National Statement: Switzerland

Nuclear Security Summit 2016

Statement by H.E. Johann N. Schneider-Ammann

President of the Swiss Confederation 

Mr. President,

Thank you for your initiative and leadership to bring us all together to strengthen nuclear security.

We all agree: nuclear terrorism remains a serious threat for our planet. Any nuclear terrorist attack would have catastrophic humanitarian consequences.

The Nuclear Security Summits have made a valuable contribution to awareness-raising and creating political momentum for action. Much has been achieved at the national and international level since 2010.

We need to acknowledge that nuclear security is part of a larger context. In Switzerland’s view, there is an obvious link between nuclear security and nuclear disarmament.  

We therefore call for further progress on nuclear disarmament and for the start of negotiations on a treaty covering fissile material used for nuclear weapons.  

We also need to be ready to meet new challenges that have a potential impact on nuclear security. Let me mention, as many colleagues already have done, the threats stemming from cyber-attacks.
 

Mr. President,

Switzerland is strongly committed to strengthening nuclear security as a responsible and constructive actor in international security policy.

I am pleased to announce that Switzerland has removed over 2 kilograms of highly-enriched uranium and approximately 20 kilograms of plutonium in the framework of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative. This is a concrete contribution to enhanced global nuclear security.

My country was among the early ones to ratify the relevant legal instruments, even before the Summit process started.

We have also adapted our nuclear security legislation in the last years to reflect our international commitments and incorporate best practices as recommended by the IAEA. We are fully committed to maintaining the highest standards and implementing the best practices possible regarding nuclear security.
 

Mr. President,

Our international action should focus on the following three areas:

We should strengthen adherence to the international legal instruments and aim for their universality. With ratification completed by 102 States, the entry into force of the Amendment to the CPPNM (Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material) is now imminent. This is a major achievement of the Summit process.

We should also encourage further States to ratify the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. We should work towards the universal application of the IAEA Code of Conduct (on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources). And we should use the comprehensive review of UN Security Council resolution 1540 this year to take stock of its implementation and reinforce it further.  

Second, we need to strengthen the leading and central role of the IAEA. With its 168 Member States, the Agency is well-placed to become the future hub of our activities. Nuclear security is an enduring responsibility. Our efforts have to continue after the Summit process ends. We welcome the convening of a Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Security by the Agency later this year, which will bring together both technical expertise and political leadership.

Thirdly, we need to broaden the agenda. If we want to build a truly comprehensive and effective global nuclear security regime, we also need to include nuclear material used for military purposes.

Voluntary transparency and assurance measures by the states possessing military material would help build confidence that international standards for effective nuclear security apply to all nuclear material. And all nuclear material that is no longer used for military purposes should be placed under the safeguards regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency. 

National Statement: Thailand

Thailand’s National Statement

2016 Nuclear Security Summit

Thailand attaches importance to the promotion of nuclear security, which has to be undertaken in parallel at the national, regional and international levels.  In fact, nuclear security issue is interlinked and should be carried out with other closely related matters, which are safety and safeguards.

Indeed, the issue of nuclear security is closer to us than we think. If a nuclear incident occurs, its impact is widespread and indiscriminate. The collaborative network within and across national borders is necessary to contain the consequences. That is why we are here today to renew and reaffirm our political commitment.

Thailand believes that it is a fundamental responsibility of states to maintain effective security of nuclear and other radioactive materials as well as nuclear facilities under their control, including military ones. Therefore, at the national level, the Royal Thai Government takes action seriously as nuclear technology is widely used in various peaceful applications in Thailand, so it is a priority to ensure nuclear security in all types of public and private facilities, where nuclear and radioactive materials are used -- hospitals, factories, research laboratories, and nuclear waste disposal facilities. Attention has to be given also to the security of transportation, importation, and exportation of nuclear and radioactive materials.

In terms of national legal frameworks, relevant regulations pertaining to exportation and importation of dual-use goods have been updated. The amended Customs Act has empowered Customs officials to inspect, search and confiscate suspected merchandise in transit or transshipment. In addition, the amended Nuclear Energy Act is now under consideration of the National Legislative Assembly. This Act has been amended to cover all relevant dimensions of peaceful use of nuclear energy, as well as impose penalties on those who violate any provision of this Act. Once the Nuclear Energy Act is enforced, Thailand will be able to ratify a number of international instruments, including the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) and the Convention of the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM). As a state party to these conventions, Thailand will be able to do more under her international obligations to further enhance nuclear security.

Our efforts include an establishment of a national coordinating mechanism, the Sub-Committee on Coordinating for Prevention and Solution of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in 2013. This mechanism helps strengthen the coordination and collaboration among all relevant government agencies concerned, both at national and local levels, in efficiently and effectively fulfilling Thailand’s obligations and commitments. At present, a whole-of-government Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) is being drafted to ensure efficient and integrated implementation and coordination in cases of interdiction of suspected merchandise entering or passing through Thailand by sea, land and air. Several outreach and awareness-raising activities and programmes, including visits to ports and border checkpoints, have also been conducted throughout the countries, particularly frontline officers in the border areas prone to risks of illicit entry of persons or goods with ill intention, which could be used for malicious purposes.

As people are at the centre of nuclear security, it is therefore crucial to continuously develop and further enhance the capabilities of relevant agencies and their staff to be able to strictly comply with international standards and requirements, in order to ensure effective nuclear security. It is also necessary to raise the awareness of the general public as nuclear security is an issue very close to our daily lives and should not be overlooked in order to reduce potential risks from ignorance or negligence. Thus, Thailand gives importance to reach out and raise awareness among various target groups, including industrialists, entrepreneurs, healthcare personnel, exporters and importers, law enforcement agencies, academia, and civil society. Nuclear security should always remain in the public interest as minor issues can cause major consequences. If nuclear waste has not been properly disposed of, radiation will be harmful to health, food and water sources, and the environment.  Moreover, the impacts of radiation will be long-term, making it hard to determine the extent of damage, as well as how to contain and mitigate the detrimental consequences.

States also need to build up global nuclear security culture in nuclear facilities both at national and international levels. This will alert all stakeholders of potential risks which could arise at anytime, anywhere and in any form -- insider threats, outside trespassers, or through cyber space. Therefore, clear codes of conduct, stringent preventive and effective response measures must be in place. Building up nuclear security culture will reduce risks from nuclear threats and protect everyone in a systematic and sustainable manner.  

At the regional level, freer flow of people and goods in a borderless world, especially within the ASEAN Community, has increased the number of tourists as well as the volume of imports and exports passing through the borders. The Thai authorities concerned have boosted up their capacities in response to the changing environment by upgrading their systems and equipment, and training of staff. These efforts have helped improve the screening process and reduce risk of ill-intentioned entry and transit through Thailand and smuggling of illegal items, thereby contributing to the prevention and countering of unnecessary tragic incidents. 

Beyond national borders, regional cooperation is very important to Thailand as regional countries are our “neighbours”. It is thus necessary to keep our community harmonious as well as well integrated and coordinated. For ASEAN, Thailand initiated the setting up of the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy, or ASEANTOM, which was welcomed by the ASEAN Leaders in 2011 and has been functioning since 2012. It is a collaborative network of nuclear regulatory bodies and relevant agencies to share information, experiences, and best practices, as well as to discuss issues relevant to nuclear safety, security and safeguard. It is a confidence building measure within the region. ASEANTOM is complementary to other existing mechanisms, such as the Asian Nuclear Safety Networks (ANSN) and the ASEAN Nuclear Energy Cooperation Sub-Sector Network (NEC-SSN).  These mechanisms represent work in the 3 pillars of nuclear safety, security, and safeguard for peaceful use which have to be carried out in parallel, in order to ensure sustainability. Thailand stands ready to cooperate and implement our obligations in all 3 pillars, including nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. It is our hope that all participating States, International Organisations and Initiatives also give equally emphasis on all 3 S-pillars.

At the international level, global efforts will certainly help strengthen efforts at the national and regional levels, through sharing of accurate, reliable and timely information and intelligence for preventive actions, as well as capacity building and technology transfer from more advanced countries to those which may be faced with implementation challenges, in order to achieve truly robust nuclear security at the global level. In this regard,     Thailand has cooperated with the IAEA in hosting regional meetings, seminars and training for capacity building in nuclear related matters for countries in the region.  Thailand has also established a Master’s degree program on nuclear security education -- the only one in the ASEAN region -- and receives on a regular basis, students from the region and beyond.

Cooperation at all levels is important in order to reduce potential risks and mitigate potential damage as the impact of nuclear accident or sabotage will be widespread and indiscriminate. States also need to be vigilant and cooperate more closely to prevent cybercrime and terrorism. 

All efforts undertaken by Thailand under various international frameworks have so far been complementary, and the Nuclear Security Summit has played an important role in bridging all the elements of nuclear security and further strengthening those frameworks in a comprehensive manner. The Nuclear Security Summit also helps promote international cooperation in this field in a sustainable manner through various collaborative measures set out in the 5 action plans, in line with the mandates of UN, IAEA and INTERPOL, as well as other international initiatives. These international organisations and initiatives will play significant roles to our efforts and help strengthen our national capacities.

When all countries join hands together and sustain our efforts to fulfill our obligations, promote international cooperation at all levels, and work with relevant international organisations, our world will be a safer and more secure place for all.

