National Statement: Algeria (French)

SOMMET SUR LA SECURITE NUCLEAIRE

Washington D.C., Etats-Unis d’Amérique

31 mars-1er avril 2016

ALGERIE

INTERVENTION DE MONSIEUR LE PREMIER MINISTRE

1er avril 2016

Monsieur le Président,

Mesdames et Messieurs les Chefs d’Etat et de Gouvernement,

Excellences,

Mesdames et Messieurs,

Je voudrais tout d'abord exprimer, au nom de la délégation algérienne, ma gratitude au Président des Etats-Unis, M. Barack Obama, pour son initiative d’organiser le Sommet auquel nous prenons part aujourd’hui pour mesurer les progrès accomplis dans le renforcement de la sécurité nucléaire depuis le premier Sommet tenu, ici à Washington, en 2010.

Notre réunion, qui regroupe plus de cinquante Etats issus de toutes les régions du monde, autant que les résultats de nos différentes rencontres depuis 2010 sur cette question d’importance majeure, nous offrent l’opportunité de prendre la mesure du risque potentiel lié à l’émergence de nouvelles menaces mettant en cause les matières et sources radioactives avec toutes les conséquences radiologiques pour les populations, les biens et l’environnement. D’où l’impérieuse nécessité de leur prise en charge, de manière adéquate, tant au plan national que dans le cadre d’une coopération multilatérale renforcée.

Les efforts déployés par la communauté internationale pour le renforcement de la sécurité nucléaire depuis le Sommet de Washington 2010, ont permis de converger vers une vision globale de nos Etats qui aspirent à partager des objectifs communs en matière de désarmement nucléaire, de non-prolifération et d’utilisation pacifique de l'énergie nucléaire.

Cette évolution n’a été possible que grâce à la mise en oeuvre d’actions concrètes et durables par nos Etats, conformément à leurs obligations respectives, tant au plan national que régional et international.

Dans ce contexte, je saisis l’occasion qui m’est donnée aujourd’hui pour saluer l’action de l’Agence Internationale de l’Energie Atomique en matière de promotion de la sécurité nucléaire sur le plan international et dont il faut soutenir les efforts, tant son expertise et expérience demeurent, à tous points de vue, essentielles dans le renforcement continu du cadre international de sécurité nucléaire, comme rappelé dans les communiqués respectifs des Sommets de Washington, Séoul et La Haye.

Je voudrais, aussi, souligner l'apport de l'AIEA en matière de prise en charge de la sécurité nucléaire sur le plan international, notamment en ce qui concerne l’élaboration des normes et de la documentation technique y afférente.

Monsieur le Président,

L’Algérie, qui a ratifié la Convention sur la Protection Physique des Matières Nucléaires ainsi que son amendement et la Convention Internationale pour la répression des actes de terrorisme Nucléaire, saisit cette occasion pour réitérer toute l’importance que revêt l’adhésion universelle à l’ensemble des instruments juridiques internationaux qui régissent la sécurité nucléaire.

Outre ces deux instruments qui ont un impact direct sur le renforcement de l’architecture mondiale de la sécurité nucléaire, l’Algérie a souscrit au Code de Conduite de l’AIEA sur la Sûreté et la Sécurité des sources radioactives dont les dispositions sont mises en application depuis plus d’une décennie.

Dans ce contexte et en conformité avec ses engagements en faveur de la paix et de la sécurité internationales, l’Algérie a adhéré également aux instruments juridiques internationaux connexes, notamment les Conventions des Nations Unies sur la lutte contre le terrorisme, le crime organisé, la corruption et le blanchiment d’argent.

L’Algérie, qui accorde une importance particulière aux questions de désarmement, de non-prolifération et de sécurité internationale, a procédé, le 21 mars de cette année, à la signature de l’engagement relatif à l’impact humanitaire des armes nucléaires, confirmant ainsi son soutien aux efforts internationaux en matière de promotion de la paix et de la sécurité internationales.

Monsieur le Président,

Sur le plan interne, mon pays a substantiellement renforcé son cadre législatif et réglementaire par l’amendement du code pénal criminalisant davantage l'utilisation malveillante de matières radioactives et les actes de terrorisme nucléaire. La réglementation régissant la protection physique des installations nucléaires, matières nucléaires et autres sources radioactives est régulièrement revue et révisée, en conformité avec les prescriptions en la matière.

Par ailleurs, le régime des importations, de détention et des exportations des sources radioactives a été renforcé par la mise en place d’un contrôle rigoureux aux frontières, en coordination étroite avec les Institutions nationales concernées.

Toutes ces actions contribuent au renforcement de la mise en oeuvre des dispositions de la résolution 1540 du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies.

Monsieur le Président,

L’Algérie accorde, également, un intérêt particulier au développement des ressources humaines, notamment pour la formation et la sensibilisation des personnels relevant des Institutions et Organismes dont les missions sont en rapport avec la sécurité nucléaire.

A cet effet, nous avons mis en place un Centre de formation et d’appui à la sécurité nucléaire qui permet de répondre aux défis posés par la problématique de la sécurité nucléaire et de valoriser nos capacités nationales pour le maintien d'un régime de sécurité nucléaire inspiré des principes fondamentaux y relatifs.

Ce Centre de formation a une vocation régionale qui lui permet de contribuer, de manière effective, au renforcement du réseau international des centres d’appui à la sécurité nucléaire pour le partage des informations et des connaissances.

L'Algérie participe activement à la mise en oeuvre du programme de sécurité nucléaire de l'AIEA qui s’inscrit dans le cadre des différents plans adoptés sous son égide. Elle coopère également avec INTERPOL.

Mon pays a également marqué son adhésion à la mise en oeuvre des fondamentaux de la sécurité nucléaire en initiant un Plan Intégré d’Appui à la Sécurité Nucléaire (INSSP) en collaboration avec l’AIEA. A cet effet, un Comité de Sécurité Nucléaire a été mis en place, en vue de définir l’architecture de sécurité nucléaire nationale ainsi que les mécanismes de coordination inter-institutionnels prévus à cet égard.

Monsieur le Président

Conscient de l’importance des enjeux dans ce domaine, mon pays oeuvre également à l’avènement d’une architecture de sécurité nucléaire globale et durable. A ce titre, nous estimons qu’il est nécessaire d'encourager et de promouvoir une coopération internationale efficace pour améliorer constamment la sûreté et la sécurité nucléaires, en favorisant les échanges en matière d'information, d'expertise et de technologie.

L’initiative du Président Obama a favorisé l’inscription de la problématique de la sécurité nucléaire au premier plan de l’agenda international. Elle a ouvert la voie à une action globale pour l’amélioration de la coopération internationale en la matière. C’est, de toute évidence, le lieu de s’en réjouir et l’Histoire vous retiendra cela.

Je souhaite plein succès à nos travaux et vous remercie de votre attention.

National Statement: France

To access France's National Statement, please click here. 

National Statement: Argentina

La Comunidad Internacional ante los Desafíos de la Seguridad Nuclear

La República Argentina posee una rica historia en el desarrollo pacífico de la energía nuclear y, como tal, ha estado presente en el proceso de Cumbres de Seguridad Nuclear desde su lanzamiento en 2010. Ello demuestra el compromiso de nuestra nación con los esfuerzos multilaterales en aras de un mundo más seguro, libre de terrorismo en cualquiera de sus formas.

El sector nuclear en nuestro país opera conforme los más altos estándares de seguridad física y tecnológica en base a los lineamientos impartidos por las agencias de control nacionales correspondientes. Dada la importancia del rol regulatorio del Estado, se torna indispensable que el mismo mantenga una política de mejoras constantes, tanto desde un punto de vista técnico como político.

En tal sentido, reconocemos la importancia de mantener los logros internacionales alcanzados en materia de seguridad y avanzar en la mejora de las capacidades estatales en aquellas áreas en las que se observa un menor desarrollo relativo. Es por ello que la Argentina apoya la creación de centros de entrenamiento y apoyo en seguridad nuclear, ya que considera muy importante sostener iniciativas que, como ésta, contribuyen a una cultura de la seguridad nuclear.

Asimismo, iniciativas tales como el incremento de la seguridad cibernética en plantas e instalaciones, así como el desarrollo de la forénsica nuclear constituyen ejes centrales de la política de seguridad nuclear de la Argentina y de su compromiso con la agenda multilateral en la materia. En este sentido, cabe destacar el desarrollo nuclear pacífico argentino a lo largo de más de seis décadas, así como los esfuerzos ininterrumpidos en la expansión del empleo de uranio de bajo enriquecimiento en todas aquellas actividades que son susceptibles de llevarse a cabo con ese material sensitivo y en estricto cumplimiento con las directrices del Grupo de Países Proveedores Nucleares (NSG, por sus siglas en inglés).

Una condición indispensable para una sólida política de seguridad nuclear es la existencia de instituciones eficientes, modernas y entrenadas. En este campo, la Argentina dispone desde hace décadas –y dedica esfuerzos constantes a su fortalecimiento– de organizaciones especializadas que velan por mantener las instalaciones y los materiales seguros; al tiempo que garantizan el cumplimiento de nuestro país de los compromisos internacionales. Estas organizaciones son:

·         La Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear, una agencia independiente del Estado, con plena competencia legal y técnica en materia de seguridad radiológica y nuclear, salvaguardias y no proliferación, y seguridad física.

·         La Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica, a cargo de la investigación y desarrollo en el campo nuclear; mantiene y cumple rigurosamente con los estándares internacionales y cultiva una sólida cultura de seguridad. Desde hace casi dos décadas, la Comisión opera en conformidad con los instrumentos internacionales vigentes.

·         Nuestra Cancillería tiene un área específica dedicada a los asuntos nucleares y otras tecnologías de uso dual, que contribuye al seguimiento internacional y la implementación de políticas efectivas en la materia.

·         Por último, es importante destacar que nuestro país cuenta con una fuerza federal de seguridad equipada, entrenada y altamente especializada (Gendarmería Nacional) a cargo de la seguridad de los materiales nucleares, ya sea en situación de almacenamiento, uso o transporte.

Iniciativas de la Argentina en seguridad nuclear

La Argentina forma parte del Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica (AIEA, por sus siglas en inglés) desde el año de su fundación y participa intensamente en los programas e iniciativas que se generan en su seno en materia de seguridad. Asimismo, participa de esfuerzos colectivos como la Iniciativa Global para Combatir el Terrorismo Nuclear (GICNT, por sus siglas en inglés). En este marco, hemos realizado en 2014 un ejercicio binacional de seguridad nuclear junto a la República de Chile, que derivó en la mejora de nuestras capacidades instaladas, al tiempo que aportó enseñanzas de trabajo conjunto contra un fenómeno global. Esperamos continuar trabajando en la misma línea, tanto con Chile como con otros países de la región.

La Argentina, como miembro parte del “Programa Internacional de Reducción de Enriquecimiento para reactores de investigación”, y en consonancia con las recomendaciones de la Conferencia Internacional para la Reducción de la Amenaza Global, realizada en el año 2004, ha convertido sus reactores de investigación a uranio de bajo enriquecimiento, demostrando una política responsable para la eliminación de altos riesgos nucleares y un progreso considerable en lo referente al control y seguridad de materiales nucleares.

