National Progress Report: Japan

Japan National Progress Report

2016 Nuclear Security Summit 

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Japan has strengthened nuclear security implementation and built up the global nuclear security architecture by…

…Strengthening Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Security

●       Taking on the IAEA IPPAS Mission
      In February 2015, Japan accepted to take on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) Mission.  The results of its review will be highly beneficial to improve Japan's nuclear security regime.  Recommendations and suggestions were fully examined and considered, and currently, Japan is working on how to address them.

●       Strengthening Computer Security Measures at Nuclear Facilities
      The Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) regulates computer security at Nuclear Facilities with measures to enhance nuclear security.  As part of the nuclear security inspection the NRA has conducted enhanced inspections since 2013 in addition to the existing computer security inspection, and continues to improve capacity in the area of computer security.

●       Efforts to Establish a System to Determine Trustworthiness
      At the Nuclear Security Summit in 2012, Japan announced that it would examine the introduction of a system to determine the trustworthiness of personnel.  In October 2015, the NRA decided to establish a new system based on the report by the Committee on Nuclear Security, which is an expert committee under the NRA.   Concrete regulations are under examination at the Committee and the NRA is working to establish the system in the near future.

●       Fostering Nuclear Security Culture
      At the Nuclear Security Summit in 2014, Japan announced its commitment to fostering nuclear security culture.  In January 2015, the NRA adopted the Code of Conduct on Nuclear Security Culture with five action principles.  In addition, the NRA is making efforts to improve nuclear security culture in Japan through education, the personal interviews of operator CEOs by the NRA commissioner, and the making of a video to educate operators and the design of a collection of slogans to foster nuclear security.

●       Strengthening the Security of Radioactive Isotopes
      Regarding the security of radioactive isotopes, Japan established a system to issue export certificates in December 2005, and a registration system of radioactive sources in January 2011 in accordance with domestic laws and regulations.  The Committee on Nuclear Security under the NRA is concretely examining measures, as one of the priority issues, to further enhance security in line with the IAEA guidelines, and will issue a report shortly.  The NRA intends to establish a new system based on the report.

●       Strengthening Domestic Transport Security
      Based on the report of the Committee on Nuclear Security, the NRA and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) of Japan incorporate the transportation security measures in line with the INFCIRC/225/Rev. 5.

…Minimizing Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials

●         Removal of the Nuclear Fuel at the FCA
     Based on the Joint Statement issued at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit and the Fact Sheet issued at the Japan-US Summit Meeting in 2015, Japan and the United States have completed the removal of all highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium fuels from the Fast Critical Assembly (FCA) of the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA).

●         Conversion of KUCA from HEU to LEU Fuel
     During the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, Japan and the United States announced that they would work together toward the conversion of Kyoto University Critical Assembly (KUCA) from HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel and the removal of all HEU fuel.

●         Plutonium Management Policy
     Japan has been conducting all nuclear activities, in compliance with the NPT (Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) and under IAEA safeguards. The IAEA has also recognized that there is no diversion from peaceful nuclear activities in Japan. On this basis, in recognition of the importance of ensuring transparency with regard to plutonium management, and to obtain an understanding both domestically and internationally, the Government of Japan has published an annual report on "The Current Situation of Plutonium Management in Japan" since 1994, which is more detailed than the international plutonium management guidelines. Japan maintains transparency over its plutonium reserves and manages them appropriately.

The Government of Japan's policies for restarting nuclear power plants, including the policies for the plutonium use in light water reactors, have been consistent.  The highly independent NRA makes judgments based on scientific and technical knowledge.  Only once the NRA has confirmed the conformity of nuclear power plants with the new regulatory requirements, which are of the most stringent level in the world, will the Government of Japan follow the NRA's assessment and proceed with the restart of the nuclear power plants, after obtaining the understanding of the local population.
    

In this way, Japan will also firmly maintain its policy of “not possessing plutonium reserves for which the purpose of utilization is unspecified”.  Japan will steadily use its plutonium reserves and will continue to pay due consideration to the balance between supply and demand of plutonium.

…Countering Nuclear Terrorism

●       Active Participation in the PSI
      Japan has actively contributed to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), by attending Operation Experts Group meetings and joint exercises.  Most recently, Japan served as facilitator at the table-top exercise MARU 2015 held in New Zealand last November.  In addition, Japan will host an exercise in 2018 as a part of Asia Pacific Rotation Exercises.

●       Promoting Development of Nuclear Security Related Technology (Nuclear Forensics, Nuclear Detection, etc.)
      At the Nuclear Security Summit in 2010, Japan announced its intent to develop technology related to the measurement and detection of nuclear material and nuclear forensics. Since then, Japan has promoted this research and development in cooperation with the United States and the European Union.  JAEA has developed basic nuclear forensic analysis technology and, through international collaboration, also has developed a national nuclear forensics library prototype.  Japan continues to promote research and development in this area in cooperation with the United States and the European Union.

●       Implementation of Nuclear Security Exercises (Facility, Transport)
      Since the Nuclear Security Summit in 2014, Japan has implemented field exercises based on threat scenarios such as design based threats (DBTs) at all protected facilities.  Through these exercises, the facilities could maintain and improve their capacity to respond to a nuclear security event.  In addition, since 2014, field exercises to counter cyber-attacks to the control system of nuclear facilities, or including the combination with physical attacks, have been implemented.  Japan continues to increase the number of facilities to implement field exercises and enhance the exercise contents.  Moreover, Japan conducted two table-top exercises and two field exercises focused on the improvement of transport security from 2015 to 2016.

●       Strengthening the National Regime to Counter Terrorism for G7 Ise-Shima Summit and Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games
      Japan will host the G7 Ise-Shima Summit in May 2016 and the Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games in 2020.  In order to prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear material or other radioactive material, Japan continues to strengthen nuclear security by clarifying the roles of relevant ministries and agencies, enhancing communication plans, and enhancing capacity through joint exercises.

…Supporting Multilateral Instruments

●       Concluding the Amendment to the CPPNM
      Japan concluded the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) in June 2014.

●       Developing Good Practices Guides at the Transport Security Gift Basket
      The Transport Security Gift Basket led by Japan developed good practices guides for air, rail, road, and sea transport modes.  Japan will share these guides with other states through the IAEA and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and make use of them for future activities.

●       Outreach to Incorporate International Norms into National Regulations
      Japan has encouraged the ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), the CPPNM, and its Amendment, as well as incorporating the IAEA recommendations, at international occasions such as the Asian Senior-level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP), which is hosted by Japan every year for Asian countries.  Through these activities, Japan continues to work on universalization of international norms on nuclear security.

…Collaborating with International Organizations

●       Strengthening Cooperation with the IAEA
      Japan has contributed about 900 thousand Euros to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund since the last Summit.  This includes the cost for dispatching cost free experts.  In addition, Japan continues to send experts, as needed, for drafting nuclear security series documents and dispatching missions such as IPPAS missions. 

●       Strengthening Cooperation between the 1540 Committee and the Global Partnership
      The 1540 Committee works on assistance for match making based on requests from the Member States of the United Nations.  In this regard, cooperation between the 1540 Committee and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (Global Partnership) which works on the match making of projects to strengthen CBRN security is highly beneficial in terms of efficiency.  As the 2016 Chair of the Global Partnership, Japan promotes this cooperation.  In addition, the 1540 Committee is working on the Comprehensive Review on the status of the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 (2004), as set forth by UNSCR 1977 (2011).  Japan, as a nonpermanent member of the Security Council, will actively contribute to the review process to improve the implementation of the UNSCR 1540.

●       Strengthening Cooperation with the GICNT
      Japan has attended all Plenary meetings since its inception and actively joined the discussions.  For example, Japan led the discussions on the technical aspects of nuclear forensics, and shared the lessons learned through the accident at TEPCO’s Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations.  Japan explores how to further contribute to the area of transport security using the good practices guides developed at the Transport Security Gift Basket.

…Partnering with External Stakeholders

●       Human Resource Development at the ISCN
      In recent five years, more than 2,700 personnel joined trainings at the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security (ISCN), the first Center of Excellence (COE) in Asia established by the JAEA in December 2010.  The JAEA has advanced cooperation with the IAEA based on the Practical Arrangement signed in 2013.  The ISCN will continue to develop training courses on new agendas such as computer security at Nuclear Facilities and receive 500 personnel per year for human resource development and capacity building.

●       Cooperation among COEs in Japan, China, and the Republic of Korea
      Based on the Joint Declaration for Peace and Cooperation in Northeast Asia issued at the Japan-China- ROK Trilateral Summit in November 2015, COEs in Japan, China, and the Republic of Korea are consulting with each other to deepen their mutual collaboration.  Regional cooperation like this should be promoted in the other regions and Japan will continue to support regions based on their experience in East Asia.

Efforts as the Chair of the Global Partnership
            In 2016 Japan became the Chair of the Global Partnership and also the Chair of its Nuclear and Radiological Security sub-Working Group.  Japan, as the Chair of these fora, will work on implementation of the Action Plan in Support of the Global Partnership adopted at the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit.

National Progress Report: Jordan

NSS 2016 - National Progress Report

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

Ratification of  ICSANT

On 9 February 2014, the Council of Ministers presented to the Parliament the bill for Jordan’s accession to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT). The Parliament approved the convention and a Royal decree was published in the official gazette, the instrument of ratification was deposited on February 28, 2016.  

Counter Nuclear Smuggling Team 

On 8 September 2013, the Council of Ministers took the decision to create a Counter-Nuclear Smuggling Team. The team is led by Jordan Armed Forces and comprising Ministry of Interior, the General Intelligence Directorate, Energy and Mineral Resources Commission, the Public Security Directorate, and the Customs Department. 

Jordan has, since the Seoul Summit, conducted intensive bilateral consultations and embarked on site visits to NSS countries that have made considerable progress in the area of Nuclear Security and Counter-Nuclear Smuggling.  

Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation

 On November 13, 2015, Jordan announced its commitment to “Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation” as contained in the International Atomic Energy Agency document INFCIRC 869

Bilateral and International Cooperation

Jordan -USA

Joint Action Plan between the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Government of the United States of America on Combating Smuggling of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials.

 On January 11, 2016, Jordan and the USA signed a joint action plan with the intent to cooperate to build and increase the capabilities of Jordan to prevent, detect, and respond effectively to attempts to smuggle nuclear or radioactive materials.  The plan focuses on building self-reliance capabilities of Jordan, while at the same time establishes a cooperative relationship with the US, where assistance is needed. 