National Statement: Turkey

STATEMENT BY H. E. PRESIDENT RECEP TAYYİP ERDOĞAN,

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY,

AT THE FOURTH NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT 

(Washington, 31 March-1 April 2016)

Mr. President,

Distinguished Heads of State and Government,

Esteemed Participants,

I salute you all with most heartfelt feelings and deepest regards.

I thank President Obama for hosting the fourth Nuclear Security Summit in Washington.

I wish that this Summit, which is being held at a time when critical developments on a global scale are taking place, will contribute to the strengthening of peace, serenity and security in the world.

Today, we hold this Summit immediately in the aftermath of the days when we once again witnessed the bloody face of terrorism in Ankara, Istanbul and Brussels where innocent people were brutally slaughtered.

We have to admit that our world is less secure than it was earlier because of terrorism.

Looking back at terrorist acts and emergence of new terrorist groups in the two year period since the last Hague Summit, we see that the international community has been unable to demonstrate the desired level of success in fighting terrorism.

As a country that has been fighting the PKK separatist terrorist organisation for the last 30 years and that has lost 40 thousand of its citizens who fell victim to terrorist acts, we are aware of the magnitude of the problem we are confronted with.

We feel in our heart the pain of all those who have lost their lives in acts of terror, from Paris to Beirut, from Tunisia to Nigeria and from Burkina Faso to Somalia, to Libya.

We can counter the globalising threat of terror only by increasing global solidarity and cooperation.

I once again wish to reiterate our long repeated calls upon all countries.

Despite the differences in their ideologies and identities, PKK, PYD, YPG, DAESH, DHKP-C, Al Qaeda, Al Shebab or Boko Haram are all dens of evil sharing the same methods, aims and objectives.

Let us take a common stance against these dens of evil who are enemies of all humanity.

Let us not allow the bloody acts of these organisations to be exploited by marginal circles to the benefit of their blind ideologies such as Islamophobia, racism, xenophobia and anti-migrationism.

Mr. President,

Distinguished Participants,

A world free from nuclear weapons continues to be our common objective.

Strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime is thus a collective responsibility for us all.

Nuclear weapons proliferation and nuclear terrorism remain to be among the most serious and real threats to global security. 

Strengthening security entails ensuring physical protection of all nuclear facilities and material as well as countering the threat of terrorism.

These challenges must be addressed in a collective and organized manner. 

Only effective nuclear security measures can prevent such material from falling into the hands of terrorists and other unauthorized actors.

We, therefore, support a broad approach to security through a partnership network.

It is with this understanding that Turkey has taken an active part in the Nuclear Security Summit process since its inception. 

Distinguished participants,

The Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process began in 2010 with a call for a “new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years”.

The first three summits have achieved notable results, from reaffirming the goal of securing weapons-usable nuclear material worldwide, to reiterating the responsibility of states to secure nuclear material as well as through promoting their adherence to relevant conventions and various global initiatives.

These Summits have facilitated the efforts in safeguarding vulnerable nuclear and other radioactive material and enabled actions designed to make the world a safer place.

Thanks to additional measures and increased awareness, the potential for the acquisition of nuclear material by terrorist groups and non-state actors has been greatly reduced, even if the risk of nuclear terrorism cannot be ruled out in total.

However, more work is still needed to build an effective global nuclear security system in order to secure all weapons-usable nuclear material.

High-level political attention on nuclear security must be preserved to guide and expedite the ongoing work toward building such a system and improving nuclear security.

Additional ratifications by more States of legally binding instruments such as the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) would further strengthen the security regime.

I would like to seize this opportunity to underline once again our commitment to this goal, as Turkey already finalized the process of ratification of the 2005 Amendment and deposited its instrument of ratification to the IAEA on 8 July 2015.

Distinguished Participants,

We are going through a period where energy supply security has become more important than ever.

Turkey is determined to carry on its nuclear energy projects in order to increase and diversify its energy supplies.

We believe that construction of new nuclear power plants with the most advanced technology that ensure their safety and the highest standards of security, will contribute to Turkey’s sustainable growth by providing significant portion of its energy needs.

We have always supported the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy by all States in compliance with international obligations.

Measures that we are taking to ensure nuclear security should in no way hinder international cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Access to nuclear technology, equipment and material for peaceful purposes should be available to all countries.

With this understanding, back in 2010, in an effort to resolve the Iran nuclear issue, Turkey and Brazil signed with Iran the Tehran Declaration.

It should be recalled that this Declaration proposed a deal that contained elements not too different from those achieved with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

As a country that has strongly supported this process from the outset, we welcome the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action as of 16 January this year.

As reflected in the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué, it is the fundamental responsibility of the states to maintain effective security of all nuclear material, which also includes those used in nuclear weapons, and of the nuclear facilities under their control.

As leaders, we bear the primary responsibility to ensure public confidence in the safety and security of all aspects of our nuclear programs.    

Mr. President,

Distinguished Participants,

We appreciate the IAEA’s central role and competence in strengthening the international nuclear security framework.

The IAEA plays a key role on issues related to nuclear security by assisting member states in developing and implementing nuclear security programs.

We support the work of the Agency in promoting “nuclear security culture” at national levels.

A sustainable nuclear security culture is crucial for the management of activities involving nuclear or other radioactive material.  

We should strive to provide the Agency with the political support and financial resources it needs to continue to effectively discharge its duties.

As has been done until today, Turkey will continue to cooperate with the Agency and lend the necessary support.

Honourable Participants,

Allow me to conclude my remarks by underlining that for a better future, nations should rely on the reconciling and practical effects of cooperation and dialogue rather than a potentially deterrent impact of nuclear arms.

Global peace and security can be achieved only through common vision, mutual trust and common sense.

This requires a strengthened global nuclear security architecture that is comprehensive and based on international standards, which can also lead to reductions in stocks of weapons-usable nuclear material.

It is our hope and wish that the 2016 Washington Summit will result in a legacy that will sustain past accomplishments and establish a more effective structure.

I wish the Summit to lead to better days for our countries.

Thank you.

National Statement: Ukraine

NSS 2016 Statement on the Threats posed by the Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and Nuclear Militarization of Crimea to Safety and Security of Nuclear Sites and Material of Ukraine 

Ukraine confirms its firm adherence to the NSS community goals and principles. We remain fully committed to implementing further joint efforts to promote stable and strong international nuclear security system.

Ukraine, which abandoned its nuclear arsenal in 1994, has been always devoted to finding peaceful solutions to the existing security threats and challenges supporting the international efforts aimed at achieving the universal disarmament goals. In 1994 Ukraine signed Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances with Regard to Ukraine’s Joining the NPT as a Non-nuclear State. Since 2014 the Memorandum has been meanly violated with impunity by one of its guarantors and thus became senseless for the other parties to this document.

In 2010, at the first Nuclear Security Summit Ukraine took another cornerstone decision – to remove its stocks of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and responsibly and timely implemented its obligations by the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. In this regard, we are grateful to our U.S. partners who fully supported us in this endeavor and provided the relevant technical assistance. We also highly appreciate the assistance of the United States in completion of the construction of Neutron Facility in Ukraine.

During the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit, we appealed to the NSS community to apply pressure on the Russian Federation (then a member of this forum) and persuade it to withdraw its armed forces from the territory of Ukraine, namely the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. We were insisting that Russia’s behavior constituted a real threat to the nuclear security, particularly to the Ukrainian research nuclear facilities in Crimea.

Unfortunately, the Russian Federation did not only stop its illegal actions in Crimea, but moved further by sending its troops to Donetsk and Luhansk regions and fueling terrorist actions against Ukraine.

Undermining the UN-based security system by violating the UN Charter and provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), breaching the IAEA Safeguards’ application regime, providing shelter to criminals wanted by Interpol and supporting terrorists, the Russian Federation eventually took logical decision to leave NSS process.

This fact is a real evidence that the NSS goals and principles to be onwards implemented in the framework of UN, IAEA, GP, Interpol and Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) as well as commitments taken by all of us in 2010, 2012 and 2014 are not recognized by the Russian Federation any more.

On this background the Russian Federation is declaring its rights to deploy nuclear weapons on the Ukrainian territory, namely in Crimea. Russian occupants are thoroughly restoring soviet-era nuclear storage facilities and have already deployed at the occupied territories of Ukraine the means of nuclear weapons delivery, like warships and combat aircraft. To facilitate this activity Russia is likely to install uranium enrichment facilities, organize production of dual use materials and apply technologies linked to the nuclear weapons on the peninsula.

The occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and ongoing Russian aggression in the east of Ukraine have left without due control of the Ukrainian national regulator LEU research reactor in Sevastopol, 2 nuclear repositories and more than 1200 radionuclide sources in Crimea, as well as 277 in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, 65 and 53 sites using the sources of ionizing radiation respectively.

In such circumstances we cannot exclude the illicit trafficking and malicious use of these sources and could even tackle the threats posed by eventual smuggling of HEU to and from the occupied Ukraine's Crimea.

For example, in July 2015 the Security Service of Ukraine discovered that Luhansk-based terrorists sold out a number of sources of ionizing radiation from the occupied coal mine in Luhansk region, which was lately found in the populated area in Donetsk region.

As a result of the Russian aggression, Ukraine cannot resume control over more than 400 kilometers of its border. These sections of the border can be used by traffickers to illegally transfer to Ukraine and further to Europe radiation sources from Russia. The recent reports of the Ukrainian law enforcement agencies demonstrate that this is a real scenario. Just recently, in March 2016, the Security Service of Ukraine intercepted in Zaporizhia region three sources of ionized radiation, which, allegedly, arrived to Ukraine through the uncontrolled sections of the Ukraine-Russia border.