Actualmente, nuestro país está llevando una profunda reforma del paradigma de trabajo de las fuerzas federales a cargo de la seguridad nuclear, incorporando nuevas hipótesis de amenazas terroristas tanto en instalaciones como en el sistema de transporte. Así, se proyecta una importante inversión nacional en la modernización del equipamiento de seguridad, al tiempo que se busca mejorar nuestras capacidades de detección en puestos de control aduaneros y fronterizos en base a la cooperación interagencial. En relación a este punto, cabe mencionar la puesta en funcionamiento de un nuevo sistema de control biométrico de pasajeros en todo el país, que permitió mejorar sensiblemente la seguridad de los datos personales registrados. Implica la más importante mejora tecnológica en décadas y permite procesar el ingreso y egreso de personas contra la base de datos centralizada en tiempo real y con un error prácticamente nulo. Contamos con un sistema de pasaportes de los más seguros del mundo, tal como lo certifican las organizaciones especializadas en la materia.

Tomando los aprendizajes y las recomendaciones del reciente ejercicio “Apex Gold”, estamos trabajando en un programa para desarrollar una biblioteca de forénsica nuclear para ser incorporada a la red global de bibliotecas y registros. Por otro lado, la Argentina asumió a partir de junio de 2014 –y por dos años consecutivos– la presidencia del NSG, reafirmando el rol fundamental, y la responsabilidad, de los países proveedores en el mantenimiento de la seguridad nuclear a nivel mundial.

Asimismo, nuestro país ha adoptado una política responsable en materia de gestión de los residuos radioactivos y de los combustibles gastados derivados de la actividad nuclear y sus aplicaciones. Es por ello que nuestro Plan Nacional de Gestión de los mismos busca permanentemente la mejora de la seguridad de las instalaciones con el fin de evitar que sean objeto de actos maliciosos.

La cooperación internacional como mecanismo de prevención del terrorismo nuclear

Los esfuerzos colectivos como el proceso de Cumbres de Seguridad Nuclear deben sustentarse en la cooperación internacional bajo un claro y firme compromiso de los Estados: negarle al terrorismo el acceso a los materiales nucleares susceptibles de ser usados como armas políticas. La Argentina ha sufrido el flagelo del terrorismo en su propio territorio en dos ocasiones y conoce el enorme costo en vidas humanas que el mismo conlleva. Es por ello que el compromiso con la seguridad nuclear no debe ser interpretado como un impedimento al ejercicio soberano de los Estados a la autonomía tecnológica y los usos pacíficos de la energía nuclear, lo cual debe darse siempre en estricto cumplimiento de los compromisos asumidos bajo el Tratado de No Proliferación Nuclear (NPT, por sus siglas en inglés) y demás instrumentos de control regionales e internacionales.

A 25 años de la creación de la Agencia Brasileño-Argentina de Contabilidad y Control de Materiales Nucleares (ABACC, por sus siglas en español), Argentina reafirma su compromiso con el uso estrictamente pacífico de la tecnología nuclear y los esfuerzos concertados a favor de la estabilidad internacional. Constituida a partir de la transición democrática, la ABACC fue el primer enlace de integración entre ambos países, constituyéndose con el tiempo en una fuente de transparencia y construcción de confianza que posibilitó el avance de la cooperación hacia otras áreas de interés mutuo. Este acervo compartido da testimonio de la vocación política de la Argentina y Brasil por asegurar los usos exclusivamente pacíficos de esta energía y la no proliferación nuclear.

Asimismo, debe señalarse que la tecnología desarrollada para los combustibles de reactores nucleares argentinos y para la producción de radioisótopos en base al uranio de bajo enriquecimiento, han estado presentes en las principales exportaciones tecnológicas del país a través de la empresa INVAP. La utilización de uranio de bajo enriquecimiento asegura los fines pacíficos de las aplicaciones de la energía nuclear, que sumados a la promoción internacional de este tipo de prácticas y tecnologías han contribuido a que la Argentina ostente un destacado perfil internacional en el campo nuclear.

Es en virtud de esta trayectoria histórica que la Argentina considera que los esfuerzos significativos que han venido realizando los países no poseedores de armas nucleares en el campo de la seguridad nuclear, tendrán un éxito relativo mientras la agenda de desarme no sea impulsada con el mismo ímpetu colectivo.

El proceso de Cumbres en su actual formato llega a su fin. Es nuestra responsabilidad compartida que los compromisos asumidos mantengan su vigencia. Por ello, sostenemos la importancia de fortalecer las instancias e instituciones pre-existentes, enriqueciéndolas con los planes de acción que hemos logrado acordar. A tal fin, llamamos a los Estados a establecer un Grupo de Contacto en Seguridad Nuclear que consolide los logros alcanzados y asegure su seguimiento e implementación futuros. De este modo, estaremos contribuyendo a la seguridad de la tecnología nuclear a través de resultados duraderos en el tiempo. 

National Statement: Australia

The 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit

Australian National Statement

The Nuclear Security Summits have served well to strengthen the global nuclear security architecture and address the threat of nuclear terrorism.  In spite of this, terrorists will seek to exploit the weakest link, misuse technology and take advantage of any lack of international cooperation in their quest to cause catastrophic damage and loss of life. This is why Australia fully supports high standards of nuclear security to prevent the theft of nuclear materials or sabotage of nuclear facilities.

Australia’s commitment to nuclear security, safeguards and non-proliferation is longstanding. Even prior to the first nuclear security summit in 2010, Australia had ratified the 2005 Amendment of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, was already using low enriched uranium technology to fuel its research reactor and produce medical isotopes, was engaging strongly with the IAEA and regionally on promoting high standards of nuclear security, and was a regular contributor to the IAEA’s nuclear security fund since its inception in 2002.

Since the first Washington summit, Australia has ratified the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, hosted an IAEA Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) peer-review mission and has invited the IAEA to conduct a follow-up mission in 2017.  Australia also has repatriated highly-enriched uranium (HEU) to the United States and supported many of the gift baskets and joint statements of supplementary initiatives that are associated with the summits.

Australia has provided over AU$2.4 million to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund since its inception.  Australia calls on all states to ensure that the IAEA has sufficient and sustainable resources to fulfil its central role in nuclear security.

Australia has confirmed its commitment to implement the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Series of guidance documents through its association with the joint statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation. Australia is proud to have been ranked top of the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s global review of nuclear security for three times in succession. Australia is also a leader in the safety and security of radioactive sources, having committed to the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and to the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources, and having conducted a comprehensive outreach program on radioactive source security in South-East Asia and the Pacific.

Australia is further supporting global HEU minimisation efforts by significantly expanding its production of medical radioisotopes for the global market, made exclusively from low enriched uranium (LEU) targets using its LEU-fuelled reactor.

Australia continues to support the IAEA’s central role in nuclear security and also supports and participates in the leadership of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) including by chairing the Nuclear Forensics Working Group.

Australia actively supports the Nuclear Industry Summit on nuclear security. More needs to be done to integrate the nuclear security goals and activities of industry and governments.  Australia welcomes the significant contributions that non-government organisations have made to nuclear security conceptual development and the summit agenda, and welcomes the convening of the NGO Summit “Solutions for a Secure Nuclear Future” held earlier this week. Arrangements beyond the summits must involve the bringing together of government, industry and non-government participants to focus on continued improvement of the global nuclear security architecture and on effective implementation. In this regard, Australia welcomes the IAEA’s convening of a second Ministerial meeting and international conference on nuclear security in December this year.

The imminent entry-into-force of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material is a welcome outcome of the high-level attention to nuclear security gained through the summits. Importantly, this must be followed up with robust implementation of its provisions and a commitment to further improvement at its mandated review conference.

To be comprehensive, nuclear security architecture requires more than ratification of treaties, repatriation of nuclear material, and setting standards and guidelines. It also requires international cooperation and other voluntary measures where states can assure each other that their respective national nuclear security regimes are robust, implemented to a high standard and applied to all nuclear material under its control.

Australia will faithfully pursue the commitments set out in all the summit communiqués and the five action plans delivered at this final nuclear security summit.  This includes support for the institutions and initiatives that will maintain the momentum produced through the summits.

In this regard, Australia will focus on four areas of activity for the sustainment of the nuclear security summit’s objectives and goals, namely through:

·         supporting the existing nuclear security treaties, organisations and initiatives, consistent with and beyond the commitments made in the action plans delivered at this summit;

·         being active in a post-summit contact group to promote the implementation of nuclear security commitments and identify emerging trends that may require more focused attention;

·         involvement in track 1.5 dialogues and programs of government, industry and non-government experts for the enhancement of global nuclear security; and

·         participating in regional initiatives for capacity building in nuclear security.

With this nuclear security summit being the last planned at present, Australia calls on all summit participants to stand by their commitments, maintain vigilance and sustain efforts for the continuous enhancement of the global nuclear security architecture to ensure the security of all nuclear material and facilities.

National Statement: Brazil

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERATIVE

REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL, DILMA ROUSSEFF, FOR THE

IV NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT

Washington, April 1, 2016

Dear President Obama,

Dear Heads of State and of Government and representatives of International Organizations and Special Guests,

Dear Ministers,

Ladies and gentlemen,

I congratulate President Obama for having launched, in 2010, this process of reflection on the importance of nuclear security, which led to four Summits and the adoption of national and multilateral Action Plans.

Brazil, which has been taking part in this process since its inception, recognizes the positive outcomes of this reflection, such as the enhanced visibility of the subject of nuclear security and the broad mobilization that it has ensued.

Now that the fundamental principles and the basis for increased international cooperation in this area have been laid down, we consider it important, as we move forward, that the International Atomic Energy Agency give continuity to the process. The AIEA is the only multilateral institution with expertise and experience in matters of nuclear security. It has the capacity to develop, on a global level, an organic, holistic and all-encompassing vision based on the progress that we have made through four Nuclear Security Summits.

The physical protection of nuclear materials and installations and adequate guarantees for exclusively peaceful use of nuclear technology are fundamental if we are to create a favorable environment for developing nuclear energy that benefits humanity.

Today we face the challenge of preventing the possible use of nuclear weapons and materials by non-State actors. Brazil has undertaken national and international actions with a view to countering terrorism. We condemn any act of terrorism, no matter what its pretext, and look with concern upon the possibility that acts of terrorism may be perpetrated with weapons of mass destruction.

This threat must not, however, overshadow the fact that the detonation of a nuclear device by a State would be as catastrophic and illegitimate as the use of these same weapons by non-state actors. As the UN Secretary-General has said so wisely, "there are no right hands for these wrong weapons."

Seventy years after the adoption of the first resolution by the United Nations General Assembly on the elimination of nuclear weapons, the threat of the extinction of humankind still weighs upon the international community. Nuclear weapons are the most lethal, indiscriminate and disproportionate devices ever created by man. They are detrimental to the most elementary foundations of international humanitarian law.

That is why our region signed, in 1967, the Tlatelolco Treaty, which established a Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Latin American and Caribbean countries are proud to have created a vast region free of weapons of mass destruction, which served as an inspiration to similar initiatives in other parts of our planet.

In 1991, also in a pioneering fashion, Brazil and Argentina created the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC, in Portuguese), which allows inspectors to carry out reciprocal inspections of our countries' respective nuclear activities. Throughout its 25-year existence, ABACC has been acknowledged internationally as a model of transparency and confidence-building in the nuclear area.

Before this initiative came into being and as our 1988 Federal Constitution was being drafted, Brazilian legislators inscribed in its Article 21 the principle that "every nuclear activity in the national territory will only be admitted for peaceful uses."

Brazil will not shy away from demanding that all States fully observe the objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, particularly those regarding nuclear disarmament. 

The failure of the 2015 NPT Review Conference has raised serious questions about the future of the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime. These hesitations aggravate the nuclear threat.

