National Progress Report: Norway

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Norway has strengthened nuclear security implementation and built up the global nuclear security architecture by… 

Strengthening Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Security

• Norway hosted an IPPAS mission in October 2015, in line with our support to IAEA Information Circular (INFCIRC) 869. The mission recommended that Norway should:
  • Ensuring effective financial and legal independence of the regulatory authority;
  • review its regulations on physical protection, incorporating input from the IPPAS mission;
  • strengthen national measures against insider threats;
  • strengthen measures against cyber threats;
  • improve coordination between different authorities with particular emphasis on threat assessments and response.
• Norway has increased its cooperation with Ukraine on nuclear safety and security, including the following measures:
  • A Norwegian–Swedish–Ukrainian initiative on improving nuclear safety and security in Ukraine was launched at NSS 2014.
  • Bilateral regulatory cooperation with Ukraine has been enhanced. This includes establishing an overview of regulatory challenges to improved nuclear safety.
  • Cooperation with the US has been entered into on projects in Ukraine to counter illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials.
  • In 2016, Norway will host an international meeting for closer coordination of efforts to improve nuclear safety and security in Ukraine.
• Norway has been engaged in several projects over the last two decades on securing the nuclear legacy from the Cold War and other radioactive material in north-western Russia.
  • We are currently supporting activities aimed at securing nuclear material at the former military base in Andreeva Bay and at Atomflot in Murmansk

Minimizing Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials

• Norway launched a Gift Basket at the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit on Minimising and Eliminating the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in Civilian Applications. A follow up International Conference will be organised in 2018.
• Norway has replaced all Cs-137 Category 1 radioactive sources with X-ray technology.
• In 2016, Norway will host an International meeting on minimisation of stocks of highly enriched uranium in a uranium-thorium mixture.

 Countering Nuclear Smuggling

Norway has:

• contributed to improved border monitoring in Ukraine by installing additional border monitoring portals, in partnership with the US;
• helped to improve Ukrainian border guard capabilities in handling nuclear smuggling incidents;
• contributed to training activities in searching for and securing radioactive sources for relevant Ukrainian authorities, in partnership with the US;
• initiated a collaborative project with Slovakia, on improved border control against nuclear smuggling.

Supporting Multilateral Instruments

Norway has:

• signed and ratified the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Facilities (CPPNM);
• adopted the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources including its supplementary guidance document;
• signed and ratified the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism;
• promoted additional measures for material transparency, control and production cut-off, and early start and conclusion of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT).

Collaborating with International Organizations and Initiatives

• Norway has contributed approx. USD 5 mill. to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund since the first summit.
• Norway participates in the IAEA Nuclear Security Guidance Committee.
• Norway is an active member of the G7 Global Partnership.
• Norway participates in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.
• Norway has reported on implementation of UNSC resolution 1540.

 Partnering with External Stakeholders

•  In January 2016, Norway hosted a WINS workshop, in collaboration with the US, on the implementation of the 2014 Gift Basket on Enhancing Radiological Security. 

National Progress Report: Philippines

Nuclear Safeguards: The Philippine Nuclear Research Institute (PNRI) ensures that nuclear materials are not diverted to non-peaceful applications. As part of the reporting obligations under the Additional Protocol, the PNRI submitted an annual update of the declaration and quarterly reports of Export of Annex 2 items.

US Department of Energy (US DOE) Funded Programs/Projects: Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Radiological Security Program formerly Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GRTI)

• Additional security upgrades installed in the hospitals and PNRI facilities with category 1 sources in view of the latest development in radioactive source security requirements, updates on threat assessment and new security system technologies.
• Conducted Radiological Security Incident Response Training (Train-the-Trainer) for the Philippine National Police on 16-19 February 2015 held in Bohol. The objective of the training is to enhance the capability and effectiveness of PNP to conduct training by integrating its curriculum to the Police Academy. This is in support for sustainability of PNP’s human resource development
• Upgraded the PNRI perimeter fence to harden the physical protection along the Radioactive Waste Facility.
   Megaports Initiative/ Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence
• Memorandum of Agreement was signed on 20 July 2015 among the implementing agencies, Bureau of Customs, Philippine Ports Authority and Philippine Nuclear Research Institute in the implementation and sustainability of installed Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) at the Port of Manila. The US DOE supported the transition turnover to the Philippine government, the RPMs and other radiation detection equipment for the maintenance.
• Recovered radiation source from the radiation equipment particularly a TROXLER moisture/density gauge which was sold for scrap during the tertiary inspection at Cebu International Port in July 2015. The moisture/density gauge has an americium and cesium sources. Unfortunately, only the americium was recovered. The PNRI informed the Bureau of Customs in Cebu to monitor possible gamma alarm on future scrap metal export of the Consignor. The PNRI continued to assist the BOC in the interdiction of radiation sources in the scraps and contaminated goods with radioactive sources detected at the ports.
• The Philippine National Police received four (4) mobile detection vans with handheld based detection and identification systems in November 2015. This is to enhance the capabilities for preventing, mitigating, and apprehending suspects and criminals in the act of radiological and nuclear material smuggling. The PNRI will support the PNP through our Mobile Expert Support Teams (MEST) also with one (1) MDS van.
• US Bilateral Assessment Visit Update on 20-21 July 2015. The purpose was to hold discussions with appropriate Government and PNRI officials to review the plans and discuss topics on threats and physical protection based on the IAEA INFCIRC 225 Rev. 5. Representatives from NICA and NSC were present in the meeting. The US Team was composed of the following: US DOE, US Dept. of State, US NRC and Sandia National Laboratory.

IAEA’s Support for Nuclear Security Major Public Event

• NSSS hosted the Coordination Meeting on Major Public Event with IAEA from 11-13 March 2015. The workshop was attended by relevant government agencies and PNRI staff. The Joint Action Plan was signed on 29 April 2015 between the Division of Nuclear Security of the IAEA and PNRI in relation to the 27th APEC Economic Leaders Meeting in November 2015 to be held in Manila.
• In preparation of the APEC, training workshops were conducted:
   
  • National Workshop on Threat Assessment and Design Basis Threat, 21-24 April 2015
  • Workshop on Nuclear Security Systems and Measures for Major Public Event in cooperation with the USDOE/NNSA.
  • Workshop on Concept of Operations between Front Line Officers and Mobile Expert Support Teams
  • Workshop on Responding to Nuclear Security Events at Venues and other Strategic Locations
• Received equipment on a loan basis to be deployed during the APEC Meeting: 
  • 60 Personal Radiation Detectors
  • 8 Radionuclide Identification Devices
  • 6 Portable Radiation Scanners (Backpacks)

US DOE EQUIPMENT

60 pagers, 16 backpacks, 14 RIIDS, 2 linear radiation monitor, 2 high purity germanium detector, 2 SPARCS mobile system, 2 health physics kits

4.      The PNRI MEST performed the scanning/monitoring/paneling together with PNP, AFP and Bureau of Fire CBRN teams at the venue of the APEC Economic leaders meeting, hotels, staging areas and routes. Hotels requested to be installed with radiation equipment.

Cooperative Agreement with the Global Partnership Program of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada (DFATD) –

The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD) and the PNRI concerning activities in furtherance of the G-8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction was finalized and signed by the contracting parties on 12 January 2015. The Implementing Arrangement under the Appendix 1 of the MOU was signed on 23 January 2015. The MOU was to install physical protection system at the research reactor. The installation is on-going.

E.      European Commission project on Border Monitoring Activities in the Philippines. The purpose is to support the development of a training center at PNRI dedicated to train port operators, customs police and other first responders in the field of nuclear detection and response. The assistance is to install Radiation Portal Monitor at the front gate of PNRI, handheld equipment and train-the-trainer program. The installation of the RPM is on-going and projected to finish in January 2016.

National Progress Report: Poland

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Poland has strengthened nuclear security implementation and built up the global nuclear security architecture by:

1.      Strengthening Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Security

All the nuclear and radiological materials are subject to strict and continuous control. To fulfill its international obligations related to nuclear materials, Poland runs the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC), which significantly enhances the security of nuclear materials. Additionally, a register of radioactive sources is kept. The radioactive sources register contains data on more than 23,000 sources including spent sealed radioactive sources, information concerning their movement as well as related documents. In the years 2002-2015 the physical protection systems for a high active radioactive sources possessed by over 80 medical, research and other institutions were upgraded under the GTRI program.

In an effort to optimize the security of nuclear facilities in Poland, a special task-force group for developing proposals to strengthen the anti-terrorist security of the nuclear research reactor “Maria” in Świerk was established as a part of the Inter-ministerial Team for Terrorist Threats. The group formulated a number of recommendations aimed at improving the nuclear security of the reactor.

Moreover, the National Anti-terrorist Program has been adopted by the Government of Poland on 9 December 2014.  Its priorities include – among others – objectives related to strengthening nuclear security against terrorist threats.

On 17-20 November 2015, “Patrol 2015”, an intensive operational exercise was conducted at the nuclear research reactor “Maria” facility in Świerk. It was organized by Europol, in cooperation with IAEA and with support of the Polish Police and the National Centre for the Nuclear Research. The overall goal was to improve preparedness of the CBRN experts and first responders to effectively react to incidents and emergencies involving radiological and nuclear materials. The scenario of the exercise included a terrorist attack against the facility.

2.      Minimizing Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials

Under the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), Poland is about to complete the process of removing highly enriched uranium (HEU) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from the nuclear research reactor “Maria” in Świerk.

In August 2014 the last HEU fuel element was unloaded from “Maria’s” core. From now on, it operates on LEU fuel solely. In September 2014, 44 SNF elements containing 10,4 kg of HEU were shipped to the radioactive waste disposal site, located in the Russian Federation. The last shipment (51 SNF elements containing 12,1 kg of HEU) is due to be completed in the second half of 2016.     

Measures strengthening security of the Różan radioactive waste disposal site have been also recently applied. Process of selection of the new waste disposal site (due to total filling of the Różan capacity) will comply with the highest nuclear security standards, in accordance with IAEA recommendations.

3. Countering Nuclear Smuggling

In cooperation with the US Department of Energy, Polish Border Guard continued process of improving its counter-smuggling capabilities with regard to nuclear materials. A number of relevant trainings and exercises was conducted. Technical infrastructure of border-crossing points was also subject for improvement.

Poland will continue cooperation with external partners in strengthening national responses to the nuclear and radioactive smuggling. In this context, we welcome the initiative of Sweden to organize a conference in 2016 to discuss implementation of NSS commitments and objectives in the wider Black Sea region.

4.      Supporting Multilateral Instruments

Poland already ratified all relevant international nuclear security conventions and is a member of international initiatives and mechanisms aimed at strengthening nuclear security and preventing illicit trafficking of nuclear materials.

We will continue to support universal application of all relevant international instruments.

5.      Collaborating with International Organizations

Poland has committed itself to ensuring that the highest nuclear security standards are observed in the development of its peaceful nuclear power program. At the request of the Government of Poland, an international team of senior safety experts met with representatives of the National Atomic Energy Agency (PAA) in 2013 to conduct an Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission. The purpose of the mission was to examine Poland’s regulatory framework for nuclear and radiation safety, and its effectiveness. Based on the IRRS evaluation against the IAEA safety standards, the review team identified good practices as well as offered several recommendations and suggestions to be addressed by the PAA. As the result, the action plan has been developed and the recommendations of the mission are being implemented. In order to verify the process of implementation Poland will host IRRS follow-up mission in 2017.

After hosting the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) Workshop and Preparatory Meeting in 2015, the IPPAS Mission was conducted in Poland in February 2016. The recommendations and suggestions received from the Mission will strengthen national nuclear security regime.

In order to assure better compliance with the IAEA guidelines and recommendations, a national workshop on Design Basis Threat (DBT) implementation was held in Warsaw in September 2013. As a result of discussion conducted during the workshop, the series of high-level and working-level meetings of all interested Polish institutions were held and led to draft an amendment to the national security legal framework. It is foreseen that updated regulation related to the DBT will enter into force in 2017. Among the options suggested by the IAEA, approach of a single DBT covering all threats and potential targets in country has been chosen.

In the aftermath of IAEA’s Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR) mission, hosted by Poland in March 2013, Poland prepared the National Action Plan to implement relevant recommendations and suggestions. This Plan has been approved and signed by the Minister of Economy in April 2014. It confirmed i.e. the Polish Nuclear Power Program to contain all necessary provisions on nuclear security. In May 2014, the IAEA representatives visited Poland to elaborate the Integrated Work Plan for INIR conclusions. The next INIR mission (so-called Follow-up mission) will take place in June 2016, with the aim to assess the level of compliance with the INIR mission recommendations and suggestions. At the same time it will look at Phase 2 of the development of the Polish nuclear power Program (using the “Milestone approach”) following the announcement of the technology tender by the investor/operator (“PGE EJ1 Ltd.”) at that time.

In addition, in October 2015 Council of Ministers adopted the National Plan for Management of Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel.

National Progress Report: Republic of Korea

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, the Republic of Korea (ROK) has strengthened nuclear security and built up the global nuclear security architecture by:

1. Supporting Multilateral Instruments

Accomplishments

• Korea ratified the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) in May 2014, after incorporating both conventions into the national legislations. Korea has also incorporated IAEA INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 into its national regulations.
• Korea has established the legal and administrative framework for the security of Category 1 and 2 radioactive sources as provided in the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the revised supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.
• Together with 35 countries, Korea participated in the joint effort to share, through IAEA INFCIRC/869, the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation with the IAEA Member States. Its intention is to incorporate the broader community of states outside the NSS process by giving them a chance to subscribe to the Statement.

Commitments

• Korea will continue its support for multilateral legal instruments and work with the international community to achieve full implementation and universalization of the relevant legal instruments.

2. Strengthening the National Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Security System

Accomplishments

• Korea received an IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission in 2014 to review its national nuclear security architecture and reflected the recommendations for the improvement of its physical protection system.
• Korea carries out regular inspection of its nuclear facilities and periodic force-on-force physical protection exercises, which is mandatory under domestic law. These exercises are designed to detect and respond to mock adversaries, and use state-of-the-art devices and systems. 

Commitments

• Korea will continue to review and update its legislative framework for nuclear security with a particular focus on areas such as consolidating transport security of nuclear materials taking a graded approach in sabotage response, introducing a licensing system for physical protection for the front-end life cycle of the nuclear power plant mitigating insider threats, and identifying vital areas at nuclear facilities.

3. Collaborating with International Organizations

Accomplishments

• (IAEA) Korea has been an active supporter of IAEA nuclear security activities, providing expertise and financial support. Since 2012, Korea has been contributing 1 million US dollars annually to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund (NSF) and its experts have been participating in the development of the IAEA’s nuclear security guidance, training courses, and research projects.
• (UN) As the Chair of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 1540 Committee for the 2013-2014 term, Korea played a leading role in the international efforts to promote full implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004), such as providing financial support of 1 million US dollars and presiding over the Security Council open debate on Resolution 1540 in May 2014 at which the Presidential Statement (PRST) was adopted by consensus.
• (GICNT) Korea served as the Coordinator for the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) Implementation and Assessment Group (IAG) from 2013 to 2015. In this capacity, Korea hosted the annual IAG Meeting in July 2014 at which the development of the future strategy was discussed.
• (GP) Korea has made contributions to multiple nuclear security-related projects under the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP).  Those projects include securing high activity radioactive sources, establishing mobile radiological detection system, building remote monitoring center for nuclear facilities in various regions around the world.