In this regard, we underscore the need for continued efforts by the NSS participating states to strengthen nuclear security to prevent terrorists, criminals and all other illegal armed groups from acquiring nuclear and other radioactive material, especially when such material is placed at risk by conflict or unrest.

We count on the firm support of the international community in ensuring territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders with a view to stop nuclear proliferation and mitigate threats emerging from the Russian aggression.

Ukraine welcomes the unequivocal decision of the IAEA to apply safeguards to all nuclear sites and material on the whole territory of Ukraine, including those located on the occupied territories, in conformity with the international law and relevant agreements between Ukraine and the Agency.

Ukraine fully supports the Action Plans for UN, IAEA, INTERPOL, Global Partnership and GICNT aimed at advancement of the principles and goals of nuclear security summits beyond 2016. The guidelines for the States and international organizations embedded in these documents should mitigate the consequences and roots of weakened nuclear safety and security architecture at the conflict areas. 

National Statement: United Kingdom

National Statement by the United Kingdom

Following our pledges at the 2010, 2012 and 2014 Nuclear Security Summits, the United Kingdom will continue to lead efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring sensitive nuclear or radiological material or knowledge.

The UK will:

• undertake the largest single movement of Highly Enriched Uranium. The UK will transfer around 700kg of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) to the United States. In return, the United States will provide HEU in a different form for use in European reactors to produce medical isotopes used in the diagnosis and treatment of conditions including thyroid cancer. This transfer will consolidate and achieve a net reduction in global HEU holdings, whilst providing real societal benefits.
• lead efforts to further strengthen the cyber security of nuclear plants.  The Prime Minister is launching an initiative at the Summit to share best practice among states, nuclear operators and the supply chain to enhance their resilience and manage cyber risks to control systems in civil nuclear sites. During 2016 the UK will also be conducting a joint cyber security exercise with the US on the civil nuclear industry to test our systems against attack.
• invest over £10 million during 2016 to improve standards worldwide.  Delivered through the UK Government’s Global Threat Reduction Programme, this will provide financial and expert assistance worldwide to protect facilities, strengthen security culture and dispose of sensitive material.  It will include:
  • £7.1m to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Fund to enable the IAEA to respond to requests for assistance. This is in addition to our annual contribution of around £14m to the IAEA regular budget and around £3m to the Technical Cooperation Fund.
  • 500,000 to the World Institute for Nuclear Security Academy to provide online nuclear security training to the nuclear industry worldwide.
  • £300,000 to Interpol’s Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Unit to counter nuclear smuggling.
  • £100,000 to host the IAEA's International Physical Protection Advisory Service Review Conference in London in November to bring together nuclear security experts to review 20 years’ experience from peer reviews.

The United Kingdom’s ongoing national commitment to nuclear security

The UK will continue to maintain the highest standards of security nationally.

Within our civilian nuclear power programme we have rigorous, independent and expert regulation. The UK nuclear regulation framework is world-class. It sets high standards for nuclear security, and operates in line with international obligations and best practice. There is a clear regulatory regime for security set by the Government which is overseen and enforced by an independent regulator with its own statutory powers. The UK strives for continuous improvement, and expects operators and others in the industry to learn from operational experience to take further steps to enhance security.

The UK also takes its responsibilities for protecting its military nuclear material very seriously. Our security arrangements are based on the principle of no unauthorised access, through the delivery of multi-layered, integrated, security arrangements designed to counter a range of threats and which are kept under review.  Robust national security controls are applied to personnel responsible for, or who have access to, nuclear military material and associated information. We have a well-established and on-going programme of activity to protect defence networks and the information they hold from cyber attack. And in addition to other security measures, we have strict accountancy and control measures for military nuclear material which are based on UK legislation and industry best practice.

Joint Statement on Certified Training

Joint Statement on Certified Training for Nuclear Security Management
2016 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.

Introduction

Gathered in Washington D.C. on the occasion of the fourth Nuclear Security Summit, the leaders of Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States welcome the progress that has been made by states to commit to the effective and sustainable implementation of the essential elements of nuclear security guidance, particularly in the area of ensuring that management and personnel with accountability for nuclear security are demonstrably competent.   

At the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit, thirty five states sponsored a Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation.  The aim of this Joint Statement was for Subscribing States, at their own discretion, to meet the intent of the essential elements of a nuclear security regime and to commit to the effective and sustainable implementation of the principles therein. The Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation was subsequently published by the IAEA in 2014 as INFCIRC/869 and is open for any IAEA Member State to support.

One of the four key commitments outlined in the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation is for Subscribing States to “Ensure that management and personnel with accountability for nuclear security are demonstrably competent.” The challenges associated with managing nuclear and other radiological materials are complex, and it is essential that States ensure that such materials remain secure. The Joint Statement outlines two ways in which States can support the training of effective and competent managers of those materials and related facilities:

• Maintaining and continuously improving domestic or regional training through education, certification and/or qualification activities; and
• Supporting or participating in the development of World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) best practice guides and training activities.

In support of the commitments in the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation, Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States, together with a number of corporations and foundations, joined together to establish the WINS Academy, the world’s first structured professional development and certification program for nuclear security managers. The first training module of the WINS Academy was launched at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit.

Since its launch at the 2014 Summit, and with support from Nuclear Security Summit participating States, corporations and foundations, the WINS Academy has developed a robust international nuclear security certification program.  The training program is designed to develop a network of certified professionals who are implementing meaningful and sustainable changes to security culture and best practices worldwide. To date, 560 participants from 75 countries have registered in the WINS Academy certification program.   

Next Steps

In support of the commitments in INFCIRC/869, and acknowledging the international recognition of the need for nuclear security training, education, certification and/or qualification activities, this gift basket records the intent of Canada, Finland, Hungary, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States to undertake to further support the WINS Academy in its efforts to expand its international certification program, including through the provision of advocacy, peer review support, contributions, or by other means as necessary.  

The States listed above also recognize and undertake to promote cooperative efforts between the WINS Academy and the IAEA, including: WINS cooperation with the IAEA Nuclear Security Support Centre (NSSC) Working Group on Best Practices, whose 2014-2015 Action Plan includes the development of a program to collect lessons learned case studies from NSSC members; and WINS Academy cooperation with the IAEA’s International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN), which has helped academics connect and collaborate with WINS to help develop blended courses leading to joint certification.

We welcome other States, supported by industry and civil society, to provide a tangible commitment in support of the WINS Academy and certified professional development for nuclear security. Together we can help to ensure that nuclear and other radioactive materials remain secure under the management of demonstrably competent professionals.

Fact Sheet: U.S. Participation in ITWG

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

________________________________________________________________

For Immediate Release                         

FACT SHEET

U.S. Participation in the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group

The United States and European Commission co-chair the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG), which is an informal, unaffiliated association of nuclear forensics practitioners from governments around the world.  ITWG works to identify, develop, and promote best practices in the field of nuclear forensics by holding annual meetings, conducting exercises, and publishing guidelines.  These efforts help strengthen national capabilities to investigate and prosecute illicit uses of nuclear and other radioactive material. 

In addition to co-chairing ITWG, U.S. experts help lead several ITWG task groups including those on evidence collection, exercises, guidelines, training, and national nuclear forensic libraries (NNFLs).  These efforts draw upon experts from several U.S. interagency partners, including the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration and national laboratory complex, the Department of Homeland Security, Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

ITWG held its twentieth annual meeting June 2015 in Budapest, Hungary, and will hold its next annual meeting in Lyon, France in June 2016.  The European Commission’s Joint Research Centre will host the 2017 annual meeting.  Experts from more than 50 countries have participated in ITWG meetings since it was established in 1995. 

ITWG completed its fourth collaborative material exercise March 2015, and it will initiate the next one in fall 2016.  During these exercises, experts from laboratories around the world are asked to analyze nuclear material as part of a mock investigation and then later review the effectiveness of the various techniques employed.  Lessons learned and techniques developed from these exercises have been published in peer-reviewed technical journals and used as the basis to develop ITWG guidelines.  ITWG has prepared guidelines on the use of a variety of technical tools.  The guidelines can be found on the ITWG website www.nf-itwg.org. 

ITWG also conducts a U.S.-sponsored, web-based, virtual exercise series on NNFLs called Galaxy Serpent.  An NNFL is an important nuclear security tool that helps a country determine if material found outside regulatory control is or is not consistent with material it produces, uses, or stores.  In its national statement, the United States announced it now accepts NNFL queries from other governments.  (More information on the query process is available on the Nuclear Security Summit website www.nss2016.org).

The United States and European Commission issued a joint statement at the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit regarding future ITWG efforts.  Contributions by the United States to future ITWG efforts include: 

• Continued co-chairmanship with the European Commission;
• Provision of experts to help lead task groups;
• Participation in ITWG collaborative material exercises, e.g. CMX-5;
• Provision of subject matter expert input to the development of new ITWG guidelines;
• Facilitation of future Galaxy Serpent exercises on national nuclear forensics libraries; and,
• Support for the participation of some foreign government experts in ITWG annual meetings and exercises.   

Cooperation between governments is critical to addressing transnational threats involving nuclear and other radioactive material found outside regulatory control.  U.S. collaboration with international nuclear forensics practitioners through ITWG has strengthened global nuclear security. 