Jordan-IAEA:

During the period 31May to 11 June 2015, the IAEA conducted a Nuclear Security Peer Review Mission. The Energy and Minerals Resources Commission (EMRC) was commended by the IAEA for the cooperation and support the mission received.

Workshops and Training

CNS Teams in Volatile Regions

During the period 18 to19 November 2015, Jordan hosted an international workshop on CNS Teams in Volatile Regions in Amman on. It was designed to promote the initiative of His Majesty King Abdullah II on the Counter Nuclear Smuggling Teams that was declared during the Second Nuclear Security Summit held in Soul in 2012 and reintroduced in 2014 and 2016 summits respectively. 

The overall aim of the workshop was to raise awareness of cross border threats in volatile regions and to exchange experiences on current national level mechanisms for interagency and cross-sector coordination in security on nuclear material issues. During the second day of this workshop, Jordan presented itself as a case study on how it has been securing itself considering unprecedented border volatility with a special focus on how it has been dealing with the threat of infiltration of smuggled material including the possibility of smuggling nuclear and radioactive material. 

Jordan-Canada

Workshop “Towards Universal Implementation of International Legal Instruments for Nuclear Security”,

During the period 26 to 27 January 2016, Jordan organized in cooperation with Canada this workshop. It addressed entry into force and implementation of the International Convention on the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) and the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM/A). This workshop was dedicated to countries in the Arab region. 

Jordan-Canada-INTERPOL

INTERPOL organized and run Project STONE in Jordan with a contribution in kind from the government of Canada.

Project STONE is delivered in two phases, phase 1 comprises training in Radiological Nuclear investigations, intervention and  counter trafficking for law enforcement and other personnel and this is followed up a few months later with phase 2, which is a live counter trafficking operation at border crossing points, utilizing the same personnel. The first phase took place during the period 1-3 March 2016; the second follow up with the operational phase will be conducted in May 2016.

Jordan- United Arab Emirates, Morocco, GCC, GICNT, EU, & UNICRI

Inter-Arab Nuclear Detection and Response Exercise “ FALCON TABLE TOP EXERCISE”, 23-25 February 2016, Abu Dhabi

This exercise is regionally-oriented to partner nations in the Gulf Cooperating Council (GCC) with the participation of Jordan and Morocco. It focused on key aspects of the nuclear security activities related to detection and initial response to Radiological and Nuclear (RN) threats with an emphasis on national planning, information-sharing, operational cooperation, and decision-making in detecting nuclear material out of regulatory control and in managing the investigation of and response to an escalating nuclear security situation involving radioactive materials.

The exercise has been developed under the auspices of the EU CBRN Centers of Excellence, the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), the European Commission, the Governments of the UAE, Jordan, Morocco and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). One of its important outcomes is to strengthen regional cooperation in the field of nuclear security and the conduct of follow up activities in the future. 

2016 Nuclear Security Summit voluntary commitments:

Jordan introduced a new “Statement of Activity and Cooperation on Countering Nuclear Smuggling” to the 2016 Summit. 37 states, the UN and the INTERPOL have co-sponsored this Gift Basket. Additionally, Jordan joined five gift baskets:

1.        Joint Statement on Sustaining Action to Strengthen Global Nuclear Security

2.        Insider Threat Mitigation.

3.        Supporting Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism Preparedness and Response Capabilities

4.   Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540.

5.    Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres/Centres of Excellence (NSSC/CoE)”

National Progress Report: Kazakhstan

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Kazakhstan has taken a set of practical steps in the strengthening of nuclear security, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and peaceful use of atomic energy. Kazakhstan has undertaken all possible efforts on national, regional and international levels for the effective implementation of decisions made at the Nuclear Security Summits in Washington, Seoul and The Hague. 

Strengthening Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Security

• The new edition of the Law on the Use of Atomic Energy was enforced in January 2016. The basic law of Kazakhstan in the sphere of peaceful use of atomic energy, in which principles of regulation of nuclear safety and security, protection of the environment and population are established. The Law prescribes further enhancement of the state system for control of radioactive materials and other sources of ionizing radiation. The definition of nuclear security is also provided in Law, together with basic requirements for a state system of nuclear security.
• Physical protection systems in the Institute of Nuclear Physics and Ulba Metallurgical Plant were upgraded. Radiation monitors were mounted on two customs control points with corresponding personnel training for these points.
• Several training courses in safeguards and nuclear forensics were conducted with support of the National Nuclear Security Administration of US DOE for Kazakhstan experts.
• In August 2015 in Astana, table-top exercises (TTE) were conducted on the security of rail-road transportation of nuclear and radioactive materials. In December 2015 Kazakhstan experts presented the TTE results and developed recommendations in the Tokyo seminar on security of air, maritime, road and rail-road transportation of nuclear and radioactive materials.
• In December 2015, construction of the Nuclear Security Training Center began in the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Almaty. The conceptual design of the Training Center was developed in collaboration with the Los Alamos National Laboratory, USA, in 2010-2011. The Center construction will be completed in October 2016.
• Kazakhstan together with IAEA, USA and Russia is developing training materials, course programmes, presentations, brochures and other necessary materials for courses on nuclear security, physical protection, non-proliferation, control and accountancy of nuclear materials, etc.
• Further work is being done on the elimination of the legacy of nuclear tests on the territory of the former Semipalatinsk test site. In the frame of the programme “Global Nuclear Security” of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency of the US Defense Department, physical barriers and physical protection of some sensitive areas of the former test site were enhanced.
• New regulations in the field of nuclear security will be developed and enforced reflecting provisions of the new Law on the Use of Atomic Energy and recommendations of the IAEA documents on nuclear security.
• IPPAS missions for peer evaluation of physical protection of nuclear facilities will be invited and recommendations of the missions will be implemented for nuclear facilities in Kazakhstan.

Minimizing Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials

• Atomic research reactor VVR-K and critical stand (zero power reactor) of the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Almaty are converted to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel.
• All highly enriched uranium (HEU) from the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Almaty was downblended into LEU on the Ulba Metallurgical Plant.
• In support of the HEU-LEU conversion programme training seminars were conducted on technologies for the active core design of nuclear reactors. Workers of the National Nuclear Center of Kazakhstan took part in technical workshops in Idaho National Laboratory for consideration of further cooperation fields. In September 2015 in Kazakhstan, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed in which, inter alia, exchange of information on research reactors is defined as one possible cooperation field.
• With support of US DOE, spent fuel of BN-350 reactor of Mangistau Nuclear Power Combinate, Aktau, was transferred for safe and secure storage in Kurchatov.
• Facility for sodium coolant processing was designed for BN-350 decommissioning programme, the facility will be commissioned in June 2016.
• Round Table on problems of minimization of use of HEU in civil cycle was conducted in Almaty in December 2015.
• Kazakhstan will continue projects on transfer of research reactors IWG1.M and IGR from HEU fuel to LEU in National Nuclear Center in Kurchatov, Eastern Kazakhstan, and implement the transition were it will be technically possible. Remove remaining HEU and HEU spent fuel from the research centers.
• Kazakhstan will facilitate the exploration of possible ways of minimizing use of HEU in the civil cycle, including production of radio-isotopes, where it will be technically possible. One of the main and important possibilities for encouraging the industry to use non-HEU technologies is the development and introduction of economic incentives.

Countering Nuclear Smuggling

• Export control system is implemented including strengthened interactions and coordination of involved state authorities and introduction of internal compliance control for main nuclear exporters.
• National Response Plan is being enforced in the field of nuclear activities including issues related to illicit trafficking and other illegal actions with involvement of nuclear and other radioactive materials and radiation sources. The Plan is enforced under the provisions of the new Law on Use of Atomic Energy.
• In the National Nuclear Center of Kazakhstan, the establishment of the Identification Center for Nuclear and Radioactive Materials began. The Center will develop a database with passports for all nuclear and radioactive sources fabricated in or imported to Kazakhstan by which the sources will be identified including in cases of possible illicit use or trafficking. Also, radioactive wastes will be accounted in the Identification Center with the aim of developing a strategy for radioactive waste management.
• Kazakhstan will continue to strengthen export control system including internal compliance in companies exporting nuclear items. Implementation measures will be taken and training will be conducted for the National Response Plan.

Supporting Multilateral Instruments

• Kazakhstan joined and ratified practically all basic international conventions and agreements in the field of peaceful use of atomic energy. Kazakhstan ratified CPPNM and its Amendments, and we hope that the Amendments will be ratified by some other countries that will allow to enforce the Amendments. Adoption of the Amendments will be an important step in strengthening of nuclear security on national as well as on international global levels.
• Continue outreach efforts in a frame of Central Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. Kazakhstan together with member states of the Agreement on Central Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone will develop and adopt a multilateral agreement on cooperation in prevention of illegal trafficking of nuclear materials and combating of nuclear terrorism in the region of Central Asia.
• Kazakhstan will continue discussions with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), and UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA). Adoption of such agreement will give an important input into the strengthening of nuclear security in the Central Asia region.

Collaborating with International Organizations

• In August 2015, the Agreement with the IAEA was signed on establishment of the IAEA low-enriched uranium bank (IAEA LEU Bank). Also, technical agreements were signed between the IAEA and Kazakhstan Ministry of Energy on specific measures in implementation of the LEU Bank Agreement, and between the IAEA and Ulba Metallurgical Plant in Ust-Kamenogors, Eastern Kazakhstan, on the Bank Operator services. Practical work on establishment of the Bank began.
• Kazakhstan will finalize the construction of the LEU Bank storage facility in 2017, meeting all applicable safety standards of the IAEA for storage of LEU and nuclear security recommendations of the IAEA corresponding documents. In 2017 the IAEA LEU will be shipped for storage in Ulba Metallurgical Plant.
• Kazakhstan will strengthen cooperation with Interpol in the field of prevention and countering nuclear terrorism, smuggling, illicit trafficking and other illegal actions related to nuclear activities. Kazakhstan will take part in implementation of Action Plan in support of Interpol that is adopted on Nuclear Security Summit 2016.
• Kazakhstan supports the IAEA and underlines its leading role in the strengthening of global nuclear security, Kazakhstan will fully support implementation of activities included into the Action Plan in support of the IAEA.

Partnering with External Stakeholders

• Kazakhstan took part in all initiatives of the Global Partnership against Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP), and will take all efforts in implementation of the Action Plan in support of GP.
• Kazakhstan took part in all activities of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and will make every effort in the implementation of the Action Plan in support of GICNT.