Commitments

• Korea will serve as the Chair for the Ministerial Segment of the 2016 IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security to be held in Vienna in December 2016, as part of the efforts to contribute to maintaining the political momentum created in the Nuclear Security Summit process.
• Korea will hold in September 2016 a regional outreach event to promote implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540 amongst relevant stakeholders in industry and academia.  
• Korea will continue to strengthen its capabilities in the field of nuclear security through close technical cooperation with relevant international organizations and continue to render technical, financial, and political support.

4. Enhancing Cyber Security in Nuclear Facilities

Accomplishments

• Korea revised its national laws and regulations to add cyber security requirements at nuclear facilities. In accordance with these laws and regulations, Korea has been conducting regular inspections and reviews of cyber security at nuclear facilities since 2015. In addition, Korea has included cyber threats as one of the elements in the Design Basis Threat (DBT) of nuclear facilities.
• Korea hosted the IAEA-ROK Regional Workshop on Computer Security for Nuclear Facilities in November 2014 and participated in the IAEA International Conference on Computer Security in a Nuclear World in June 2015 sharing its experience of an attempted cyber attack against nuclear facilities.

Commitments

• At the national level, Korea will further strengthen its legislative and regulatory framework for cyber security at nuclear facilities through the development of cyber security regulation procedures, review of cyber security training programs, and building up of capabilities in responding to cyber incidents.
• At the international level, Korea will continue to cooperate with the IAEA to strengthen cyber security at nuclear facilities. The planned activities include collaborating on a Coordinated Research Program on the development of evaluation methods for cyber incident response, participating in the review process of the Nuclear Security Series publications to reflect cyber security considerations, and hosting the IAEA Regional Training Course (RTC) in 2016, and the IAEA International Training Course (ITC) in 2017.

5. Promoting Nuclear Security Education and Training

Accomplishments

• Since its inauguration in February 2014, the International Nuclear Non-proliferation and Security Academy (INSA) has trained more than 3,200 experts, operators, and officials through domestic and international training programs on nuclear security, safeguards, and strategic trade controls. It has run 12 international nuclear security training courses inviting experts from 23 countries, including those from emerging nuclear power States.

Commitments

• Korea will continue to provide nuclear security training, especially for regulators and officials in emerging nuclear power countries.
• Korea will continue its efforts to enhance regional cooperation between Centers of Excellence (COEs), building on the Asia Regional Network (ARN) within the IAEA International Network for Nuclear Security Training and Support Centers (NSSC Network), with a view to strengthening measures for nuclear security in nuclear facilities and building confidence among the countries in the region.

6. Minimizing the Use of HEU

Accomplishments

• Korea is working with Belgium, France, Germany and the United States on a joint project to develop and qualify new high-density low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuels for research reactors. As committed to in the 2014 Joint Statement, Korea has provided 100 kg of atomized U-Mo powder for use in the fabrication of LEU test fuels and has committed to produce and provide any additional powder needed for further research and qualification. 

Commitments

• Korea will continue to render technical and political support to achieve the goal of converting the remaining HEU-fueled research reactors.

7. Countering Nuclear Smuggling

Accomplishments

• Korea supports active information sharing to combat nuclear smuggling, including reporting through the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB).
• Korea is operating the domestic Radiation Source Location Tracking (RADLOT) system for the prevention of loss or trafficking of radiological materials. It has also been working with the IAEA and Vietnam on the pilot project for the establishment of the RADLOT system in Vietnam.
• Korea has also started developing a national nuclear forensics system, including a national response plan, and nuclear forensics library.

Commitments

• Korea will continue to enhance its capacity to counter nuclear smuggling, especially by strengthening nuclear detection activities at borders, including at airports and ports, and working with relevant international organizations.  

National Progress Report: Romania

Romania is strongly committed to the efforts of strengthening nuclear security and reducing the continuing threat of nuclear terrorism.

Ensuring the highest possible standards of nuclear security lies at the core of Romania’s nuclear energy policy.

Therefore, since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Romania has continued to resolutely implement its nuclear security commitments, and to contribute to the efforts of building up the global nuclear security architecture through the following main actions:

A. Supporting Multilateral Instruments

Romania is a State Party to the following multilateral instruments which promote nuclear security: the Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its Amendment; the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSTANT); the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Romania encourages all States that have not yet done so to become party to the CPPNM, to ratify its Amendment, and to sing and ratify CTBT.

Romania is actively involved in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), subscribing to the commitment to detect, prevent and respond effectively to acts of nuclear terrorism by carrying multilateral activities aimed at improving interoperability among participating States. Romanian experts take part regularly in the activities of two specific GICNT working groups, namely, Nuclear Detection Working Group – NDWG and Nuclear Forensics Working Group – NFWG.

B. Strengthening national legislation

Romania has in place the necessary regulatory framework and has the capacity to ensure a proper management of nuclear materials, including preventing terrorists from acquiring such materials.

In 2014, Romania updated its National Strategy for Nuclear Safety and Security, which was approved by Governmental Decision in July 2014, with the objective of strengthening national legislation framework on nuclear security.

C. Collaborating with International Organizations

Romania recognizes the leading role of IAEA, fully supports the IAEA’s nuclear security programme and commends the Agency for its tireless efforts to strengthen international cooperation and improve nuclear security worldwide.

Romania reiterates its readiness to engage in international cooperation projects, to share its experience in the field of nuclear security and safety and to offer relevant expertise in this field.

The national regulatory authority in Romania (the National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control - CNCAN) strictly follows the standards and guidelines issued by the IAEA. It participated in most of the relevant activities organized by the IAEA, including the International Conference on Advances in Nuclear Forensics: Countering the Evolving Threat of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control (July 2014), or the International Conference on Cyber Security: Discussions and exchange of information (June2015)[1].

D. Undertaking Unilateral Commitments

In the margins of NSS 2014, Romania undertook a number of unilateral commitments, which were or are currently being implemented, namely:

i) A voluntary contribution of 30,000 Euro to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund: the payment is in the process of being made;

ii)   Receiving, in 2014, an IAEA INSServ (International Nuclear Security Advisory Service) mission: The mission took place on 12-16 May 2014, and ensured an independent assessment of the national capabilities for detection and response in case of illicit trafficking, identifying means for enhancing nuclear security related activities;

iii) Inviting, in 2016, an IAEA IPPAS (International Physical Protection Advisory Service) follow-up mission to assess the stage of implementation of the recommendations presented on the occasion of the previous IPPAS mission, in 2012: Romania is in the process of officially inviting the IPPAS follow-up mission for the last quarter of 2016.

E. Securing all Nuclear Materials

Romania repatriated to the country of origin (the Russian Federation) the entire quantities of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and low enriched uranium (LEU).

F. Controlling the Radioactive Sources

Since 2009, Romania has in place an agreement with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) on cooperation for enhancing the physical security of special nuclear materials and radioactive sources in Romania. Under this agreement, during the period 2014-2016, Romania carried out several activities, such as improving the physical protection systems at several hospitals and oncological institutes, and placing into safe storage all existing highly radioactive sources in hospitals and research institutes.   

In the framework of the "Second Line of Defense" initiative, Romania continued to commission equipment, thus completing securing the Romanian north-eastern border by installing radiological detection portals at the access points for road, rail and pedestrian traffic. In 2015, detection portals for luggage and passengers were installed at Romania’s national airport, in Bucharest.

G. Countering illicit trafficking of nuclear materials

Romania is one of the countries which voluntarily report to the IAEA database on illicit trafficking of radioactive substances in the event that such developments ever occur. No high-risk events regarding illicit trafficking in dual use (civilian and military) nuclear items occurred in Romania so far. Since the launch of the IAEA database, Romania only reported some minor incidents.

During the period 2014-2016, the frequency of such recorded events was about 3 or 4 per year. They are, nevertheless, insignificant in what concerns their impact on the environment and the population.

H. Supporting the Nuclear Security Culture

Romania attaches great importance to the promotion of the nuclear security culture. The Romanian authorities contribute actively to efforts of raising awareness and improving understanding of the nuclear security culture, not only among governmental agencies, but also among individuals. As of 2016, a dedicated curricula is considered to be included in the training programme for all staff in the field of nuclear installations and law enforcement institutions. 

I. Gift Baskets

Romania supports the following 2016 NSS Gift Baskets: Nuclear Security Contact Group; Activity and Cooperation to Counter Nuclear Smuggling; Strengthening the security of high activity sealed radioactive sources – HARS; Minimizing and Eliminating the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in Civilian Applications; Insider Threat; Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540.

[1] On the basis of a specific cooperation agreement with IAEA[1], CNCAN organized, at national level, several events aiming at a better dissemination of specific aspects referring to the cyber security issues of the devices used in nuclear installations, and also to the strengthening of national, regional and international capacity for preventing, discovery and response to criminal and unauthorized acts involving nuclear and/or radioactive material, such as: National Training Course on Information and Computer Security Advanced Practices for Nuclear Security (July 2014), Black Sea Regional Meeting Nuclear Security Detection and Response: Information Exchange and Coordination (November 2014), National Training Course on Security of Radioactive Material in Transport(May 2015), National Training Course on Nuclear Security Events significance – assessment and response(April2015).

National Progress Report: Saudi Arabia

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Saudi Arabia has strengthened nuclear security implementation through effective participation in a number of events and international activities related to nuclear security, including the following:

1. Participated in the annual meeting of the International Network of Training and Assistance in nuclear security of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) held in Vienna in February 2014

2. Participated in a diplomacy workshop for ambassadors on disarmament and nuclear security held in Baden-Austria in June 2014.

3.  Conducteda national workshop in cooperation with the IAEA on nuclear safeguards and security, held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in September 2014

4. Organized a joint meeting in cooperation with the IAEA on nuclear security between border control experts from the Republic of Yemen and Saudi Arabia in Riyadh-Saudi Arabia in January 2015.

5.  The Kingdom joined the European Union (EU) Centers of Excellence on Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Risk Mitigation (CBRN CoE Initiative) in January 2015 and became a member of the Regional Center of Excellence under this initiative, which is based in the U.A.E. The Kingdom has actively participated in the third meeting of CBRN CoE Initiative, held in Brussels, Belgium in May 2015.

6. Organized a workshop in collaboration with Japan on the development of human resources in security and nuclear safety and safeguards, held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in February 2015.

7. Participated in the meeting of the Working Group of the International Network of Nuclear Security Education (INSEN) at the Agency's headquarters in Vienna-Austria, in February 2015.

8. Participated in the regional workshop on integrated nuclear security support plans for Arabic-speaking countries in Cairo, Egypt in April 2015.

9. Participated in the regional meeting to exchange information about the Database of Illicit Trafficking in Radioactive and Nuclear Materials held in Kuwait in October 2015.

10.  Organized national workshop for protection from the risks of chemical, biological radioactive, and nuclear materials in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in 15-17 November 2015 in cooperation with the United Nations crime and Justice Research Institute (UNCRI).

11.  Signed the Convention Practical Coordination between the IAEA and Naif University for Security Sciences in December 2015 for cooperation in the field of education and training programs related to nuclear security

12.  Organized a symposium on nuclear security presented by the head of Nuclear Security at the IAEA, which was held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in December 2015.

13.  Organized workshop in cooperation with the IAEA on capacity assessment and strategy for education and training in nuclear disciplines, which was held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in December 2015. 

National Progress Report: Singapore

Singapore is firmly committed to working with the international community to strengthen the global nuclear security architecture.  We take a serious view of our international responsibilities.  In this regard, we fully comply with and implement our international obligations.  This includes the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 and other country-specific UNSCRs.  Singapore participates in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) aimed at preventing the illicit trafficking of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).  In September 2016, we are due to serve on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s Board of Governors for the fifth time.  We look forward to this opportunity to work with other Member States to enhance nuclear safety and security as an active member of the Board. 

Singapore also consistently supports various regional efforts to build capacity and strengthen collaboration in the area of nuclear security.  We participate actively at ASEAN Regional Forum Meetings and regional seminars on export controls and non-proliferation.  We also work with the European Union’s Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Centre of Excellence (CoE) in Southeast Asia on its projects and activities.

On the national front, Singapore is committed to playing our part in countering proliferation.  As a major transit and transhipment hub, Singapore has a robust export control system.  We subscribe to effective implementation and rigorous national legislation standards, which are regularly reviewed.  This is a reflection of our desire to maintain our position as a safe and secure trade and shipping hub, taking into account the evolving security environment. 

Following the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Singapore has consistently contributed to the enhancement of the global nuclear security architecture through the activities outlined below.

Strengthening the Security of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material

To ensure the safe and secure use of radioactive materials, Singapore has an effective licensing regime for the import, export, possession, handling, transport, use and storage of radioactive materials.  Singapore maintains a national register for radioactive materials to ensure they are properly accounted for. 

Singapore works hard to strengthen security measures in local storage sites for radioactive materials.  To this end, a working group consisting of home-front agencies and regulators was established in 2014.  This working group focuses on:

a) conducting inspections at storage sites for the security of sensitive materials, including radioactive materials;

b) assessing the adequacy of existing security measures; and

c) making recommendations to further improve security at storage sites. 

The working group has carried out site inspections at storage sites where higher risk radioactive materials are kept.  Appropriate security measures are issued to the licensees for implementation, while compliance is ensured through follow up inspections.

Singapore has also been educating and promoting awareness of nuclear security. Singapore, represented by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) of the Nanyang Technological University, became a member of the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) of the IAEA in July 2014.  As an INSEN member, RSIS aims to develop academic courses and conduct training modules in partnership with the IAEA to educate its students on nuclear security policies.

Singapore recognises the emerging cybersecurity threats and risks of cyber-attacks on critical information infrastructure.  To boost Singapore’s cybersecurity infrastructure, Singapore set up a Cyber Security Agency (CSA), which began operation on 1 April 2015.  The CSA is a high-level central agency to coordinate public- and private-sector efforts to protect national systems from increasing cyber threats.  Given the trans-boundary nature of cybersecurity threats to critical infrastructure, Singapore recognises the crucial need for like-minded countries to cooperate closely on cybersecurity initiatives, through cooperation between Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs), sharing of best practices and procedures, joint training and drills as well as cybersecurity capacity building.  CSA has already established close working relationships on these areas with our ASEAN and international partners through existing ASEAN platforms as well as through the signing of MOUs.  Singapore also organised and actively participated in a workshop on cyber confidence building measures in the ASEAN region.

To support international law enforcement to counter multi-dimensional, transnational and fast-evolving security threats, Singapore hosts the INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation (IGCI).  The IGCI allows INTERPOL to better disseminate real-time alerts and coordinate operational responses.  These alerts also allow member countries to be better placed to stop transnational security threats.  The IGCI’s focus on innovation enables INTERPOL to further develop advanced tools and training techniques for countries to tackle emerging threats.  Law enforcement agencies can access INTERPOL’s tools and programmes through the IGCI to better train and equip their officers to combat these threats, thereby enhancing collective regional safety and security around the world.  