The reaffirmation of deterrence doctrines, modernization plans and long-term investments in nuclear weapons programs also serve to undermine the legitimacy of the non-proliferation and disarmament regime. These trends pose serious challenges to nuclear security initiatives. The vast majority of the world’s fissile material—which could be used in nuclear weapons—is located in military facilities which are not subject to any international oversight, information-sharing or confidence-building mechanisms.

Brazil and many other countries consider it essential that we work simultaneously and with determination as we face our challenges in the nuclear area. Besides strengthening nuclear security, we also need to sustain non-proliferation efforts and make rapid progress towards nuclear disarmament, with a view to bringing about a world free of nuclear weapons, or any other weapons of mass destruction.

Guided by this spirit of an overall mitigation of the risks posed by the use of nuclear weapons, Brazil and 15 other participating countries in this Summit will adopt a Joint Declaration with a comprehensive vision of the challenges that we face in the nuclear area.

Forty-five years after the Non-Proliferation Treaty entered into force and twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War, the continued existence of thousands of nuclear weapons constitutes the biggest and most immediate threat to humanity.

The complete elimination of these weapons stands as the sole absolute guarantee against their use, or threat of their use.

Thank you very much.

National Statement: Canada (French)

SOMMET SUR LA SÉCURITÉ NUCLÉAIRE 2016

DÉCLARATION NATIONALE

Le Canada reconnaît que le terrorisme nucléaire constitue l’une des menaces les plus graves pour la sécurité internationale. Un seul acte de terrorisme nucléaire ou radiologique pourrait avoir des conséquences catastrophiques sur les plans humanitaire et économique, à l’échelle tant locale que mondiale. Il est de la responsabilité des chefs de file mondiaux de prendre les mesures nécessaires pour éviter qu’une telle situation ne survienne.

            Le Sommet sur la sécurité nucléaire a fourni une tribune privilégiée aux chefs de file mondiaux qui leur a permis de prendre des engagements mutuels et de renforcer l’engagement pris au plus haut niveau pour assurer la sécurité des matières nucléaires. De concert, nous avons renforcé les efforts déployés à l’échelon international pour lutter contre le terrorisme nucléaire, amélioré la sécurité des matières nucléaires au niveau mondial et renforcé les institutions internationales qui sont partie intégrante de la structure mondiale en matière de sécurité nucléaire. Le Canada facilite la mise en application d’un cadre multilatéral solide pour la lutte internationale contre le terrorisme nucléaire, notamment des obligations contraignantes pour les États afin de renforcer la sécurité des matières nucléaires, cadrant avec les objectifs du Sommet sur la sécurité nucléaire. Ce quatrième Sommet a été considéré comme un « Sommet de transition » et vise à garantir que les réalisations atteintes soient durables.

Le Canada souscrit pleinement aux orientations de transition du Sommet sur la sécurité nucléaire visant à appuyer les institutions de la structure mondiale en matière de sécurité nucléaire : l’Agence internationale de l’énergie atomique (AIEA) qui joue un rôle clé de coordination dans le domaine de la sécurité nucléaire, l’Organisation des Nations Unies (ONU) en tant qu’organisme qui établit des normes, l’Organisation internationale de police criminelle (INTERPOL) en tant qu’organisme qui proscrit et qui lutte contre le crime, l’Initiative mondiale de lutte contre le terrorisme nucléaire (IMLTN) en tant que groupe qui possède un savoir-faire technique et le Partenariat mondial contre la prolifération des armes de destruction massive et des matières connexes (le Partenariat mondial) par lequel les donateurs coordonnent leurs efforts en matière d’assistance afin de traiter les problèmes qui se posent dans le domaine de la sécurité nucléaire. Nous reconnaissons que les engagements continus pris lors du Sommet et que la poursuite des travaux dans les années à venir requièrent une coordination continue. Après le Sommet, le Canada se joindra au Groupe sur la sécurité nucléaire, qui aidera à assurer une transition en douceur en offrant une tribune aux États; cette tribune leur permettra de cerner les lacunes dans la mise en œuvre des engagements pris lors du Sommet et de discuter des menaces émergentes et des enjeux sous-jacents.

J’ai le plaisir de confirmer que le Canada a, soit déjà honoré tous ses engagements nationaux établis lors des trois sommets précédents, ou est sur le point de les honorer, notamment sous la forme d’un financement de 28 millions de dollars pour améliorer la sécurité mondiale dans les domaines nucléaire et radiologique par l’intermédiaire de notre Programme de partenariat mondial. Dans le cadre de ce programme, citons le financement de 5,5 millions de dollars pour améliorer la sécurité physique des installations nucléaires en Asie du Sud-Est, celui de 12 millions de dollars pour prévenir le trafic illicite de matières nucléaires et radiologiques dans les Amériques et au Moyen-Orient et celui de 10,4 millions de dollars pour renforcer la sécurité des sources radioactives en Afrique, dans les Amériques, au Moyen-Orient et en Asie du Sud-Est. Un point important supplémentaire pour le Canada dans la mise en application des engagements pris lors du précédent Sommet a été l’organisation de notre première mission du Service consultatif international sur la protection physique (SCIPP) de l’AIEA en octobre 2015 aux fins d’évaluation de notre programme national en matière de sécurité nucléaire. Le rapport de mission a conclu que le programme national en matière de sécurité nucléaire est solide, résistant et durable. Le Canada encourage les États qui ne l’ont pas encore fait à organiser une mission SCIPP, et salue l’AIEA pour son approche collaborative et globale dans le soutien qu’elle apporte aux États membres à améliorer leur sécurité nucléaire nationale.

Nous prenons également d’autres mesures, à l’échelle tant nationale qu’internationale, qui démontrent notre leadership et notre engagement continus à l’égard des efforts mondiaux pour assurer la sécurité nucléaire et prévenir le terrorisme nucléaire. Le Canada demeure fermement résolu à réduire la prolifération d’uranium hautement enrichi et d’autres matières nucléaires sensibles, comme moyen pour accroître notre sécurité. Outre les engagements pris aux Sommets sur la sécurité nucléaire de 2010 et 2012, nous sommes sur le point de rapatrier l’uranium hautement enrichi provenant des États-Unis. Par ailleurs, l’Université de l’Alberta est en train de prendre des mesures afin d’arrêter son réacteur de recherche SLOWPOKE et de rapatrier son carburant d’uranium hautement enrichi aux États-Unis, ce qui va en réduire l’utilisation au Canada. Pour finir, le Canada a déterminé que les trois quarts de ses stocks de plutonium sont prêts à être éliminés, et il a entamé des discussions avec les États-Unis pour savoir s’ils accepteraient ces matières en vue d’une gestion à long terme. Le reste continuera d’être entreposé de manière sécuritaire et sera utilisé pour soutenir les futurs travaux en matière de recherche et développement.

Au-delà des engagements pris au Sommet sur la sécurité nucléaire de 2012, le Canada poursuit le développement de sa capacité nationale en criminalistique nucléaire – un élément clé dans l’enquête sur le trafic illicite des matières nucléaires et radioactives. Nous allons nous appuyer sur notre capacité existante et créer officiellement une bibliothèque dans le domaine de la criminalistique nucléaire ainsi que mettre sur pied un réseau de laboratoires en la matière qui seront en mesure d’appuyer la répression des actes de terrorisme nucléaire et de l’utilisation criminelle de matières nucléaires. Nous allons continuer à partager notre savoir-faire technique dans ce domaine avec d’autres États par le biais d’initiatives comme l’IMLTN.

Le Canada consacrera un montant supplémentaire de 42 millions de dollars dans le cadre du Programme de partenariat mondial au cours des deux prochaines années afin d’accroître la sécurité dans les domaines nucléaire et radiologique à l’échelle mondiale :

·       en luttant contre le trafic illicite grâce au renforcement des capacités nationales dans les Amériques et au Moyen-Orient;

·       en améliorant la sécurité physique aux installations nucléaires dans un certain nombre de pays;

·       en favorisant la gestion et l’élimination en toute sûreté des sources radioactives désaffectées dans les pays et régions où l’on relève des besoins en la matière, essentiellement dans les Amériques;

·       en supportant le Fonds de sécurité nucléaire de l’AIEA.

Outre ces engagements, le Canada se réjouit particulièrement d’avoir conjointement avec l’Espagne et la République de Corée, renouvelé un engagement sur la promotion de la mise en application complète et universelle de la résolution 1540 du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies (RCSNU). Le Canada est pleinement convaincu que la RCSNU joue un rôle clé dans la lutte contre la prolifération nucléaire par des acteurs non gouvernementaux. Avec le Royaume-Uni, le Canada a dirigé un engagement conjoint sur la formation certifiée relativement à la promotion de la gestion de la sécurité nucléaire. Cet engagement souligne l’importance du World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) et des cours de formation certifiés dispensés par la WINS Academy aux gestionnaires et au personnel œuvrant dans le domaine de la sécurité nucléaire. Conjointement avec d’autres États qui ont fourni un soutien à l’Academy, le Canada encourage l’expansion du programme de certification offert par la WINS Academy.

Le terrorisme nucléaire continue d'être une menace à l’échelle mondiale qui requiert non seulement le déploiement d’efforts continus à l’échelle nationale, mais également une coopération internationale soutenue. Le Sommet a été l’occasion d’attirer l’attention des chefs de file mondiaux sur la question de la sécurité nucléaire et cela s’est traduit par des réductions substantielles du volume de matières nucléaires sensibles en circulation dans le monde. L’amélioration de la sécurité des matières nucléaires à l’échelle mondiale reste une priorité absolue pour le Canada. Nous exhortons tous les États, qu’ils aient participé ou non au Sommet sur la sécurité nucléaire, à poursuivre leurs efforts de contribution, au moyen de leurs systèmes nationaux et de toutes les institutions internationales pertinentes.

National Statement: Canada

2016 NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT

NATIONAL STATEMENT

CANADA

Canada recognizes nuclear terrorism as one of the gravest threats to international security. A single act of nuclear or radiological terrorism could have catastrophic humanitarian and economic consequences, both locally and globally. It is the responsibility of the world’s leaders to take all necessary steps to ensure that this does not happen.

            The Nuclear Security Summit process has provided a vital forum for leaders to engage with each other and reinforce commitment at the highest levels to securing nuclear materials. Together, we have enhanced international efforts to combat nuclear terrorism, improved the security of nuclear materials worldwide, and strengthened the international institutions that are integral to the global nuclear security architecture. Canada supports a strong multilateral framework for the global fight against nuclear terrorism, including binding obligations on States to enhance the security of nuclear materials, in line with the objectives of the Nuclear Security Summit. This fourth Summit has been characterized as a “transition Summit,” and will focus on ensuring that the achievements of the Summit process are sustained. 

Canada strongly endorses transitioning Nuclear Security Summit lines of effort to the institutions of the global nuclear security architecture: the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which plays a leading role coordinating nuclear security; the United Nations (UN), as the norm-building organization; the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), as a crime-tracking and interdicting body; the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) as a group that develops technical expertise; and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (the Global Partnership), through which donors coordinate their assistance efforts for tackling nuclear security challenges. We recognize that sustaining Summit commitments and ensuring that work continues in the years ahead will require continued coordination. Canada will join the post-Summit “Nuclear Security Contact Group” which will help to ensure a smoother transition by providing a forum for States to identify gaps in the implementation of Summit commitments and discuss emerging threats and issues of concern. 