Kazakhstan highly regards the comprehensive and fruitful work that was done during the Nuclear Security Summits. Good momentum is generated at the highest political level for further work on the strengthening of nuclear security and non-proliferation regime. Action Plans are adopted that form the basis for support of the necessary level of activities of the Nuclear Security Summit member states in the mentioned areas.

Kazakhstan commits its full support for implementation of the Summit objectives, continuation of work and efforts in support for strengthening nuclear security and nuclear weapon non-proliferation regime.

National Progress Reports: Lithuania

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Lithuania has strengthened nuclear security implementation and built up the global nuclear security architecture by 

Strengthening Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Security

• State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI) continuously carries out national regulatory activities and supervision of physical security of nuclear facilities, nuclear materials and all materials of the nuclear fuel cycle. VATESI experts review physical security documents, submitted by entities carrying out site evaluations of nuclear facilities, all licence and permit holders and applicants alongside other economic entities involved in any activities pertaining to nuclear materials. VATESI experts prepare comments, conclusions and supervise compliance with the regulatory legislation on physical security of the nuclear facilities, nuclear and nuclear fuel cycle material, and conduct physical security inspections.
• In 2015, State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI) revised the existing regulations on Physical Security (Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.6.1-2012 “Physical Security of Nuclear Facilities, Nuclear Material and Nuclear Fuel Cycle Material”) and issued an amendment to the regulation. The amendment specifies the process of development of physical security justification documents (i.e. Security Plan and Vital Area Identification documents) and coordination of those documents with the competent authorities. The amendment is in line with the recommendations defined in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series #13 (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5).
• In December 2015, a VATESI led Interagency Commission for Design Basis Threat Assessment held a meeting to review and make conclusions on the established Design Basis Threat documents, related to all nuclear facilities of the Republic of Lithuania and to the nuclear material transportation. The main objective of this review was to address changes in the regional geopolitical situation and determine possible changes in the threat assessment. A Design Basis Threat to the nuclear facilities and nuclear material was introduced in 2001 and is reviewed annually.
• Radiation Protection Centre (RSC) in its national capacity of radiation protection regulatory authority, carries out identification activities and prepares implementation recommendations on all principles and criteria that are relevant to the national radiation protection regulation - accounting of ionizing radiation sources, securing radiation protection and physical protection of ionizing radiation sources.
• Radiation protection national legislation reviews completed during the relevant period include:
  • New amendment to the Law on Radiation Protection with added emphasis on radioactive material security;
  • new National Guidelines for Security of Ionizing Radiation Sources, developed in accordance with the IAEA recommendations (IAEA Nuclear Security Series  #14 and  #11), approved by the Minister of Health, with additional provisions on design and implementation of physical protection systems, relevant to all respective categories of radioactive materials, and potential threat and consequence assessment. Licensees and temporary permit holders are now required to perform vulnerability assessments of their physical security systems in order to assess the system efficiency and guarantee sufficient quality of the physical protection measures deployed;
  • new amendments to the Guidelines on Import, Export, Transit and Transport of Radioactive Materials, Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel were approved by the Minister of Health and Head of VATESI on 24 December 2008, adding to new security requirements for transportation of radioactive materials. The Guidelines have been developed in accordance with the IAEA recommendations (IAEA Nuclear Security Series #9).
• Nuclear Security Centre of Excellence (NSCOE), established in Lithuania in the aftermath of the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul in 2012, has significantly developed its operational capacity. Main goal of the NSCOE is to support sustainability and effectiveness of the national nuclear security measures and their development through continuous assistance to the stakeholders in development of human resources. NSCOE develops and implements training programs tailored to the specific needs of various stakeholders, promotes and supports interagency collaboration and coordination and continues international cooperation in the nuclear security training.
• The Government of Lithuania shares integrated approach of the IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) as effective peer review of the regulatory technical and policy issues and an objective comparison of the national regulatory infrastructure against IAEA Standards and Guidance. Lithuania will welcome the IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission on April 17 – 29, 2016, with a part of the upcoming mission to be dedicated to the evaluation of safety/security interface module.
• Lithuania remains committed to the IAEA’s efforts of assisting the Member States in establishing and maintaining effective nuclear security regimes and protection against the unauthorized removal of nuclear material and the sabotage of nuclear facilities and material. Lithuania recognizes International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission as a fundamental part of these efforts and is convinced that IPPAS system is a very efficient asset in assisting the State in the assessment of its nuclear security regime and in the development of future activities in support of nuclear security issues. The Government of Lithuania has officially requested for the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission, confirmed by the IAEA to be conducted in the year 2017. The general purpose of the planned IPPAS mission is to assess Lithuania’s nuclear security regime.
• Lithuania is committed to continuous orphan sources search campaigns, organized by the RSC as part of its annual programs. Orphan sources search areas widen and include various sites of former industrial and military installations, medical treatment facilities, and municipal waste landfills throughout Lithuania.
• Lithuanian Nuclear Security Centre of Excellence (NSCOE) will continue to add to the international efforts in the face of growing threats of terrorism, focusing national training programs on nuclear security personnel capability development. The main goal of NSCOE is to support domestic sustainability and effectiveness of the nuclear security measures and their development through continuous assistance to the stakeholders in training. NSCOE will continue developing and implementing training programs that are tailored to the specific needs of the numerous stakeholders. The Centre also promotes and supports interagency collaboration and coordination and maintains international cooperation in the area of the nuclear security training. NSCOE will continue with its public awareness raising efforts on nuclear security measures and their impact to the national security, and promotion of robust nuclear security culture and integrity. 
• Lithuania participates in the Global Initiative to Counter Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and continues its cooperation with the Global Threat Reduction Initiative.

Prior to the Nuclear Security Summit 2016, Lithuania has confirmed support to the newly introduced and continuous gift baskets on: Sustaining Action to Strengthen Global Nuclear Security; Enhancing Radiological Security; Strengthening the Security of High Activity Sealed Radioactive Sources; Activity and Cooperation on Countering Nuclear Smuggling and Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres/Centres of Excellence (NSSC/CoE).

Lithuania intends to support relevant NSS joint statements and will duly contribute to the future development of these initiatives.

Minimizing Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials

• Activities involving radioactive materials may be authorized and conducted in Lithuania only when economic, social and other returns to individuals or society outweigh the detriment radiation causes to human health and the environment. Written verification of intent of the planned activities of the applicant with radioactive materials is one of the main documents required to be submitted with license or temporary permit application.
• Due to the efforts made and the new availability of alternative technologies based on X-ray generation, the number of sealed sources in Lithuania is declining annually. All sealed sources of ionizing radiation are required to be returned to the consignor after their use.

Countering Nuclear Smuggling

• Lithuania remains fully supportive of the information sharing initiative on illicit trafficking of nuclear material under the framework of the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database of Nuclear and other Radioactive Material. National nuclear regulatory authority (VATESI) is responsible for notifying the IAEA Database on all relevant events in Lithuania and for collecting all global data on illicit trafficking events involving nuclear and other radioactive material. Complete information on reported cases involving illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material worldwide is duly shared with other competent institutions of Lithuania.
• Bilateral cooperation in countering nuclear smuggling grows strong as the collaboration between the United States and Lithuania builds up in a comprehensive manner, contributing to deterrence of future smuggling attempts and strengthening global security. Bilateral Counter Nuclear Smuggling Joint Action Plan, signed in April 2013, is aimed at prevention, detection, and response to nuclear and radioactive materials smuggling incidents. On December 14, 2015, Lithuanian- U.S. Counter Nuclear Smuggling Joint Action Plan review was performed by the multiagency representatives from Lithuania and the United States as a continuous effort to seek ways to further strengthen joint endeavor to counter nuclear smuggling in areas of prevention, detection and response.
• Maritime supply chain security is coordinated by the State Border Guard Service (SBGS) of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Lithuania. SBGS continues close cooperation with the United States Department of Energy Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence program (NSDD): multiple Dual-Pillar RPMs and vehicle RPMshave been installed at the Klaipeda seaport, „Klaipeda Smelte“  terminal,  Klaipeda Container Terminal and near the „Draugyste“ railway station. Primary purpose of this new system is to monitor vast majority of marine containers shipped to and from the Klaipeda seaport and identify possible attempts of illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials. Secondary inspection of the suspected marine containers is performed by the trained border guard officers, following the approved procedures. Since 2013, the SBGS performs annual metrological verification of the handheld dosimeters that are used in secondary inspections.
• According to the U.S.-Lithuanian Counter Nuclear Smuggling Joint Action Plan, the multiagency representatives are committed to organizing future ad hoc reviews of counter nuclear smuggling activities in areas of prevention, detection and response. Bilateral cooperation in nuclear detection, law enforcement investigations, and other forms of collaboration will be continuous and will contribute to effective bilateral and international partnerships in the field within the framework of the Plan. Lithuania reaffirms its commitment to share expertise in the area with other international partners.

Supporting Multilateral Instruments

• Since Lithuania has ratified the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) in 2008 and deposited its instruments of ratification on May 19, 2009, all Lithuanian legislation, regulations and policies have been developed in coordination with the amended CPPNM.
• Lithuania remains committed to CPPNM and together with the IAEA community welcomes the international progress in ratification of the Amendment as an important step to bolster nuclear security worldwide. CPPNM is the only legally binding international undertaking in the area of physical protection of nuclear material, hence adoption of the Amendment to the CPPNM is the single most important step the international community can take to strengthen nuclear security globally.
• Lithuania will continue its support and contribute to all multilateral and regional efforts of the international community in raising sufficient awareness and securing additional ratifications that are needed in order for the Amendment to enter into force, with the goal of achieving this by the end of 2016.

Collaborating with International Organizations

• Lithuanian nuclear security experts submit contributions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Series document drafts, participate in the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Guidance Committee and are members of the Agency’s Working Group on Radioactive Source Security (WGRSS).
• RSC cooperates with and reports to IAEA on the source security status via web platform of Nuclear Security Information Management System (NUSIMS), designed for self-assessment, country-specific nuclear security information gathering, information management and sustainability.
• Lithuanian experts have participated in the Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) missions to Pakistan, Netherlands, Croatia and Armenia, led by the IAEA. Expert participants of these missions had a valuable opportunity to share their expertise internationally. Lithuanian institutions are preparing for the IRRS mission in Lithuania, which will be conducted on April 17 – 29, 2016.
• Lithuanian RSC co-operates with the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) and The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). RSC expert has participated in the Workshop on NSS Gift Basket “Enhancing Radiological Security” in Oslo in January 2016.
• With a view to assess the implementation progress of the new IAEA recommendations on both national and institutional levels, the Government of the Republic of Lithuania has invited and received confirmation of the IAEA for the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission to assess Lithuania’s nuclear security regime. The IPPAS mission is confirmed to take place in the year 2017. Lithuania has received IPPAS missions in 1999 and in 2001.