EU-US Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG) Joint Statement

Recognizing twenty years of cooperation in promoting nuclear forensics as a tool and key component to strengthen nuclear material security, the United States of America and the European Union, co-chairs of the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG), have positioned ITWG to be an effective platform for nuclear forensic practitioners to raise awareness, build capacity, and identify and promote best practices.

Nuclear forensics advances Nuclear Security Summit goals by enhancing efforts to investigate and prosecute criminal or unlawful acts involving nuclear and other radioactive material.  Since the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague in 2014, ITWG has pursued a number of activities.  These include conducting comparative nuclear material exercises that socialize nuclear forensic techniques and identify best practices.  In addition, ITWG conducted exercises that clarify the uses and utility of national nuclear forensic libraries in helping identify the origin of nuclear or other radioactive material found outside regulatory control.  Finally, ITWG has developed and propagated conceptual, technical, and analytic guidelines documents on a range of topics that include alpha and gamma spectroscopy, x-ray diffraction and related techniques. 

On behalf of the ITWG Executive Committee, the European Union and the United States of America affirm that ITWG will continue to serve as the authoritative international technical forum for nuclear forensic practitioners to:

• Foster and sustain investigative and prosecutorial efforts against illicit uses of nuclear and other radioactive material;
• Conduct international exercises that identify and socialize best practices, explore new technical approaches to advance nuclear forensic capabilities, engaged practitioners in building an effective technical nuclear forensics community; and,
• Continue providing technical expertise and products in collaboration with longstanding international partners that include the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol).

Fact Sheet: Joint Statement on HEU Minimization

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

________________________________________________________________

For Immediate Release                       

FACT SHEET

Minimizing and Eliminating the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium

in Civilian Applications

Since the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, there has been considerable and tangible progress made toward the minimization of highly enriched uranium (HEU).  These efforts include converting reactors from HEU fuel to low enriched uranium fuel, HEU removals, technology substitution, and down-blending.  As of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, 29 countries and Taiwan have strengthened global nuclear security by eliminating all HEU from their territory.  Minimizing, and eventually eliminating, civilian HEU stocks represents permanent threat reduction by preventing sensitive nuclear materials from falling into the wrong hands.

At the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, Norway has sponsored a Gift Basket on Minimizing and Eliminating the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in civilian applications.  The States joining this Gift Basket have outlined a comprehensive five-point plan to minimize and ultimately eliminate HEU from civilian applications, including (1) limiting the use of HEU in new civilian facilities and applications; (2) converting to LEU or shuting down all HEU civilian reactors; (3) repatriating all civilian HEU to the countries of origin or otherwise permanently disposing of or down-blending excess HEU; (4) converting medical isotope production facilities to non-HEU technologies; and (5) meeting to review progress on this plan in 2018.

To support this effort, the United States will continue to work on new low enriched uranium (LEU) fuels to convert its six remaining High Performance Research Reactors, establish domestic non-HEU based molybdenum-99 production, and down-blend HEU declared as excess.  The United States will also support international efforts to convert HEU research reactors to LEU fuel, return or dispose of excess civilian HEU, and convert large-scale international medical isotope producers from HEU to LEU targets. 

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Fact Sheet: Joint Statement on Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

________________________________________________________________

For Immediate Release

FACT SHEET

Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence and Training Centers

Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence (COE) have emerged as an important part of the global nuclear security architecture.  A number of Summit participants have committed to establishing COEs since the first Summit in 2010.  This trend recognizes the importance of making sure that scientists, technicians, engineers, managers, and all others who work with and around nuclear materials are properly trained.  Areas of focus for training include physical protection, nuclear forensics, nuclear emergency preparedness and response, export controls, and nuclear detection.  COEs address the important “human factor” of global efforts to secure nuclear material. 

To promote communication and interaction, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) established the Nuclear Security Training and Support Center Network and portal in 2012.  This has resulted in greater coordination and collaboration amongst the COEs and is a venue to provide best practices to states interested in establishing a COE.

Italy has sponsored a Joint Statement at the 2016 Nuclaer Security Summit to support the continued development of the COEs.  This statement includes pledges to increase cooperation among COEs, both within the IAEA and regionally, as well as steps that the Centers will take to ensure continous improvemnet to circiulum and instructers. 

The United States has worked closely with many countries toestablish and support the missions of these Centers to train international audiences on nuclear security issues. 

The U.S. will continue to work with international partners on nuclear security training and education, helping to ensure a strong security culture and the building sustainability for the important work achieved through the Nuclear Security Summit process.

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Fact Sheet: Removal of HEU and plutonium from Germany

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

___________________________________________________________

For Immediate Release                         

FACT SHEET

Nuclear Material Removal from Germany

Germany is a global leader on nuclear security, working with the United States since 1996 to return more than 135 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU). 

At the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, the United States and Germany announced the successful removal of excess plutonium and HEU from Germany.  This shipment was completed through a multilateral effort involving the U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA), Germany’s Wiederaufarbeitungsanlage Karlsruhe Rückbau-und Entsorgungs-GmbH (WAK), and the European Commission Joint Research Centre’s Institute for Transuranium Elements (JRC-ITU).  This is the 19th shipment of nuclear material from Germany to the United States.

In order to execute this project, DOE/NNSA, WAK, and JRC-ITU overcame several technical challenges including:

• Design, construction and qualification of new gloveboxes for plutonium and HEU packaging;
• Development of processes for stabilization and characterization of materials for safe transport;
• Training and certification of personnel for specialized packaging operations; and
• Validation of packages for transport of plutonium and HEU material.

Significant contributions were made by Germany’s Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building, and Nuclear Safety (BMUB) and its licensing authority, the Federal Office of Radiation Protection (BfS), which approved the necessary licenses to ensure safe and secure packaging and transport of the material; Germany’s Daher Nuclear Technologies GmBH, which provided the secure transport of the material within Germany; and the United Kingdom’s International Nuclear Services, which provided secure transport of the material from Germany to the United States.  The European Commission’s Euratom Supply Agency (ESA) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) played an important role in all aspects of the operation.  This material will be stored at safe and secure facilities in the United States.  The United States and Germany plan to continue to work together in the future to foster nuclear security and non-proliferation.

Fact Sheet: Removal of all HEU and plutonium from FCA

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

___________________________________________________________

For Immediate Release                         

FACT SHEET

Removal of All Highly Enriched Uranium and Plutonium from Japan’s Fast Critical Assembly

Japan has been one of the United States’ closest allies in the global effort to minimize, and when possible eliminate, the use of sensitive nuclear materials at research facilities.  This strong partnership has helped the international community ensure that these materials never find their way into the hands of criminals, terrorists, or other unauthorized actors.  

At the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, Japan and the United States announced that all highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium fuel has been removed from the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA)’s Fast Critical Assembly (FCA).  This announcement follows up on the joint pledge that Japan and the United States announced at the 2014 Summit, committing to remove the FCA material.  This effort will result in the elimination of hundreds of kilograms of sensitive HEU and plutonium.

The FCA came online in 1967 for the purpose of studying the physics characteristics of fast reactor cores.  With the technology available at that time, HEU and plutonium were believed to be required for these experiments.  Recent advancements in technology and decades of experience have opened the door for FCA continuing, and even expanding, its mission without the need for HEU or separated plutonium fuels. The United States and Japan have already started on a series of joint research collaborations that will facilitate the ability for FCA to continue to conduct important new research.   

Japan and the United States also announced at the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit that we will work together to remove all HEU fuel from the Kyoto University Critical Assembly (KUCA) to the United States for downblend.  The removal will take place after converting KUCA from HEU to LEU fuels. 

In 2010, the United States and Japan successfully converted the Kyoto University Research Reactor from HEU to LEU fuel.  Unlike HEU, LEU cannot be used to produce a nuclear weapon.  JAEA has also voluntarily promoted the conversion of several of its research reactors, successfully eliminating hundreds of kilograms of HEU from civilian commerce.

Joint Announcement of INTERPOL and the United States of America on Cooperation to Combat the Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and Radiological Material

INTERPOL and the United States of America have confirmed a shared commitment to efforts to promote practical measures to counter nuclear and radiological smuggling.  INTERPOL’s Project Geiger Database and the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Incident and Trafficking Database indicate that nuclear and radioactive materials continue to be encountered out of regulatory control. 

The United States applauds INTERPOL’s continued commitment to build awareness and capacity of law enforcement to combat smuggling in nuclear and radiological materials and are pleased to announce the results of the INTERPOL hosted “Global Counter Nuclear Smuggling Conference,” sponsored by the United States Department of Energy which was held in Lyon, France on January 27-29, 2016. 

In support of the commitments outlined in the Nuclear Security Summit Communiqués and Work Plan, the “Global Counter Nuclear Smuggling Conference focused on five subject areas key to INTERPOL’s role in combatting radiological and nuclear trafficking; information sharing, capacity building, support to investigations and operations, security of material, and prosecuting radiological and nuclear smugglers.  It additionally included a number of case studies to illustrate the reality of nuclear and radiological smuggling and a demonstration of radiation detection and identification equipment available to support investigations. 

This conference gave law enforcement professionals the opportunity to strengthen relationships with their international counterparts and to conduct counter nuclear smuggling operations and opportunity to gain a greater understanding of the nuclear smuggling challenge. 

Furthermore, the parties are pleased with the joint efforts to offer counter nuclear smuggling training programs in the form of regional workshops and cross-border exercises and remain committed to implementing these and other training activities. 

