEA Member States and representatives from seven international organizations took part in this exercise, which constituted a major contribution to strengthening the international nuclear security system.

This bilateral relationship between Morocco and Spain has set an international standard that will be promoted as a model at other international fora, such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the IAEA.

Fortunately, the world has not yet experienced the impact of nuclear terrorism. However, we know that the threat exists. As members of our Governments, it is our duty to protect our citizens, doing everything in our reach to prevent terrorist attacks with unpredictable consequences—and, should they occur, to stand ready to respond effectively to defend the victims and enforce the law.