Partnering with External Stakeholders

• Promoting cooperation in the area of the prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and advancement in defense and military relations, the Government of Lithuania continues cooperation with Government of the United States. Several bilateral meetings on security of sources were organized during this period Visiting experts from the United States have reviewed existing national legislation on security of radioactive materials and prepared recommendations for improvement. Moreover, the demand for trainings for the officers of the Police Department under the Ministry of the Interior regarding detection of orphan sources issues was discussed and the repair and renewal possibilities for the RSC equipment used to detect orphan sources were considered. In 2014 and 2015, Police Department officers participated in detection training in Dubrovnik, Croatia, organized by the Sandia National Laboratory and in the United States Department of Defence equipment use and maintenance training.
• RSC continues its collaboration with the Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU) on various scientific issues in nuclear security – particularly, in combating illicit trafficking of nuclear or other radioactive materials. 
• NSCOE has become an important regional nuclear security training hub and is further expanding its activities: 34 training events have been organized in the actual period with 764 national and international participants. Productive cooperation network has been established between the NSCOE and the U.S. Department of Energy, the IAEA, Interpol, OSCE, GICNT, other international organizations and fora. The most significant cooperation is developing with U.S. Department of Energy Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence Program (NSDD). NSDD is the main NSCOE partner in developing national nuclear security detection infrastructure and building personnel capabilities. NSCOE achievements and progress were featured as a success story in the NSDD Program Review Conference, held in the Fall of 2015. 
• NSCOE provided training support to the Ukrainian and Moldovan law enforcement agencies, and continued cooperation with Georgia and Armenia.
• NSCOE is an active member of IAEA Nuclear Security Support Centre Network: national and regional IAEA training events were organized in cooperation with and utilizing the NSCOE infrastructure.
• In cooperation with the U.S. Export Control and Related Border Security Program (EXBS) and Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), trainings and workshops for national and regional audiences were organized. Global Initiative for Combating Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) Nuclear Forensics Working Group organized an in cooperation with NSCOE as a national response effort to illicit trafficking; and the IAEA training courses on Radiologic Crime Scene Management and nuclear forensics foundations were held in addition to the implemented national training program.  

Fact Sheet: Apex Gold

Apex Gold Scenario-Based Policy Discussion

On January 27-28, 2016, the U.S. Department of Energy and the Kingdom of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosted a scenario-based policy discussion entitled Apex Gold, the first ever minister-level exercise to identify national and international actions to address a nuclear crisis.  The SBPD brought together ministers and other senior delegates from 37 nations, along with representatives from the International Atomic Energy Agency, the European Union, and the United Nations, to practice their ability to respond effectively to an emerging nuclear security threat.

During the discussion, the ministers were presented with a hypothetical nuclear terrorism scenario and then worked together to determine how each of their nations might respond at each step of the situation.  The participants also toured Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to better understand some of the technical tools available for detecting and analyzing nuclear material and making decisions in the event of a nuclear terrorism crisis.

The primary objective of Apex Gold was to prepare ministers to advise their heads of government during a nuclear security crisis or emergency.  Additionally, the exercise laid important groundwork for the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit.  At the Summit, national leaders will also be presented with a hypothetical scenario involving a nuclear security threat.

National Progress Report: Georgia

Since the Nuclear Security Summit of 2014, Georgia has successfully continued to reinforce the implementation of nuclear security, and has lent substantial support to the build-up of the global security architecture by accomplishing relevant tasks in the following areas:

Strengthening Nuclear and Radioactive Material Security

1.    Georgia takes active steps to bolster its nuclear security regime. New amendments to the Law “On Nuclear and Radiation Safety” - that also envelop security tasks - were elaborated and adopted. These amendments consider the implementation of a new reform – namely, the Department for Nuclear and Radiation Safety under the Georgian Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources Protection was transferred to the Legal Entity of Public Law, The Agency of Nuclear and Radiation Safety (ANRS). The Regulatory Authority (RA) rights along with certain responsibilities to support the state’s nuclear security regime were also transferred from the Department to ANRS. This move increased RA’s effectiveness, independence, and efficiency to make decisions, including those related to nuclear security matters.

2.    As a part of the reform, the Department for Radioactive Waste Management was created under the ANRS. The Department was assigned a task of operating the radioactive waste centralized storage and disposal facilities to ensure the waste safety and security, including the disused radioactive sources, which reinforced the state system for control of radioactive waste A new Law “On Radioactive Waste” was adopted to put in place legal requirements for handling waste. The adopted legal instruments provide a clear distinction between the functions of the ANRS and the Department for Radioactive Waste Management

3.    The Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP) for the period of 2015-2019 was elaborated with the immediate support rendered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The plan was adopted by the Georgian government. The INSSP defines key activities that are essential for setting up a comprehensive nuclear security regime in the country, and for responsible Georgian state bodies to fulfill them. All those activities are divided into five functional areas with assigned objectives. The time table for the completion of each of those activities is fixed.

4.    Georgia had already formalized the Association Agreement with the European Union. According the Agreement’s Article 298, Paragraph “K” (Title VI Other Cooperation Polices), cooperation in the area of nuclear security may be pursued in accordance with the principles and standards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as well as relevant international treaties and conventions concluded within the framework of the IAEA and, where applicable, in compliance with the Euratom Treaty.

5.    The CSF security system – a special facility, where a number of Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources (DSRS) is stored (including recovered DSRS found as orphan radioactive sources) - was upgraded based on the program support provided by the U.S. Department of Energy own National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Radiological Security.

6.    The security system for radioactive waste disposal site was upgraded with the support of the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change and that of IAEA.

7.    The security entrance checkpoint at the Applied Research Center of the Institute of Physics was upgraded with the support of the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority.

8.    Georgia has established and currently operates the special inventory for the sources of ionization radiation and associated facilities. The inventory contains detailed information on any activities related to the source, including the tracking history, inspection and enforcement data. Moreover, the legal requirements are established to provide the inventory sustainability.

9.    Georgia had adopted the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Threat Reduction Strategy along with the action plan for its implementation (CBRN NAP) for the period of 2015-2019. The plan includes the activities in R&N fields, including those related to nuclear security, and citations of timeframes and responsible agencies.

10. The training for Georgian specialists in the field of nuclear and radioactive materials transportation security was provided with the U.S. support.

11. The Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA) operates training centers (a police academy, a border police training center, an emergency management training center) for human resources development in CBRN, border security, counter-smuggling, emergency response, management, and other spheres related to the nuclear security of the state. These centers primarily serve the MoIA personnel.

12. The new law “On Radioactive Waste” sets requirements for elaboration of the radioactive waste management strategy for a 15-year period and an action plan for its practical implementation. The strategy and the action plan also envelop handling with DSRS and accounting for the tasks of physical protection. The elaboration of the documents has commenced in collaboration with the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority. The working plan and working groups have already been established for this purpose.

13. Georgia has made significant efforts to improve its regulatory framework to also encase nuclear security issues. A new regulation for physical protection is currently being elaborated. The licensee is obliged to set forth and implement the physical protection plan. The requirements for inspection and enforcement activities have already been elaborated and implemented.

Comment: The implementation of the INSSP and related plans are directed to establish all 12 elements of a state nuclear security regime. Additional support is welcome, especially for the aim of developing a nuclear forensic capability.

Minimizing Nuclear and Other Radioactive Materials

1.    Georgia operated only one nuclear research reactor, which was shut down in 1989. The spent and fresh fuel was exported from Georgia in mid-1990s. The decommissioning of the reactor and its auxiliary systems is ongoing. The last nuclear installation known as the “Breeder-1” was situated in the Institute of Physics. The installation, containing 1833 grams of the 36%-enriched Uranium and the Pu-Be radioactive source, was used for the neutron-activation analysis. Due to some technical reasons, the installation became non-operable. Georgia fully complies with the existing international standards and requirements for non-proliferation and for safeguarding the nuclear security regime. Therefore, according to the statement of The Hague Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué, the decision was made to repatriate the nuclear fuel to the country of origin. The plan for decommissioning the installation and for the repatriation activities was developed in close collaboration with IAEA and U.S. experts. The plan was reviewed and adopted by the Georgian Regulatory Authority.. All operations, including the HEU repatriation were supported by the RRRFR program. As a result, Georgia is no longer in possession of a significant amount of HEU.

2.    Georgia applies a respective strategy to fully minimize the number of DSRS and unused nuclear materials that do not require additional resources for safe storage and physical protection. Every license applicant must demonstrate and guarantee that all radioactive sources imported by him will be repatriated to the country of their origin following their respective utilization. The requirement are set forth for reducing a number of DSRS and using the existing resources more effectively to provide physical protection of the already existent DSRS.

Countering Nuclear Smuggling

1.    In a formal letter addressed to the IAEA Director General, Georgia expressed its full support for the principles laid out by the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. In reality, Georgia conducts a stricter control compared to the existing standards, and the utilization as well as the exports and imports of all five categories of radioactive sources are subject to strict authorization.

2.    In cooperation with the EC, the Nuclear Forensics Laboratory in the Crime Forensics Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was provided a modernized equipment to conduct nuclear forensic investigations. This activity represents a yet another step towards attaining the highest standards in nuclear forensics and the starting point for launching effective worldwide communication with nuclear material libraries.

3.    To enhance the process of control over military and dual use commodities - and in addition to the law “On Control of Military and Dual Use Commodities” - the Government of Georgia issued special decrees in 2014 that define the list of military and dual use commodities and control measures.

4.    Georgia conducts a robust control over the export and import of nuclear and radioactive materials. The control system includes:

• Legal issues pertaining to the export and import of all five categories of sources that require the issuance of special permits;
• Technical issues pertaining to the movement of nuclear and radioactive materials through Georgian borders controlled by special portable radiation monitors and hand detectors;
• Administrative issues pertaining to special response actions through which responsible state bodies are defined for the alert cases on the borders.

