National Progress Report: Germany

Germany, like many other long-term users of peaceful energy applications, had already achieved a high level of nuclear security well before the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit. This report concentrates on activities since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit. Germany has continued to enhance nuclear security implementation and has contributed to strengthening the global nuclear security architecture. The following actions, developments and initiatives are to be highlighted:

Strengthening Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Security

• The evaluation of the national nuclear security regulatory framework is an ongoing process involving all relevant authorities. Since 2010 many regulations have been adjusted or rewritten. Design Basis Threats (DBTs) and subsequent regulations for facilities, nuclear material transports and computer security are either in place and are being regularly evaluated or are in the final stage of development.
• Nuclear security measures, including transport security measures, are being designed and implemented in accordance with the 2005 CPPNM Amendment and INFCIRC/225/Rev.5. In order to implement EU Council Directive 2003/122/Euratom, which demands strict control of each “High Activity Sealed Source” from manufacturing to the final disposal, a central register has been established at national level which ensures the comprehensive traceability of these sources and their whereabouts at any time.
• Aiming at strengthening the security regime for other radioactive material, comprehensive guidelines are being developed, taking into account the IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 11 (Implementing Guide – “Security of radioactive Sources” and further recommendations). The guidelines include a graded approach based on the potential risk of other radioactive material and define requirements and measures for each security level. A first draft version of the guidelines is expected to be ready at the end of 2016.
• Germany has co-signed Gift Baskets on the Security of Radioactive Sources at the Nuclear Security Summits in 2014 and 2016. Against this background, Germany will host an International Workshop in September 2016 in order to discuss whether the Code of Conduct for Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (CoC) is adequate for the designated purposes.
• With regard to the human dimension Germany has incorporated the interfaces man -technology – organization into its safety and security regulations. The regulatory framework for the professional training of technical personnel in nuclear power plants has been adapted accordingly. In addition, it has been updated to cover nuclear power plants in a post-operational phase. At the same time training and education for personnel in nuclear facilities increasingly follows an integrated approach to assure nuclear safety and security in equal measure.

Minimizing Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials

• In close cooperation with international partners Germany continues its efforts to develop high-density LEU fuel with high flux properties as part of its endeavours to minimize the use of HEU in research reactors where technically and economically feasible. The Federal Ministry of Education and Research is currently funding a project for the development of a lower-enriched fuel element for the German research reactor FRM II.
• Germany, France and Belgium, supported by the European Commission and in close cooperation with their US counterparts, continue to work together within the HERACLES consortium, focusing on testing and developing a U-Mo dispersion fuel.
• Germany continues to explore ways and means of ensuring the timely return of all spent nuclear fuel of foreign origin from German research reactors based on HEU to the country of origin.
• As part of the Nuclear Security Summit process, Germany has pledged to eliminate excess nuclear material from its inventories. In early 2016, a significant amount of excess plutonium and HEU was successfully removed from Germany and transferred to the United States.

Countering Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and Radiological Material

International aspects:

• Germany has taken part in the international sharing of information on the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials through its participation in the IAEA ITDB, IAEA, NUSEC, ITWG and GICNT IAG.
• The German Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) closely cooperates with partners in the framework of Interpol’s CBRNE Programme. In addition, the BKA participates in the CBRN Working Group of the European Explosive Ordnance Disposal Network.

National aspects:

• Since 2011, the Federal Customs Administration has more than doubled the number of mobile radiation measurement devices. The new highly sensitive radiation gauges enable customs authorities to conduct customs controls more efficiently.
• In 2012, a special CBRN incident reporting scheme for police and customs was implemented on national level. This improved the information flow on CBRN incidents between federal and state authorities. It serves as an important tool for the BKA to assess the CBRN-related situation in Germany in a timely and concise manner and to produce its own periodical national CBRN crime situation report.
• Finally, at federal level a CBRN information platform was established in 2014 to enable all relevant federal ministries and agencies to exchange information swiftly in the event of serious CBRN-related crime and possible CBRN terrorism threats in Germany.