Minimising Nuclear and Other Radioactive Materials

Singapore has taken a number of measures to fully implement UNSCR 1540.  We participated in regional workshops on promoting the full implementation of UNSCR 1540, organised by the Philippines in July 2014 and by the Republic of Korea in October 2014.  More details of our efforts can be found in Singapore’s reports to the UNSC Committee established pursuant to UNSCR 1540.  Singapore submits these reports regularly, which demonstrates our commitment against the proliferation of all WMD and their delivery systems.

Countering Nuclear Smuggling

Singapore’s Immigration and Checkpoints Authority Ports Command is equipped with Radiological Portal Monitors to detect cargoes carrying radiological or nuclear consignments.  To strengthen our efforts in the area of nuclear detection and nuclear forensics, Singapore has developed its first border laboratory - “Protective, Analytical and Assessment Facility”.  The laboratory, which is expected to be operational by mid-2016, is equipped with capabilities in radiation-nuclear detection and analysis to interdict illicit activities at the border.

Singapore regularly reviews and updates our export control list to ensure that our system is in line with international practices.  This includes the four multilateral export control regimes, namely the Missile Technology Control Regime, Wassenaar Arrangement, Nuclear Suppliers Group and Australia Group.  On the domestic front, we regularly organise outreach programmes to ensure that the Singaporean business community is updated on the latest developments and requirements.  As a major financial centre and a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Singapore is committed to following up on FATF Recommendations to combat proliferation financing.

Support for Multilateral Instruments

Singapore is committed to implementing and fulfilling the obligations of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its 2005 Amendment.  To this end, several legislative amendments were made to our Radiation Protection Act.  These were passed in Parliament on 7 July 2014.  Singapore deposited the instrument of accession and acceptance to the CPPNM and its 2005 Amendment with the IAEA on 22 September 2014 and became a party to the Convention on 22 October 2014.  Since then, Singapore has implemented a licensing and monitoring regime to track maritime vessels carrying nuclear material transiting through Singapore’s seaports.  Singapore also participated in the Technical Meeting of the Points of Contact and Central Authorities of States Parties to the CPPNM in December 2015 to learn the best practices adopted by CPPNM Member States in fulfilling their obligations to the Convention. 

As part of our efforts to counter nuclear terrorism, Singapore signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) on 1 December 2006.  Following Singapore’s accession to the CPPNM and its 2005 Amendment, we are working towards the legislative framework necessary to ratify ICSANT in the upcoming months.

Singapore fully supports and endorses the IAEA’s efforts to enhance the safety and security of radioactive sources.  In this regard, Singapore is working towards following the guidance contained in the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.  Singapore has been a member of the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) since 2012.  As the National Focal Point for the ITDB, Singapore’s National Environment Agency (NEA) disseminates notifications on nuclear/radiological-related incidents filed by Member States to Singapore’s Government agencies.  NEA also files local incidents to the ITDB.

Collaborating with International Organisations

Singapore is a strong supporter of the IAEA’s work in helping Member States strengthen nuclear security.  Since 2014, Singapore has been actively participating in various IAEA emergency exercises organised by the Incident and Emergency Centre.  These exercises are aimed at testing arrangements for a transnational radiological emergency, such as sending notifications on the accident and requests for international assistance.

We renewed a MOU for the Singapore-IAEA Third Country Training Programme (TCTP) in January 2015.  The Programme provides joint technical assistance to developing countries across a wide range of areas including nuclear security.  Singapore is also working with the IAEA to organise a Regional Workshop on Nuclear Law in 2016 under the Singapore-IAEA TCTP, which will cover various topics including the international nuclear legal framework for nuclear security.

Singapore’s Ministry of Home Affairs’ Chief Science and Technology Officer, Dr Lee Fook Kay, contributed actively as a member of the IAEA’s Emergency Preparedness and Response Expert Group.  He was also part of the organising committee for the International Conference on Global Emergency Preparedness and Response, which was held from 19 to 23 October 2015 in Austria.  At the conference, Singapore presented a paper on nuclear detection technologies entitled “Evaluation Study of High Purity Germanium based Technology in Detection of Radiation Sources at Container”.

Partnering with External Stakeholders

As a partner nation of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), Singapore works with other participating states to strengthen global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism.  To enhance our national capability, Singapore attended a workshop on Public Messaging for Emergency Management in the Philippines in April 2015.

Together with China and the US, Singapore co-chaired the first three ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Meetings (ISM) on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, which took place annually from 2009 to 2011.  We continue to support this initiative and have participated actively in subsequent ISMs every year.

Singapore was an early supporter of the European Union’s initiative to establish the CBRN CoE in Southeast Asia.  The CBRN CoE was subsequently launched in Singapore in 2009.  Since its inception in 2011, we have participated regularly in the CBRN CoE National Focal Point meetings.  Singapore also takes part in related projects, such as on biosecurity, chemical and biological waste management, and e-learning in order to enhance our domestic capabilities.  We have hosted CBRN CoE projects and activities.  These include the working session on knowledge development and transfer of best practices on chemical and biological waste management in Southeast Asia in July 2014 and the Regional Experts Meeting on Non-Proliferation Nuclear Forensics for ASEAN states in November 2014.

Through our participation at the annual Asian Export Control Seminars held in Japan, Singapore shares our experiences on reaching out to our domestic industry and working closely together to counter WMD proliferation by maintaining a robust export control regime.

Singapore participates regularly in the annual Asian Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP) meetings in Japan.  At the 12th ASTOP meeting held on 20 January 2016, Singapore gave a presentation on our efforts in non-proliferation and counter-proliferation through initiatives such as the PSI.

Singapore is a participant in the PSI and the only Southeast Asian member of the PSI’s Operational Experts Group (OEG).  We believe that PSI helps to promote more international cooperation in the global effort to combat the illicit trafficking of WMD. The exercises allow participating states to build up critical interdiction capabilities and practices.  Singapore has hosted two PSI exercises to-date, each of which was attended by approximately 2,000 participants.  We will host a third exercise in September 2016.  Singapore also participates regularly in OEG meetings as well as in policy discussions, such as the High Level Political Meetings.

National Progress Report: Spain

I. INTRODUCTION

At The Hague Summit 2014, the Spanish Government pledged to carry out a series of measures that would contribute to improving Global Nuclear Security. These are: (1) Promoting the entry into force of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM); (2) Developing a National Plan for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540; (3) Fostering a nuclear security culture on a national scale; (4) Joining the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

In order to strengthen specific technical areas of nuclear security, Spain supported the following Gift Baskets: (1) the National Legislation Implementation Kit on Nuclear Security; (2) Strengthening the nuclear security implementation; (3) Forensics in Nuclear security; (4) Enhancing the security of the maritime supply chain; (5) Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres/Centres of Excellence.

This report focuses on the measures adopted for legal and regulatory development; for developing technical, human and operational capabilities to ensure the security of nuclear and radioactive material and facilities; and for strengthening international bilateral, regional and multilateral cooperation.

II. LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: National Implementation and Support for the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and UN Security Council Resolution 1540

1)     In 2007 Spain ratified the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Since then Spain has been integrating the provisions of this Convention into its national legal system and has been working for the international promotion of the entry into force of this Amendment.

2)      Since The Hague Summit, Spain has made remarkable progress in adapting its legal and regulatory framework to the international instruments and regulations. More specifically, in September 2015 Spain approved a new National Security Act (Ley 36/2015 of 28 de September) which defines the national security system, assigns responsibilities to the different departments of the Government, and organizes the management of prevention and response to national threats.

Furthermore, Spain has amended and updated its regulations for the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities (RD 1308/2011) through a new Royal Decree 1086/2015 of 4 December, with the aim of: (1) Incorporating the new International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recommendations; (2) Adapting it to the new threats, including cyber and insider threats; (3) Improving law enforcement forces response; (4) Incorporating the basic elements of the new 2013 national cyber-security strategy; (5) Taking into account experience and lessons learned since the ratification in 2007 of the Amendment to the Convention (CPPNM).

In order to foster the entry into force of the 2005 Amendment to the 1987 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Spain’s embassies with representation in 37 States have carried out demarches aimed at accelerating their ratification process of this Amendment.

3)      The Spanish “National Security Council” approved the National Action Plan for Compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1540 on 24 April 2015. The 1540 Action Plan establishes appropriate measures for the full implementation of Resolution 1540 and those of nuclear security in particular. In addition, from 1 January 2015 to 31 December 2016, Spain is chairing the 1540 Committee of the UN Security Council. In 2016 Spain will lead the “Global Review” for a full and universal implementation of Resolution 1540.

III. DEVELOPING NATIONAL CAPABILITIES: National Security and Security of Nuclear and Radioactive Material and Facilities

1. Security of Material and Facilities

Spain has made substantial progress on the security of its nuclear material and facilities: (1) The Physical Protection Plans for nuclear facilities have been amended, incorporating protection criteria specified in the national Regulations on Protection of Critical Infrastructures (Act 8/2014 and RD 704/2011); (2) A new protection model has been developed for the comprehensive protection of nuclear facilities by Security Forces; (3) Insider Trustworthiness programmes have been developed for monitoring personnel at nuclear facilities; (4) Criteria have been included for protecting data and computerized control systems in the physical protection plans.

Regarding the security of transportation of nuclear and other radioactive materials, the Spanish Nuclear Regulatory Authority (Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear, CSN) continues to develop technical standards on transport security. In this regard, the Ministry of the Interior organized in 2015 a national exercise on security in land transportation of spent fuel from nuclear power plants.

As regards the security of radioactive sources, the CSN is drawing up the technical standards on the requirements for the physical protection of sources in categories 1, 2 and 3, as well as the practices to guarantee the physical protection of those in categories 4 and 5. Spain continues to provide support to other States for them to strengthen security measures for their radioactive sources. Spain also chairs the open-ended international Working Group on developing international guidance for the security of disused radioactive sources, to complement the provisions of the “Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources”.

The Spanish Nuclear regulatory Authority (CSN), together with the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, is organizing the “Second International Regulators Conference on Nuclear Security” which will take place in Madrid in May 2016.

2. Developing Nuclear Detection and Nuclear Forensic Techniques

Spain continued developing its national nuclear detection architecture. Spain’s current detection capabilities make it possible to carry out radiological monitoring on more than 80% of the national maritime cargo containers. Progress continues on the development and implementation of the national plan for nuclear radiation detection in cross-border areas. In addition, with the participation of the Ministry of Defence, a National Maritime Security Strategy has been adopted. A Spanish delegation participated in the international Nuclear Security Summit Maritime Security Workshop organized by the United Kingdom and the United States in November 2015. The international experts agreed on the need to review the duties of customs agents and to develop comprehensive nuclear security systems in port facilities.

Spain’s National Nuclear Forensics Task Force, led by the Ministry of the Interior, is now working towards establishing a technical-operational procedure which will integrate all the technical areas and operational groups involved in Nuclear Forensics, including prevention, detection and respond to nuclear security events.

3. Promoting a Nuclear Security Culture: Technological and Human Capacity-Building

Spanish institutions regularly organize, in cooperation with the IAEA, national and international courses on nuclear security. As part of these activities, Spain organized, together with the IAEA, an International Workshop on Nuclear Security Culture in Madrid from 29 February to 4 March 2016. Seventy international experts from 40 countries convened in Madrid to work, together with Spanish experts, with the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Culture Model for nuclear facilities.

As part of national efforts to promote security culture and to develop know-how and technologies relating to nuclear security, Spain’s National Centre for Energy, Environmental and Technological Research (CIEMAT) has signed specific agreements with the European Commission’s Research Centres seeking to promote human and technological capacity-building in the physical protection of nuclear and radioactive material and associated facilities. In this context, CIEMAT has established joint training programmes with national Law Enforcement Forces and the Army.

In order to promote nuclear security in Spanish industry, it is worth noting that the Spanish Nuclear Society, a non-profit association of professionals and institutions, held its annual meetings in the autumn of 2014 and 2015. These meetings include the participation of representatives from the nuclear industry and academia and, increasingly, presentations on nuclear security.

IV. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: International Coordination, Cooperation with International Organizations and Initiatives, Multilateral and Bilateral Relations

1. Support for the Nuclear Security Summits Process

Spain has been very present and active in the Nuclear Security Summits process. In Washington Spain will support the official Communiqué and the five institutional Action Plans. Spain, together with Morocco, has led and successfully concluded the preparation of the Action Plan supporting the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). Spain, together with Canada and the Republic of Korea, has prepared and submitted to the Summit a “Joint Statement” for improving the implementation of Resolution 1540.

2. Support for the IAEA’s Nuclear Security-Related Activities

Spain has made a contribution to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund. Spanish experts participate in nuclear security-related activities organized by the IAEA. Spain is a permanent member of the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Standards Committee and it is represented on the Organizing Committee for the Second International Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Security to be held in Vienna in late 2016. Spain contributes actively to the development and implementation of the IAEA’s technical programme and it is an active member of the Illicit Trafficking Database. During this period, Spain has contributed with technical experts to the improvement and implementation of International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions.

3. Contribution to Other International Nuclear Security-Related Initiatives: The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and The G7 Global Partnership

In 2014, 2015 and 2016, Spain continued to play a key role in the GICNT. During these years, Spain has insisted on the need to prioritize practical activities, such as technical workshops and exercises on realistic security scenarios. At the Plenary Meeting held in Helsinki in 2015, Spain presented its strategic proposals for the Initiative’s future: (1) Review, in light of the rapid evolution of terrorist threats, the Initiative’s priorities and technical working plans on the basis of its eight principles; (2) Promote technological development and scientific knowledge, among the Initiative’s members, with regard to combating nuclear terrorism.

In compliance with the commitment it undertook at the latest Nuclear Security Summit, in 2014 Spain joined the G7 Global Partnership (GP) against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

4. Bilateral Cooperation

Spain has continued to work with the international community to prevent and improve response to security incidents related to nuclear and radioactive material and facilities. Particularly relevant here is the cooperation with Morocco. Spain and Morocco have made substantial joint progress on combating nuclear terrorism and establishing a system to enable enhanced protection of nuclear and radioactive material and their associated facilities. As part of this joint effort, Spain and Morocco organized in Madrid, from 27 to 19 October 2015, and in collaboration with the IAEA, a joint exercise called Gate to Africa, on security in the transportation of radioactive sources. Sixty-four observers from the IAEA Member States and representatives from seven international organizations took part in the Gate to Africa exercise, which constituted a major contribution to strengthening the international nuclear security system.

This bilateral relationship between Morocco and Spain, established during the past eight years, has set an international standard that will be promoted as a model at the GICNT and the IAEA.

National Progress Report: Sweden

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Sweden has strengthened nuclear security implementation and built up the global nuclear security architecture by:

Strengthening Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Security

The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority has issued new requirements with the objective of strengthening physical protection at relevant sites. Measures to bar access of vehicles to the vicinity of nuclear power plants have been put in place. Decisions have been taken to arm guards at the sites of nuclear power plants. Operators of nuclear power plants are required to install bunkered independent core cooling systems for the event of station blackouts. These safety systems, along with required security measures, have to be in place by 2020.

Minimizing Nuclear and Other Radioactive Materials

New license requirements have been introduced to strengthen the physical protection measures that have to be in place for highly radioactive sealed sources and materials in the medical, industrial and university sectors. Further decisions have been taken to strengthen security requirements for licensees possessing and using Cs-137 in medical applications. This is expected to lead to a technology shift away from the use of Cs-137.

Sweden converted its HEU-fueled research reactors to LEU in the 1990s. Today, Sweden does not have any HEU reactors in operation.