To enhance Georgia’s border control, the Ministry of Internal Affairs has elaborated a 5- year Program for Modernization, Standardization and Unification of Georgian Border Police, which was adopted upon the Ministerial Order 404 on 8 June 2015. To improve the intelligence-led planning in the Border Management, a Concept of the Unified System of Analysis on Risks and Threats on the State Border of Georgia was approved by the Ministerial Order 92 on 31 January 2015.

5.    To increase the response effectiveness against the illegal movement of nuclear and radioactive materials, the legal act titled “The Procedure for Responding to the Illegal Trafficking of Nuclear and Radioactive Substances” was adopted.

6.    Sweden is committed for further work in the area reducing the risk or likelihood of smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials in the years come. Sweden plans to organize a conference in Tbilisi, Georgia together with partners of Georgia, USA and Poland for states of the wider Black Sea region on implementationof Nuclear Security Summit’s commitments and objectives

7.    In 2015 and 2016, two cases of illegal turnover of radioactive sources (Cesium-135 and Cesium-137) were detected. In total 8 people were held liable.

Supporting Multilateral Instruments

1.    Georgia supports the existing global nuclear security regime by implementing its requirements at the national level and demonstrating its commitment to the international legal instruments: Georgia is a party to the Convention on Physical Protection (CPPNM), its amendment (CPPNME) and Convention for Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT). The country is a signatory to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and fully implements UN Security Resolution 1540. Georgia is a non-nuclear weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The country actively participates in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT).

2. The Tbilisi Regional Secretariat of the EU CBRN Risk Mitigation Centers of Excellence (CoE) Initiative uniting 9 states – namely, Albania, Armenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia and Ukraine - has been successfully functioning since 2013. The secretariat was established through joint efforts by the Georgian Government, the EU Joint Research Centre (JRC) and the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) and is hosted by the MoIA Academy.

3. The Georgian Government, together with the Governments of Philippines and Morocco, initiated the establishment of the UN Group of Friends on the CBRN Risk Mitigation and Security Governance. The first meeting of the GoF, chaired by Georgia’s Permanent Representative, was held at the UN headquarters on 8 December 2015 and was attended by the representatives of 27 UN member states. 

4. Georgia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has officially addressed the Japanese Government for country’s membership in the G-7 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

Comment: According to INSSP, the following activities are planned for multilateral instruments:

• Accession to the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (ASSIST)
• Signing up to the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the IAEA (P&I)
• Joining and adhering to the obligations of States Parties in the 2005 Protocol to the 1988 SUA Convention 

Collaboration with International Organizations

1. Georgia obtains IAEA assistance in various fields related to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and contributes to several technical meetings by providing expertise for the drafting of the IAEA nuclear security series and other related documents.

2.     Georgia carries on its cooperation with the IAEA through implementing a national Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP), which functions as a roadmap for achieving the highest level of state nuclear security.

3.     Georgia actively cooperates with the IAEA ITDB (Illicit Trafficking Data Base) office by exchanging the relevant information. Cooperation with this international mechanism for global information flow helps Georgian authorities analyze more effectively the trends in worldwide nuclear smuggling. This, by itself, retains great importance for the relevant state agencies as they plan and execute counter-smuggling activities. The ANRS, acting as a focal point for the IAEA ITDB, cooperates with the state law enforcement agencies in this regard.

4.     The ANRS acts as a National Competent Authority (NCA) for the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and provides the IAEA through the USIE system notifications information on nuclear incidents, and also has access to the information provided by other countries. The established information exchange helps maintain confidence among the countries and define possible risks and support from other countries.

5.     The IAEA conventional exercises are conducted on a regular basis within the frames of the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident. These exercises enhance the capabilities of the Georgian team to respond and harmonize its activity with international experts.

6.     The IAEA provides through various projects support to Georgia in developing its national framework for nuclear and radiation safety and security. The technical collaboration is based on the Country Program Framework (CPF), which was officially adopted for the period of 2015-2019. Such support is usually provided through a) the knowledge and experience sharing; b) equipment supply; c) experts support; and d) elaboration and implementation of programs and activity plans.

7.     Georgia actively collaborates with the IAEA-supported International Network for Nuclear Security Training and Support Centers (NSSC) to define the needs and goals for trainings in the field of nuclear security.

8.     Georgia is an active user of the IAEA Nuclear Security Information Portal (NUSEC). This information sharing system helps Georgia systemize the information pertinent to its nuclear security regime as well as identify ways for effective implementation of the requirements for Nuclear Security Integrated Management System (NUSIMS).

9.     Georgia conducted the installation of several radiation portal monitors as a first step of collaboration with the EU in the field of nuclear security. The EU also provided nuclear forensic equipment to MoIA’s own criminalistics laboratory. The EU, through the initiation of the Center of Excellence, supports the regional activity aimed at strengthening the CBRN first response capabilities and regional cooperation in South East Europe, Southern Caucasus, Moldova and Ukraine. Another EU project to upgrade research capabilities to support the nuclear security regime is underway. 

Partnering with external Stakeholders

1.     Based on the support provided by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Georgia created and sustained the inventory of the sources of ionization radiation and related activities. The RIS computer program is used for this purpose.

2.     Georgia actively implements tasks and projects detailed in the Joint Document of U.S. and Georgian Delegations on Georgia’s Priority Needs to Improve Its Capabilities to Combat Nuclear Smuggling formalized on 2 February 2007 and amended in 2009. Various projects related to the agreement, which was funded by the U.S. DoE, the U.S. DoD, the U.S. DoS, US DTRA, EU and UK. These include strengthening Georgia’s nuclear RA (RA has been provided with equipment, vehicles, communication and office commodities); increasing patrols of green borders; supporting Georgian border police aviation; equipping mobile radiation detection patrols; sponsoring international cooperation in nuclear forensics; developing a joint maritime coordination center; and supporting maritime patrols of the coast guard.

3.     The implemented agreement between the U.S. Department of Energy (DoE) and the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources on cooperation to enhance the security of Georgia’s radioactive sources was signed in September 2011. Under this agreement, Georgia continues cooperation with the U.S. Department of Energy to enhance the security level and physical protection infrastructure for high-activity radiation sources. By the implemented agreement, nearly all disused high activity radiation sources have been consolidated and transported to the CSF, and the latter’s physical protection system was upgraded. The upgraded system was also installed on relevant other facilities. The installed equipment is covered by a long-term – namely, a three year-long - U.S. DoE warranty that includes maintenance.

4.     Georgia collaborates with the U.S. Department of State’s EXBS (Export Control and Border Security) program and receives assistance in human resource development and capacity building in this sphere. The EXBS program has initiated and funded a Joint Maritime Operations Center in located Supsa, western Georgia (Black Sea coast). The Center can, headed by the Border Police, hosts various agencies such as MFA, Customs, Patrol Police, MoIA’s Anti-Terrorist Center, and MOD. The purpose of the Center is to exchange intelligence information between the agencies to adequately address maritime threats and challenges.

5.     The U.S. DoE’s own NNSA supports training for the physical protection of personnel serving in the facilities with high-activity radiation sources and control of dual use commodities.

6.     The assistance provided by the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) encompasses various issues. The SSM supports participation of Georgian experts in a range of meetings. The SSM supported the regional office of Georgian RA, especially in terms of responding to illicit trafficking. The SSM participated in the upgrading of physical protection of the Applied Research Center of the Institute of Physics. The most recent important contribution by the SSM was its support thrown behind the elaboration of the national strategy for radioactive waste management, including the related security issues, for the next 15-year period.

Joint Statement of the United States of America and the Kingdom of the Netherlands on the Scenario Based Policy Discussion Apex Gold

On January 28, 2016, the Department of Energy of the United States and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands jointly hosted Apex Gold, a Scenario-Based Policy Discussion (SBPD) on nuclear security, at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California, USA.

Apex Gold fostered international dialogue and cooperation through interactive discussion to resolve a fictional, transnational nuclear terrorism threat involving highly enriched uranium.  This event built upon the successful SBPD at the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit (NSS). 

Delegations from 37 NSS countries and 4 observing International Organizations – the European Union, the International Atomic Energy Agency, INTERPOL, and the United Nations – participated in a robust discussion dealing with policy and technical issues related to threat assessment, nuclear materials security and detection, nuclear forensics, and emergency preparedness and response.

The fictional scenario featured an evolving crisis requiring urgent senior-level Government decision-making in order to address an international threat with implications for interagency and international coordination, leading to the following key takeaways:

1.      In a nuclear security emergency, leaders will need to prioritize prevention, protection, and prosecution, in that order.

2.      In a nuclear security emergency, the ability to swiftly and effectively cooperate with international partners to identify and respond to threats is essential; in addition to urgently needed national and international technical capabilities, relationships and trust are “capacities” that must also be developed in advance of a crisis through frequent engagement, including exercises such as Apex Gold.

3.      In a nuclear security emergency, leaders would face relentless demands for information from many stakeholders, including senior leadership, other government agencies, other nations, the media, and the public. Meeting this challenge requires advance planning and coordination. It is inevitable that the time for decisions by government leaders will outpace the availability of reliable information and analysis. In addition, decisions about how to inform the public about the threat may present significant challenges.

4.      Leaders must support and advance the international legal framework that serves as the foundation for nuclear security commitments, including ratification and entry-into-force of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials.

5.      Exercising regularly at national, regional, and international levels will generate cumulative improvements and foster the interagency and international coordination that would be essential to responding successfully in a nuclear security emergency.

The United States and the Netherlands would welcome future scenario-based policy discussions involving different levels of responsibility and across multiple communities that would be affected by a nuclear or radiological event.  International cooperation will continue to be essential to meeting the global nuclear security and proliferation challenge so long as weapons-useable fissile materials exist.  

Joint Statement on EU-US HEU Exchange

Joint Statement on the Exchange of Highly Enriched Uranium Needed for Supply of European Research Reactors and Isotope Production Facilities

Meeting in Washington, DC in the United States of America, on the margins of the fourth Nuclear Security Summit, the Department of Energy / National Nuclear Security Administration of the United States of America (DOE/NNSA) and the Euratom Supply Agency (ESA), supported by the European Commission, hereinafter "the Participants", in consultation with the Member States of the European Atomic Energy Community ("Euratom") concerned, reaffirm their endeavors to working together to minimize the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) for civilian purposes, where technically and economically feasible.