Supporting Multilateral Instruments

• Germany ratified the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM on 21 October 2010 and supported international efforts to reach the quorum for its entry into force. To that end, Germany financed IAEA-organized regional workshops in Europe, South America and Africa to facilitate interested states’ ratification processes. In the framework of Germany’s G7 Presidency in 2015, Germany organized a diplomatic demarche campaign reaching out to about 30 countries which had not yet ratified the Amendment.

Collaborating with International Organizations, Initiatives and Governments

• Germany considers the leading role of the IAEA in developing international standards and guidance on nuclear security to be extremely important. Therefore Germany actively supports IAEA security-related activities such as the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee, the Consultancy and Technical Meeting, IPPAS missions, IAEA training courses and the Train-the-Trainer programme not only financially but also by seconding national experts and contributing to the drafting and revising of IAEA Nuclear Security Series documents.
• Since 2011 Germany has donated around five million euros to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund and more than 6.5 million euros for the ECAS project to modernize the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory in Seibersdorf, Austria. Nuclear Security Fund projects supported by Germany included securing orphan and disused radioactive sources, setting up a global inventory of radioactive sources, monitoring the import and export of radioactive materials to and from Libya and establishing a postgraduate curriculum in nuclear security.
• Germany has committed to work with the IAEA and its member states on the safety and security of high activity radioactive sources and to establish a roadmap of actions and cooperation in the following areas:
  • Further strengthening and expanding support for the international framework of conventions and IAEA guidelines relevant to the safety and security of high activity radioactive sources throughout their life cycle;
  • Supporting the development and use of alternatives to high activity radioactive sources;
  • Enhancing the efforts of the Ad hoc Group of States that are Major Suppliers of Radioactive Sources to further strengthen and harmonize supplier state activities to improve the safety and security of high risk radioactive sources.
• Germany actively supports the IAEA in enhancing the Nuclear Security Series by providing nuclear security guidance on computer security, particularly at the recommendations level. In addition, Germany intensively exchanges knowledge and experience regarding the German DBT and guidelines on computer security with other states in bilateral meetings.
• Germany held the 2015 G7 Presidency and thus chaired the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GPWG) – the largest G7 expert group, which currently includes 30 active members– from June 2014 until the end of 2015. The GPWG includes a sub-working group on Nuclear and Radiological Security (NRSWG), which provides a forum for GP members and international organizations to coordinate their assistance in this field. Germany hosted and chaired three meetings of the NRSWG with a focus on the Global Partnership Action Plan, to be adopted at the Nuclear Security Summit, on the coordination of assistance in response to individual requests as well as on the improvement of coordination mechanisms and procedures in emergency situations.
• Germany is a founding member of the GICNT and attended all GICNT Plenary Meetings, the last one being held in 2015 in Helsinki. Furthermore, German experts took part in table-top exercises and workshops organized in the framework of GICNT, the most recent being a workshop of the GICNT Response Management Working Group which included a practical exercise in November 2015 and a joint International Maritime Transport Security Exercise which was conducted by Spain and Morocco in cooperation with the IAEA in October 2015.
• Germany has extended its efforts in bi- and multilateral cooperation with respect to nuclear security of nuclear facilities, computer security and nuclear material transports. In this regard Germany will continue to host meetings and regional workshops for sharing information and good practices regarding, inter alia, threat assessment, Design Based Threats (DBT), legal frameworks, technical countermeasures against e.g. sabotage scenarios during transport, as well as protection against intentional airplane crashes.