In a joint effort with the United States in 2012, Sweden transferred separated plutonium from historical Swedish nuclear research and development activities to the USA. The shipment was carried out under the Global Threat Reduction Initiative.

Countering Nuclear Smuggling

The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority has, together with partners, arranged conferences for authorities from states in the Black Sea Region aiming at strengthening regional networks and interaction. Projects to strengthen national control of radioactive and nuclear materials and to detect and respond to incidents of illicit trafficking have been implemented in cooperation with Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova. Together with partners in Georgia, USA and Poland, Sweden is preparing a conference in October 2016 in Tbilisi, Georgia, for states in the Black Sea region on the implementation of NSS commitments and objectives.

Supporting Multilateral Instruments

Sweden ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) on 18 August 2014. Sweden ratified the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) on 23 March 2012.

Sweden participates in international efforts to promote nuclear security, including the G7 Global Partnership and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority carries out a number of projects aiming at strengthening security for nuclear and other radioactive materials and installations in cooperation with partners in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia and Moldova. These projects are presented in a separate report: “Nuclear Security, Safety and Non-Proliferation: Sweden’s International Cooperation in 2015”.

Collaboration with International Organizations

Sweden has regularly contributed to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund. In 2015, Sweden participated in the two exercises “Pilot 2015” in support of the IAEA’s development of an exercise manual. In 2011, the IAEA carried out an International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS mission) in Sweden, and a new IPPAS mission will take place in 2016.

Partnering with External Stakeholders

In 2015, authorities in Sweden, Norway and Finland started to develop agreements regarding information exchange with nuclear regulatory counterparts in Belarus. The agreements focus on emergency situations, including cases of nuclear terrorism and smuggling of radioactive and nuclear materials. Furthermore, the Swedish regulatory authority has, together with Finland, Norway and Russia, started to negotiate protocols to establish procedures to enhance the joint capacity to act in case of emergency. Sweden remains committed to strengthening ties at regional and international levels to ensure the efficiency of authorities and their interaction related to the prevention, detection and response in the nuclear security domain.

National Progress Report: Switzerland

Underlying Principles

Implementing and ensuring nuclear security is the responsibility of every State.

Switzerland is fully committed to maintaining the highest standards and implementing the best practices possible regarding nuclear security and the physical protection of nuclear and radiological material as well as of nuclear facilities on its territory.

Nuclear Security-Related International Initiatives

Support for the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

Measures pertaining to nuclear security, including transport security measures, are implemented in Switzerland in accordance with the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM).

Switzerland also ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) on 15 October 2008.

Support for the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the G8 Global Partnership and UN Security Council Resolution 1540

Switzerland participates in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and in the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. It is committed to the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and has fulfilled its national reporting obligations in this regard. Switzerland also supports regional implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Support for Nuclear Security Summit initiatives

Switzerland supports the following Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) gift baskets in the context of the 2016 Summit: the Joint Statement on Sustaining Action to Strengthen Global Nuclear Security, the Joint Statement on Forensics in Nuclear Security, the Joint Statement on Strengthening the Security of High Activity Sealed Radioactive Sources (HASS) and the Gift Basket on Cyber Security of Industrial Control and Plant Systems at Nuclear Facilities.

Contribution to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security-Related Activities

Switzerland actively supports the IAEA’s nuclear security activities through regular participation of Swiss experts.

Switzerland actively contributes to the development of the Nuclear Security Series. This is manifested by Switzerland’s participation in the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee and as a member in the interface group.

Furthermore, Switzerland contributes with expertise in forensics and other areas to the IAEA in the interests of the global nuclear security framework and nuclear security services.

For instance, Switzerland shares information on the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological materials by participating in the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB).

Strengthened National Nuclear and Radiological Material Security System

Nuclear Material

By ratifying the amendment to the CPPNM on 15 October 2008, Switzerland committed to reflect in its domestic regulations the Fundamental Principles of this instrument and to adapt its legislation accordingly. This process has since been concluded.

Switzerland has strengthened and updated its legal and regulatory framework for physical protection. The new laws and ordinances that have been passed ensure compliance with the relevant international conventions, in particular with the CPPNM and its 2005 Amendment. In addition, they reflect, to the largest possible extent, the INFCIRC/225 document as revised and other recommendations contained in documents of the IAEA Nuclear Security Series.

The Swiss Federal Intelligence Service and the national authority responsible for nuclear security, the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI), have pooled their activities to update the design basis threat for the nuclear facilities nationwide and to complete the DBT-process.

In order to ensure an efficient implementation of its nuclear security policy, Switzerland makes use of the feedback provided by expert teams of the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions of the IAEA. Switzerland received an IPPAS mission in 2005 and is planning to invite another IPPAS mission by 2018. And in the field of nuclear safety and security, Switzerland also avails itself of the International Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) full scope mission including module No12 (interface nuclear safety and security).

To assess the effectiveness of the physical protection system, with a particular focus on coordination of safety and security where they overlap, and to test the interfaces between the contingency planning of the operators and the State, exercises have been conducted in Switzerland, involving all nuclear sites and all relevant state organizations.

In June 2012, the Swiss Government adopted a National Strategy for the Protection of Switzerland against Cyber Risks.

Switzerland recognizes that HEU and separated Pu require special precaution. Therefore, Switzerland is committed to reducing its stocks in these materials to a minimum level. Switzerland has removed approximately 20 kilograms of separated plutonium. With this removal of separated plutonium, Switzerland is now free of all separated plutonium. In addition, Switzerland has removed 2.2 kg of highly enriched uranium. With these contributions, Switzerland emphasizes its role as a global leader in nonproliferation and its strong endorsement of the international goals of consolidating and minimizing inventories of sensitive nuclear material. Switzerland is now free of category 1 material as defined by the IAEA.

Radiological Material

Switzerland applies the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, and the supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources, published by the IAEA in 2004. It has established a national register of radioactive sources for categories 1 and 2 present on its territory.

Switzerland is in a process of improving the compatibility of its legislation with the requirements of the Code of Conduct.

Nuclear Security Culture

Nuclear equipment and radioactive sources used in Switzerland in industry, the medical field, educational institutions or research institutes are subject to particular attention with regard to their security. Heads of units responsible for such equipment and the personnel using them are trained and given compulsory basic instruction in nuclear security and radioprotection. Every year, refresher courses have to be attended. Heads of units receive more extensive and specialized training.

Switzerland has participated in regional training courses on physical protection against sabotage organized by the IAEA. It supports the ongoing or planned development of Regional Training Centres, such as the one in Delft for Europe, and those in the Republic of Korea or in China for the Asian region. Switzerland would welcome the transformation of these regional centres into Centres of Excellence.

In addition, Switzerland is developing a nuclear security culture programme based on the IAEA Nuclear Security Series No 7.

Regional Cooperation

Switzerland actively promotes the basics of nuclear security at a regional level. In this context, Switzerland is a former Chair and a current member of the Troika of the European Nuclear Security Regulators Association (ENSRA). Furthermore, Switzerland provides ENSRA with a secure platform for the exchange of sensitive information regarding nuclear security.

National Progress Report: Thailand

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Thailand has strengthened nuclear security implementation and built up the global nuclear security architecture by:

1. Strengthening Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Security

• Human resources development: Training courses for national security officers has been conducted annually, since 2005. Each year there are approximately 60 participants from various agencies, such as Customs Department, Border Patrol Police, Port Authority of Thailand, Central Institute of Forensic Science, and National Intelligence Agency. The purpose is to enhance capabilities of the authorities concerned in their implementation of the UNSC Resolution 1540 as well as other relevant measures or standards in order to strengthen national nuclear and radioactive security infrastructure.
• The Office of Atoms for Peace, as the national coordinating agency for all nuclear-related matters, as well as other competent agencies, including the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, and the Ministry of Public Health, in collaboration with IAEA under technical cooperation projects, have been, for over 20 years, organizing regional workshops and seminars on various issues related to peaceful application of nuclear technology, for participants from Thailand and other countries in the region. Government officials from relevant agencies have also attended international workshops and seminars on various topics related to nuclear security. Thailand has also established a Master’s degree program on nuclear security education -- the only one in the ASEAN region -- and receives on a regular basis, students from the region and beyond. All these efforts contribute to building up capacity of Thailand and beyond.
• Capacity building and drill exercise: Thailand attaches importance to awareness raising and capacity building among government officials and the general public on the potential risks of nuclear incidents and response measures.  Training and drill exerciseshave been organized annually, since 2009, for frontline officers working with nuclear and radioactive materials or who may be faced with related incidents, as well as local officers and people who live in the surrounding areas of nuclear facilities in case of emergency situations. The relevant authorities in nuclear technology also conducted national emergency exercises (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical: NBC) since 2010 in compliance with the National Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Plan.
• Rules and Regulations: Thailand continues to strengthen the national infrastructure for regulating the security of nuclear and radioactive materials. In early 2016, the revised regulation on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, as well as the draft Act on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, in line with the IAEA’s INFCIRC 225/Revision 5 - Nuclear Security Series No. 13, have been submitted to the Atomic Energy for Peace Commission for consideration. Once approved, they will become national guidelines for relevant agencies to further enhance nuclear security.
• Environmental impact: Thailand is also committed to improving the national environmental radiation monitoring capabilities by expanding the Early Warning Environmental Stations to 17 ambient and 3 underwater Gamma Radiation Monitoring Stations.
• Regional cooperation: Thailand hosted the second formal meeting of ASEANTOM [1] during 25-27 August 2014 in Chiang Mai, Thailand. The meeting reviewed the activities conducted during the past year, since its establishment in 2013, and discussed further activities under the work plan for 2015-2016. These activities include a number of regional workshops and training courses on emergency preparedness and response, as well as on nuclear security culture and management. In addition, ASEANTOM has also been working to set up an environmental radiation monitoring network in order to provide a platform for sharing environmental radiation monitoring activities and data. To complement such effort, the Office of Atoms for Peace organised a Technical Meeting for ASEANTOM on Environmental Radiation Network during 25-27 August 2015 in Phuket.
• International cooperation: Thailand is committed to continuously enhancing the capacity of relevant agencies in nuclear safety and security, including through international cooperation. The Global Threat Reduction Programme (DNN RSP), supported by the United States Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administrations (NNSA), has been implemented since 2008 and is still ongoing today. The Programme has upgraded the Physical Protection System (PPS) at the nuclear facilities under the control of Thailand Institute of Nuclear Technology, including Co-60 Irradiators and waste storage facility. Thailand Institute of Nuclear Technology is also working with Canada’s Nuclear and Radiological Security Department (NRS) under the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD) and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), on the upgrading of the PPS of the Thai Research Reactor and the waste storage facility under G-8 Global Partnership Programme against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction. The upgrading is due to start in 2016.
• Awareness raising and outreach activities: As radioactive materials have many peaceful applications in our daily lives, the Office of Atoms for Peace, as national focal point, has been conducting several awareness raising and outreach activities for the general public through various means, such as radiation security manual, TV programmes and You Tube, radio and printed materials, social media, and news briefing and other public forums.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand also targeted young audience by organizing Youth Public Speaking Contest on the occasion of International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 10 September 2014, in collaboration with the Embassies of Mexico and Cuba in Bangkok. The contest was well received and many university students participated.  They were well prepared and educated on the issue and delivered impressive speeches with great ideas.

 2. Minimising Nuclear and Other Radioactive Materials

            N/A

3. Countering Nuclear Smuggling

• National mechanism: In order to strengthen efforts in countering nuclear smuggling, Thailand has improved coordination among relevant agencies working on matters relating to non-proliferation, in line with the UNSC Resolution 1540 and other international frameworks such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). In 2013, the National Security Council of Thailand, as the focal point on this issue, established a Sub-Committee on Coordinating for Prevention and Solution of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction as national coordinating mechanism. This body has conducted several outreach and awareness-raising activities among relevant agencies by organising site visits to border checkpoints around Thailand. Briefing sessions have also been provided to local government officials to inform them of Thailand’s obligations and commitments as well as to enhance coordination and cooperation among relevant local offices in implementation of such obligations. The Sub-Committee also visited ports and points of entry to assess preparedness and understanding about non-proliferation among working officials on the ground. The whole-of-government Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) is being drafted to ensure efficient implementation and smooth coordination for cases of interdiction in various WMD-related scenarios.  It is expected that this SOP will become operational by the end of this year.
• Rules and regulations on export controls: As part of the obligations under the UNSC Resolution 1540, Thailand’s amended Customs Act has entered into force in March 2015, establishing principles for transit and transshipment in line with international standards. The amended law also empowers Customs officials to inspect, search and confiscate suspected merchandise in transit or transshipment without requiring a warrant. At the same time, Thailand’s dual-use items (DUI) regime has also been revitalised and strengthened.  In October 2015, the Ministry of Commerce issued a ministerial announcement on Export Control for Dual-Use Goods requiring permissions for export of items under the updated DUI list, which is similar to the one being used by the European Union.  Thailand has also put in place more effective tracking and management of dual-use items with the application of an IT system, known as the e-TMD system.
• Capacity building: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand invited experts from relevant Sanctions Committees to speak at a workshop held in Bangkok during 25-26 August 2014. The purpose was to enhance understanding of Thai agencies concerned on the obligations under the UNSC resolutions related to non-proliferation of WMD and how to ensure full and effective implementation of diverse measures.  Officials and experts from agencies concerned also participated in various exercises hosted by other states and international organisations.

4. Supporting Multilateral Instruments

• Rules and regulations: The Royal Thai Government is moving ahead with amendments of domestic laws so as to provide appropriate legal basis to fulfill our international obligations. The amendment of the Nuclear Energy Act has been approved by the Cabinet and is now under consideration of the National Legislative Assembly. Once it is enacted, it will enable Thailand to accede to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Convention for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) and its 2005 Amendment, as well as the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT). Thailand is also in the process of considering accession to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1988 as well as the 2005 SUA Protocols.

5. Collaborating with International Organisations

• International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): In February 2016, the Office of Atoms for Peace, as national coordinator on atomic energy, in collaboration with IAEA, organised a regional workshop on Nuclear Forensics and Bio-dosimeter, aimed at building national capacities of ASEANTOM Member States and strengthening regional cooperation in these fields.     

Through ASEANTOM, Thailand will work with IAEA under the Technical Cooperation (TC) project on “Regional Cooperation Project Concept in South East Asia to Support Regional Environmental Radioactivity Database and Nuclear Emergency Preparedness and Response”, with funding support from IAEA.  The objectives are to develop and implement emergency preparedness and response arrangements, both at the national and regional levels, in order to protect the people and the environment, in case of a severe nuclear and radiological incident. The project duration is four years, commencing in 2016.

• Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT): The Office of Atoms for Peace participates in Joint Working Group Meeting and Mid-Year Implementation and Assessment Group Meeting annually since 2011.
• European Union: The Office of Atoms for Peace has been working with the European Commission Joint Research Centre (EC JRC), in collaboration with IAEA and the United States Department of Energy and National Nuclear Security Administration under the Project on Border Monitoring Activities in Thailand.  The Project is aimed at strengthening national capability in countering illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials, through capacity building of personnel and provision of equipment to the Thai authorities concerned, including Customs Department, Port Authority of Thailand, Airport Authority of Thailand, Thailand Post, Royal Thai Police, and Bureau of Immigration. The Office of Atoms for Peace, together with Thailand Institute of Nuclear Technology, have also continued its collaboration efforts with EU CBRN projects, including the integrated national security system for nuclear and radioactive materials, Network of Excellence for Nuclear Forensics in Southeast Asia, and a course on Regional Human Resource Development for Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards Management under Chulalongkorn University’s Masters Programme on nuclear non-proliferation.
• Australia Group: Apart from nuclear safety and security, Thailand is committed to her obligations under the BWC and the CWC, as these bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins as well as chemical agents should also be secured in order to prevent them from falling into the wrong hands.  Therefore, Thailand has also worked with other partners, such as the Australia Group, to strengthen the implementation in this regard.  On 23 November 2015, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand and the Australian Group organised a briefing for relevant government agencies on the harmonization of national export licensing measures and developments in the Australia Group, including updates on the control lists.  

6. Partnering with External Stakeholders

• Regional and international cooperation: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, in collaboration with Norway’s International Law and Policy Institute (ILPI), organised “9th Regional Roundtable on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons and the Prospects for a Ban Treaty” during 26-27 March 2015 in Bangkok. This forum brought together key individuals from the Asia-Pacific region, including government officials, academic and civil society actors, in order to share thoughts and ideas on how the humanitarian initiative could be taken forward. The forum was aimed at raising awareness of humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, as well as seeking appropriate measures to promote transparency and reduce risks associated with nuclear weapons.  Thailand is of the view that efforts on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, including enhancing nuclear security, are mutually reinforcing and therefore, aims to contribute to all efforts in a comprehensive manner.

[1] The ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy, or ASEANTOM, was established in 2013 at the initiation of Thailand. ASEANTOM has been designated as an Annex-1 sectoral body under the ASEAN Political-Security Community. ASEANTOM provides an official framework to facilitate cooperation among the nuclear regulatory bodies of ASEAN Member States in order to promote nuclear safety, security and safeguard in the region, as well as serves as the key point of contact with IAEA to promote cooperation in these areas, including capacity building for the benefits of all member states.

National Progress Report: Turkey

I. SUPPORT FOR CPPNM AND ICSANT

i) Turkey has been a party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) since 1985 and has also ratified its 2005 Amendment. The instrument of ratification was deposited with the IAEA on 8 July 2015.

Already before the ratification of the Amendment, the national regulation on the physical protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear material had been revised by taking into account its provisions.

The revised regulation, broadening the scope of physical protection measures in Turkey, governing the measures that should be taken to safeguard nuclear facilities and nuclear material from sabotage and theft during handling, use, storage or transport, was published in the Official Gazette and entered into force on 22 May 2012.          

Based on lessons learned and experience accumulated during its implementation, work on new updates to this regulation is underway and is expected to be completed by the end of 2016.

ii) Turkey is among the initial signatories of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT). Already before the 2012 Seoul Summit, the Turkish Grand National Assembly had ratified ICSANT. Turkey has been party to this Convention since its instrument of ratification was deposited on 24 September 2012.

iii)   An amendment has been proposed recently by the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority to adapt the relevant provisions of the Turkish Penal Code in accordance with Turkey's international undertakings in this domain and in light of global developments. Interagency consultations on the draft amendment is underway.

II. STRENGTHENED NATIONAL NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL MATERIAL SECURITY SYSTEM

i)  Turkey continues to update its nuclear legislation and practices in line with the IAEA's latest safety and security standards and guidance, including Nuclear Security Series documents, in particular the Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5).

ii)  In accordance with the mentioned national legislation, a “Design Basis Threat” (DBT) document was prepared.

Based on the DBT document, a Physical Protection Program has been prepared for the research facilities at the Çekmece Nuclear Research and Training Centre and the research facilities of Istanbul Technical University. The draft is currently being examined by the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority.

iii) Training activities concerning the inspection and physical protection of the nuclear facilities and nuclear material and accounting of nuclear material and controls are being conducted inside and outside of the facilities regularly, on a yearly basis.

iv)  Turkey has also concluded both the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol with the IAEA. The broader conclusion obtained from the Agency in 2012, confirming that all nuclear material in the country have remained in peaceful activities, is testimony to the high standards that Turkey's system of accounting and control of nuclear material has reached.

III. CONTRIBUTION TO THE IAEA’s NUCLEAR SECURITY-RELATED ACTIVITIES

i)  Turkey participates in and contributes to the work undertaken by the IAEA for the preparation or review of its “Nuclear Security Series” documents.

ii) Turkey also actively participates in the courses and technical meetings organized by the IAEA on nuclear safety.

Within this context, Turkey has contributed to technical meetings such as “Preventive and Protective Measures against Insider Threats at Nuclear Facilities”, “Enhancing Nuclear Security for Research Reactors and Associated Facilities” and “Computer Security”.

A national workshop on the “Nuclear Security Plan” was organized in Ankara on 2-6 March 2015 with the support of the Integrated Support Centre for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security, subordinate to the Japanese Atomic Energy Agency.

iii)  Turkey maintains close dialogue with the IAEA on the development of the country's nuclear infrastructure. In this context, Turkey will receive International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) consultancy from the IAEA in October 2016. A preparatory meeting with the IPPAS Mission was held on 13-14 January 2016.

IV. SUPPORT FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY-RELATED INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES

i)  Turkey fully supports the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and supports the work of the 1540 Committee. Government experts from Turkey have actively participated in a number of regional and international outreach and training events on matters relevant to the implementation of the Resolution.

In line with its commitment to the implementation of the Resolution, Turkey is considering submitting an updated version of its national 1540 matrix in the coming period, to reflect partial updates in its legislation.

ii) Turkey regards multilateral counter-proliferation initiatives as important voluntary cooperative mechanisms, complementing the existing international instruments and export control regimes. Turkey contributes to the work of initiatives such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Proliferation Security Initiative among others, on the basis of potential added value that the specific activity or Turkish participation may bring about. Based on this approach, Turkey has continued to observe, host or participate in selective activities of such initiatives in support of broader nuclear security and counter-terrorism efforts.

V.  CONTRIBUTION TO MINIMIZATION OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM

Having returned the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) fuel used in the 5 MW research reactor at the Çekmece Nuclear Research and Training Centre to the US, Turkey continues to discourage the use of HEU and plutonium and encourage the development and use of low enriched uranium alternatives.

VI.  ESTABLISHMENT OF CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE AND SUPPORT

i) Ankara Nuclear Research and Training Centre (ANAEM) was established in August 2010 in order to conduct national and international training, including on radiation protection, radiation safety, nuclear power, nuclear safety, nuclear security and nuclear applications. ANAEM's main duty is to meet the qualified manpower needs of the industry as well as those of the public sector. ANAEM is also responsible for public information activities. Becoming an innovative and productive research and training centre meeting high international standards in this field, is also among the objectives of ANAEM.

ii) Turkey also regularly participates in the meetings of the “International Network for Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres” as an observer and supports its activities.

VII.  ENHANCED EFFORTS TO COMBATING ILLICIT TRAFFICKING OF NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL MATERIALS

i)   In addition to adhering to the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, Turkey has formally notified the IAEA of its support for the Supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.

ii)  Turkey hosted a training course titled “Training Course on Nuclear Security Detection Architecture” which was held in Istanbul on 12-16 October 2015.

VIII. STRENGTHENED COOPERATION BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND NUCLEAR INDUSTRY

Turkey continues to work closely with its industry to identify the nuclear security requirements and to develop necessary legal and practical infrastructure for its current and future nuclear facilities, particularly in the context of its planned nuclear power plant projects.

National Progress Report: Ukraine

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Ukraine has strengthened nuclear security implementation and contributed to building up the global nuclear security architecture by:                                           

Strengthening Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Security                   

As part of the comprehensive action plan on improving physical protection of nuclear facilities, nuclear material, radioactive waste and other sources of ionizing radiation, strengthening security of nuclear and radioactive materials on nuclear and radiation hazardous objects is a constant process.

Organization and implementation of measures for physical protection of the Ukrainian nuclear power plants (NPPs) is being carried out under real threats caused by the Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine and deterioration of social and political situation in the country. In these conditions, to ensure stable operation of nuclear power facilities, significant efforts are directed at strengthening physical protection, defense and practical training focused on anti-terrorism and anti-sabotage measures at nuclear power plants. Systematic monitoring of crisis situations and development of new approaches to protect nuclear facilities are underway.

Taking into account unstable military and political situation in the east of Ukraine, in order to prevent provocations, mass disorders, incidents with unpredictable consequences, illegal actions towards nuclear facilities, nuclear material, radioactive waste and other sources of ionizing radiation, in January, 2014 the state system of physical protection of Ukraine was switched to a high alert regime.

Acts of inter-agency committees on protection of nuclear material, facilities, radioactive waste and other sources of ionizing radiation have been revised and reapproved by competent authorities of Ukraine. According to their provisions, protection of all nuclear power plants in Ukraine has been significantly strengthened.

New Plans of coordination in case of sabotage and relevant Action Plans in case of crisis situation were developed and introduced at all Ukrainian NPPs. All-round automated data control systems of engineering and technical means of physical protection have been placed in operation.

Vulnerability assessment studies of all Ukrainian NPPs have already been completed.

Physical protection of Ukraine's nuclear facilities, nuclear material, radioactive waste and other sources of ionizing radiation is organized according to the current legislation in this area. In order to verify its conformity with the legislation, in 2014 -2015 regular state inspections were carried out at all nuclear power plants, research facilities, radioactive waste management facilities and entities that use category I sources of ionizing radiation in their work.

However, due to the inability to safely perform their duties by state inspectors in Crimea and certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, in 2014 only 3 inspections of the systems of physical protection of radioactive waste management facilities were carried out.

Within the framework of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, in order to enhance security of sources of ionizing radiation, in 2015 physical protection systems were examined at the following facilities:

• Vinnytsia regional oncology center;
• Zhytomyr regional oncology center;
• Kyiv regional oncology center;
• Chernihiv regional oncology center;
• Cherkasy regional oncology center;
• Kirovohrad regional oncology center.

Systems of physical protection of radioactive waste and other sources of ionizing radiation were installed and put into operation at radioactive waste management facilities.

On August 27, 2015 "New design basis threat to nuclear facilities, nuclear material, radioactive waste and other sources of ionizing radiation in Ukraine" was approved by a Presidential Decree.

Project proposals on modernization of systems of physical protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear waste management facilities, announced in 2014-2015 during the G7 Global Partnership meetings, have been incorporated into Integrated Nuclear Security Support National Plan (INSSP) of Ukraine for 2016-2018 and to the Action Plan on its implementation, in particular:

• Technical re-equipment of physical protection system of South-Ukraine NPP's perimeter;
• Technical re-equipment of physical protection system of South-Ukraine NPP's units 1-3;
• Technical re-equipment of physical protection system of Khmelnytsky NPP (establishing main control panel);
• Technical re-equipment of physical protection system of Rivne NPP's personnel and vehicles access control points;
• Technical re-equipment of physical protection system of Rivne NPP's unit 3;
• Construction of interim storage facility for long-term storage of vitrified high-level radioactive waste, returned from the Russian Federation after processing of spent nuclear fuel from Ukrainian NPPs with WWER-440 units;
• Establishing a communication subsystem of physical protection system of Zaporizhia NPP;
• Technical re-equipment of physical protection system of Zaporizhia NPP;
• Establishing automated complexes of physical protection system of radioactive waste processing of Zaportizhia NPP;
• Technical re-equipment of physical protection system of Kmelnytsky NPP's unit 1;
• Strengthening physical protection system of specialized radioactive waste management enterprises of the UkrDO Radon State Corporation;
• Liquidation of radioactive inheritance of the former Soviet Union at specialized radioactive waste management enterprises of the UkrDO Radon State Corporation;
• Improving capabilities of the UkrDO Radon State Corporation for ensuring nuclear and radiation safety of spent radiation sources.

Currently, after taking into account comments and recommendations of the IAEA experts, in February 2016 the INSSP was approved.

Central long-term storage of spent sources of ionizing radiation is scheduled to be put into service in 2016.

In order to adjust national legislation on physical protection to the IAEA recommendations, in 2016 the respective Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine will be revised (On approval of the order of determination of level of physical defense of nuclear facilities, nuclear material, radioactive waste and other sources of ionizing radiation according to their categories).

Minimizing Nuclear and other Radioactive Material

There are 6 repositories of radioactive waste and sources of ionizing radiation, which are kept in storage facilities, equipped in accordance with national legislation with high level security systems. However, three of these repositories are currently located on the temporarily occupied territories: 2 in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and 1 near the city of Donetsk.

During 2014-2015, competent authorities of Ukraine continued to collect spent sources of ionizing radiation, transferring them to specialized radioactive waste management enterprises of the UkrDO Radon State Corporation. Activities in this area have been carried out in close cooperation with the donor states (USA, Great Britain, Germany, France), the European Union, the IAEA and NATO.

On June 17, 2015 the Implementing agreement between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the NATO Support Agency on disposal of radioactive waste, accumulated in the result of carrying out military programs of the former USSR in Ukraine, was ratified. According to this Agreement, the disposal of nuclear waste repositories is to be conducted at the enterprises of the UkrDO Radon State Corporation with NATO financial assistance.

Countering Nuclear Smuggling

Ukraine continues to strengthen radiation control system at its State Border. During 2010-2015 in the framework of the projects of international technical assistance, Ukraine installed and put into operation stationary systems for radiation monitoring in more than 50 border-crossing check-points, 7 of which are located on temporary occupied territories of Crimea and certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

Border Guard staff participated in more than 100 training sessions on detecting radioactive (nuclear) materials on the State Border using nuclear radiation detectors for control and reconnaissance. Five exercises were devoted to response to detection of radioactive (nuclear) material smuggling.

As part of the agreement with the IAEA, advanced training on physical protection and accounting of nuclear material was held for officials of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine at the training center for physical protection, accounting and control of nuclear material.

Regular exchange of information between the border agencies of neighboring countries is ensured by the border guard executives in order to counter smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials and timely respond to the threat of nuclear terrorism.

As part of the "Identifying and preventing nuclear smuggling" international technical assistance project, in 2015 five obsolete Russian-made stationary systems for radiation detection were upgraded, two new TSA-type American-made modern stationary systems were put into operation, TSA stationary equipment was supplied for installation in 4 border-crossing check-points on the Ukrainian-Moldovan border.

Preparatory phase of installing new stationary systems for radiation monitoring in 6 border-crossing check-points on the Ukrainian-Belarusian border is underway. Competent authorities of Ukraine are working actively at the establishment of automated system for exchange of information on cases of stationary systems triggering. Such system will be a potential platform for inter-agency information and telecommunication system to register facts of detection and intents of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials through the territory of Ukraine and across its State Border.

National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine elaborated a draft Concept of the State program of development of nuclear forensics in Ukraine for the years 2014-2020. An agreement was reached to create a regional network of nuclear forensics expertise for the GUAM countries using the funds of the EU technical assistance. Research expert organizations of Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova started working on this project in 2015. Its objective is to create a network of nuclear forensics laboratories in the GUAM region, including the expansion of basic technical and information capabilities of national expert laboratories in each participating country, and creating a basis for mutual support and cooperation in this area of esearch.