I am pleased to confirm that Canada has either already honoured or is in the process of fulfilling all national commitments made at the three previous Summits, including providing $28 million in funding to improve global nuclear and radiological security through our Global Partnership Program. Examples of this programming include $5.5 million to enhance the physical security of nuclear facilities in Southeast Asia, $12 million to prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological material in the Americas and Middle East, and $10.4 million to promote the security of radioactive sources in Africa, the Americas, the Middle East and Southeast Asia. An additional highlight for Canada in the implementation of previous Summit commitments was the hosting of our first IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission in October 2015, for the purpose of evaluating our domestic nuclear security regime. The mission report concluded that Canada’s nuclear security regime is robust, strong and sustainable. Canada encourages States that have not done so to host an IPPAS mission, and commends the IAEA on its comprehensive and collaborative approach to helping Member States enhance domestic nuclear security. 

We are also taking further steps, both at national and international levels, to demonstrate ongoing leadership and commitment to global efforts to advance nuclear security and prevent nuclear terrorism.  Canada remains dedicated to minimizing highly enriched uranium (HEU) and other sensitive nuclear materials, as a means of further enhancing our security. Further to commitments made at the 2010 and 2012 Nuclear Security Summits, we are on-track to repatriate United States (U.S.)-origin HEU. In addition, the University of Alberta is taking steps to decommission its SLOWPOKE research reactor and repatriate its HEU fuel to the U.S., which will further reduce the use of HEU in Canada. Finally, Canada has assessed that approximately three-quarters of its inventory of plutonium is ready for dispositioning, and has initiated discussions with the U.S. to determine whether it would accept the material for long-term management. The remainder would continue to be safely stored and used to support future research and development work.

Beyond the commitments made at the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit, Canada is in the process of further developing its national nuclear forensics capability – a key element in the investigation of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials. We will build on existing capacity and formally create a national nuclear forensics library and a network of nuclear forensics laboratories that will be able to support the prosecution of acts of nuclear terrorism and the criminal use of nuclear materials. We will continue to share our technical expertise in this area with other States through initiatives such as the GICNT.

Canada will be dedicating an additional $42 million in Global Partnership Program funding over the next two years to continue to improve nuclear and radiological security worldwide by:

·       combating illicit trafficking through strengthening national capacities in the Americas and the Middle East;

·       improving physical security at nuclear facilities in a number of countries;

·       promoting safe management and disposal of disused radioactive sources in countries and regions with identified needs, primarily in the Americas; and

·       supporting the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund.

In addition to these commitments, Canada is very pleased to have jointly led a renewal of a gift basket with Spain and the Republic of Korea on the full and universal implementation of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540. Canada strongly believes that UNSCR 1540 is a key component in countering nuclear proliferation by non-state actors. Canada also led a gift basket with the United Kingdom on certified training for nuclear security management. This gift basket underscores the importance of the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) and the certified training courses provided by the WINS Academy for managers and personnel involved in nuclear security. Along with other States that have provided support to the Academy, Canada encourages the further expansion of the WINS Academy’s certification program.

Nuclear terrorism remains a global threat that requires not only continued national efforts, but also sustained international cooperation. The Summit process has brought the issue of nuclear security to the forefront of world leaders’ attention, and has resulted in real reductions in the amount of vulnerable nuclear material in the world. Enhancing the security of nuclear materials worldwide will remain a top priority for Canada. We call on all States, whether they have been part of the Nuclear Security Summit process or not, to contribute to these vital efforts, both through their domestic systems and all relevant international institutions.

National Statement: Chile

STATEMENT BY THE HEAD OF THE CHILEAN DELEGATION, H.E. THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC,

MS. MICHELLE BACHELET JERIA

(NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT,

WASHINGTON, D.C., 31 MARCH & 1 APRIL 2016) 

Mr. President,

Chile joins other delegations in expressing our appreciation to the United States for your exceptional direction and organization of this Fourth Nuclear Security Summit. We highlight your leadership in this initiative, which represents an important dimension of the vision expressed in its statement made in Prague to address nuclear threats.

We are convinced that the efforts, and particularly the results of this process, will project in time, granting the international community with more robust global nuclear security architecture.

My country has firmly supported all international efforts to strengthen peace and security in the world, guided by the principle of the indivisibility of international security, where all States – regardless of their power or size – share the responsibility of consolidating a global order, based on cooperation and international law.

In this regard, we believe that cooperation in the field of Nuclear Security is one of the most effective ways for the international community to prevent the potential catastrophic consequences that the malicious use of nuclear and/or radiological material would have in a terrorist attack.

The recent terrorist attacks in Brussels, and in particular, the attempts to enter a nuclear facility, have proven the urgency of addressing the threat of Nuclear Terrorism.

From the start of this process, Chile has sought formulas to advance the consolidation of a legal and political regime to enhance nuclear security. This has entailed doubling the efforts to increase physical security in radioactive materials, generating measures to prevent nuclear smuggling, and the strengthening of international institutions in favor of nuclear security.

This is why we are proud to announce the creation of the Radiological Emergency Security Commission (CONSER), an inter-ministerial and inter-sectoral organism that seeks to generate policies regarding the coordination, preparation, and responses to radiological emergencies caused by accidents or illicit acts.

Moreover, and in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), we have assumed a formal commitment to implement a project for the detection of radioactive material in border points. The project will entail the donation of radioactive-source detection equipment to customs and police authorities, as well as the Chilean Commission on Nuclear Energy, in its capacity as the regulatory entity.

Similarly, during the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul in 2012, my country committed to develop a Nuclear Security Support Center (CASN). We are happy to announce that this project is in the final stage of its execution and will become operational in the coming months. This initiative will focus on the development of human resources in nuclear physical security, resulting in the strengthening of national capacities in the preparation; response; detection; equipment management and mitigation actions regarding radiological emergencies of different origins, involving the participation of people of different levels in security.

With respect to the strengthening and support of multilateral instruments, Chile has stated its commitment with the physical protection of nuclear and radioactive installations against the non-authorized removal of nuclear or radioactive material and acts of sabotage.  Proof of this is the series of treaties and agreements we have joined, such as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its Amendment, which we hope will enter into effect shortly, and which we have strongly promoted in different geographical regions and fora.

We also participated actively in the promotion of the universalization and full implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which continues to be the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime.

Chile is also part of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.

Another action worth noting is our contribution to the minimization of Highly Enriched Uranium. In this regard, Chile has converted its uranium enriching reactors to less than 20% and does not possess highly-enriched nuclear fuel. Furthermore, our country does not consider plutonium separation as part of its activities of the nuclear fuel cycle.  And finally, none of the research and development initiatives consider the use of highly enriched uranium.  

These are some of Chile’s most significant achievements that resulted from our commitment with the goals of the Nuclear Security Summit process. We are convinced that this initiative can contribute to advance the objective of ensuring all nuclear materials.

I would like to thank again the Government of the United States for the intense effort carried out during this Summit, as well as underline the significant momentum this initiative has generated in increasing nuclear security in the world. We are pleased, Mr. President, to contribute our part to reach this common objective.

Finally, we certainly hope that your legacy will constitute the basis for facilitating our common efforts aimed at preventing and confronting the threat of Nuclear Terrorism.

Thank you very much, Mr. President.

National Statement: Egypt (Arabic)

كلمة مصر أمام قمة الأمن النووي الرابعة

واشنطن

(31 مارس- 1 أبريل 2016)

السيد الرئيس،

شاركت مصر في أعمال قمة واشنطن للأمن النووي لعام 2010، استجابة لمبادرة الرئيس أوباما التي أطلقها لمعالجة تهديدات ومخاطر الأمن النووي. وقد حرصت مصر أيضاً علي المشاركة بفعالية في القمم التالية لقمة واشنطن والتي عقدت في سول عام 2012، ثم في لاهاي عام 2014 بما في ذلك كافة الاجتماعات التحضيرية التي عقدت ما بين القمم الثلاث.

وبانعقاد قمة واشنطن 2016، فإن مسار الجهود الدولية والوطنية الذي استمر لستة أعوام كاملة، يستوجب تقييماً مكتملاً بهدف استشراف وتحديد سبل التحرك المستقبلي، خاصة في ظل ما شهده هذا المسار على مدار هذه السنوات من جهد وفكر ومبادرات لتعزيز الأطر الوطنية والإقليمية والدولية لتطوير مفهوم الأمن النووي وتعزيز ثقافته، وذلك في الإطار الأشمل لسعي المجتمع الدولي نحو تدعيم نظام منع الانتشار، إسهاماً في تحقيق الأمن والاستقرار الدوليين.      

         لقد أكدت مصر دائماً دعمها ومساندتها للجهود المبذولة في مجال الأمن النووي سواء تلك التي كانت نتاجاً للقمم الثلاث السابقة أو التي خلصت اليها مسارات التعاون الثلاث أو ما ارتبط بمجالات التعاون الثنائي. ومع ذلك، فإن الرؤية المصرية إزاء موضوعات الأمن النووي تحكمها الاعتبارات والثوابت التالية:

أولاً: أن التعامل الأمثل مع موضوعات الأمن النووي يظل مرتبطاً ارتباطاً وثيقاً بضرورة معالجة قضايا الأمن النووي من منظور شامل تسمح بتطبيق إجراءات الأمن النووي علي كافة المواد النووية دون استثناء وفي مقدمتها تلك المستخدمة للأغراض العسكرية، خاصة الأسلحة النووية.

ثانيا: أن أي تقدم حقيقي في مجال دعم الأمن النووي يستلزم تحقيق تقدم فعلي في جهود نزع السلاح النووي، فإذا كان المجتمع الدولي قد أولى إهتماماً خاصاً بالأمن النووي خلال السنوات الماضية، فمن الأجدر والأولى أن توجه جهود المجتمع الدولي من الآن فصاعداً لتحقيق نقلة نوعية في مجال نزع السلاح النووي. فالوضع الأمني دولياً وإقليمياً لا يسمح بأي حال أن تترك برامج ومنشآت نووية دون نظام للضمانات أو رقابة دولية قادرة علي النفاذ إلي هذه المنشآت النووية. ويقودنا ما تقدم إلي التأكيد مجدداً علي الأولوية التي توليها مصر لإنشاء المنطقة الخالية من السلاح النووي في الشرق الأوسط، والتي باتت أمراً ملحاً يستوجب توافر الإرادة السياسية للمجتمع الدولي لاتخاذ ما يلزم من خطوات فعلية لتنفيذ القرارات الصادرة عن مؤتمرات المراجعة لمعاهدة منع الانتشار في هذا الشأن.

ثالثاً: يظل الحق الأصيل للدول في الاستخدام السلمي للطاقة النووية أحد الركائز الأساسية الثلاث لمعاهدة منع الانتشار النووي، ومن ثم فإن تطبيق إجراءات الأمن النووي لا يجب بأي حال أن تمس هذا الحق الأصيل للدول سواء من خلال تقييد هذا الحق أو فرض أية مشروطية عليه، فمفهوم الأمن النووي في نهاية الأمر يعد هدفاً تعاونياً وليس تقييدياً.

رابعاً: أن مسئولية الإضطلاع بتنفيذ إجراءات الأمن النووي إنما هي مسئولية خالصة للدول الأعضاء، تلتزم بها طوعياً إتساقاً مع تعهدات والتزامات الدول وفقاً لقوانينها وتشريعاتها الوطنية.

خامساً: تعد الوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية هي الجهة القادرة علي تحمل المسئولية الرئيسية، والدور الريادي في تنفيذ إجراءات الأمن النووي لما يتوافر لديها من موارد وخبرات علمية وعملية متراكمة تؤهلها بشكل أساسي من تنفيذ ومتابعة إجراءات الأمن النووي، وتقديم المساعدة الفنية للدول الأعضاء إن طلبت ذلك.