Partnering with External Stakeholders

• Germany remains fully committed to implementing the obligations deriving from UNSCR 1540. It continues to encourage, and, where appropriate and feasible, to assist other states in implementing UNSCR 1540. Moreover, Germany initiated the “Wiesbaden Process” in 2011 to improve cooperation between government and industry, one of the central aims in UNSCR 1540 implementation. Since 2012, Germany has hosted four industry outreach conferences in Wiesbaden, each focusing on different key aspects of government-industry relations in export control and non-proliferation. Last year’s conference took stock of the outcomes that have been achieved so far and tried to identify future trends and challenges. The final report of the conference will be published as a UN Security Council document. It contains concrete recommendations on how to further strengthen the partnership between governments and industry as well as how to best adapt to regulatory requirements from an industrial point of view. In addition, the final report shall be presented as a contribution to the 2016 comprehensive review of Resolution 1540. Germany is proud to have initiated an effective implementation mechanism in the framework of UNSCR 1540 and stands ready to further intensify its commitment.

National Progress Report: Hungary

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS), Hungary has strengthened nuclear security implementation and contributed to the global nuclear security regime by accomplishments in the following areas:  

1.      Sustainable implementation of the fundamental principles of nuclear security and meeting the intent of recommendations contained in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series

• The internationally accepted basis of physical protection in Hungary is represented by the Law-Decree 8 of 1987, which promulgated the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) approved by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1979 and by the Act LXII of 2008, which promulgated the Amendment to the Convention signed on 8 July 2005 in a diplomatic conference organized by the IAEA.
• The Hungarian nuclear security regulatory framework was revised between 2008 and 2011, in full compliance with the IAEA recommendations and guidance. The conduct of the National Threat Assessment and the determination of Design Basis Threats (DBTs), and the subsequent regulatory procedures of licensing and inspection of the newly established physical protection plans of nuclear facilities, nuclear and other radioactive material license holders were completed by the end of 2012. The DBTs are updated on an annual basis.
• At the request of the Government of Hungary, a full scope International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission started on the 27th of May 2013 to review the physical protection systems of nuclear and radioactive materials and associated activities and facilities in Hungary. The IPPAS team concluded that the physical protection systems at the visited sites have been significantly enhanced in line with the IAEA recommendations and guidance.
• As a contribution to global level confidence building and transparency, Hungary made the National Review part of the 2013 IPPAS report publicly available.
• Hungary has been providing experts in the field of nuclear security to support IAEA IPPAS missions as IPPAS team members/team leaders. Additionally, Hungarian experts actively participate in IAEA technical and consultancy meetings for the development of the guidance and recommendations provided by the IAEA Nuclear Security Series documents.
• In order to implement the suggestions and recommendations of the IPPAS mission team, a national Action Plan has been launched for the period up until 2017. A follow-up IAEA IPPAS mission has already been requested by the government of Hungary for the year of 2017.
• Hungary will increase self-assessment activities to identify gaps in the security culture on all levels of nuclear security.
• Hungary will further develop its domestic training capabilities in nuclear security and seeks to contribute to regional and international training courses organized by the IAEA.

2.      Strengthening Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Security

• Hungary supports both the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the IAEA Guidance on Export and Import. The import and export-related provisions of the Code and the Guidance are implemented in the national legislation, typically as binding regulations.
• Hungary is also implementing the provisions of the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT).
• Hungary has revised the safety requirements of radioactive materials and introduced new requirements for the end-of-life management of high activity sealed sources in 2015 calling for the tacking back guarantee from the producers as a condition for licensing.
• Replacing high activity sealed sources in medical use to non-radioactive technology is in progress (teletherapy Co-60 sources will be out of use in the coming years).
• Hungary participated in the workshop on NSS’ Gift Basket “Enhancing Radiological Security” (Oslo, 18-19 January 2016.)
• The regulatory tasks of safety, security and safeguards of nuclear and other radioactive materials were integrated into the competency of the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority (HAEA) in 2015. The HAEA intends to increase the synergy between the safety, security and safeguards to achieve a more effective regulatory overview of these materials.
• Hungary will participate actively in multinational programs to sustain the improved level of security of its high category radioactive sources.