Within the framework of TACIS and Instrument for stability (IfS) the Institute for Nuclear Research of Ukraine received a mobile laboratory for the on-site actions in response to illicit trafficking incidents. It also received the Element 2 precision mass spectrometer with inductively coupled plasma (ICP-MS) for multi-element analyses at trace levels in nuclear material and environmental samples. Such improvements increased greatly the technical expertise capabilities of the Institute.

Supporting Multilateral Instruments and Cooperating with International Organizations

Ukraine continues to fulfill its obligations within the framework of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) according to approved plans, namely, the Statement on Principles of Combating Nuclear Terrorism and the Action Plan on improvement of capabilities of state-parties to the Initiative to achieve positive results based on multilateral cooperation.

Ukraine confirmed to the IAEA Secretariat its readiness to provide interested countries with consulting assistance in elaboration of laws and regulations on physical protection of nuclear facilities, nuclear material, radioactive waste, other sources of ionizing radiation, and to organize experts training in this field.

Partnering with External Stakeholders

With financial support of the US Government and in cooperation with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Ukraine is working on creation of a scientific and methodological basis for determining attributes of uranium-bearing materials of different origin and development of nuclear forensics library data and materials to enhance the effectiveness, efficiency and validity of conclusions of nuclear forensic expertise.

Within the framework of the Agreement on Nuclear Safety and respective Memorandum of Understanding Ukraine jointly with the United States designed and completed construction of the Neutron source based on subcritical assembly driven by linear electron accelerator (Neutron Source Facility). Currently pre-commissioning works, individual and complex tests are underway at the Facility.

Since 2014 the following joint projects aimed at strengthening capabilities in the area of etection of nuclear and radioactive materials have been carried out:

• Detecting and countering nuclear smuggling (US Department of Energy);
• WMD non-proliferation initiative: assistance to the State Border Service of Ukraine (US Defense Threat Reduction Agency);
• Technical assistance to strengthen Ukraine's export control system and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (US State Department);
• Increasing the capabilities of the border guard services of Ukraine and Moldova to detect chemical, biological, nuclear and radioactive materials (European Commission).

Following the agreement of the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit, the trilateral Swedish-Norwegian-Ukrainian Initiative was successfully established. In 2014-2015 seven projects were implemented within the Initiative, namely:

1.  Safety requirements for new types of nuclear fuel. Project support was provided to the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU) to develop requirements for safe implementation of new types of nuclear fuel. These requirements were included in regulations related to safe management of fuel. The project was successfully completed in November, 2015. The regulations are currently under consideration of the Ukrainian authorities.

2. Tools for probability safety assessment. Online surveillance systems that enable assessment of safety risks related to operation of nuclear power plants are being introduced in Ukraine in the framework of this project. Safety assessment software was delivered to the SNRIU and the South Ukrainian nuclear power plant, followed by personnel training. Such systems will be installed at other Ukrainian NPPs as appropriate.

3. Safety enhancements at Rivne nuclear power plant. Modernization of safety systems of Rivne nuclear power plant is an element of a Package program on safety enhancement of all NPP's units of Ukraine. Realization of this project will enable detection of the NPP's malfunctions at an early stage and to take timely actions to prevent accidents.

4. Safety requirements for damaged nuclear fuel. The primary objective is to develop regulatory requirements for management of damaged nuclear fuel. The project is in the development phase with implementation date set for 2016.

5.  Modernization of radioactive source register. Upon review of the national source register of Ukraine it was determined that the system required upgrades to meet current regulations and to further improve control of radioactive sources. Assistance on upgrading the system was provided to the authorities that maintain and support the existing national source register. Further development of the database will include applying a web-based system.

6. Security upgrades at Khmelnytsky nuclear power plant. The project's main goal is to strengthen and upgrade physical protection system of Khmelnytsky NPP. Foreign experts visited this nuclear power plant to assess the volume and value of necessary works. The implementation of the project will begin in 2016.

7.  The 13th Ukrainian conference on nuclear security will be organized at Khmelnytsky NPP in October 2016. All national stakeholders responsible for nuclear and radiological security will participate in the event to share their experience and expertise.

Issues of concern

Russian military aggression in eastern Ukraine and its attempt of illegal annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea pose new threats to the national system of nuclear and radiation security and resulted in loss of regulatory control in those areas.

The following sources and facilities remain without regulatory control in the Eastern Ukraine:

• 1200 radionuclide sources of ionizing radiation (category 1-5);
• 65 entities that use sources of ionizing radiation (including eight that have high-level radiation sources of category 1 with activity of more than 1000 Ci);
• Donetsk specialized radioactive waste management enterprise of the UkrDO Radon State Corporation;
• 1 repository of radioactive waste and sources of ionizing radiation near Donetsk chemical plant;
• Radiation sources in two coal mining facilities of Donbas, which combine 15 coal mines (142 radiation sources, with the maximum activity of a single source of 2.35×1011 Bq).

The following sources and facilities are located on the territories of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol:

• Research reactor of the Sevastopol National University of Nuclear Energy and Industry: DR-100 research reactor, DR-100 (critical assembly) physical test bench, subcritical uranium water assembly, about 3488 kg of depleted uranium;
• 277 radionuclide sources of ionizing radiation;
• 53 entities that use radionuclide sources of ionizing radiation, six of them use category 1 and 2 radiation sources according to the level of potential hazard (medicine, shipbuilding) in which over 1200 kg of depleted uranium is used as biological shielding;
•  2 nuclear waste repositories.

Due to external aggression, Ukraine lost regulatory control on the territories of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, as well as communication with the Crimean State Inspectorate. Property of the Crimean State Inspectorate was seized by illegal authorities and handed over to the so-called Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea – a regional branch of the Industrial and Nuclear Supervision Service of Russia (Rostekhnadzor).

Companies on the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea lost the possibility to transfer radioactive waste (spent sources of ionizing radiation) for storage to the Odessa State Specialized Interregional Plant.

At present Ukraine cannot guarantee physical protection of the abovementioned research reactor, nuclear material and sources of ionizing radiation on the territory of Crimea, city of Sevastopol and certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

Given the occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea by the Russian Federation and ongoing anti-terrorist operation in eastern Ukraine, any damage to radiation-hazardous objects located on those territories may lead to dire consequences not only for Ukraine but for many European nations as well. Thus, we consider that the issue of establishing international control over nuclear facilities that can be seized or damaged as a result of military actions, requires immediate international attention.

National Progress Report: United Arab Emirates

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, the UAE has strengthened nuclear security framework and its implementation in the country while contributing to the development of global nuclear security architecture by…

…Strengthening Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Security

The Government of the UAE has developed an effective nuclear security regime in line with the development of its peaceful nuclear power programme. UAE will host an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) Mission in 2016, which will review the physical protection system in the UAE and compare it with international guidelines and internationally recognized best practices.

Nuclear Security

UAE has endorsed the Amendment of the Convention of the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). Although the amendment has not yet entered into force,  UAE regulation and regulatory guides have been developed in compliance with the Convention’s amended requirements.

The regulation for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities, issued in 2010, and its associated regulatory guides have been established in accordance with the IAEA Nuclear Security Series publications, in particular the Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities publication (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5).

Since 2014, two new regulatory guides were developed and issued in regards to the security of the transport of nuclear material and to the contingency plan required at a nuclear facility.

In 2014, UAE hosted an IAEA workshop on the security of transport of nuclear materials.

     Radiological Security

The UAE regulation for the security of radioactive sources has been developed in accordance with the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive as well as the related IAEA safety and security standards, which the Government of the UAE endorsed

After the issuance of the regulation (FANR regulation 23) in 2011, licensees managing category 1 to 3 radioactive sources in the UAE were required to implement it immediately. Since then all required nuclear security plans were reviewed and approved by the regulator, and inspections of all concerned licensees were achieved to verify the implementation and conformance with the new regulation.

Information Protection and Cyber Security

The Information Protection Program Operating Manual (IPPOM), defining the management of sensitive nuclear information in the UAE, was updated and is currently implemented by relevant entities in the nuclear sector such as Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR), Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) and Critical Infrastructure and Coastal Protection Authority (CICPA).

UAE Regulation and the associated regulatory guides are based on the IAEA publication, Protection against cyber-attack has been taken into account in various FANR regulations developed between 2009 and 2015.

The UAE hosted an IAEA national workshop on cyber security in 2014.

…Countering Nuclear Smuggling

To meet the requirements of import and export control rules, the UAE nuclear regulator, FANR has issued in 2014 an updated Regulation on the Export and Import Control of Nuclear Material, Nuclear Related Items and Nuclear Related Dual-Use Items.

The Government of the UAE is an active member in the international information sharing on the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials through its participation of the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB).

The UAE participated and supported the convening of IAEA sub-regional meeting on nuclear security information exchange and coordination in October 2015 in Kuwait. This meeting, aimed at strengthening national, regional and international capacity to prevent and combat illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material through enhanced information cooperation.

…Supporting Multilateral Instruments

The Government of the United Arab Emirates strongly supports the universal implementation of the International Convention on Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terror (ICSANT), as well as the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) and its 2005 Amendment.

The UAE provided to the United Nations (UN) 1540 Committee, its national report as well as the associated matrix.

The UAE law, regulations and regulatory guides which are enforced have been established in accordance with the amended CPPNM, UAE continues to promote the entry into force of amended CPPNM at international and regional venues.

…Collaborating with International Organizations

The Government of the UAE supports the activities of the IAEA through ongoing participation at workshops, Nuclear Security Guidance Committee meetings and by providing experts to meetings regarding the development of Nuclear Security Series publications.

UAE is an active promoter and participant of the (IAEA) Network for Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres - NSSC Network. UAE hosted a Regional Training Course on Introduction to Nuclear Forensics in Dubai in October 2015.

An Integrated master Working Plan (IWP) was signed in 2013 between the UAE and the IAEA, which aims to enhance, for the period of 2013-2017, the efficiency and effectiveness of the partnership between the UAE and the IAEA, including in the nuclear security domain.

For ensuring the sustainability of its nuclear security regime, an Integrated Security Support Plan (INSSP) for UAE was signed in August 2012 between the UAE and IAEA and continued to be implemented through 2016

The UAE has received an IAEA International SSAC Advisory Service (ISSAS) in May 2014 and an Emergency Preparedness Review (EPREV) mission in March 2015.  The ISSAS mission covers all aspects of nuclear material safeguards implementation including export control, and nuclear material accounting.

The UAE hosted in Abu Dhabi, the Inter-Arab Nuclear Detection and Response Exercise, FALCON, in February 2016, which aimed at promoting regional approaches in matters of nuclear detection and response to nuclear and other radiological threats and enhancing national and regional interagency coordination and cooperation. The exercise has been developed under the framework of the European Union (EU), Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) Centers of Excellence (CoE) Initiative by the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), in partnership with the UAE, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Kingdom of Morocco, the European Commission and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT).

…Partnering with External Stakeholders

With regard to bilateral agreements on nuclear security, the UAE has concluded a number of nuclear cooperation agreements in support of its civil nuclear power programme. To date, 9 bilateral agreements have been concluded. In addition, multiple MoUs have been signed between FANR, the nuclear regulator and several foreign entities. Such arrangements allowed for further cooperation in areas including nuclear security and continued to be valuable interface for cooperation and knowledge exchange in relation to nuclear security.

The UAE in cooperation with USA entities established the Gulf Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Institute (GNEII) in Abu Dhabi, an educational institution that provides classroom instruction and hands-on experience in nuclear energy safety, security, safeguards and non-proliferation. GNEII is associated with Khalifa University of Science Technology and Research.  

National Progress Report: United Kingdom

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, the United Kingdom has strengthened nuclear security implementation, taken measures to build up the global nuclear security architecture and taken action to tackle the threat of nuclear terrorism. 

UK actions to enhance nuclear security worldwide 

The UK is committed to enhancing the security of the civil nuclear industry globally. Since 2014, we have:    

• invested £20.8 million in Global Threat Reduction across 20 countries.  The UK’s Global Threat Reduction Programme, established in 2002, supports improvements in nuclear and radiological security worldwide. Our financial and expert assistance has protected facilities, strengthened security culture, disposed of sensitive material and countered nuclear smuggling.  This work has included:
  • physical security upgrades in a number of countries, including Tajikistan, the Philippines, Georgia and Kazakhstan.
  • expert advice and majority funding for the construction of a new £10 million facility in the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone. This ensured secure storage of up to 500,000 disused radioactive sources from across Ukraine, which may otherwise have been targeted by terrorists and criminals.
  • improving cooperation in countering nuclear smuggling in the Black Sea region, including through a regional conference in Georgia in February 2015, and a response exercise in Moldova in September 2015.
  • addressing emerging threats by hosting an international workshop in Vienna to explore these challenges and organising a seminar on the changing nature of proliferation threats with the UN Security Council’s 1540 Committee.
• contributed international expertise. The UK participates in the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee to set international guidelines and best practice for nuclear security.  The UK provides experts to participate in International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) peer review missions to help States adopt best practice.
• transported nuclear materials for consolidation. We provided a ship with unique security capabilities to move excess plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) from Germany and Switzerland to the United States as part of efforts to consolidate and minimise global inventories of nuclear material.

Support for international institutions

We have continued to work with international institutions to improve the security of nuclear material and knowledge.  Since 2014 we have:

• supported the IAEA, providing over £5.8 million in funding and expertise. In 2015 alone, the UK was the second largest state contributor to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund. We also provided considerable technical expertise for high priority nuclear security projects, including on nuclear decommissioning to enable the removal of the last remaining HEU from Uzbekistan in September 2015;
   
• led Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism work on emergency planning and response. The UK hosted a workshop in London in November 2015 for over 100 participants from 25 countries to develop good practice in responding to radiological and nuclear emergencies. A UK representative has also been appointed to the leadership team as Advisor to GICNT’s Implementation and Assessment Group Chair; and
   
• supported INTERPOL’s Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Unit.  We have provided £650,000 to fund staff, workshops on counter nuclear smuggling and Operation Fail Safe (to support tracking of the transnational movement of individuals involved in the illicit trafficking).

Work to broaden and strengthen international agreements

The UK has implemented all key legal instruments governing nuclear security. Since 2014, we have:

• encouraged and assisted other States to ratify the key instruments. In particular, the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.  We have funded the UN Office on Drugs and Crime to run a regional conference in Thailand and a workshop in Vienna for over 40 countries to promote ratification;  and
• supported implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540.  We have hosted a visit to the UK by the 1540 Committee in November 2014; as a Vice-Chair of the 1540 Committee we guided development of its workplan; we have provided legislative assistance to help States meet their 1540 obligations and we funded visits by a former UN expert to help States develop first reports on national implementation. 

Domestic measures to enhance nuclear and radioactive material security 

The UK keeps the security regime at its nuclear sites under continuous review to ensure that it remains robust and effective. Since 2014 we have:

• invited IAEA scrutiny as a contribution to raising global standards. In February 2016, we became the first nuclear weapon state to host a follow-up International Physical Protection Advisory Service mission, following the 2011 assessment of our largest civil nuclear site Sellafield;
• continued to develop border and in-country detection infrastructure. Our detection capabilities are extensive and continue to improve using the latest science and technology research, and working with partners; and
• continued to consolidate our nuclear material. Since 2013 the UK has targeted the consolidation of its unused ‘exotic’ fuel stores to allow security resources to be focused in a single location. The programme is scheduled to complete the majority of moves by the end of 2017.