INTERPOL and the United States of America attach importance to the Nuclear Security Summit process and stress the importance of continuing efforts and ongoing collaboration to strengthen law enforcement capacity to prevent, detect, and interdict trafficking in nuclear and radiological materials.   Outcomes from the conference drawn from the input of participating countries will contribute to the Nuclear Security Summit Action Plan; which will be issued by world leaders and heads of international organizations at the 2016 Washington DC Nuclear Security Summit.  

National Progress Report: Malaysia

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Malaysia has strengthened nuclear security implementation and built up the global nuclear security architecture by…

1)            Strengthening Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Security

• Malaysia has implemented the provisions of the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, as well as the Supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. Awareness and competency programmes have been carried out to increase the level of competency among authorised users of radioactive sources in Malaysia. Malaysia also adheres to the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety of Research Reactor.
• Malaysia has received the International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ) which reviewed the relevant Malaysian laws and regulations to determine where provisions specifically related to nuclear security issues (physical protection, sabotage, illicit trafficking, import-export, penalties) could usefully be added taking into account international legal instruments and IAEA guidelines (gap analysis).
• Malaysia is planning to host the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission from 11 – 22 April 2016, to provide an avenue to discuss new concepts and exchange best practices on the subject of physical protection of nuclear material. This will enhance Malaysia’s physical protection measures. 
• Malaysia is participating in the IAEA Coordinated Research Project (CRP) entitled “Strengthening Nuclear Security at PUSPATI TRIGA Reactor (RTP)” with the aim to review the level of security arrangements of the relevant facilities, taking into account the threat assessment, regulatory requirements and IAEA recommendations.
• Malaysia is in the process of developing a disposal facility using the borehole technology on a cost sharing basis with the IAEA. This is to manage the Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources (DSRS) in a safe and secure manner.
• Malaysia is preparing to build our capacity in nuclear forensics. In this regard, Malaysia plans to receive an IAEA expert mission on nuclear forensics in May 2016.
• Malaysia is organising a domestic training programme on radiological security. This includes the requirements and methods to ensure radiation protection safety and the security of radioactive materials used in nuclear application technologies.
• Malaysia is integrating nuclear security elements into the national security perspective. The planning and implementation stages are conducted by the National Security Council, the highest national security platform. All nuclear security elements are coordinated by Atomic Energy Licensing Board (AELB) based on the IAEA Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP), involving all identified relevant stakeholders.
• Malaysia will continue to pursue nuclear security, based on IAEA’s recommendations. Malaysia encourages other countries to utilize IAEA nuclear security framework for its comprehensive approach and for the purpose of harmonizing implementation globally. Malaysia stands ready to share experiences and best practices in the development and implementation of nuclear security capabilities through INSSP.

2)            Countering Nuclear Smuggling

• Malaysia has enacted the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2015 (POTA) which is an anti-terrorism law, on 7 April 2015.
• To enhance detection capability, Malaysia, with the cooperation of IAEA, has developed a nuclear security detection laboratory, focusing on maintenance and configuration of radiation detection equipment. The lab is established under the Malaysian National Nuclear Security Support Centre (NSSC) that was approved by the government in February 2016.   
• Malaysia continues to report to the IAEA on any cases of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and other radioactive sources since joining the IAEA Database on Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear Materials and Other Radioactive Sources in 2001.
• Malaysia is a registered user of the International Catalogue of Sealed Radioactive Sources and Devices (ICSRS), which provides data on sources, housing devices of the sources, and details of manufacturers and suppliers worldwide.
• Since 2004, Malaysia has invested in deploying radiation detection equipment at all points of entry and exit as well as other locations through national funding, IAEA and US cooperation. Malaysia has updated detected cases to the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) when such events occur.
• Malaysia has developed a high level strategy to counter smuggling, involving all law enforcement and border authorities under the National Security Council. Malaysia has actively conducted exercise and activities on national detection to shares experiences and best practices with IAEA and other countries.
• Malaysia acknowledges the importance of networking in enhancing effectiveness for nuclear security detection. In this regard, Malaysia has been working closely with Thailand in conducting joint table top and field exercise from 17 to 20 August 2015 at our shared borders, and has also shared these experiences with other ASEAN countries. Malaysia and Thailand will continue the exercises in 2016 (scheduled to take place from 31 October to 4 November 2016) with the cooperation of IAEA.
• Malaysia stands ready to share with all interested countries the established national systems and capabilities on nuclear security detection, which have been developed since 2004, based on IAEA nuclear security detection architecture.

3)            Supporting Multilateral Instruments

• Malaysia is nearing completion of its revision of the Atomic Energy Licensing Act (Act 304) that would incorporate the provisions of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), and its 2005 Amendment Protocol; the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT); and the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.
• This comprehensive nuclear law would enable Malaysia to become a party to the various Conventions and Protocols on nuclear security, including Malaysia’s accession to the CPPNM, ratification of the ICSANT and the IAEA Additional Protocol, and adoption of various outstanding IAEA Codes of Conduct.
• Malaysia will undertake to have the comprehensive nuclear law approved by the Parliament once the revision is completed.

4)            Collaborating with International Organizations

• Since 2010, Malaysia has continued to actively participate in the European Union Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative (EU CBRN COE) programs, which aim to strengthen the institutional capacity of countries outside the European Union to mitigate CBRN risks.
• Under the Global Partnership Programme 2010-2018, Malaysia is also currently working to establish cooperation with the Department of Foreign Affairs Trade and Development of Canada (DFATD) to seek support in the form of expertise, technical advice and funding for the purpose of strengthening the safety and security of nuclear and radioactive materials.
• Since 2012, Malaysia has received assistance to enhance its physical security infrastructure through Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI). Several facilities in Malaysia which use radioactive materials have been equipped with advanced security systems to detect unauthorized movement of radioactive material.
• Malaysia strongly believes in regional approaches in discussing nuclear security matters, and have successfully chaired the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy (ASEANTOM) in August 2015 during Malaysia’s chairmanship of ASEAN. A revised action plan on sub regional activities that covers nuclear security activities were identified and defined.
• Malaysia reiterates the central role of IAEA in nuclear security and encourages international organizations and other countries to cooperate in nuclear security activities through the IAEA. Malaysia also extends national resources to support IAEA nuclear security series development, expert missions and training.
• Malaysia has also actively hosted technical visits to the Malaysian National NSSC since 2012 focusing on nuclear security detections.
• Malaysia will continue to cooperate with and support IAEA nuclear security programs. In this regard, Malaysia believes the overall objective of nuclear security can be met through confidence building and harmonizing implementation based on IAEA nuclear security guidelines.  

5)            Partnering with External Stakeholders

• Malaysia has endorsed the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) on 27 April 2014. And is in the process of drawing up, the ‘Provisional Guidelines on the Operationalisation of the Proliferation Security Initiative’.
• Since 1 July 2011, Malaysia has enforced its Strategic Trade Act (STA) 2010 which is a comprehensive export control law. The enactment of the STA reflects Malaysia’s commitment to implement UNSCR 1540. The Act aims to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by controlling the export, transit, trans-shipment and brokering of strategic items.
• Malaysia actively cooperates as a standing partner with the United States National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) of the United States Department of Energy, in nuclear security and non-proliferation. This is done through an exchange of Letter of Intent focusing on capacity building programs.
• On CBRN issues, the Malaysian Armed Forces and the Canadian Army successfully cooperated on a planned exercise on nuclear security in February 2016. Such exercises promote networking and experience sharing while strengthening national response capability.
• At the regional level, Malaysia cooperates with the Indonesian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (BAPETEN) through a memorandum of understanding. Malaysia is in the process of finalizing a similar cooperation with the Korea Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC). Malaysia through the IAEA has also initiated negotiations for cooperation on nuclear security with Sudan and Mauritania focusing on nuclear security detections.
• Malaysia strongly believes that international cooperation with other external partners are critical not only in strengthening nuclear security capabilities, but more importantly in promoting harmonized nuclear security implementation in line with IAEA nuclear security framework. In this regard, Malaysia pledges to continuously contribute to achieving nuclear security. 

National Progress Report: Mexico

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Mexico has strengthened nuclear security implementation and built up the global nuclear security architecture by…

1. SUPPORT FOR CONVENTION ON THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL (CPPNM) AND INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF ACTS OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM (ICSANT)

• The Government of Mexico deposited with the IAEA its instrument of accession to the CPPNM on April 4, 1988 and deposited its instruments of ratification of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) on 1° August 2012.
• Mexico deposited its instruments of ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) and entered into force on 9 July 2007.

2. STRENGTHENED NATIONAL NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL MATERIAL SECURITY SYSTEM

• Mexico’s government development, implementation and maintenance of a system of physical protection of radioactive and nuclear materials and nuclear facilities on the recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency in its document entitled: Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC / 225 / Revision 5).
• The Government of Mexico has accepted the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, which is the basis for the establishment of the regulation on this issue.
• Furthermore, Mexico actively participated in the IAEA technical meeting on the formulation of guidelines for the import and export of nuclear and radiological sources.
• In March 2014 the Federal Penal Code was modified to establish the crimes and penalties for terrorist acts, sabotage, theft, attacks on means of communication or international terrorism, those who use radioactive material, nuclear material, nuclear fuel, radioactive mineral, radiation source or instruments that emit radiation in order to carry out acts against goods or services, whether public or private, or against the physical integrity of persons that produce alarm, fear or terror in the population or a group or sector, for acting against national security.
• In 2016 the publication of Regulation transport of radioactive and nuclear materials is expected.