السيد الرئيس،

         في ضوء التحديات التي تواجهها مصر في مجال الطاقة، وبالنظر إلي العوائق المرتبطة بالمصادر التقليدية للطاقة، أعلنت مصر في 15 نوفمبر 2015 عن إنشاء أول محطة نووية في منطقة الضبعة تضم أربعة مفاعلات بطاقة إنتاجية 1200 ميجاوات لكل مفاعل، وبتكلفة مالية تبلغ حوالي 10 مليار دولار، وذلك في إطار برنامج نووي سلمي يهدف إلي توطين التكنولوجيا النووية للأغراض السلمية، وإنتاج وتوفير الطاقة الكهربائية التي يتزايد الاحتياج إليها في عمليات التنمية الاقتصادية.

         وضماناً لنجاح هذا المشروع، اهتمت مصر بتوفير أقصى درجات ومعايير الأمن والأمان النوويين، وإخضاعها للمراجعة الدورية وعمليات تقييم مستمرة من منطلق تحمل مسئولية الدولة للأمن والأمان النوويين.

وفيما يتعلق بالشق الخاص بالأمن النووي، فقد قطعت مصر شوطاً كبيراً في هذا المجال شمل تطوير الإطار التشريعي والرقابي باصدار قانون تنظيم الأنشطة النووية والإشعاعية رقم 7 لسنة 2010، وإصدار لائحته التنفيذية عام 2011، وكذلك تطوير نظام الحماية المادية للمفاعلين البحثيين والمنشآت التابعة له، فضلاً عن تطوير الكوادر البشرية ودعم أوجه التعاون الدولي من خلال الإنضمام لعضوية الشبكة الدولية لتعليم الأمن النووي التابعة للوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية، كما تم الإنتهاء من إعداد الخطة المتكاملة لدعم الأمن النووي، بالتنسيق مع الوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية، والتي جاءت تتويجاً لهذه الجهود ودعماً لدور الجهات الوطنية المصرية في أداء مهامها ذات الصلة بالأمن النووي.

         وختاماً وفي ضوء التأكيد علي أن مصر إدراكاً منها بأن دعم نظام منع الإنتشار يسهم في تحقيق المزيد من الأمن والاستقرار الدوليين، فإنها سوف تواصل جهدها في العمل علي تحقيق التوازن المطلوب بين الركائز الثلاث لهذا النظام المتمثلة في نزع السلاح النووي، ومنع الإنتشار، وحق الدول في الإنتفاع من الإستخدامات السلمية للطاقة الذرية دون قيد أو شرط.  

         أود أن أشكركم، سيادة الرئيس، علي استضافة قمة الأمن النووي الأخيرة في واشنطن، ونتطلع إلي المزيد من التعاون مع الولايات المتحدة ودول المجتمع الدولي لتحقيق المزيد من الأمن والاستقرار.

National Statement: Egypt

Egypt Statement at the fourth Nuclear Security Summit

 Washington D.C.

(32 March – 1 April 2016)

Mr. President,

In line with our longstanding support of initiatives aimed at strengthening the international non-proliferation regime through collaborative and multilateral mechanisms, Egypt's participation in the 2010 Washington Summit on Nuclear Security came as a positive response to President Obama's initiative on dealing with the threats and dangers related to nuclear security. Egypt has also been keen to effectively take part in various following meetings to build on this initiative, including the Seoul 2012 and the Hague 2014 summits, as well as various preparatory meetings in-between those landmark conferences.

The convention of the Washington 2016 Summit is indeed a new milestone on our path to enhance national, regional and international cooperation frameworks in the field of nuclear security. Over the past six years, much thought and engagement, as well as many initiatives have been invested by the international community towards this end to enable states to uphold their responsibilities in consolidating the very culture of nuclear security. It is time for an honest appraisal of our collective efforts in this regard, guided by the shared objective of strengthening the non-proliferation regime, and, in-turn, enhancing international peace and stability.

Egypt has always emphasized its full support of international efforts to implement the results of the three previous summits, and in so doing our vision for the international community's collective cooperation in the field of nuclear security has always been guided by a number of key principles that I would like to once again re-iterate before you today:

First:

We believe that nuclear security issues are best dealt with within a comprehensive framework that provides for the implementation of nuclear security procedures on all nuclear materials without exception. This most certainly includes materials used for military purposes, and especially those used for the making of nuclear weapons.

Second:

Achieving real progress towards supporting nuclear security is closely connected to progress achieved towards nuclear disarmament. In conjuncture with the notable focus on issues related to nuclear security over the past few years, the international community is required to prioritize achieving a qualitative shift in its effort towards the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament. For within the current regional and international security environment, it is both dangerous and absurd to allow certain nuclear programs and facilities to remain outside the umbrella of the comprehensive safeguard system without effective international monitoring, verification, or access. This leads us to stress once again the fundamental importance Egypt attributes to the establishment of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East. Establishing the Zone is indeed a matter of utmost urgency that requires the consolidation of the international community's political will to fully implement respective NPT review conference decisions in this regard.

Third:

The inalienable right to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear power remains one of the three pillars of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The implementation of nuclear security procedures should in no way put conditions on, or limit the ability of states to exercise this right. Ultimately, nuclear security is a cooperative and not a restrictive objective.

Fourth:

The ultimate responsibility for the implementation of nuclear security procedures lies with member states. Such implementation should remain voluntary and in conformity with the respective state's internal legislations, as well as with its international obligations.

Fifth:

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the most qualified international entity to take the leading role in the implementation of nuclear security procedures. The Agency's resources and accumulated scientific and practical experiences will be invaluable in providing needed technical support to member states in this context, should they so request.

Mr. President,

In light of the challenges Egypt faces in the energy sector, and given the challenges traditionally related to relying on conventional sources of energy, we have announced plans last November to build our first nuclear power station in the 'Al-Dabaa' region.

The Power station, which will be the core of a nuclear program that aims at embedding nuclear know-how for peaceful purposes, will include four nuclear reactors that have a capacity of 1200 Megawatts each, with an estimated total cost of ca. USD 10 Billion.

As part of our effort to secure the success of this major project, Egypt has put special emphasis on ensuring the highest degree of conformity with nuclear security and safety standards. In the field of nuclear security especially, Egypt has taken important steps to upgrade current legislative and institutional frameworks, including the promulgation of law 7 of2010 and its executive regulations, upgrading material protection systems of our two existing research reactors and their facilities, intensifying capacity-building activities and training of our human resources in the field, enhancing international cooperation through the accession to the IAEA's International Network for Nuclear Security Education, and, not least, the finalization of a compressive national plan for nuclear security support, in collaboration with the IAEA. These steps represent a clear demonstration of the awareness by our national institutions of the fundamental significance of upholding their responsibilities related to nuclear security.

In conclusion, and as Egypt re-iterates its belief in the mutually supportive connection between an enhanced international non-proliferation regime and international peace and stability, we remain committed to working towards preserving the needed balance between the three pillars of that regime: Nuclear Disarmament, Non-proliferation, and the inalienable, unconditional and limitless right of states to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

National Statement: Finland

                 GENERAL STATEMENT BY FINLAND

NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT 2016, WASHINGTON

Nuclear Security work will continue after Washington Summit in five existing international fora, among others, that are already very active in this field: the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Nations, Interpol, Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and Global Partnership. Finland is committed to strengthening global nuclear security and to implementing the Communiqué and the five Action Plans to be suggested for the Summit.

It is crucial that the momentum to improve nuclear security is retained after 2016. Finland supports the initiative to establish a contact group to assess implementation of nuclear security commitments, including those made during the Nuclear Security Summit process. The IAEA’s international conference on nuclear security and its Ministerial segment in December 2016 will be an important opportunity to show the continuing political support for our important mission. Wider ownership of nuclear security objectives is needed. An inclusive approach in the follow-up is the best way to increase participation in our joint effort. 
Further progress has been made in securing nuclear materials, in strengthening national systems and in enhancing regional and international cooperation since the beginning of the Nuclear Security Summit process. This is largely due to the political will mobilised through the Summits. Unfortunately, the international security environment has recently deteriorated. Work done in the NSS process has been timely and effective. However, the importance of securing the continuum of this work is clearer than ever.   

Past years Finland has raised several topics to the discussions. This time we would like to emphasise the importance of cyber security, the importance of nuclear security culture, the importance of sharing information, including intelligence, and the importance of nuclear security activities within the IAEA. In addition, we would like to highlight the importance of safe, secure and sustainable disposal of nuclear waste, in which Finland is a forerunner in the world. 

Information and cyber security has been a cross cutting theme throughout the preparations of this Summit. We have realised the magnitude of the challenge. If not adequately addressed, vulnerability to cyber attacks grows as nuclear facilities move to digital systems. This threat does not respect the distinction between civilian and military use of nuclear materials. Terrorists and criminals can be as powerful as national states.

Nuclear security culture is about the human and organizational factors in our effort. A developed security culture in the nuclear field means that the entire chain of national actors is able to identify risks, prevent and to respond to them. A working inter-agency cooperation is part of good nuclear security culture. We believe this is one of the strengths of the Finnish national system. 

Finland has recently designed a model of a nuclear security detection architecture, which is based on the right combination of personnel, technology, and an integrated timely operation of all authorities involved. Information on this inter-agency model is available, and we are very willing to discuss it further with any interested partner. Developing national level nuclear detection architectures and capabilities, and strengthening regional efforts are prerequisites for an effective international cooperation in combating illicit trafficking and malevolent use of nuclear and other radioactive materials. Finland coordinates a Gift Basket on National Nuclear Detection Architectures to this Summit. We are grateful of support many other NSS-countries have shown to this initiative. 

Sharing nuclear security-related information, intelligence and other information, is a necessity in combating nuclear terrorism.  Even though the confidentiality of this information has to be taken into account, the confidentiality shouldn’t be used as an excuse for not sharing information which is possible to share. Finland is pleased to note that Summit Communiqué also recognises the value of information sharing. Be it about nuclear detection or sharing information, it is important to have exercises both at national and at international level to be sure that our systems function as they should.

IAEA’s essential responsibility and the central role in nuclear security activities are unanimously agreed among the Nuclear Security Summit participants. We are confident that this continues to be visible also in practice. We must ensure that the work carried out under the IAEA umbrella, among others, has the resources it needs. Continuing funding also from the regular budget of the IAEA is necessary. The NSS IAEA’s Action Plan notes that it is important to enhance nuclear security within the IAEA and achieve a suitable balance between the IAEA’s nuclear security program and the nuclear safety program. Finland warmly supports this target.

Another national project relevant to the agenda of this Summit is the safe and secure disposal of nuclear waste. Finland issued construction license in 2015 for the spent nuclear fuel geological disposal facility Onkalo. It is the first construction license ever issued for the disposal facility globally. The Onkalo will meet strict and appropriate security requirements and uses advanced technology developed mainly in Finland. The disposal facility can be ready for operation in 2023. Responsible use of nuclear energy takes into account future generations and one part of it is to take care of security, safety and safeguards of disposal of nuclear waste. This is an issue which all countries using nuclear energy have in front of them at some point.  
National nuclear security systems will not reach their full potential without cooperation at the international level. Finland promotes wider ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and of the Amendment made in 2005 to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. This amendment will make the Nuclear Material Convention decisively more effective. 

Threat of nuclear terrorism and the need to address it through international cooperation has been in the focus of the Summit series from the very beginning. We have done good work and it is easy to recognize the four Nuclear Security Summits as an outstanding process in addressing global challenges. Finland would like to thank President Obama personally for launching Nuclear Security Summit process, and the United States for leading preparations for this Summit. Finland has supported the objectives of the Nuclear Security Summit process since the beginning and will continue to do so. 