Support for the Nuclear Security Summit process 

As part of our contribution to the Nuclear Security Summit process, we have:

• led the development of the Action Plan for the United Nations. We chaired the drafting group for this plan; its effective implementation will be key to strengthening the global nuclear security architecture;
• developed best practice on maritime transport and supply chain security.  We hosted two tailored workshops that led to the development of best practice guidance on measures to enhance supply chain security and the transportation of civilian nuclear material by sea.
• inspired the first ever IAEA guidance on nuclear information security. Following our 2012 and 2014 Summit commitments, we continued to lead international action to ensure the protection of sensitive nuclear information. This culminated in the IAEA’s recognition that information security measures are an essential part of a State’s nuclear security regime with the publication of Nuclear Security Series no. 23-G in February 2015; and
• funded in-depth analysis of progress on radiological security. We funded a Nuclear Threat Initiative report to highlight the measures signatories to the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit Gift Basket are taking in this area, published in March 2016.

National Progress Report: United States of America

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, the United States has strengthened nuclear security implementation and built up the global nuclear security architecture by…

…Strengthening Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Security

• The United States provided updates on security of military material and measures to secure other nuclear materials through United Nations National Security Council (UNSCR) 1540 reporting processes on March 23, 2016.
• The United States assessed and verified through inspection activities that operating nuclear power plants are implementing cyber security regulatory requirements in accordance with their cyber security plans.  In addition, the program is designed to identify lessons learned throughout the process and implement improvements as needed.*
• The United States is conducting rulemaking for civilian fuel cycle as well as research and test reactor security, to translate case-by-case exceptions into a generically applicable rule.  Activities have begun to incorporate the material attractiveness concept into rulemaking to make graded security regulations more informed by risk.
• The United States has worked to mitigate the risks associated with malicious insiders at nuclear facilities and is helping develop or enhance human reliability programs in 24 countries.
• The United States hosted the following P-3, expert-level security information exchanges:

1.       In 2014, to discuss an “enterprise approach” to vulnerability assessments and including peer review of the Y-12 Security Complex vulnerability assessment.*

2.       In 2014, on transportation security best practices, held at Sandia National Laboratory.*

3.       In 2015, to discuss security challenges with unmanned aerial vehicles at nuclear sites and exchanging best practices and lessons learned.* 

• The United States conducted more than 300 nuclear and radiological security workshops and 12 weapons of mass destruction (WMD) counterterrorism tabletop exercises with key international partners, strengthening nuclear security culture and enhancing capabilities related to physical protection, insider threat, transportation security, guard and response force activities, emergency response, crisis coordination, and computer security.*
• Consistent with the 2014 Gift Basket on Radiological Security, operators/managers of 82% of buildings containing Category 1 sources have volunteered to institute additional best practices published by the NRC.*
• United States instituted a Memorandum of Understanding among U.S. agencies to enhance cooperation on radioactive materials transportation security.
• The United States has recovered over 51,000 U.S.-origin sources (over 1.1 million curies) domestically, including 12,958 sources since March, 2014, and repatriated over 2,900 (over 63,000 curies) U.S.-origin sources, including 367 sources since March, 2014. *
• Working with our international partners, the United States has enhanced radiological security at 115 buildings in 34 countries since March 2014.*
• The United States is conducting a “lessons learned” project for drills based on hostile action to share with stakeholders and make publically available to facilitate enhancing nuclear power plant emergency response in the unlikely event of a hostile action.*
• The United States is conducting an assessment of the effectiveness of physical security requirements for radioactive materials which includes an internal and external review, baselining against international standards, and outreach to stakeholders.*
• The United States will provide international partners specialized training for radiation emergency responder operations for nuclear security at major public events and support partners operations during events. *

…Minimizing Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials

• The United States disposed of five metric tons of weapons-usable highly enriched uranium (HEU) domestically, bringing the total to more than 150 metric tons of material surplus to the U.S. nuclear weapons program that has been dispositioned.*
• The United States has decreased its national inventory of HEU from 740.7 metric tons in 1996 to 585.6 metric tons in 2013, a decrease of more than 20%. 
• The United States, working with other countries, removed or confirmed the disposition of more than 250 kilograms of nuclear material, resulting in three additional countries becoming HEU-free.  This was enabled by the use of modified casks for unique fuel designs.*The United States supported the downblending of 780 kg of excess weapons-usable non-U.S. HEU.*
• Consistent with its national security requirements and in recognition of the international benefits to minimizing the use of HEU globally, the United States continues to investigate the viability of using low enriched uranium (LEU) in naval reactor cores.  The United States concluded that the potential exists to develop an advanced fuel system that could increase uranium loading beyond what is practical today while meeting the rigorous performance requirements for naval reactors. 
• The United States ensures that inventories of HEU allocated for use in manufacturing naval reactor cores are based on clearly defined U.S. Navy requirements.
• The United States established a pilot production line for high-density LEU fuel to support the conversion of the remaining high performance research reactors in the United States and abroad from the use of HEU fuel.
• The United States makes LEU available, through lease contracts, for irradiation for the domestic production of Mo-99 for medical uses.*
• The United States remains fully committed to the U.S.-Russia Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement, and to meeting its obligation to verifiably dispose of no less than 34 metric tons of excess weapon-grade plutonium under the agreement, and to cooperate with Russia in these undertakings.
• The United States participates in experts’ group exchanges to explore HEU minimization efforts and plutonium management.*
• The United States, in partnership with France, established an International Ad Hoc Working Group on Alternatives to High-Activity Radiological Sources.
• The United States will demonstrate commercial capability to produce the medical isotope molybdenum-99 in the United States using non-HEU technologies in 2016.
• The United States will continue to develop initiatives for reducing the number of vulnerable high activity radioactive sources through continued research and development on non-radioisotopic alternative technologies, international workshops and collaboration, and direct site engagement.*
• In an effort to promote permanent risk reduction, the United States will partner with industry to replace 34 cesium-137 blood irradiators with non-radioisotopic alternative technologies by 2020.
• Consistent with legislation, the United States will consider initiating a program of work to develop LEU fuel for use in naval reactor cores.

…Countering Nuclear Smuggling

• The United States supports the expansion and acceleration of international capabilities to arrest nuclear smugglers, seize illicit nuclear material, investigate illicit nuclear trafficking, and effectively prosecute perpetrators.
• The United States’ Nuclear Forensics Public Affairs Guide is available as a model of how to organize and coordinate national efforts to communicate nuclear forensics information with the public in an effective and timely manner.
• The United States’ National Nuclear Forensics Expertise Development Program continued to transfer knowledge to the next generation and sustain nuclear expertise, facilitating the hiring of an additional 17 Ph.D. scientists into the nuclear forensics workforce and exceeding the program goal with a total of 41 new scientists added since 2008. 
• The United States strengthened its domestic nuclear detection architecture by training over 7,500 state and local first responders and law enforcement officials in nuclear detection operations and conducting over 300 exercises, assessments, and deployments to enhance federal, state, local and tribal agencies' readiness to combat nuclear terrorism.*
• The United States has executed over 120 comprehensive evaluations and demonstrations of new technologies to enhance capabilities to detect and identify nuclear or other radioactive material out of regulatory control.
• The United States developed a library of technical guides on installing, operating, and maintaining radiation detection systems. 
• Since March 2014, the United States provided 58 reports on domestic detection events involving material outside of regulatory control to the IAEA’s Incident and Trafficking Database program.
• The United States worked bilaterally through Countering Nuclear Smuggling Joint Action Plans with 14 international partners to strengthen capabilities to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear and radioactive material smuggling.*
• The United States strengthened the capability of partners in 55 key countries by conducting over 310 training courses, workshops, and field training exercises in radiation detection system operation and response since March 2014.*
• The United States worked bilaterally with 45 countries to assess and implement improvements in the operation of radiation detection systems deployed to counter nuclear smuggling.*
• The United States equipped 49 fixed sites worldwide with radiation detection systems, deployed 44 mobile and man-portable radiation detection systems to 24 countries, and transitioned another 106 radiation detection systems to partner country responsibility since the end of March 2014.  The United States also enhanced the capability of seven partners to deter, detect, and interdict attempts to traffic WMD and related materials across unstable or threatened land borders by providing equipment, training, and sustainment capabilities.  *
• The United States equipped eight additional international partners with radiation detection systems, which can be deployed in mobile, boat or aerial platforms to search, locate, identify and/or characterize nuclear material.*
• The United States strengthened the maritime domain awareness capabilities of five partners to prevent the proliferation of WMD materials through and near their national waters through provision of equipment, training, command and control centers, and vessel sustainment facilities.
• The United States conducted 17 training courses with key international partners, designed to strengthen global capabilities for identifying, characterizing, interdicting and responding to incidents involving nuclear or radiological material which bolsters nations’ overall response capabilities and contribute to the integration of nuclear safety and nuclear security.*
• The United States has developed six new Certified Reference Materials, along with the UK, France and Sweden, for use by the international community to support accurate and legally defensible forensic analyses of nuclear and other radioactive materials.  Eleven additional reference materials are currently in progress.*
• The United States facilitated a second multilateral exercise on national nuclear forensics libraries with more than 186 experts from 28 countries and three international organizations (International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), INTERPOL, and European Commission).*
• The United States will provide assistance to countries contending with a threat of nuclear terrorism and encourages such requests.* 
• The United States will accept and process official queries of its National Nuclear Forensics Library through its National Point-of-Contact to determine whether nuclear or other radioactive material outside of regulatory control may have originated in the U.S.*
• The United States plans to initiate work in North Africa to reduce the threat of non-state actor acquisition or proliferation of WMD and related materials across unstable borders.*
• The United States will develop and implement an expert testimony training program for nuclear forensic scientists to develop good practices for how to describe nuclear forensics conclusions in judicial proceedings and convey highly technical results to a non-technical audience.*
• The United States will convene a third multilateral exercise on national nuclear forensics libraries.*

…Supporting Multilateral Instruments

• The United States deposited instruments of ratification for the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM/A) on July 31, 2015 and International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism on September 30, 2015.
• The United States deposited instruments of ratification for the 2005 Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation on August 28, 2015. 
• The United States is carrying out joint R&D with Sweden on the characterization of top priority Certified Reference Materials.*
• The United States will provide an updated report to the IAEA, in accordance with Article 14.1 of the CPPNM/A, within two months after its entry into force.

…Collaborating with International Organizations

• The United States contributed an additional $17.5M to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund in 2014 and $13M in 2015 and expects to provide similar support in 2016 and beyond.*
• The United States collaborated with the IAEA in conducting 12 training courses designed to strengthen global capabilities for identifying, characterizing, interdicting and responding to incidents involving nuclear or radiological material; medical management of radiation injuries; and managing the consequences resulting from a release of such material.*
• The United States provided continued support, review, and participation toward the development and revision of IAEA Nuclear Security Series guidance documents to include active participation in the IAEA Nuclear Security Guidance Committee. *
• The United States provides financial, technical and human resources to the IAEA’s efforts relating to nuclear material accounting and control, mitigation of insider threats, cyber security, physical protection, transportation security, nuclear security culture, securing nuclear materials out of regulatory control, sustainability of nuclear security system, identifying unique technical solutions to nuclear forensics issues, and developing non-isotopic technologies to radiological sources.
• The United States, through the IAEA Contact Experts’ Group, collaborated with international partners on secure shipments of four highly enriched spent nuclear submarine cores within Russia for more secure storage or down blending.
• The United States is supporting the strengthening of the IAEA Division of Nuclear Security through development of eLearning modules to expand and sustain nuclear security training efforts.*
• The United States funds international organizations that contribute to the objectives of the Nuclear Security Summit, including Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540, INTERPOL, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), Global Partnership, UNODC, UNODA, and other relevant organizations and initiatives.
• The United States supports the 1540 Committee’s effort to increase global implementation of the resolution through submitting a report on U.S. Effective Practices on UNSCR 1540 Implementation in 2014, continuing to strengthen its measures to implement the resolution, as described in its 2015 submission of an updated matrix of all U.S. actions to implement fully UNSCR 1540, and integrating UNSCR 1540 into U.S. assistance programs and its work with international organizations.* 
• The United States has continued to provide both funding and the provision of subject matter experts to support INTERPOL’s Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Unit and its events, noting its central role in providing investigative support and coordinating law enforcement aspects of addressing criminal and terrorist offences involving nuclear or other radioactive materials. 
• The United States continued to co-chair the GICNT with Russia, which builds partner capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to acts of nuclear terrorism.
• The United States continued to collaborate with partners under the Global Partnership on projects and other activities for securing nuclear and radiological materials, contributing to the objectives of the Nuclear Security Summit.
• The United States will continue to provide technical, financial, and subject matter expert support to the IAEA and other international organizations, including activities supporting the Action Plans endorsed at the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit.
• The United States will continue to partner with states on nuclear security training courses, engage Centers of Excellence and Nuclear Security Support Centers, support cyber security efforts and training as it relates to nuclear security, and work to exchange and develop best practices related to the physical protection of high activity radioactive sources, as well as assist other than high income countries to upgrade physical protection systems at facilities with materials of concern.*

…Partnering with External Stakeholders

• The United States supported World Institute for Nuclear Security-led best practices workshops on security exercises on insider threat identification and mitigation, effective integration of cyber security and physical protection, and nuclear material control and accountancy.*
• The United States supported development of World Institute for Nuclear Security guides on Developing a Security Strategy for Armed Response, Crisis Management and Decision Making, National-Level Material Accounting and Tracking, Managing Internal Threats, Security Exercises, Security of IT and IC Systems at Nuclear Facilities, and Data Analytics for Nuclear Security.*
• The United States worked with international manufacturers of high-activity sealed source devices to perform voluntary assessments of the vulnerability to source theft.*
• The United States shares information bilaterally on actual nuclear forensic investigations and publishes the results of new techniques and methodologies applicable to nuclear forensic science.*

National Progress Report: Vietnam

Viet Nam’s consistent policy is to use nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes, while ensuring nuclear safety and security, and in a responsible manner. Viet Nam supports the right of states to use nuclear energy for peaceful uses, as well as efforts aimed at nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Viet Nam’s Prime Minister attended the First Nuclear Security Summit held in the United States in 2010, the Second in the Republic of Korea in 2012 and the Third in the Netherlands in 2014. To fulfill its commitments, Viet Nam has actively engaged in and made every effort to implement the provisions of the Communiqués of the Summits. Since the Third Nuclear Security Summit in 2014, Viet Nam has enhanced its actions to ensure nuclear security and contributed to the global nuclear security architecture through the following measures:

1. Strengthening the security of nuclear and other radioactive materials

Viet Nam has established a national database of radioactive sources and detailed administrative information on all facilities with radioactive sources. Viet Nam supports and seriously implements the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. Within the framework of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, with assistance of the United States, Viet Nam has upgraded the physical protection system for its only nuclear facility and 24 other facilities with category 1 radioactive sources. (activity ratio above 1000 Ci).

In order to control mobile radioactive sources, Viet Nam has established a radioactive source tracking system. At the same time, a pilot project on Radiation source location tracking system (RADLOT) is implemented with the cooperation among Viet Nam, the Republic of Korea and the IAEA. The project provides the infrastructure necessary for stricter control of these radioactive sources, requiring all facilities having mobile radioactive sources to install radiation source location tracking devices.