The Participants note that HEU currently remains important for a variety of peaceful scientific applications and for the production of critical medical isotopes, while at the same time HEU constitutes a significant security risk in the hands of unauthorized actors.  Hence, the Participants encourage conversion of European research reactors and isotope production industries to non-HEU-based fuel and targets, where technically and economically feasible.  At the same time they acknowledge that, in some facilities, HEU is still indispensable during the transition period to conduct peaceful scientific research or to produce medical radioisotopes used for radiopharmaceutical products.

In light of the 2012 Belgium-France-Netherlands-United States Joint Statement “Minimization of HEU and the Reliable Supply of Medical Radioisotopes,” the Participants, fully sharing the objective of the progressive overall minimization of the use of HEU in civil applications, acknowledged that a significant amount of excess and unirradiated HEU exists in Europe as a result of past activities.  Hence, they signed, in December 2014, a "Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration of the United States of America and the Euratom Supply Agency concerning the exchange of highly enriched uranium needed for supply of European research reactors and isotope production facilities" outlining the principles of an “exchange” going forward, in order to achieve a better overall balance of HEU quantities related to such civilian use in Europe.

The Participants, in cooperation with the Euratom Member States concerned, committed that, in exchange for HEU supplied from the United States to research reactors and isotope production facilities in Euratom Member States, Euratom Member States would transfer unirradiated, excess HEU to the United States for peaceful uses, including for downblending and fabrication into low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, or would recycle and down-blend excess HEU to LEU in Euratom Member State facilities.  Transfers would be conducted subject to applicable domestic laws of the respective participants.  The quantities of this excess material are to be overall greater than the total quantity of HEU that eligible facilities in Euratom Member States expect to receive from the United States in the future for civilian activities.

The Participants salute the progress achieved jointly by all the countries involved in this effort.  Indeed, sufficient quantities of excess HEU have been identified and proposed for the exchange to meet this goal.

The United Kingdom, France, and other European partners have taken important steps to identify excess HEU that they plan to ship to the United States over the next two years – one of the largest such efforts of its type.  This exchange is intended to help ensure that even after additional exports of HEU are sent from the United States to Europe for the production of medical isotopes and other societal benefits, net HEU reduction will be achieved. 

The Participants share a common view on the logistical and economic challenges that will still have to be met.  They trust that, in cooperation with the Euratom Member States concerned, this exchange, as an element of the HEU minimization policy, will advance the goal of global nuclear security.

Joint Statement on the Contributions of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) to Enhancing Nuclear Security

Since 2006, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) has grown into a partnership of 86 nations and 5 official observers committed to strengthening global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism.  The GICNT continues to make valuable contributions to nuclear security, and has held nearly 80 multilateral activities that have demonstrated the GICNT’s unique ability to bring together policy, technical, and operational experts to share models and best practices and enhance partners’ capabilities to address difficult and emerging nuclear security challenges.  We, the Co-Chairs of the GICNT (Russia and the United States), the past and present Implementation and Assessment Group (IAG) Coordinators (Spain, the Republic of Korea, and the Netherlands), leaders of the three IAG Working Groups (Morocco, Finland and Australia), and the Special Advisor to the IAG Coordinator for planning the GICNT’s Tenth Anniversary Event in 2016 (United Kingdom), wish to inform the states in attendance at the 2016 U.S. Nuclear Security Summit, as well as states who are members of other international organizations and initiatives with nuclear security-related mandates, on progress made by the GICNT since the Nuclear Security Summit hosted by the Netherlands in The Hague in March 2014.

Over 200 representatives of GICNT partner nations and representatives from all five GICNT official observers – the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the European Union (EU), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) – participated in the ninth GICNT Plenary Meeting, hosted by Finland in Helsinki on June 16-17, 2015.  The Plenary selected the United States and Russia to continue as Co-Chairs of the GICNT for the term 2015-2019 and endorsed the Netherlands to serve a two year term as IAG Coordinator.  The Netherlands announced the continuation of Australia and Morocco as Nuclear Forensics and Response and Mitigation Working Group chairs, Finland as the next Nuclear Detection Working Group chair, and the United Kingdom as Special Advisor to the IAG Coordinator for planning the GICNT’s Tenth Anniversary Event in 2016.  Plenary participants also recognized the Republic of Korea for its leadership as IAG Coordinator. In this capacity, the Republic of Korea played a critical role in implementing the GICNT strategy announced at the 2013 Plenary Meeting in Mexico City, which called for an increase in practical, topically- and regionally-focused activities.

The Nuclear Security Summits in Washington (2010), Seoul (2012), and The Hague (2014) recognized the GICNT’s contributions to advancing global nuclear security. GICNT activities and the partners that supported them have produced many valuable outcomes that have complemented the Nuclear Security Summit process and positioned the GICNT to continue to play an important role in strengthening the global nuclear security architecture.

The Implementation and Assessment Group held three IAG Meetings that advanced the GICNT strategy by reviewing and approving Working Group documents, planning future activities, enabling event hosts to present key outcomes and lessons learned, and promoting a policy-level dialogue on key nuclear security issues.

At the annual IAG Meeting hosted by the Republic of Korea in July 2014, partners discussed the GICNT’s Statement of Principles and developed proposed topics and themes for incorporation into the GICNT’s strategic planning to build upon past work and address new or continuing nuclear security challenges. Partners’ feedback contributed significantly to the development of the GICNT strategy for 2015-2017, and identified potential new focus areas, such as addressing challenges related to sustainability of expertise and promoting the exchange of best practices on legal and regulatory frameworks, for further consideration.

Morocco hosted a Mid-Year IAG Meeting in February 2015, where each Working Group held simultaneous sessions to finalize guidance documents, plan future activities, and discuss working group plans for 2015-2017.  Partners also participated in the “Atlas Lion” tabletop exercise, which explored the interfaces across the three working groups from a higher-level policy perspective and identified the critical priorities that participants assessed their senior leaders would have in a real-world nuclear security incident.  Senior leaders at the 2015 Plenary Meeting later discussed key outcomes from “Atlas Lion,” underscoring the GICNT’s unique ability to serve as a platform for cross-disciplinary exchanges among groups of experts in different fields and highlighting the value of cooperation among these different groups.  

Finland hosted an IAG Meeting in June 2015 before the Plenary Meeting, where all five of the GICNT’s official observers briefed their programs of work and available assistance.  The outgoing IAG Coordinator from the Republic of Korea also made several important recommendations based on partners’ feedback from the July 2014 IAG Meeting that were endorsed by partners, including maintaining the GICNT’s three Working Groups; continuing cross-disciplinary work; developing thematic series of activities that increase in complexity to strategically build partnership capacity; and enhancing the utility of the Global Initiative Information Portal (GIIP).  These themes, as well as recommendations for the GICNT to organize additional activities that promote regional cooperation and develop activities that focus on key fundamentals of exercise design, implementation, and self-assessment, are key components of the GICNT’s strategy for 2015-2017.

The Nuclear Detection Working Group (NDWG) completed its Developing a Nuclear Detection Architecture series, which focuses on addressing challenges inherent to successful implementation and enhancement of national nuclear detection architectures.  The United States organized a workshop in April 2014 to complete the final technical review of Volume IV, Guidelines for Detection Within a State’s Interior, the final best practices guide in the series. Volume IV identifies challenges and mitigating strategies for building detection capabilities in the interior and provides options to mitigate those challenges by utilizing both technical and non-technical capabilities.  The 2015 Plenary Meeting endorsed Volume IV as an official GICNT product.

The NDWG also developed the “Exercise Playbook” – a collection of realistic scenarios that illustrates key nuclear detection challenges.  The “Exercise Playbook” is now available on the GIIP as a tool for helping partners to organize national-level exercises to promote practical implementation of nuclear detection best practices.  The “Exercise Playbook” will also be utilized for developing future NDWG activities and may be further refined and updated over time to meet partners’ evolving priorities and integrate other key nuclear security issues.
  
Finland hosted the nuclear detection workshop and tabletop exercise,  “Northern Lights,” in January 2015 to focus on the integration of traditional law enforcement techniques and radiation detection capabilities toward investigating illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials.  “Northern Lights” highlighted the importance of a coordinated, whole-of-government effort to detect and respond to illicit trafficking activities involving nuclear or other radioactive materials and promoted the practical implementation of best practices outlined in Guidelines for Detection Within a State’s Interior.

In May 2015, the European Commission hosted “Radiant City,” which featured a tabletop exercise and a series of hands-on demonstrations by the Joint Research Centre, Institute for Transuranium Elements, focusing on nuclear detection capabilities, radiological crime scene management, and traditional forensic and nuclear forensic laboratory analysis.  “Radiant City” built upon the successful outcomes of “Northern Lights” by bringing together the nuclear detection and nuclear forensics communities to identify strategies for how their respective expertise and capabilities could be leveraged in support of an ongoing law enforcement investigation into stolen nuclear or radioactive materials.

The Nuclear Forensics Working Group (NFWG) completed Exchanging Nuclear Forensics Information: Benefits, Challenges and Resources, a GICNT best practices document that aims to increase awareness of the benefits and challenges of exchanging nuclear forensics information associated with a nuclear security event and identifies potential mechanisms for enabling information exchange.  Lithuania hosted a nuclear forensics workshop in April 2014 to review this document, and it was subsequently endorsed at the June 2015 Plenary Meeting as an official GICNT product.  The GICNT is continuing efforts on the topic of exchanging information through the May 2016 event on International Communication and Assistance Requests in Sydney, Australia. The three-day workshop and exercise will be complemented by an IAG meeting hosted by Australia the same week.

In October 2014, Hungary hosted the workshop and tabletop exercise, “Csodaszarvas: Mystic Deer,” which engaged participants on nuclear forensics policy-level considerations and decisions related to national-level authorities, such as interagency coordination, roles and responsibilities, communication, and domestic information sharing during the investigation of a nuclear security incident.  The event showcased and promoted the practical application of core capabilities outlined in the GICNT document, Nuclear Forensics Fundamentals for Policy Makers and Decision Makers.

The Netherlands hosted the International Conference and Mock Trial on Nuclear Forensics, “Glowing Tulip,” in March 2015 to address the role of nuclear forensics experts in the investigation and prosecution of nuclear security events, the admissibility of nuclear forensics expert evidence into judicial proceedings, and the importance of pre-incident coordination and communication among scientific, law enforcement, and prosecutorial elements.