National Statement: Germany

The 2016 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington is a welcome occasion to take stock of what we have achieved in the past six years. Looking back at President Obama’s Prague speech in 2009 and the subsequent Nuclear Security Summits in Washington in 2010, in Seoul in 2012, and in The Hague in 2014, and at developments since, we can proudly note that the international community has come a long way in strengthening nuclear security globally. Germany has been engaged in the Nuclear Security Summit process right from the beginning. A lot has been achieved, both nationally and globally, but the challenges posed by the dangerous combination of terrorism, proliferation of weapons and materials of mass destruction and regional conflicts remain.

In this context North Korea´s ongoing nuclear and ballistic missile programs as well as its proliferation activities represent a great danger and are blatant violations of several UN-Security Council resolutions.

Nuclear security must be seen in the larger context of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty. Action to ensure non-proliferation is as important as enhancing nuclear security systems. While we call for tangible progress in the field of nuclear disarmament in the near future, close and effective cooperation to combat the risks of nuclear proliferation and to bolster our defenses against the threats emanating from terrorism are tasks we all need to work on.

Germany is proud to be part of this initiative.

Germany has decided to phase out nuclear power but respects the sovereign right of each country to choose its own energy mix and supply. Germany will in any case be involved in nuclear power for many years to come, since German nuclear power plants will not cease production until 2022 and nuclear safety is still extremely relevant with regard to nuclear power plants in neighboring countries. Thus, safe nuclear technology and close cooperation with our partners will remain high on Germany’s agenda.

Germany is now focusing on the back end of the fuel cycle. Dismantling shut down nuclear power plants and treating and disposing of the radioactive waste will take several more decades. Germany will continue to attach particular importance to nuclear security. Our high level of nuclear security will be maintained and, if necessary, strengthened and enhanced.

As one of the leading countries in research and technology, Germany is also engaged in nuclear research. Worldwide, there are several research reactors and neutron sources which rely on Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) fuels. High performance research reactors play a vital role in scientific research, materials testing and the production of medical radioisotopes. Although high value capabilities cannot be replaced by the tools available at present, a group of Nuclear Security Summit countries (Belgium, France, Germany, the Republic of Korea and the United States) have reaffirmed their shared will to cooperate and ultimately convert their relevant reactors to LEU fuel as soon as this becomes technically and economically feasible. Germany has been actively working together with partners to develop and adapt new high-density LEU fuels and will continue to do so. To give just one example, Germany, France and Belgium, supported by the European Commission and in close cooperation with their US counterparts, continue to cooperate in the HERACLES consortium, focusing on testing and developing a U Mo dispersion fuel. We are also looking into the industrial pathway to ensure that as soon as a technically suitable, economically viable LEU fuel with adequate performance (compared to HEU) is identified and is commercially available, the conversion process for the facilities will be initiated.

At the same time, Germany has worked with the United States since 1996 to return to the US more than 128 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) which is no longer used for research purposes. A significant amount of plutonium and HEU was returned to the US at the beginning of 2016. Germany acknowledges the contributions that have been made by the US Department of Energy, the IAEA and all other international stakeholders to bring this project to such a successful conclusion.

Irrespective of nuclear energy, there is another challenge that requires global attention: the increasing use of radioactive sources for beneficial purposes in medicine, industry, research and education. Many factors influence this development, such as globalization, economic interdependencies and the use of new and increasingly complex technologies. These developments are accompanied by an increasing potential for malicious acts or malevolent use of these sources. Therefore, secure protection of radioactive sources is required. Serious incidents with orphaned sources have demonstrated the danger associated with radioactive sources. Germany fully supports the Joint Statement introduced by France at this summit on strengthening the security of high activity sealed sources. In order to contribute to advancing the discussion on how to further proceed with radioactive sources security, Germany will host an international workshop on the question of whether the Code of Conduct for Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (CoC) is adequate for its designated purposes. The workshop will take place from 13 to 15 September 2016 in Berlin.

The use of computer-based systems in physical protection systems, nuclear safety systems, and nuclear material accountancy and control systems at nuclear facilities continues to grow and presents an ever more likely target for cyber-attacks. To enhance the computer security measures at the German nuclear facilities, Germany has therefore tightened its regulations by developing and adopting new nuclear security guidance on computer security.

Nevertheless, computer security is a global challenge. Therefore, Germany welcomes the IAEA efforts to enhance computer security at nuclear facilities as evinced by the IAEA International Conference on Computer Security in a Nuclear World in June 2015. Germany actively supports the IAEA in its leading role and in enhancing the Nuclear Security Series by issuing nuclear security guidance on computer security. Moreover, Germany on a bilateral basis intensively exchanges knowledge and experience regarding the German Design Based Threats (DBT) and guidelines on computer security. Germany and other industrialized countries maintain a high level of nuclear security and have a wealth of expertise in this field. It is all the more important to support other countries in their efforts to strengthen nuclear security, enhance the interface between safety and security and improve the security culture in the nuclear field.

It was both a privilege and a pleasure for Germany to hold the 2015 G7 Presidency and thus be the Chair of the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction – the G 7’s largest expert group which currently includes 30 active members. At a time when regional conflicts rarely remain confined to a particular region, multilateral dialogue and cross-border cooperation on concrete projects are more vital than ever. Germany hosted three Global Partnership Working Group meetings, which provided an important forum for exchange among experts to improve the way we identify, discuss and respond to biological, chemical, nuclear and radiological threats. The Global Partnership provides an efficient framework for coordinating ongoing projects and putting forward new ideas. Together with our friends and partners in the Global Partnership, we are convinced that we can make a difference if we unite our efforts and work with the necessary resolve.

One of the priority issues during our Chairmanship was the situation in Ukraine with regard to the nuclear security challenges. Nuclear security measures are a very complex matter in peaceful times, but in crisis situations they can become serious challenges. Based on a request by the Ukrainian government for assistance in its efforts to manage a broad range of urgent chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) risks, the Global Partnership swiftly decided to assist the Ukrainian authorities in reducing immediate CBRN threats. For example, in 2015/2016 Germany contributed to the implementation of security measures in Ukrainian power plants by providing technical expertise and assistance amounting to more than 5 million euros.

Nuclear security must remain a high priority for all of us after the 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit. The 2016 Action Plans aim at giving nuclear security an even stronger profile in the relevant international organizations and initiatives and call for better coordination of their various programs and actions. This constitutes a major cornerstone in our strengthened nuclear security architecture and thus enhances the importance of all three pillars of the Non Proliferation Treaty.

Making progress on nuclear disarmament remains a matter of urgency. Non-proliferation efforts are equally urgent, and are most effective when they involve all actors, including industry. Germany has been actively involved in promoting and implementing UNSCR 1540 since its adoption. Back in 2011 Germany initiated the Wiesbaden Process which seeks to be the interface between government and industry. Listening to the concerns and proposals of industry representatives will help make the implementation of UNSCR 1540 more effective. Today, Germany is proud that the Wiesbaden Conference has become a brand name in non-proliferation efforts.

The comprehensive review of UNSCR 1540 due in 2016 will set the stage for even more effective implementation of the resolution. The fourth Wiesbaden Conference in November 2015 has delivered a strong input in this regard by formulating concrete recommendations on how to further improve cooperation between governments and industry. Germany will introduce this report into the comprehensive review discussion and stands ready to continue the work done in the Wiesbaden process.

It is in our common interest for the Nuclear Security Summit series to lead to sustainable and tangible results which aim at strengthening the international nuclear security architecture - with the IAEA playing a central coordinating role. Summit members have worked out plans as to how they will advocate for further nuclear security action in relevant international organizations and initiatives. Individual member states have agreed on joint action on particular topics like forensics in nuclear security, cyber security of industrial control and plant systems at nuclear facilities, mitigation of insider threats, activities and cooperation to counter illicit trafficking in nuclear and radiological material, security of radioactive sources, nuclear security training, nuclear and radiological terrorism preparedness and response-capabilities. These activities will need to continue for years to come.

Germany is grateful to all Nuclear Security Summit host nations – the United States, the Republic of Korea and the Kingdom of the Netherlands – for their hospitality and their essential contribution towards fostering international cooperation and raising public awareness of a pressing issue.

Germany will remain engaged in nuclear security issues at home and abroad and is looking forward to enhanced cooperation with international partners and organizations on the basis of the achievements of the Nuclear Security Summit.

National Statement: Italy

NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT

 (Washington, 1 April 2016) 

ITALY’S NATIONAL STATEMENT

The Nuclear Security Summit has impressively moved forward the global dialogue on nuclear security, by adding a high level political dimension to the technical one and strengthening the nuclear security architecture, both domestically and internationally.

It has broadened the understanding and awareness of the nuclear terrorism threat, induced countries to increase physical nuclear security measures, reduce nuclear material stocks and sites, and intensify international cooperation. The Summit has forced through many decisions that might otherwise have languished for years.

Italy is firmly committed to keep the Summit’s legacy alive, included in its Final Communiqué, and to follow through the Action Plans, and the Gift Baskets that we support.

Whilst terrorists keep on developing new means aimed at threatening our societies and peaceful coexistence, it is imperative for all of us to maintain the momentum triggered by the Summit with a proactive and holistic approach.

We are convinced that, still for many years to come, there will be a need for a continued high-level dialogue on the next steps. This is crucial in order to verify the effectiveness of our efforts and adapt them to the coming challenges.

Although no single forum will be able to fully replace the NSS process, the IAEA represents a major venue and a key actor. Therefore,  we look forward to the  Second International Conference on Nuclear Security, to be held in Vienna next December. Italy, a major contributor to the IAEA regular Budget, the Nuclear Security Fund and the Technical Cooperation Program, actively supports the Agency undertakings related to the strengthening of the international nuclear security framework.

Furthermore, we believe - as suggested by some influential voices - that the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear material can provide the proper mechanisms for a regular  review of our commitment and progress in nuclear security.

We look forward to the entry into force of its 2005 Amendment, that Italy ratified in 2015. More generally, Italy is keenly endorsing and participating in the legal framework related to nuclear security. The ratification of the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) is in progress together with a broader set of norms dealing with the fight against nuclear terrorism.

We are also convinced that widespread nuclear security culture is crucial for our future. For this reason, Italy will carry on its engagement to ensure that nuclear security culture remains a priority in the international and national agenda. To this aim and in view of this Summit, Italy has been promoting the new and more focused Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres Gift Basket.

Its objectives are the strengthening of the IAEA Network and the establishment of regional networks, ensuring the sustainability of these centres and promoting a culture of nuclear security as well as scientific advancements in this domain.

Nuclear security culture is indeed as much essential as the physical protection of nuclear material. For this reason, training and capacity building initiatives should be largely encouraged and sustained.

Moreover, Italy is a founding member of the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, that we look forward to chairing in 2017. Italy also participates in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and is ready to host a meeting of its Nuclear Forensic Working Group next fall.

Finally, Italy has been fully committed to the nuclear materials consolidation and minimization programme. We have made significant efforts together with the United States to eliminate excess Highly Enriched Uranium and Plutonium. Today, the Italian national inventory consists of limited quantities of special nuclear material, currently stored in compliance with the highest international nuclear security standards.

National Statement: Kazakhstan

President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev

Fourth Nuclear Security Summit

Washington, 1 April 2016 

Your Excellencies!

The six-year process of the Nuclear Security Summits creates a new spirit of hope.