To meet demands for the management of radioactive waste and spent fuel, Viet Nam has outlined and is preparing to implement a plan to upgrade radioactive spent fuel storage facilities to national storage facilities.

To continue to ensure nuclear security, the Prime Minister of Viet Nam in November 2014 approved the Master Plan for Nuclear Power Infrastructure Development, instructing relevant Ministries and agencies to carry out their respective duties to ensure nuclear security and safety. In 2015, Viet Nam and the IAEA organized the National Seminar on "National regulatory framework for nuclear security for Viet Nam" with a view to implementing the Plan on the improvement of nuclear security infrastructure. In addition, in November 2015, Viet Nam invited an IAEA mission to introduce the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) with the aim of utilizing this service for a comprehensive analysis of Viet Nam's physical protection infrastructure.

Viet Nam attaches great importance to the enhancement of nuclear security culture. In 2015 and early 2016, three seminars on nuclear security culture were organized specifically for local authorities, radiation facilities and research facilities.

2. Contributing to minimizing the use of HEU

Within the framework of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, Viet Nam participated in the programme of nuclear fuel conversion for Da Lat research reactor from using highly-enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU). Viet Nam has successfully completed this task for its sole nuclear research reactor. All HEU have been returned to Russia. Viet Nam is completely HEU-free.

3. Combatting illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials

Viet Nam shares information on missing radioactive sources by participating in the IAEA's Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB). Since 2014, eight radiation portal monitors have been put into operation at an international airport and twelve other RPMs at a major seaport. An integrated nuclear security network between the customs authority and the nuclear regulatory body has been established, creating a national early warning and response network. In addition, in cooperation with the IAEA, Viet Nam has organized multiple training courses for first responders and Mobile Expert Support Team (MEST) to ensure the sustainability of the radiation detection system and effective response to radiation alerts. New RPMs are to be installed at another international airport and another seaport in a few years.

4. Adhering to multilateral instruments

As a responsible member of the international community, Viet Nam implements its obligations under international treaties on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as those under United Nations Security Council Resolutions, including Resolution 1540. Following the ratification of the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement in September 2012, the accession to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) and the ratification of its Amendment in October 2012, Viet Nam joined the Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in 2014. Viet Nam is actively considering and preparing to accede to the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

Viet Nam has shared its experience at a regional workshop and the Conference of Points of Contact of the CPPNM to promote ratification of the Amendment to the Convention.

5. Cooperating with international organizations

Viet Nam actively cooperates with the IAEA within the framework of the Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP), including threat assessment Design Basis Threat (DBT) approaches, participates in the International Network of Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres (NSSC), and is planning to establish a Vietnamese Centre of Excellence for Nuclear Security and Safeguards. Viet Nam has positively contributed to the development of IAEA Guidelines on nuclear security at IAEA consultations participated in the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee; sent consultants to join IAEA assessment visits.

As a member of INTERPOL, Viet Nam has actively participated in seminars and exercises on crime scene management and response organized by INTERPOL. In January 2015, Viet Nam organized the International Workshop on Combatting illicit trafficking of nuclear materials in Ho Chi Minh City.

6. Cooperating with international partners

At the Third Nuclear Security Summit, Viet Nam expressed support for 8 gift-baskets and will continue to support others at the Fourth Nuclear Security Summit.

Viet Nam is a member of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and has participated in many of its activities, such as the Plenary meetings in 2011, 2013 and 2015, as well as workshops on nuclear forensics and nuclear counter-terrorism. Viet Nam has shared its experience on "The Role of Public Awareness in the Provision of Alerts", contributing to the drafting of the Development of Nuclear Detection Architecture.

Viet Nam actively participates in the European Union’s Initiative on Centres of Excellence on Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Risk Mitigation; helped implement 10 component projects to improve capacities and the legal framework for prevention, detection and response to CBRN risks. Viet Nam is currently developing a National Action Plan on non-proliferation and prevention of CB

National Progress Report: Algeria

I‐Multilateral Instruments:

1. Algeria has ratified all International Legal Instruments relevant to Nuclear Security in particular; those mentioned in the 2010 Washington Summit Final Communiqué and Work Plan, namely, the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT).

2.Algeria also completed the process of ratification of all related International Legal Instruments such as the United Nations Conventions on combating terrorism, organized crime, corruption and money laundering.

II‐Legislation and Regulations:

1. Algeria has amended its penal code to criminalize malicious utilization of radioactive materials, including in general acts of nuclear terrorism. This amendment is related to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT).

2. Algeria is pushing ahead with efforts to put in place strong regulatory provisions to strengthen nuclear security regime, namely in the area of physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities and security of radioactive sources during use, storage and transport.

3. In addition to the existing decrees, those establishing security perimeters around three nuclear research centers hosting nuclear materials and facilities, the government has just after the 2014 Hague nuclear security summit, issued a comprehensive decree governing the physical protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear material as well as the security of radioactive sources.  

4. The content of this decree reflects the provisions of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM as amended) and takes into account criteria of the IAEA related recommendations as well as the implementing guides and technical guidance documents.

5.     As part of this regulatory development process, Algeria has established a Nuclear Security Committee at the national level, in charge of the development and update of the Nuclear Security Program.

6. The Committee is also given the mandate to conduct threat assessment and to define appropriate security measures in compliance with the requirements applicable to storage, transport and use of nuclear material and radioactive sources.

7. Algeria has made significant progress, strengthening its national nuclear security architecture through the establishment of sustainable mechanisms and updated procedures to address nuclear security issues at borders including export control of dual-use materials.

8. Memorandums of understanding between involved national actors are regularly updated, to take charge of actions related to safety and security of nuclear materials and other radioactive materials.

9. As a result of these Memorandums of understanding, joint work plans have been developed aiming to strengthen national detection capabilities, in particular at borders, through training programs and technical support.

10. Significant updating of regulations is under development, with input from every department involved in security issues, taking into account international requirements and experiences.

III‐National and Regional Capacity‐building Actions:

1.     A Nuclear Security Training and Support Center was entrusted in 2012 by presidential decree. Its mission is to provide a high quality technical and scientific support to the competent authorities as well as to contribute in enhancing human resources at both the national and regional level.

2. Training and support activities of the Centre follow the IAEA conceptual methodology, based on systematic approach to training and nuclear security needs assessment. Specific training courses and workshops are regularly delivered to various operators and stakeholders involved in applying nuclear security measures.

3. Several outreach Conferences on illicit trafficking of radioactive sources are regularly organized for customs.

4.  Master’s degree course in nuclear security has been implemented as well as nuclear security and physical protection modules were included in the nuclear engineering education programs.

5. During 2013-2016, Algeria organized several national and regional courses in nuclear security. Some of them were supported by the IAEA, namely, the workshops on Design basis threat, nuclear forensics, radiological crime scene management and nuclear security culture.

6.   Courses are regularly organized, in cooperation with the IAEA, on nuclear safety, safeguards and security; they met with great success and have had strong participation among African states, for both the English and French speaking countries.

IV‐ International Cooperation and Coordinating Mechanisms:

1. Algeria is a founding member of the international network of nuclear security and support centers, created under the auspices of the IAEA on the 2nd February 2012. Algerian experts from different institutions are actively contributing in its working groups.

A particular importance is attached to strengthening the activities of the network by fostering those aimed at promoting an intensive and sustainable collaboration between the network members through exchange of experience and best practices in nuclear security training.

2.     Algeria is cooperating with the IAEA to adopt and implement the integrated nuclear security and support plan (INNSP). Since the last INSSP meeting, held in Algiers in November 2013, gathering national representatives and IAEA experts, Algeria issued many regulations and took several steps with a view to enhancing its nuclear security framework for which an update is about to be completed during the year 2016.

3. Algeria has participated in training courses on Physical protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear security infrastructure development in Republic of Korea, International Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security Academy (INSA).

4. During 2012‐2016, Algeria, with the U.S./State Department, has identified relevant areas of collaboration in the field of nuclear security.

The cooperation with the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) has now entered the phase of implementation.

Needs assessment has been jointly conducted with the objective of identifying topical areas of training and technical support. Several Action plans focusing on specific training and technical cooperation in nuclear security are being deployed.

The scope of work for these Action Sheets includes in particular, tasks focusing on physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities and the security of radioactive sources as well as nuclear security curriculum training development, train-the-trainer, cyber-security and nuclear forensics.

Train-the-trainer was outlined as a priority task, to provide the Algerian nuclear security training and support centre, powerful human resource capabilities to deliver nuclear security training at both national and regional level.

Various Workshops were organized within the framework of this cooperation, namely: The Fundamentals of physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, Development of an Analytical Plan in Support of a Nuclear Forensics Investigation based on CMX-4 Exercise, Graded approach to developing a national nuclear forensics library.

5. Since its adherence to the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), in February 2012, Algeria is following with great interest its activities and looks forward to contributing to its continuous efforts toward the goal of strengthening the overall global architecture to combat nuclear terrorism

6. Algeria has been involved through the North‐Africa‐and‐Sahel Regional Secretariat of the EU‐CBRN threat reduction Centre of Excellence (EU CBRN‐CoE) in the coordination of several cooperative projects in the area of capacity building to enhance nuclear security and CBRN safety and security at the national, regional and international level.

The initiative has now entered a new phase, where the participating countries are invited, as a next step, to carry out a needs assessment. This initiative plays a major role by ensuring cooperation and coordination with partner countries through their National Focal Points and by facilitating the implementation of projects in the region.

7.  Algeria has hosted several workshops and meetings through the (EU CBRN‐CoE) cooperation project, related to nuclear detection instruments at ports and airports (JRC/EU), dual use equipment and control (EU/CBRN) and export control regulation with (BAFA), Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control.

An additional mechanism was also established in 2015 to enhance the cooperation among African police. Called the African Police Cooperation Organization- AFRIPOL (under the aegis of the African Union), headquartered in Algiers, Algeria. AFRIPOL will bring together all African police forces to cooperate in the fight against crime, especially terrorism and cross-border crimes like illicit trafficking.

National Progress Report: Argentina

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Argentina has strengthened nuclear security implementation and built up the global nuclear security architecture by…

…Strengthening Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Security

• Argentina has been implementing the provisions included in the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment and in the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.
• The Nuclear Regulatory Authority (ARN) has updated the domestic norm on "Transport of Radioactive Materials". The norm encompasses the "Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials" (2012 edition) of the IAEA.
• ARN and the IAEA jointly organized a national workshop on Design Basis Threat during May 2015.
• Argentina strengthened the attention to the nuclear security component in the storage of fuel elements from the Embalse NPP during the first stage of the life extension process.
• ARN is working on the revision of the pertinent norm for implementing INFCIRC 225 Rev. 5 during 2016.

…Minimizing Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials

• The total stock of HEU agreed under FRRSNF acceptance program has been just finally minimized by down-blending last HEU inventories.
• Argentina continues to support the LEU technology for fission radioisotope production, contributing to a worldwide HEU minimization.

…Countering Nuclear Smuggling

• Argentina will continue to strengthen its national export control regime, with particular attention to preventing the diversion of sensitive materials including nuclear material.

…Supporting Multilateral Instruments

• As part of its efforts to support the implementation of UNSC resolution 1540, Argentina sent a technical assistance mission to Grenada covering nuclear regulatory issues and will undertake training activities in that country including in the field of nuclear security.

…Collaborating with International Organizations

• In order to continue Argentina’s active participation in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) activities and to promote the GICNT in the region, Argentina co-hosted with Chile a Response and Mitigation Working Group workshop and tabletop exercise on August 2014. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism’s Radiological Emergency Management Exercise (REMEX) 2014: “Paihuen”, focused on demonstrating best practices for interagency communication and coordination needed to respond to criminal event involving radiation sources.
• In terms of international nuclear security related activities Argentina participates in the GICNT, within which framework contributed to the development of documents and guidelines for the three working groups: NUCLEAR FORENSICS, NUCLEAR DETECTION and RESPONSE AND MITIGATION.
• Argentina took active participation in main GICNT exercises:
  • Tiger Reef Feb 2014
  • Northern LightsJan 2015
  • Radiant CityMay 2015
  • Gate to AfricaOct 2015
  • Blue RavenNov 2015
• Argentina and Chile are planning to organize another joint exercise, possibly “Paihuen 2”.
• Argentina will continue to support and actively participate in the GICNT
• Argentina is a member of the Program Committee for the 2nd International Conference on Nuclear Security convened by the IAEA on December 2016 and fully supports the Agency’s role in nuclear security.
• Argentina integrated the Organization Committee for the International Conference “Computer Security in a Nuclear World – Expert Discussion and Exchange” IAEA Jun 2015.
• Argentina will host an IAEA regional training course on security of radioactive material in transport in 2016.

National Progress Report: Australia

1. Supporting multilateral instruments: Australia has ratified the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Australia has completed its UNSCR 1540 reporting requirements. Australia has supported IAEA workshops and conducted regional outreach in support of ratification of the CPPNM amendment. Australia has submitted to the IAEA updated information pursuant to Article 14.1 of the CPPNM to inform the depositary of its laws and regulations giving effect to the convention.

2. Strengthening Nuclear and Other Radiological Material Security: Australia has independent nuclear security regulators for nuclear material and radioactive material. Australia follows key IAEA guidance documents including Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (NSS-13), the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, and the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.  Australia employs a Design Basis Threat (DBT) for its nuclear facilities, which includes a cyber-security component.  Australia is a subscriber to the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation, promulgated as INFCIRC/869 in the IAEA.

The security system at the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation is regularly tested and evaluated through an exercise program which includes multi-agency and force on force exercises that are designed to test a DBT scenario.

3. Contribution to and use of the IAEA’s Nuclear Security-Related Activities and Services: Australia has contributed over AU$2.4 million to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund since its inception, hosted regional training courses on nuclear security, and been heavily involved in the development of the IAEA’s nuclear security series of guidance documents. 

Australia hosted an IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission in November 2013 and has requested the IAEA to conduct a follow-up mission in 2017.

4. Collaborating with International Organisations, Initiatives and Partnerships: Australia is a member of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and chairs its Nuclear Forensics Working Group. In May 2016, Australia will host a GICNT nuclear emergency planning and response workshop and exercise “Kangaroo Harbour” which will demonstrate best practices in issuing and responding to notifications and assistance requests to increase nuclear detection, nuclear forensics and emergency response involving the threat and use of radioactive materials in a terrorist attack. Australia has been a member of INTERPOL since 1948, and is a donor participant in the (G8) Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

5. Minimising Sensitive Nuclear Material: Australia has shut-down its HEU-based research reactor at the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) in Sydney, repatriated all its spent fuel, and now uses only low-enriched uranium technology to fuel the research reactor and produce radiopharmaceuticals. Australia repatriated surplus stocks of HEU to USA in late 2012. Australia’s total holdings of highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium are below 5 Kg.

6. Efforts to Combat Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and Radiological Materials: Australia contributes to the IAEA’s Illicit Trafficking Database and has contributed to an IAEA project to improve technical measures to detect and respond to Illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials.

7. Strengthened cooperation between government and nuclear industry: The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) is an active member of the World Institute of Nuclear Security (WINS) and is involved in the development of best practice guides on nuclear and radioactive source security.

For Australia's nuclear security profile tables, click here.