3. CONTRIBUTION TO THE IAEA’S NUCLEAR SECURITY-RELATED ACTIVITIES

• Mexico, actively contributes to the development of the Nuclear Security Series, most recently by participating in the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee.
• Mexico conducted with the cooperation of the IAEA National Training Course on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials in transport.
• Mexico has received International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions in all its nuclear facilities.
• Mexico has received the International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ) missions to review the general status of measures that protect against nuclear terrorism and identify ways to improve a broad spectrum of nuclear security activities. The recommendations provide a platform for preparation of a country-specific Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP) for future implementation, through IAEA programme and bilateral assistance.
• Mexico participated in the meeting of contact points of the CPPNM, held at the headquarters of the IAEA in December 2015, recognizing the commitments based on the Convention and its amendments.

4. SUPPORT FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY-RELATED INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES

• Mexico participates in the Global Initiative to Counter Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and in the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. In May 2013, Mexico hosted the 8th Plenary Session of Global Initiative to Counter Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) which took place in Mexico City, and cooperates with the 1540 Committee.
• From the 25th to the 28th of February 2014, the Government of Mexico in coordination with the GICNT Nuclear Detection Working Group (NDWG) hosted a Workshop and Field Training Exercise in the Port of Manzanillo, Colima.

5. CONTRIBUTION TO MINIMIZATION OF HEU

• Mexico, in collaboration with US, Canada and IAEA, converted, in 2012, the HEU fuel of the nuclear research reactor “Triga MARK III”, to use LEU fuel. The reactor intends to use only LEU targets for the production of medical and research radioisotopes.

6. BILATERAL COOPERATION

• Mexico since 2011 cooperates with the US to improve the security of medical, industrial and research facilities where radioactive category I and II sources is improved. This includes physical security infrastructure and training. In this process, more than 150 facilities have participated.
• With the Governments of Canada and USA, Mexico has signed an agreement to monitor radiation sources from its origin to its final destination, which includes transportation sources category I. These agreements are operational currently.
• Likewise, with cooperation to Canada, took place in 2013 a regional workshop for Central America on the safety of radiation sources in medical facilities.
• With the cooperation of the US, Mexico has improved infrastructure mega-ports to import and export 80% of goods by sea.
• Additionally, with the US, Mexico has created an inter-governmental cooperation for the training of specialists in export controls and the identification of sensitive materials, which has resulted in trainers of trainers. In 2015 specialists from different institutions participated in training courses for specialists from Panama and Colombia.

7. FULFILLMENT OF RESOLUTION 1540 (2004) OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

• In 2012, Mexico began the process of joining the four export control regimes. By March 2014, Mexico is a member of the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA), Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Australia Group (AG). It has the legislation and the process for granting permits to export products subject to control under these schemes. Mexico joined to WA in January 2012, and accepted on NSG in September 2012. Additionally, August 12th, Mexico was admitted as a fully-fledge Member State to AG.
• Within the export control process, Mexico created an Export Controls Committee, determining the export of special materials, taking into account the final use and destination.

8. RECOGNITION OF THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF INDUSTRY IN PROMOTING AND EXCHANGING BEST PRACTICES AS APPROPRIATE, INCLUDING THE PROMOTION OF BEST PRACTICES GUIDES RELATED TO NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE AND NUCLEAR SECURITY INFORMATION

Mexico is promoting into industry (nuclear power owner), and other institutions in the government the nuclear security culture, in order to have the response to an attack involving nuclear or radiological material.

National Progress Report: Morocco

Since the 3rd Nuclear Security Summit (The Hague 2014), the Kingdom of Morocco has undertaken the following actions, in line with its commitments, to implement the Action Plan adopted at the1st Nuclear Security Summit (Washington 2010):

Supporting Multilateral Instruments on Nuclear Security:

Morocco continues to support the international instruments aiming at enhancing global efforts for nuclear security:

• Morocco chaired, in 2005, the 6th Committee of the UN General Assembly and played a significant role in facilitating the consensus for the adoption of the Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT). Morocco has been party to this important instrument, since February 23rd, 2010.
• Morocco has been party to the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement between Morocco and IAEA, since April 21st, 2011. Morocco continues to fully comply with the IAEA’s inspection reports, and positively considers their recommendations.
• Morocco updated and submitted, on July 28th, 2015, its last report to the UNSC resolution 1540 (2004) and subsequent resolutions, pursuant to its obligations to implement the resolution 1540.
• Morocco ratified, on October 18th, 2015, the Amendment of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM), adopted in Vienna on July 8th, 2005.
• Morocco promulgated, on August 22nd, 2014, the Act 142-12 on nuclear and radiological safety, security and for safeguards. This law aims at harmonizing the national legal arsenal with the relevant provisions of the international conventions on nuclear law.
• The Decree on the establishment of the” Moroccan Agency on Nuclear and Radiological Safety and Security” (Moroccan Regulatory Body) was published on October 26th, 2015.
• The Director of the “Moroccan Agency on Nuclear and Radiological Safety and Security” was appointed at the last Council of Ministers, held in Lâayoune, on February 6th, 2016. He is responsible for setting up this new National Regulatory Authority and implementing the law provisions.

Supporting International Initiatives on Nuclear Security:

As a founding member of the Global Initiative for Combating Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), Morocco continues to implement its statement of principles and terms of reference as amended at the 6th GICNT Plenary Meeting (Abu-Dhabi-UAE, June 2010):

• Morocco has chaired, since June 15th – 16th, 2011, one of the GICNT three working groups, “the Response and Mitigation Working Group (RMWG)”. The main focus of the RMWG is to examine best practices related to crises or emergencies involving radiological or nuclear terrorist threats or incidents.
• Morocco organized the Mid-year IAG meeting, in Rabat, on February, 17th-19th, 2015, to facilitate the adoption of the Response and Mitigation Fundamentals Document entitled “Fundamentals for Establishing and Maintaining a Nuclear Security Response Framework: A GICNT Best Practices Guide”.
• Morocco submitted at the 9th GICNT meeting held in Helsinki, on June 16th–18th, 2015, “the Response and Mitigation Fundamentals Document”. This document, which was endorsed by Helsinki CICNT Plenary meeting, is a collection of key considerations that a country with “limited capabilities” should consider when designing or enhancing its national nuclear and radiological emergency response system.
• Morocco organized, on January 20th- 21st, 2016, in cooperation with the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), the European Commission, and the GICNT, the final planning meeting of the Inter-Arab Nuclear Detection and Response Exercise “Falcon”, conducted, in Abu Dhabi, on February 23rd- 25th, 2016.

Contributing to the Global Efforts and the IAEA’s Activities to Strengthen the International Nuclear Security Regime:

Morocco hosted, organized and coordinated with the IAEA, several activities by adopting an integrated and global approach, aiming at strengthening the international nuclear security regime. The areas covered range from training, capacity-building and information-sharing to exercises on nuclear security (prevention, detection, forensics, response and mitigation):

• Morocco has, also, built its notification, information exchange and assistance request System with the IAEA, pursuant to the relevant dispositions of the “Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident” and “the Assistance in case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency”.
• Morocco presented the lessons learnt from the exercise ConvEx 3 named “Bab Al Maghrib” at the Competent Authority Meeting, held by the IAEA, in Vienna on May 18th, 2014, and at the International Conference on Challenges Faced by Technical and Scientific Support Organizations (TSOs) in Enhancing Nuclear Safety and Security: Strengthening Cooperation and Improving Capabilities, in Beijing on October 2014.
• Morocco and Spain organized, with this dynamic, on October 26th- 28th, 2015, in cooperation with the IAEA, a maritime transportation security exercise of radioactive material from the port of Algeciras to the port of Tangiers-Med, named “Gate to Africa”. The context of the exercise program was driven by the political instability in the Sahelo-Saharan region that requires collective efforts, on the bilateral and regional levels, due to terrorism threat.
• Morocco and Spain took part, in Vienna, on February 2nd-5th, 2016, in the Consultancy Meeting on the Preparation Executive Summary and the Report from the “Gate to Africa” exercises, organized by the IAEA. In the meantime, Morocco presented the lessons learnt in the areas to be improved and to gather good practices. The latter’s will be submitted as      a summary executive exercise to be shared with IAEA members, and as an input to Washington NSS (2016).

Promoting Nuclear Security Culture:

Morocco attaches the highest priority to human resources development and to the promotion of a nuclear security culture, through nuclear security education and training by establishing nuclear security support centers and international nuclear security education network:

• Morocco updated in 2015 with IAEA its Integrated Nuclear Security and Support Plan (INSSP) for the period 2016-2017.  This plan considers the main actions to be conducted to support nuclear security enhancement. The INSSP covers legal and regulatory framework, prevention, detection, response and human resources development. 
• Morocco continues to organize and host, at the premises of the National Nuclear Security Support Center (NSSC), training activities on nuclear security to disseminate knowledge and information, as well as to promote international standards on nuclear security for representatives of African and MENA region countries.
• Morocco organized, in the framework of its Nuclear Security Support Center, several training activities at the national and regional levels. In 2014-2015, the National Training and Support Center of the National Center of Energy Sciences and Nuclear Techniques (CNESTEN) conducted 15 training events (9 national and 6 regional) for 380 participants on various topics related to nuclear security: detection architecture, radioactive sources physical protection, sources security transportation, emergency preparedness and response, nuclear security information management, nuclear forensics, borders control. These trainings were organized, in cooperation with the IAEA, the USA and the Arab Atomic Energy Agency.
• Morocco (General Directorate for Civil Protection – DGPC) has been hosting, since 2013, a Regional Center of Excellence CBRN for the African countries of the Atlantic coast to share best practices, to enhance collaboration at the regional and sub-regional levels, with the following objectives:
  • To reduce the risk of illicit nuclear trafficking;
  • To raise awareness on chemical, Biological, Radiological and nuclear materials
  • To reinforce capacity building on the use of personal equipments for detection of ionizing rays.
• Morocco equipped its customs-controlled borders and exit-entry points with devices detecting and identifying nuclear and radioactive materials.
• Morocco’s National Center for Radiation Protection (NCRP), organized many trainings, in cooperation with the General Directorate for National Security (DGSN) and the Radiological Security Office (ORS) of the US Department of Energy.