I would like to thank President Barack Obama for this historic initiative.

It is certainly a great achievement of your mission as the U.S. President and one of the world leaders.

As we meet today the arrows of the “Doomsday Clock” – the measure that scientists and experts use to judge the closeness of the threat of a nuclear collapse are frozen in a fixed position for the second year in a row.

This is the practical result of our Nuclear Security Summit.

The anti-nuclear component of modern international relations has been significantly strengthened.

First of all, on December 7, 2015 for the first time in human history, the UN adopted the Universal Declaration on the Achievement of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World proposed by Kazakhstan.

I suggested this idea six years ago here in Washington during our first summit.

Secondly, the problem related to the Iranian nuclear program is virtually removed from the global agenda.

Thirdly, the establishment of the Low-Enriched Uranium Bank in Kazakhstan under the agreement with the IAEA is of vital importance.

It allows all countries wishing to develop and use peaceful nuclear energy to do so without violating the non-proliferation regime.

Fourthly, the five nuclear powers signed a Protocol on negative assurances to the Treaty on the nuclear-weapons-free zone in Central Asia.

Finally, security measures to protect hundreds of kilograms of nuclear materials from reaching international terrorists have been consolidated.

It is important to consider how to maintain this format of multilateral dialogue on nuclear security and continue to conduct them on a regular basis.

Dear colleagues!

Despite all efforts, humanity still stands on the brink of nuclear self-destruction.

While the arrows of the “Doomsday Clock” are frozen, they are still at the same point as they were in the most critical period of the Cold War.

The phantom of a global war has again been circling over our planet.

The nuclear non-proliferation process is marking time.

The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty has not yet entered into force.

The testing of nuclear weapons and missiles is happening on the Korean peninsula.

A number of politicians publicly discuss who can “wipe others into nuclear dust” and who can “strike first”.

Many have started to quickly forget a simple truth.

In the nuclear age, no one will win a global war.

All will lose, because our planet will be destroyed!

Humankind’s central task should be to become a world free from the threat of war as a means of interstate relations.

This is the only way we will ensure a breakthrough in promoting genuine and sustainable nuclear security of the planet.

This is the primary meaning of my MANIFESTO “THE WORLD: 21st CENTURY”.

I presented it yesterday at the meeting at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

It will be published and distributed in the United Nations.

In this manifesto, I am proposing to adopt a comprehensive program “21st CENTURY: A WORLD WITHOUT WAR”.

It is important to adapt a regime of non-proliferation and disarmament to contemporary conditions by including into it all the de jure and de facto nuclear states.

It is necessary to reconfigure the international disarmament process and to prohibit the use of scientific discoveries for the creation of new weapons of mass destruction.

Urgent measures are required to reduce would-be conflicts in all the hot spots of the planet.

It is of great importance to overcome such a vestige of militarism as the existence of military blocs.

A necessary condition for a world without war - is, in the first place, a fair paradigm of global competition in the sphere of international finance, trade and development.

Further strengthening of global nuclear security relies on restoring trust and dialogue, especially between nuclear powers.

I sincerely hope that this appeal will be heard by all world leaders.

Ladies and Gentlemen!

The discovery of the energy of atom fission was a fruit of human genius.

But using this discovery for military purposes is the result of artful carelessness of people.

We have a chance to correct this mistake of the 20th century.

I call upon all states not to weaken joint efforts to combat the threat of self-destruction of the planet.

Renunciation of war and nuclear weapons would be an act of supreme wisdom of humanity in the 21st century.

Now, under the auspices of the UN, there is a need to create a counter-terrorism global network with the participation of all nations of the world.

That is the only way we can win this undeclared war.

All of this requires more cooperation between countries and organisations.

It is unthinkable without the trust of all members of the nuclear club.

And it is time to design a new format for that club, where all states that de facto possess nuclear weapons are included.

The new club would take the responsibility for nuclear disarmament.

To those who ignore international solutions, drastic measures of coercion should be applied.

We need a full audit of all international treaties.

We must bring them to a common denominator in line with new realities. Currently in international law there are no clear criteria and standards allowing intervention in affairs of a state and to compel it to comply with adopted agreements.

Some time ago Barack Obama supported the “Global Zero” initiative of a group of politicians and military experts on a phased and total elimination of nuclear weapons by 2030.

An absolute majority of international public opinion stands with this goal for the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons.

In this respect, we believe the holding of nuclear security summits should continue.

This is the only way we can change the world, leaving a safer planet for future generations.

Thank you for your attention!

National Statement: Lithuania

Nuclear Security Summit 2016 – Lithuanian National Statement

The Nuclear Security Summit in Washington marks tremendous efforts and formidable achievements of States in strengthening the nuclear security and accomplishing distinctive progress in the security of nuclear materials. The Summit in Washington also recaps difficult challenges to global nuclear security posed by the evolving threats such as nuclear terrorism.

Lithuania is and will remain strongly supportive of the main objectives of this process:

• to raise awareness of the importance of nuclear security;
• to improve national capacity to prevent, detect, protect and prosecute; and
• to increase global nuclear security through international cooperation. Stronger international institutions and advanced nuclear security culture will undeniably help deter, detect, and disrupt attempts of mishandling of radioactive materials out of regulatory control and of nuclear terrorism.

Lithuania is proud to contribute to the concerted efforts of the international community in fortifying global nuclear security architecture that is all-inclusive, built on international standards, transparent in implementation on all levels, and results in a significant decline in global stocks of the nuclear weapons-usable materials.

In this respect, Lithuania will continue its support to the initiatives undertaken in Seoul on “Activity and Cooperation to Counter Nuclear Smuggling” and on “Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres”. Nuclear Security Centre of Excellence (NSCOE), established in Lithuania in the aftermath of the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul in 2012, has significantly developed its operational capacity in supporting sustainability and effectiveness of the national nuclear security measures and their development. Lithuania is keen to further employ and expand regional potential of the Nuclear Security Center of Excellence as a full-scale capacity-building and training institution in prevention, detection, response, and investigation of nuclear and radiological smuggling.

Diminished use of highly-enriched uranium (HEU), secure nuclear materials, actions to counter nuclear smuggling and collectively improve nuclear security culture, share best practices, and elevate nuclear security are all vital in achieving objectives of Nuclear Security Summits. Underscoring the importance of radiation protection and security of the high activity radiation sources (HASS) and a fundamental commitment to the provisions of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, that are comprehensively implemented in the national legal system as well as in the practice or activities related to HASS, Lithuania is proud to announce its support to the initiative on Strengthening the Security of High Activity Sealed Radioactive Sources.

Adherent to full transparency in implementing all international nuclear security and safety requirements, Lithuania will continue its support to an all-encompassing employment of the IAEA network to ensure transparency among states. Lithuania endorses plans to reinforce enduring international institutions and initiatives that support nuclear security. Strong system of international institutions will enable them to build upon the legacy of the Summits. Lithuania is proud to announce its support to the Gift Basket on Sustaining Action to Strengthen Global Nuclear Security.

In 2016, Lithuania will welcome the IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission with the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) Mission to follow in the year 2017.

Acknowledging nuclear security cannot be upheld with in isolation from nuclear safety, Lithuania reiterates a fundamental and collective international interest to make sure that nuclear security and safety are dealt with in a coordinated and consistent manner to minimize the countless inherent risks of a precarious nuclear safety conditions, reckless international behavior of States and violations of the international nuclear safety requirements at national, regional, and international levels. For this reason, it is vitally important to address both nuclear safety and security without compromising each other, prioritizing the essential need of transparency in securing the nuclear safety.

Lithuania‘s commitment to nuclear security, safeguards and non-proliferation is long standing: a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Lithuania ratified the 2005 Amendment of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) in 2008, has an Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

National Statement: Morocco

Kingdom of Morocco

4th Nuclear Security Summit

  National Statement

« National, International and Institutional Actions to enhance Nuclear Security » 

Washington, March 31st- April 1st, 2016

Mr. Chair,

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen

The Kingdom of Morocco expresses it thanks to the United States of America for hosting the fourth Nuclear Security Summit in Washington DC.

Today more than ever the potential use of nuclear arms or nuclear components has become a real threat to international peace and security. This threat is no longer theoretical or hypothetical, but is a reality.

There are many indications that point to the fact that terrorists have attempted or will attempt to acquire nuclear materials. Such a scenario is terrifying.

The use of radioactive materials to build even the toughest traditional nuclear bomb will have tragic human, economic, and environmental consequences.

The use of radioactive materials to build even tough nuclear traditional bomb will have human, economical and environmental tragic consequences.

Mr. Chair,

Six years after the first Washington Summit held in 2010, we meet today to assess the various common efforts made in the field of nuclear security, in accordance with the “Washington Action Plan” and all issued Summit communiqués.

The Kingdom of Morocco has taken several concrete measures to implement this action plan into its national strategy to combat terrorism, a strategy that is also in accordance with the guidelines of His Majesty the King Mohammed VI. These guidelines call for a proactive and multidimensional approach to combat terrorism and extremism through national measures that will contribute to strengthening of the international nuclear security arsenal.

At the national level, Morocco adopted the following national measures:

1.    Strengthening the legal framework relating to nuclear safety and security through the adoption of law 142-12 on nuclear and radiological safety and security, on September18th, 2014;

2. Submission on July 28th, 2015 to the UNSC committee established through Resolution 1540 of a national report. The report outlines the new approach that implements all of the provisions as called for by UNSC resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1977 (2011);

3.   Adhesion to all international conventions aimed at strengthening nuclear security and safety. Morocco ratified on October 18th, 2015, the Amendment of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM);

4.  Set-up of « the Moroccan Agency for Safety and Security in Nuclear and Radiological Fields ».

As for the various diversified contributions that Morocco has made to strengthening the international nuclear security regime, the following actions were undertaken;

1. An exemplary cooperation between Morocco and Spain has allowed both countries to elaborated an action plan in support of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) to be endorsed during this Summit;

2.  The “Gate to Africa” exercise was co-organized by the Kingdoms of Morocco and Spain to evaluate the capacity of both countries to cooperate jointly in a simulation response exercise. This exercise scenario involves a terrorist act during the transportation of radioactive materials from the port of Algeciras in southern Spain to the port of Tangier-Med in northern Morocco. The outcomes and recommendations of “Gate to Africa” will be shared and presented during this Summit and during the IAEA meeting;

3.  Morocco has also elaborated, since its chairmanship of the GICNT working group on the response and mitigation in 2011, a document on “Fundamentals for establishing and maintaining a nuclear security response framework: A GICNT practice guide.” that was endorsed, by acclamation, during the political meeting of the GICNT, held in Helsinki (June 2015).

4.     This document was based on the results of the Morocco-Spain joint exercise “Remex 2013” held in Madrid (April 2013) and the international exercise “Convex3” named “Bab al Maghrib,” organized in Rabat, in cooperation with the IAEA, on November 27th-28th, 2013;

5.     The nuclear security center of excellence has collaborated with the IAEA and the US Department of Energy in Rabat to organize several training sessions for experts from across Africa and the Middle East, for the sake to promote the nuclear security culture.

Mr. Chair,

The contribution of the Kingdom of Morocco to the strengthening of the international nuclear security system reflects Morocco’s continued commitment to the international efforts undertaken in this regard in full alignment with the vision of His Majesty King Mohammed VI, and his continued call for the reinforcement of multilateral actions through a full respect of the right to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the provisions of non-proliferation regime.