The Response and Mitigation Working Group (RMWG) completed Fundamentals for Establishing and Maintaining a Nuclear Security Response Framework: A GICNT Best Practice Guide, which provides a strategic-level reference and key considerations for the development of a national response framework for preparing to respond to and mitigate the impacts of a radiological or nuclear terrorism incident.  An RMWG workshop hosted by France in April 2014 played a key role in reviewing the document, which was endorsed as an official GICNT product at the 2015 Plenary Meeting.

Argentina and Chile co-hosted the Radiological Emergency Management Exercise, “Paihuen,” in August 2014, which demonstrated national-level plans and capabilities for responding to radiological security incidents and coordinating bilaterally to address shared threats.  In addition, the exercise promoted interagency communication and coordination of best practices and demonstrated key policies and procedures for sharing information among agencies and with regional and international partners, appropriate international organizations, and the public.  

In April 2015, the Philippines hosted the Public Messaging for Emergency Management Workshop, “Sugong Bagani: Envoy Warrior,” which identified and promoted mechanisms for improving capabilities to develop and disseminate public messaging during nuclear security events, particularly concerning the need to ensure messaging consistency, effectively convey technical information, issue life-saving directions, and manage and assess public risk perception.

In November 2015, the United Kingdom hosted the Workshop and Exercise, “Blue Raven,” to uplift models for national coordination of response and crisis management resources following a nuclear security event.  This workshop focused on good practices for supporting senior leadership decision-making, ensuring common operational information, and effective coordination between local responders and national authorities.  Blue Raven was the first workshop in a series focusing on national response frameworks, and will be followed by workshops addressing international considerations and other key aspects for developing sustainable national response frameworks.

In February 2016, the United Arab Emirates hosted the Nuclear Detection and Response Exercise “Falcon.”  This 3-day workshop and tabletop exercise focused on key aspects of nuclear detection and response intended to promote and enhance interagency national coordination, regional cooperation, and information sharing.  Building on the recommendations made at the 2015 Plenary Meeting, this exercise promoted key fundamentals of exercise design, implementation, and self-assessment, and identified and promoted a regional approach to addressing key nuclear security challenges.  

Looking forward, the GICNT leadership remains committed to working with GICNT partner nations to develop and implement practical activities, such as experts meetings, workshops, exercises, and senior-level policy dialogues, that promote capacity-building across the areas of nuclear detection, forensics, and response and mitigation and to explore potential new areas of work that would benefit from GICNT focus.  The GICNT leadership also remains fully committed to working with its five official observers to ensure that GICNT activities continue to complement and support their programs of work.

As the GICNT celebrates its 10th Anniversary since being launched by the United States and Russia in 2006, the Netherlands has agreed to host a High Level Anniversary Meeting in The Hague (Netherlands) on 15-16 June 2016. The aim is to provide a retrospective view, demonstrating the unique contributions of the GICNT to nuclear security since 2006, while also facilitating a forward-looking view and discussion, identifying nuclear security challenges over the next decade (2016-2026), and the actions GICNT may take to address these challenges. 

Joint Statement on U.S.-Japan Cooperation

US-Japan Joint Statement on Nuclear Security Cooperation

Recalling President Obama and Prime Minister Abe’s pledge at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague, Netherlands:

Today in Washington, D.C., on the occasion of the fourth Nuclear Security Summit (NSS), Prime Minister Abe and President Obama announced that Japan and the United States have completed the removal of all highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium fuels from the Fast Critical Assembly (FCA) in Japan. This project was accomplished on an accelerated timeline well ahead of schedule, thanks to the hard work and strong cooperation from both sides.  This effort represents the realization of a commitment first announced at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague and reiterated during Prime Minister Abe’s April 2015 visit to Washington, D.C.  It furthers our mutual goal of minimizing stocks of HEU and separated plutonium worldwide, which will help prevent unauthorized actors, criminals, or terrorists from acquiring such materials.  The United States will downblend the HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU) for use in civilian activities and convert the plutonium into a less sensitive form for final disposition.

Today our two countries further demonstrate our determination to make contributions to the efforts to minimize stocks of HEU worldwide by announcing our pledge to work together to remove all HEU fuels from the Kyoto University Critical Assembly (KUCA) to the United States for downblend and permanent threat reduction.  This removal will be made possible by the conversion of KUCA from HEU to LEU fuels, when technically and economically feasible. KUCA will continue to serve its important missions in relevant research and human resource development, with fuels that will no longer present a risk of theft and use by nuclear terrorists.

The removal of HEU and plutonium fuels from the FCA and our pledge to convert KUCA are part of the ongoing activities of the U.S.-Japan Nuclear Security Working Group (NSWG).  Under the NSWG, we have taken a layered approach to nuclear security that involves reducing quantities of sensitive nuclear material, reducing the risk of unauthorized access to nuclear material, strengthening emergency preparedness, and improving nuclear forensics capabilities.  The United States and Japan are also sharing and will continue to share best practices on a possible framework for an integrated national response to incidents of nuclear and radioactive materials found out of regulatory control.

The NSWG further facilitates bilateral cooperation on a range of issues including nuclear security training, the physical protection of nuclear material, safeguards, and transportation security. The United States especially applauds the indispensable role which the Japan Atomic Energy Agency’s Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security (ISCN) is playing in the capacity building of personnel from other countries, particularly those from Asian countries, and expects ISCN to continue to serve as a leading Center of Excellence in this area.  

In order to further strengthen cooperative efforts on preventing nuclear terrorism, and to continue to address Nuclear Security Summit goals, both sides have commenced negotiations on a framework to enable the exchange of classified information in the area of nuclear security, with the shared intention of reaching an agreement shortly.  Japan and the United States will continue our NSWG under the U.S.-Japan Bilateral Commission on Civil Nuclear Cooperation, maintaining its leadership role in strengthening global nuclear security.     

Statement by the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction

We, the Partners of the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (the Global Partnership), supporting the goals and commitments of the Nuclear Security Summits, express our intention to continue our efforts aimed at developing and implementing projects to prevent non-state actors from acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD); and coordinating projects, including project resources, between and among partners and relevant international organizations.

One of the main focus areas of the Global Partnership is strengthening nuclear and radiological security and preventing non-state actors from acquiring these materials, notably through providing a valuable platform for building partnerships, coordination and cooperation on nuclear security programs and activities.  Within the framework of the Global Partnership, both single-donor and jointly funded projects are implemented in countries requesting assistance with nuclear or radiological security. 

We seek opportunities for cooperation with countries that are not participants in this multilateral initiative and express interest in joint work to implement the commitments made by the leaders who attended at the Nuclear Security Summits, notably the Action Plan in support of the Global Partnership.

Since 2014, the Partners of the Global Partnership have contributed more than €47 million to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Fund (NSF) to support the IAEA's central role in the global nuclear security framework in addition to other bilateral and multilateral contributions to enhance nuclear security in a number of thematic areas.  We welcome the continuation of such support, not least because the important projects implemented within the framework of the Fund are carried out only by voluntary contributions.  In meeting our mandate to implement the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540, we intend to coordinate our work with the 1540 Committee of the United Nations Security Council to match requests with offers of international assistance.

We also provide assistance to promote the prompt universalization and implementation of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; assist states to join such international agreements as the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism; and encourage states to make a commitment to the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.

U.S.-China Joint Statement on Nuclear Security Cooperation

1.  Today in Washington, D.C., on the occasion of the fourth Nuclear Security Summit (NSS), we, the United States and China, declare our commitment to working together to foster a peaceful and stable international environment by reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism and striving for a more inclusive, coordinated, sustainable and robust global nuclear security architecture for the common benefit and security of all.

2.  The United States and China, in this regard, are announcing the successful completion of the inaugural round of bilateral discussions on nuclear security that took place on February 20, 2016, in Stockholm, Sweden. We plan to continue this dialogue on an annual basis, so as to intensify our cooperation to prevent nuclear terrorism and continue advancing Nuclear Security Summit goals.

3.  We further demonstrate today our conviction that strong communication and cooperation are essential to nuclear security by committing to continue strong support for the work of relevant international agencies on nuclear security, in accordance with their respective mandates, through engagement of our experts as well as financial and in-kind contributions.

4.  Together we continue to collaborate on key areas of nuclear security. In particular, we recognize significant accomplishments and ongoing engagement in the following areas:

5.  On conversion of Miniature Neutron Source Reactors (MNSR) from highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, the United States and China express satisfaction on the recent LEU start-up of the prototype MNSR reactor near Beijing, China. Building on this successful collaboration, China commits to work with the United States to convert its remaining MNSR reactors at Shenzhen University. Further, the United States and China together commit to work through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to support the conversion of MNSR reactors in Ghana and Nigeria as soon as possible. China reaffirms its readiness, upon the request of respective countries, to convert all remaining Chinese-origin MNSRs worldwide.

6.  On nuclear security training and best practices, the United States and China express satisfaction on the successful completion and official opening of the nuclear security Center of Excellence (COE) in Beijing, China on 18 March, 2016. The COE is a world-class venue to meet China's domestic nuclear security training requirements, as well as a forum for bilateral and regional best practice exchanges, and a venue for demonstrating advanced technologies related to nuclear security. The United States and China commit to continued engagement on nuclear security training and best practices to maximize the use and effectiveness of the COE. China further commits to sponsor training programs at the COE for regional partners and other international participants to further global nuclear security awareness and engagement.

7.  On counter nuclear smuggling, the United States and China state our enduring commitment to prevent terrorists, criminals, or other unauthorized actors from acquiring nuclear or other radioactive materials. Recognizing the need for strengthened international cooperation to counter nuclear smuggling, we will continue to seek opportunities to deepen our joint efforts to investigate nuclear and radioactive material smuggling networks; detect, recover and secure material out of regulatory control; and successfully arrest and prosecute the criminals involved. The United States and China will continue to coordinate efforts to strengthen counter nuclear smuggling capabilities and share best practices with the international community, taking full advantage of the training programs sponsored by the China Customs Training Center for Radiation Detection. We further commit to continuing a discussion in 2016 on counter nuclear smuggling where our two countries can exchange views on the nuclear smuggling threat, effective tools to counter this threat, and how our governments could strengthen collaboration in this area.

8.  On the security of radioactive sources, the United States and China express satisfaction on the fruitful cooperation between the two sides in enhancing the security of radioactive sources, in particular regarding recovery of disused sources and transport security of radioactive sources. We commit to further strengthen cooperation in this regard, and facilitate the sharing of experiences and best practices with other countries.