National Progress Report: The Netherlands

1.    Support for the CPPNM (as Amended) and ICSANT

The Netherlands has ratified both the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT). Although the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM has not yet entered into force, legislation, regulations and policies of the Netherlands have been developed in accordance with the treaty as amended.

In addition, the Netherlands has cooperated with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in organising outreach activities aimed at promoting the Amendment’s entry into force. The Netherlands has also submitted a report on its laws and regulations giving effect to the treaty in accordance with article 14.1 of the CPPNM.

2.    Strengthened National System for Security of Nuclear and other Radioactive Material
Current national rules and regulations are based on the IAEA Nuclear Security Series documents, in particular the Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 and parts of Rev.5).

The Netherlands has hosted International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions on four occasions (2005, 2008, 2009 and 2012), covering all of its nuclear installations. The general conclusion of the last mission in 2012 was that a firmly grounded physical protection regime exists in the Netherlands, and that appropriate physical protection measures are in place at nuclear facilities. Two recommendations for further improvement were made: (1) incorporate all applicable parts of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 into the domestic regime, and (2) develop a Design Basis Threat (DBT) for cyber security.

With respect to the first recommendation, the Netherlands took steps to strengthen its domestic rules on physical protection requirements by means of the Executive Order on the Security of Nuclear Facilities and Fissionable Materials, which came into force on 1 January 2011. An updated order incorporating all applicable parts of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 will come into effect in 2016.

A national DBT relating to the longer-term physical threats to the nuclear sector was introduced in 2008 and adopted in 2011. By 2012, all of the nuclear facilities had implemented the measures as required. This DBT was updated in 2015, the implementation of which will take place in the course of 2016. In line with the second recommendation deriving from the series of IPPAS missions, a DBT specifically concerning cyber security for the Dutch nuclear sector was introduced in 2013 and had been fully implemented by 31 March 2014. The nuclear operators were actively involved in the discussions regarding the design and the implications of both the DBT relating to physical protection and the DBT relating to cyber security. In the second half of 2016, integration of the two DBTs will be discussed, and the DBT for cyber security will be updated. Further, legislation to set up mandatory reporting of cyber incidents in the nuclear sector is currently being discussed in parliament. It is expected that related regulations will come into force in 2017.

The start of a comprehensive review of the Executive Order on the Security of Nuclear Facilities and Fissionable Materials is anticipated for 2016. The aim of this comprehensive review is to achieve an integrated (safety, security and crisis management) performance-based approach with respect to the protection of nuclear facilities rather than a security-only performance-based approach. Among other things, the review will entail an exchange of views and experiences among public and private stakeholders.

In order to assess the effectiveness of the physical protection systems at nuclear sites as well as to test the interfaces between the contingency planning of the operators and the State, several force-on-force exercises have been conducted in the Netherlands, involving all nuclear sites and all relevant state organisations.

With respect to radioactive sources, the 2012 Executive Order on the Security of Radioactive Materials further strengthened relevant security requirements. The Netherlands follows European directives and regulations and, where applicable, has reflected the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the supplementary Guidance on Export and Import of Radioactive Sources in the national legal framework. The Executive Order on the Security of Radioactive Materials will be evaluated in 2016.

Finally, in recent years security and awareness has been enhanced at organisations that work with high risk CBRN-material through the national CBRN/E programme. The Netherlands remains committed to continuing to improve nuclear security architectures through these practical actions.

3.    Contribution to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security-Related Activities

The Netherlands actively contributes to the development of the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Series, most recently by chairing the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee (NSGC) for the term that began in June 2015.

The Netherlands has contributed financially to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund every year since 2002. Its contribution for 2014-2017 is €1 million. The Netherlands continues to advocate for an increase in the IAEA’s budget for nuclear security.

 The Netherlands also contributes expertise in forensics and other areas to the IAEA in order to support the global nuclear security framework and nuclear security services. It has hosted three regional training courses and a train-the-trainers course on physical protection, as well as courses on security culture, DBTs, protection against sabotage and identification of vital areas. Another regional training course on physical protection is planned for May 2016.

4.    Support for Nuclear Security-Related International Initiatives

Together with the other Summit hosts, the US and South Korea, the Netherlands introduced the “Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation” initiative at the 2014 Summit in The Hague. The Netherlands is part of a large group of NSS-participating States that has thus far subscribed to the initiative’s Join Statement.

In addition, the Netherlands participates in the Global Initiative to Counter Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), as well as in the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP). It currently chairs the GICNT Implementation and Assessment Group (IAG) and will host the GICNT 10th Anniversary Meeting in June 2016. The Netherlands also provides financial support to the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and cooperates with the 1540 Committee.

In 2012, the Netherlands hosted the international table-top exercise @tomic 2012, focusing on preventing (the threat of) nuclear/radiological terrorism. The exercise included cyber security and forensics components. In February 2014, the Netherlands hosted a follow-up exercise: @tomic 2014. This latter exercise was organised by the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV) and the Ministry of Foreign A­ffairs, in cooperation with the Netherlands Forensic Institute (NFI), the Ministry of Economic Affairs, INTERPOL, the IAEA, the European Commission, UNICRI, the EU CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence and Europol.

The Netherlands also supports the following NSS 2016 gift baskets: the Canadian initiative on certified training for nuclear security management; the Italian initiative on Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres and Centres of Excellence; the Jordanian initiative on countering nuclear smuggling, the Australian initiative on forensics in nuclear security; the British initiative on cyber security; the Norwegian initiative on minimizing use of HEU; the American initiative on insider threats; the French initiative on security of radioactive sources; the Canadian, South Korean and Spanish initiative on Security Council Resolution 1540; and the initiative on sustaining action to strengthen global nuclear security.

For the 2016 Summit, the Netherlands initiated a gift basket on Sustainability in Reporting and Information Sharing with an accompanying template for a Consolidated National Nuclear Security Report. This gift basket aims to improve and streamline the process of reporting and information sharing on national nuclear security efforts.

5.    Contribution to Minimisation of HEU

The Netherlands has converted all of its nuclear research reactors to use LEU fuel. Dutch industry intends to use only LEU targets for the production of medical radioisotopes, as soon as technically feasible. Almost all HEU has been removed and disposed of.

6.    Establishment of Centres of Excellence

The Netherlands supports the international CoE network coordinated by the IAEA and will contribute to improving cooperation between centres of excellence.

The Reactor Institute Delft at Delft University of Technology (one of the IAEA Collaborating Centres) started a Master’s programme in nuclear security in October 2012, open to qualified students from all IAEA member States. It was developed in collaboration with partner institutions in the UK, Germany, Norway, Austria and Greece, and was aligned with and supported by the IAEA. This programme is currently being evaluated. There are currently plans to establish a centre of excellence (CoE) on nuclear security in Delft.

The Centre for Conflict and Security Law (CCSL), based in Utrecht and Amsterdam, continues to conduct research on strengthening the international legal framework for nuclear and radiological security, as well as corresponding domestic laws and regulations. It collaborates in this area with its extensive academic and research network, in accordance with its ambition to become a CoE on this issue.

7.    Enhanced Efforts to Combat Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and Radiological Material

The Netherlands contributes to the sharing of international information on illicit trafficking in nuclear material through the IAEA’s Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) and nuclear security information portal (NUSEC), through the GICNT IAG, as well as through bilateral cooperation.

Since 2011, the Dutch government and the NFI have established, together with other countries, a comprehensive programme to foster cooperation among nuclear and forensic institutes worldwide. This programme entails the development of a glossary of internationally accepted definitions and rules regarding both nuclear and forensic science; an education and training curriculum; an interactive website providing a platform for discussion and exchange of knowledge; and a survey of best practices with respect to investigating nuclear security events. Furthermore, the NCTV has organised table-top exercises on nuclear forensics, cyber security and incident response. In 2015, the NFI organised an international conference and mock trial on nuclear forensics in the framework of the GICNT. This event, that took place in The Hague, addressed the role of nuclear forensics experts in the investigation and prosecution of nuclear security incidents, the admissibility of nuclear forensics expert evidence into judicial proceedings, and the importance of pre-incident coordination and communication among scientists, law enforcement, and prosecutors.

8.    Strengthened cooperation between government and nuclear industry

Raising security awareness in the nuclear sector is a priority for the Dutch government. To this end, three leading Dutch nuclear operators have each been awarded a €1 million grant to further develop and improve security measures. The IAEA and WINS have both recognized the merits of this concept and have encouraged its application in other countries.