National Statement: Morocco (French)

4ème Sommet sur la Sécurité Nucléaire

 Déclaration du Royaume du Maroc 

Sur :

« Les actions nationales, internationales et institutionnelles pour renforcer la sécurité nucléaire » 

  Washington, 31 Mars- 1er Avril 2016

Monsieur le Président,

Excellences, Mesdames et Messieurs,

Permettez-moi tout d’abord d’exprimer les remerciements du Royaume du Maroc aux Etats Unis d’Amérique, d’avoir abrité les travaux du 4ème Sommet sur la sécurité nucléaire.

L’usage potentiel d’armes ou de composants nucléaires constitue la plus grave menace actuelle pour la paix et la sécurité internationales. Une telle menace n’est ni abstraite, ni théorique.

Tout porte à croire que des groupes terroristes ont tenté ou tenterons d’acquérir des matières nucléaires. Un tel scenario est terrifiant. L’utilisation de matières radioactives pour la fabrication d’une bombe nucléaire, même rudimentaire, pourrait avoir des conséquences humaines, économiques et environnementales catastrophiques.

Voilà pourquoi la coopération internationale est essentielle pour prévenir ce type de menace.

Monsieur le Président,

Six ans après la tenue du 1er Sommet sur la sécurité nucléaire à Washington en 2010, nous nous réunissons aujourd’hui pour procéder à une évaluation des efforts conjoints déployés en matière de Sécurité nucléaire, dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre du « Plan d’action de Washington » et les communiqués  des Sommets antérieurs.

Dans ce cadre, je voudrais rappeler que le Royaume du Maroc a pris plusieurs mesures concrètes pour la mise en œuvre de ce plan d’action, dans le cadre de la stratégie nationale de lutte contre le terrorisme en application des Hautes Orientations de Sa Majesté le Roi Mohammed VI. Ces Orientations qui insistent sur l’importance d’une approche proactive et multidimensionnelle, à travers des mesures nationales et des contributions au renforcement du système international de Sécurité Nucléaire.

Parmi les principales mesures nationales prises par le Maroc, on peut citer :

• Le renforcement de l’arsenal juridique dans le domaine de la sureté et la sécurité nucléaire, par l’adoption de la loi 142.12 du 18 septembre 2014, relative à la sûreté et la sécurité nucléaire et radiologique ;
• La soumission par le Royaume du Maroc, le 28 juillet 2015, de son rapport national devant le comité 1540 du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies, sur la base d’une nouvelle approche consistant en la mise en œuvre de toutes les dispositions de la résolution 1540 (2004) et 1977 (2011);
• La poursuite des efforts visant l’adhésion à toutes les conventions relatives à la sûreté et la sécurité nucléaires, à travers le dépôt, le 18 octobre 2015, des instruments de ratification du protocole de 2005, amendant la convention sur la protection physique des matières nucléaires ;
• La création de l’Agence marocaine de sûreté et de sécurité nucléaire et radiologique comme autorité nationale.

S’agissant de la contribution du Royaume au renforcement du système international de la sûreté nucléaire, celle-ci est riche et diversifiée. Elle s’articule principalement autour des axes suivants :

• Une coopération exemplaire avec des partenaires régionaux et internationaux. En effet, le Maroc et l’Espagne ont par exemple élaboré un plan d’action devant être adopté lors de nos travaux, relatif à l’appui du Sommet sur la sécurité nucléaire aux objectifs de l’Initiative globale pour la lutte contre le terrorisme nucléaire. 
• L’organisation de l’exercice « Gate To Africa », en octobre 2015, en partenariat avec l’Espagne, à travers lequel les deux pays ont testé leur capacité de coordination, par la simulation d’une riposte à un acte terroriste lors du transport d’une source radioactive du port d’Algésiras au Sud de l’Espagne au port Tanger-Med au Nord du Maroc. Les résultats et les recommandations de cet exercice seront présentés lors des travaux de ce Sommet.
• Le Maroc a également préparé, lors de son mandat depuis 2011, en tant que président du Groupe de travail pour la réponse et la gestion des risques radiologiques de l’Initiative globale de lutte contre le terrorisme nucléaire, un document relatif aux « fondements de l’établissement et le maintien d’un cadre de riposte et de réponse nucléaire » adopté à, l’unanimité, lors de la réunion politique de l’Initiative globale pour la lutte contre le terrorisme nucléaire, tenue à Helsinki en juin 2015.
• Ce document constitue un protocole de bonnes pratiques « pour une réponse préparatoire en cas de risques suite à des incidents radiologiques nucléaires ». Il est basé sur les résultats de l’exercice « REMEX 2013 », organisé dans le cadre de ladite initiative durant le mois d’avril 2013, ainsi que de l’exercice international « Convex3 » intitulé « Bab Al Maghrib », organisé conjointement avec l’Agence Internationale de l’Energie Atomique, en novembre 2013.
• L’organisation par le Centre d’Excellence pour la Sûreté nucléaire, à Rabat de plusieurs sessions de formation au profit des experts africains et du Monde arabe, dans le cadre de la mise à niveau des ressources humaines et la promotion de la culture de Sureté nucléaire, en coopération avec l’Agence Internationale de l’Energie Atomique et le Département américain de l’Energie.

Monsieur le Président,

La participation du Royaume du Maroc au renforcement du système international de la sécurité nucléaire reflète son engagement constant visant à contribuer aux efforts internationaux déployés dans ce contexte et ce, conformément à la vision de Sa Majesté leRoi Mohammed VI, qui prône le renforcement de l’action multilatérale à travers la préservation d’un équilibreentre le droit à l’usage pacifique de l’énergie nucléaire à des fins de développement et le strict respect des engagements en matière de non-prolifération des armes nucléaires.

National Statement: Morocco (Arabic)

المملكة المغربية

قمة الأمن النووي الرابعة

البيان الوطني

حول

الإجراءات الوطنية، الدولية والمؤسساتية لتعزيز الأمن النووي

واشنطن، 31 مارس - 1 ابريل 2016

السيد الرئيس،

أصحاب الفخامة و المعالي و السعادة،

تتقدم المملكة المغربية بشكرها الخالص إلى الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية على استضافتها الكريمة لأشغال مؤتمر القمة الرابعة للأمن.

الاستعمال المحتمل لأسلحة أو مكونات نووية يمثل حاليا أخطر التهديدات على الأمن والسلم الدوليين.

مثل هذه التهديدات ليست بالوهمية أو غير محتملة. هناك الكثير من الأدلة تثبت على أن جماعات إرهابية حاولت ولازالت تحاول استقطاب مواد نووية. هذا الاحتمال جد مرعب.

في هذا السياق ان استعمال مواد اشعاعية لصناعة قنبلة نووية ولو تقليدية قد يكون له تداعيات انسانية اقتصادية ومناخية غير مسبوقة.

لهذا فالتنسيق على المستوى الدولي بات من الضروري من أجل استباق هذا النوع من التهديدات.

 السيد الرئيس،

بعد ستة سنوات من قمة واشنطن الأولى (2010) نجتمع اليوم مجددا بعاصمة الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية لتقييم مجهوداتنا المشتركة في مجال الأمن النووي تفعيلا "لخطة عمل واشنطن" وبيانات القمم السابقة.

وفي هذا الإطار، تود المملكة المغربية، بان تذكر أنها اتخذت عدة تدابير عملية لتفعيل هذه الخطة ضمن الاستراتيجية الوطنية للوقاية ومكافحة الإرهاب، تنفيذا للتوجيهات السامية لجلالة الملك محمد السادس، التي تؤكد على المقاربة الاستباقية المتعددة الأبعاد، وذلك عبر المثابرة في اتخاذ تدابير وطنية وإسهامات لتعزيز المنظومة الدولية الأمن النووي.   

ومن بين التدابير الوطنية الأساسية المتخذة:

• تعزيز الترسانة القانونية في مجال الأمن والأمان النوويين، من خلال اعتماد القانون 12ـ142، في 18 شتنبر2014، والمتعلق بالأمن والسلامة في المجالين النووي والإشعاعي.
• تقديم المملكة المغربية، في 28 يوليوز 2015، لتقريرها الوطني أمام لجنة القرار 1540، وفق إجراءات تعتمد مقاربة جديدة ترتكز على تفعيل كل بنود قراري مجلس الأمن 1540 (2004) و1977 (2011).
• استكمال الانضمام إلى كافة الاتفاقيات الدولية المعنية بتعزيز الأمن والأمان النوويين، وذلك بإيداع وثائق المصادقة، يوم 18 أكتوبر 2015، على البرتوكول 2005 المعدل لاتفاقية الحماية المادية للمواد النووية.
• إنشاء الوكالة المغربية للأمن والسلامة في المجالين النووي والإشعاعي، وهي بمثابة سلطة وطنية.

أما فيما يتعلق بإسهامات المملكة في تعزيز المنظومة الدولية للأمن النووي: فهي غنية ومتنوعة وتدور حول المحاور التالية:

• تنسيق نموذجي مع شركاء اقليميين ودوليين. في هذا السياق تكلف المغرب إلى جانب اسبانيا بصياغة خطة العمل، المزمع اعتمادها خلال هذه القمة، والتي تتعلق بدعم قمة الأمن النووي لأهداف المبادرة الشاملة لمكافحة الإرهاب النووي.
• تم تنظيم تمرين "بوابة لأفريقيا"، شهر أكتوبر 2015، بشراكة ما بين المملكتين المغربية والاسبانية، والذي تم بواسطته اختبار مدى جاهزية البلدين وقدرتهما على التنسيق، من خلال محاكاة رد على عمل إرهابي أثناء نقل مصدر مشع من ميناء الجزيرة الخضراء بجنوب اسبانيا إلى ميناء طنجة-المتوسط بشمال المغرب، سوف يتم تقديم نتائجه وتوصيات خلال أشغال هذه القمة.
• كما أعد المغرب منذ توليه سنة 2011 رئاسة فريق العمل للاستجابة وإدارة حالات الطوارئ الإشعاعية للمبادرة الشاملة لمكافحة الإرهاب النووي، وثيقة بشأن "أسس إنشاء والحفاظ على إطار الرد والاستجابة" والتي اعتمدت، بالإجماع، خلال الاجتماع السياسي للمبادرة الشاملة لمكافحة الإرهاب النووي، المنعقد بهلسنكي في يونيو 2015. هذه الوثيقة تشكل بروتوكول للممارسات الفضلى "للاستجابة التحضيرية في حالة للطوارئ إثر حوادث إشعاعية نووية «، كما ترتكز على أساس نتائج تمرين «2013 REMEX»، المنظم في إطار المبادرة خلال شهر ابريل 2013، والتمرين الدولي «Convex3» المسمى " باب المغرب"، المنظم مع الوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية خلال شهر نوفمبر 2013.
• نظم مركز الامتياز للأمن النووي بالرباط، في إطار تنمية الموارد البشرية وتعزيز ثقافة الأمن النووي، بتعاون مع الوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية ووزارة الطاقة الأمريكية، العديد من الدورات التدريبية، لفائدة اطر من إفريقيا والشرق الأوسط.

السيد الرئيس،

إن مشاركة المملكة المغربية في تعزيز المنظومة الدولية للأمن النووي ليعكس التزامها الثابت للإسهام في الجهود الدولية المبذولة في هذا السياق انسجاما مع رؤية جلالة الملك محمد السادس القائمة على تقوية العمل المتعدد الأطراف كإطار مناسب وفعال لتنسيق الجهود على المستوى الدولي من خلال ضمان حق تطوير واستعمال الطاقة النووية لأغراض التنمية والتزامات حظر انتشار الأسلحة النووية.  

وشكرا لكم.