9.  The United States and China also express satisfaction on the recent signature of the Statement of Intent on Commodity Identification Training Cooperation between the General Administration of Customs of China and the Department of Energy of the United States.

10.  The United States and China express their strong commitment to addressing the evolving nuclear security challenge through continuing activities sustained efforts after the current Nuclear Security Summit process concludes.

中国在核安全领域的进展报告

中国在核安全领域的进展报告

自2014年3月召开第三届核安全峰会以来，中国以习近平主席提出的理性、协调、并进的核安全观为指导，全面推进核安全工作，切实落实峰会成果，不断完善国家核安全体系，致力于加强国际核安全体系，并在国家核安全示范中心建设和运营、强化核材料及放射性材料管理、打击核材料非法贩运、提升核应急水平、加强涉核网络安全、建立辐射环境监测体系等方面取得重要进展。

一、完善国家核安全体系

各国对本国的核材料及核设施安全负有首要责任。中国致力于完善国家核安全体系，提高核安全能力，培育核安全文化。

（一）加强核安全顶层设计。2014年4月，中国将核安全纳入国家总体安全体系，明确了对核安全的战略定位。全国人大分别于2015年7月、2015年12月通过《国家安全法》和《反恐怖主义法》，从法律层面明确将核安全列为维护国家安全、反对恐怖主义的重要方面，并规定了具体的核安全任务和措施。《原子能法》、《核安全法》立法工作稳步推进，目前已列入全国人大立法计划。

（二）完善核安全法规标准。研究编制《核安保条例》，目前已上报国务院；颁布实施《核材料管制视察管理办法》、《核材料管制报告管理办法》、《核材料登记管理办法》等规范性文件；修订《核电厂核事故应急管理条例》。

（三）加强核安全能力建设。重点针对核设施、核材料、放射源安全及核材料出口管制、打击非法贩运等领域，加强基础设施和硬件设备建设，提高执法人员水平，提升从业人员核安全意识，推动核工业界采纳国际原子能机构相关导则和规范。建设核安全监管技术研发基地，加强核安全监管技术能力。

（四）培育核安全文化。2014年9月，中国环境保护部、国家能源局、国家原子能机构联合发布《核安全文化政策声明》，面向全行业、全社会倡导加强核安全文化。积极开展核安全文化专项宣传活动，逐步建立长效评估机制。

二、加强国际核安全体系

中国致力于构建公平、合作、共赢的国际核安全体系，为核能安全地造福人类提供强有力、可持续的制度保障。

（一）加强核安全国际法律文书

中国已批准《核材料实物保护公约》及其修订案，批准了《制止核恐怖主义行为国际公约》，一贯忠实履行所承担的国际法律义务，积极推动加强有关公约的普遍性和有效性。中国严格执行联合国安理会第1373号、第1540号、第1887号等反恐、防扩散决议，继续支持联合国大会通过核安全相关决议。

（二）支持国际原子能机构工作

中国支持国际原子能机构在核安全国际合作中发挥核心作用，并从政治、技术和资金等方面，为国际原子能机构提供全方位支持。

中国与国际原子能机构在核材料安保、放射源监管、核与辐射应急响应等领域积极开展合作，推荐专家参加国际原子能机构核安全文件制定，与国际原子能机构一道在中国举办核安全培训班，2014年至2015年累计培训国内外从业人员400余人次。中国并加入了国际原子能机构核应急与响应救援国际网络。

中国支持国际原子能机构开展核安全国际实物保护咨询服务。中国于2015年9月正式邀请国际原子能机构对中国在国家层面和设施层面开展国际实物保护咨询服务，相关项目于2016年正式进入实施阶段。中国并已邀请国际原子能机构于2016年对中国开展核与辐射安全监管综合评估后续行动。

中国持续向国际原子能机构核安全基金捐款，用于支持中国和亚洲地区其他国家的核安全能力建设。截至2015年底，中国已向该基金累计捐款115万美元。中国将积极考虑增加每年捐款数额，并继续捐赠中国研发的核安全设备。

（三）积极参与国际交流与合作

除国际原子能机构外，中国欢迎其他相关组织和机制根据各自授权，在核安全领域发挥重要作用，并加强相互间的协调和互补。中国深入参与联合国安理会1540委员会工作，于2014年10月接待该委员会代表团进行首次国家访问，并于2015年9月举办执行安理会第1540号决议亚太地区联络点培训班。中国还积极参与“打击核恐怖主义全球倡议”、国际刑警组织、东盟地区论坛、亚欧会议等框架下的核安全会议和演练活动。

中国高度重视国家间的核安全政策交流与务实合作。2015年9月，习近平主席与美国总统奥巴马同意建立两国核安全年度对话机制。双方于2016年2月20日在瑞典斯德哥尔摩举行了首次对话，进一步深化了两国在国际核安全事务中的协调与合作。中国还同俄罗斯、法国、英国、印度、韩国、巴基斯坦等国家，就核安全问题保持磋商和交流。

中国欢迎核安全峰会成员国提出的核安全自愿性倡议，将正式加入“加强核安全举措落实”、“加强全球核安全的持续行动”等倡议。

 三、建设和运营核安全示范中心

 中国与美国合作建设的中国国家核安全示范中心于2015年12月提前建设完工，并于2016年3月正式投入运行。示范中心集成国内外成熟先进的技术和仪器设备，包括展示培训楼、分析实验楼、环境实验楼、模拟核材料库、核材料衡算模拟设施、响应力量培训与演练设施、室外实物保护测试场以及国内外一流的培训教学设施及国际交流配套设施，涵盖核安全、核保障监督、核材料管制、实物保护等多个领域，具备人员培训、技术研发、国际交流、测试与认证等功能。该示范中心是亚太地区乃至全球规模最大、设备最全、设施最先进的核安全交流与培训中心。

 中国将积极落实习近平主席在第三届核安全峰会上的承诺，以该中心为平台，与其他国家及国际原子能机构等国际组织开展交流与合作，为提升中国及亚太、全球核安全水平做出贡献。

四、加强高浓铀安全

中国重视高浓铀安全，支持在技术和经济可行的情况下，最大限度减少高浓铀的使用。2015年9月，中国原子能科学研究院高浓铀研究堆卸出高浓铀堆芯；2016年3月，中国原子能科学研究院完成了高浓铀研究堆的低浓化改造工作。加纳高浓铀研究堆改造项目进展顺利。2014年9月，中国与加纳签署了《关于为研究堆协助供应低浓铀的协定》，项目正式进入实施阶段。2015年12月，中美签署相关商务合同，加纳研究堆低浓铀燃料元件开始加工。

中国愿本着自愿、务实的原则，与相关国家协商改造自中国进口的高浓铀研究堆，并与国际社会分享高浓铀研究堆低浓化改造技术经验。

 五、强化放射源管理

 中国支持在严格管理、确保安全的前提下，促进放射源在民用领域的应用，着力提升国内放射源安全水平。中国严格执行放射源安全管理标准，全方位涵盖放射源生产、销售、运输、使用、收贮等环节；全面推进中国各城市放射性废物库安保升级，完成《城市放射性废物库安全防范系统要求》，与美国开展放射源安保方面的合作；完成了1.5万多家放射源利用单位的安全检查，妥善处置了废旧放射源；加强放射源安全能力建设，积极开展人员培训和安保实战演练；推进放射源安保技术研发，开展高风险移动放射源跟踪系统、辐照装置安保技防措施等研究设计工作。

六、打击核材料非法贩运

    中国将打击核材料非法贩运视为防止核恐怖主义的重要环节，一贯高度重视防扩散出口管制工作。中国不断加强国家开放口岸防范核材料及其他放射性材料非法贩运基础建设，已在全国重要的海港、空港、公路及铁路口岸配备各类辐射探测设备1000余台；加强重点大型港口辐射探测覆盖面，在上海洋山港和天津东疆保税港区即将对进出口集装箱实现100%辐射探测；提高一线执法人员能力，利用中美合作建设的中国海关辐射探测培训中心，已成功举办辐射探测培训、出口管制商品识别培训班45期，培训国内外学员达1280名，海关兼职教师30余名；参照核供应国集团最新管制清单，及时修订并严格落实核及核两用品出口管制清单，于2016年1月1日起正式执行最新《核出口管制清单》；与美国、俄罗斯等就防范核材料及其他放射性物质非法贩运签署合作文件，并于2015年10月与俄罗斯成功举行中俄边境防范核材料及其他放射性物质非法贩运联合演习。

 七、提升核应急水平

中国已建立了较为完整的核应急法律法规和标准体系，不断完善核应急预案和协调机制，加强核应急能力建设，强化与公众沟通和交流，积极开展核应急演练，着力建设国家核应急技术支持队伍和救援力量，正在组建一支320人的核应急救援队伍。2015年6月，中国组织开展代号为“神盾-2015”的国家核应急联合演习，参演规模达2900人，并接待法国、巴基斯坦及国际原子能机构等代表观摩演习。2016年1月，中国发布了《中国的核应急》白皮书，全面介绍了中国核应急工作方针、取得成就和未来展望。

    八、加强涉核网络安全

中国高度重视涉核网络安全，不断加强相关立法工作，加强工业控制系统信息安全和互联网行业网络安全管理，提高行业信息安全和网络安全保障能力。明确工业控制系统网络安全管理要求，探索安全风险发布机制；加强网络基础设施和业务系统安全防护，定期开展风险评估；提升突发网络安全事件应急响应能力，组织开展网络安全应急演练；提高公共互联网网络攻击防范能力，强化网络数据保护。

九、建立辐射环境监测体系

    中国建立了比较完善的国家辐射环境监测网，开展辐射环境质量监测、国家重点监管的核设施监督性监测及事故应急监测。各省也建立了省级辐射环境监测网。国家辐射环境监测网包括辐射环境空气自动监测站和陆地、水体、海洋生物、土壤、电磁辐射共计1400个质量监测点位，所有监测数据向公众公开。

第四届核安全峰会将于2016年3月31日至4月1日在美国华盛顿举行，中方愿与各方一道，推动本届峰会取得成功。峰会进程结束后，中方将一如既往地深入参与国际核安全进程，致力于强化国际核安全体系，为提高全球核安全水平、实现共同核安全做出贡献。

2014 Progress Report Sweden

2014 Progress Report Sweden

Joint Statement on UNSCR 1540

Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540