The government consults with plant security managers and information officers when adjustments to national nuclear security policies are needed. By doing so, the government is able to understand their visions and profit from their experience. Nuclear operators are also consulted on policy evaluations in order to gain a better understanding of implementation practices. In these consultations, the different positions of responsibility of the regulator and operators are respected.

National Progress Report: New Zealand

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, New Zealand has strengthened nuclear security implementation and built up the global nuclear security architecture by the following actions.

Supporting Multilateral Instruments

• Ratified the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in March 2016.*
• Ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in March 2016.*

Strengthening National Nuclear and Radiological Material Security

• Enacted the Radiation Safety Act 2016 in March 2016. The Act is a complete overhaul of our legislative framework dealing with the safety and security of nuclear and radioactive material. The Act provides for a new type of licence enabling increased regulatory control over persons who manage or use radioactive or nuclear material.*
• Implemented in March 2016 a Code of Practice for the Security of Radioactive Material.*

Countering Nuclear Smuggling

• In November 2015, New Zealand hosted a Proliferation Security Initiative exercise – Exercise Maru 2015. Over 130 participants from 21 countries attended the exercise which was designed with the Asia Pacific region specifically in mind. The exercise focused on what steps countries with limited resources and capacity can take to intercept weapons of mass destruction and their components.* 

Collaborating with International Organizations

• In November 2015, New Zealand hosted an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission. The voluntary mission reviewed the national nuclear security regime for radioactive material, associated facilities and activities.*
• New Zealand is currently working to implement the IPPAS mission recommendations and plans to invite a follow-up mission.*
• New Zealand concluded a Modified Small Quantities Protocol with the IAEA in 2014 and hosted a successful ad hoc inspection in February 2015 to verify our nuclear material holdings.*
• New Zealand has contributed to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund regularly since its inception in 2002, and has donated $286,000 since NSS 2014.*

Partnering with External Stakeholders

• New Zealand continued to make targeted contributions to a range of voluntary nuclear security-related initiatives.*
• New Zealand has continued its partnership with the United States’ Department of Energy and since the 2014 Summit has contributed NZ$510,000 to a range of nuclear security related projects in Africa, Latin America and Asia.*
• New Zealand has also continued its partnership with the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation to partner on Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism projects. Since the 2014 Summit New Zealand has contributed NZ$160,000 to regional nuclear security training workshops in the Philippines and Sydney.*
• New Zealand has continued its partnership with the World Institute of Nuclear Security, and since the 2014 Summit has contributed NZ$50,000 towards development of its online training facility for nuclear security.*

*Denotes an accomplishment associated with Information Circular (INFCIRC) 869

National Progress Report: Nigeria

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Nigeria has strengthened nuclear security implementation and built up the nuclear security architecture by:

Strengthening Nuclear and other Radioactive Material Security

Development and Review of Regulations

Nigeria has commenced a comprehensive review and updating of the existing Nuclear Security Regulations as well as drafting of new ones to ensure nuclear materials and other radioactive sources are secured. The following regulations are at various stages of review:

• Nigerian Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials Regulations
• Nigeria safety and security of radioactive sources regulation

The following regulations are at various stages of development:

• System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material
• Physical protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities

The review and development shall be completed and gazetted in the third quarter of 2016.

Design Basis Threat

With the changing nature of global and national threats, Nigeria in conjunction with relevant stakeholders is currently reviewing the Design Basis Threat (DBT). This shall be used to guide holders of nuclear and radiological materials on the appropriate physical protection systems to put in place.

The review shall be completed and appropriately communicated to operatos in the third quarter of 2016

Oversight

Nigeria Undertakes regular security inspections of facilities to ensure materials are secured.

Nigeria shall ensure inspectors get requisite training and the inspections shall be regular

Nuclear Security Support Centre

Nigeria established a Nuclear Security Support Centre which is aimed at enhancing human capacity development in the area of nuclear security.

The Centre shall actively liaise with IAEA and other International Organizations to develop and undertake training programmes for stakeholder organizations in 2016 and beyond. The Centre is intended to serve sub-Sahara Africa.

Search and Secure of Orphan and Legacy Radioactive Sources

Nigeria has developed programme for search and secure of orphan and legacy radioactive sources. The programme has been established with the ultimate aim of identifying, securing and recovering vulnerable orphan and legacy radioactive sources in the country and to ensure they are secured to prevent unauthorized access by terrorists and criminals.

The Search and Secure programme has been a yearly exercise. The latest exercise was conducted in January 2016 in three geopolitical Zones of Nigeria.

Nigeria shall acquire more equipment and expertise to ensure efficiency and sustainability of the programme.

Depleted Uranium Survey

The survey of Depleted Uranium (DU) which commenced in 2011 is on ongoing. Nigeria has compiled reports in the IAEA required reporting format and has also created a new material balance area for location outside facilities (LOF) for submission of the report  to the IAEA.

The programme shall continue and comprehensive reports sent to the IAEA

Legacy Sources at Ajaokuta Steel Company Limited

Nigeria conducts regular inspection of the 234 legacy sources at Ajaokuta Steel Company Limited to guarantee their security pending their relocation to a temporary Radioactive Waste Management Facility.

Sources shall be moved to Temporary Waste Management Facility and efforts shall be made for final repatriation to their countries of origin.

Repatriation of Other Disused Radioactive Sources

The Nigerian Government undertakes regular inspection of disused radioactive sources located at the Temporary Waste Management Facility.

Efforts shall be made for final repatriation to their countries of origin.

Minimising Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials

HEU Conversion Programme for Nigeria Research Reactor 1 (NIRR-1)

The Nigeria, China and USA had a tripartite meeting in October 2011 in Abuja and agreed to develop a joint statement on cooperation to the objectives of the HEU to LEU fuel Conversion Programme for the Nigeria Research Reactor-1.

The Nigeria in collaboration with the IAEA commenced discussions on developing human capacity for the HEU fuel conversion to LEU, IAEA fellowship was secured for two Nigerian regulatory Officers at Argonne National Laboratory on core conversion studies in 2012.

Nigeria attended the 35th International Meeting on Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors and the Consultancy Meeting on MNSR held in Vienna, Austria in October and December 2014 respectively. The Consultancy meeting was primarily to look into Nigeria’s progress on the HEU to LEU core conversion.

Nigeria will in the second quarter of 2016  sign the Project and Supply Agreement which will allow the China Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE) procure the LEU core and commence the design and fabrication of the cask.

Countering Nuclear Smuggling

Oversight of NIRR-1

Nigeria undertakes regular inspection of NIRR-1 and supports IAEA safeguard inspection of the facility.

Training of Frontline Officers

Nigeria conducts various training and retraining programmes for its Frontline Officers from the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, Nigeria Customs Service, Nigeria Police Force, State Security Service, Nigeria Immigration Service, Federal Fire Service, Federal Airport Authority of Nigeria, Nigeria Ports Authority and the Defence Headquarters of the Nigerian Armed Forces. Frontline Officers are also nominated to attend IAEA organized training courses on Illicit trafficking/border monitoring, nuclear security, physical protection of nuclear and radiological facilities, response to unauthorized acts involving nuclear and other radioactive materials, Advance Detection of nuclear and radioactive materials, etc.

Installation of Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs)

Nigeria installed its first Radiation Protection Monitor (RPM) at the Murtala Muhammed International Airport, Lagos in 2008 and put into operation in April 2009. The RPM was donated by the IAEA and meant to prevent accidental or undeclared import and export of radioactive sources as well as checking illicit trafficking of nuclear materials.

Three more RPMs have since been procured and discussions are on-going with the manufacturer for the purpose of installing them at strategic ports of entry into the country.

The Installation of the three portal monitors shall be completed before the end of 2016 and the NSSC shall give training of frontline officers a priority.

Supporting Multilateral Instruments

Nigeria adheres strictly to all the International Instruments that it is a signatory to. It is also reviewing its Act with a view to domesticating the instruments.

Nigeria shall ensure the passage of the Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards Bill before the end of 2016

Collaborating with International organizations

To enhance Nuclear Security Nigeria Collaborates with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), United States Department of State’s Partnership for Nuclear Security (PNS), World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) etc. Nigeria actively participated in the WINS professional Certification programmes.

Nigeria is collaborating with Oak Ridge National Laboratory of the United States of America to implement a Human Reliability Programme (HRP) for the Nigerian nuclear industry. A pilot HRP programme is being developed at the Centre for Energy Research and Training, ABU Zaria and is being facilitated by the ORNL with support from Partnership for Nuclear Security (PNS). The programme shall be replicated at other high risk nuclear and radiological facilities in the country.

Nigeria has signed an agreement of cooperation with the United States Department of Energy (US-DOE) Office of Radiological Security (ORS). The objectives of this corporation are to reduce and protect vulnerable nuclear and other radioactive material located at civilian sites; remove and dispose excess nuclear and other radiological materials; and protect nuclear and other radiological materials from theft or sabotage. The cooperation included Physical Security upgrades of some high risk radiological facilities.

Nigeria shall partner more with the International Organizations for capacity building particularly in the development of the Nigerian Nuclear Security Support Centre, Physical security upgrades and HRP implementation.

Partnering with External Stakeholders

Nigeria partners actively with external stakeholders with similar objectives.  More partnerships are being explored and would be entered intoafter the NSS 2016 for sustainability of the NSSprocess.

The partnership shall be sustained

GIFT BASKETS

Nigeria joined the following gift baskets for the 2016 Summit:

• Mitigating Insider Threats
• Nuclear forensics
• Education and Training