3.      Minimizing Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials

• In 2013, Hungary completed the repatriation of all research reactor fuel containing highly enriched uranium (HEU) to the Russian Federation with the support of the US Government through the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) project. The expertise gained from the project was shared with other States planning similar exercise through IAEA support activities in 2015.
• Hungary will take every effort to reduce the use of high activity radioactive sources in medical applications by linear accelerator technology to the technically and economically feasible extent.
• Hungary will facilitate the final deposition of unused nuclear and other radioactive materials by establishing the necessary policies and economical support.

4.      Countering Nuclear Smuggling

• Hungarian experts actively participate in the work of the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG). The twentieth annual meeting of ITWG was hosted by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Center for Energy Research in June 2015, Budapest.
• Under the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) a Nuclear Forensics Working Group Workshop and Tabletop Exercise “Csodaszarvas: Mystic Deer” was hosted by the Government of Hungary in Budapest, on October 14-16 2014. The workshop and exercise showcased key concepts contained in the GICNT document, Nuclear Forensics Fundamentals for Policy Makers and Decision Makers, and will promote participants’ practical application of the fundamental capabilities outlined therein.
• The regulation for the national response measures regarding nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control has been revised in 2015. A new governmental decree 490/2015. (XII. 30.) on the actions to be performed in connection with missing, found and seized nuclear and other radioactive material and related information” is in force since 1st of January 2016. The new regulation is in line with the IAEA recommendation NS-15 and related guidance.

5.      Collaborating with International Organizations

• Cooperation is ongoing between the IAEA Office of Nuclear Security and the HAEA in the field of nuclear security for organizing regional training activities, fostering research and development, implementation of advanced techniques and procedures and exchange of information related to the security of nuclear and other radioactive materials and facilities in Hungary. In the framework of the cooperation, several IAEA regional events have been organized including:
  • "Regional Workshop on Nuclear Security Culture in Practice”, from 18 to 20 February, 2014;
  • "Regional Training Course on Protective and Preventive Measures against Sabotage”, from 23 to 27 June, 2014
  • "Regional Training Course on a Practical Introduction to Nuclear Forensics” from 11 to 15 August 2014;
  • "Subregional Meeting to Familiarize Member States in Eastern Europe and Central Asia with the Nuclear Security Information Management System”  from 4 to 7 November 2014.
  • Hungary participates in the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) programme, where HAEA serves as national Point of Contact for ITDB. Representatives of HAEA participate at regular ITDB meetings.
• HAEA is a member of the European Nuclear Security Regulators Association (ENSRA) since 2010. By representing the chairmanship of ENSRA in 2015, Hungary continued to promote the information exchange regarding Physical Security of Nuclear Power Plants and Nuclear Material, sharing experience in ‘Best Practice’ in order to maintain High Standards of security among ENSRA members.

6.      Domestic and regional training activities

• Hungary has been participating in the activities of the IAEA Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres Network (NSTSC Network).
• Hungary started to establish a Nuclear Security Support Centre (NSSC) on the basis of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre for Energy Research (HAS CER) in 2012, which started its activity in 2014. The IAEA and HAS CER already signed a cooperation agreement in 2012 in order to support the IAEA in developing guidelines and organizing trainings in the field of nuclear forensics. The Óbuda University was invited to contribute to the training activities within the national NSSC. HAEA supports the development of training materials by this university to be used by the national NSSC and training will be offered to nuclear security staff of facility operators and material holders.
• Hungary will continue to welcome fellowship students and host scientific visits in the topic of nuclear security and physical protection.

7.      Information security and cyber security measures concerning nuclear facilities

• Hungary signed the Multinational Statement on Nuclear Information Security during the 2014 summit.
• Hungary has developed a comprehensive, systematic and graded approach for the classification of any type of sensitive national information and the management thereof in line with the consequences of the disclosure thereof.
• In 2014, new requirements were introduced into the domestic regulation concerning the programmable systems of nuclear facilities. As a result, the design base threats of the facilities have been revised including cyber threats in 2015.
• A “National Cyber Security Workshop” was organized for the Hungarian facilities in June 2014 with 30 participants.
• Based on the IAEA recommendations and guidance, Hungary has prepared a national guideline, entitled „Protection of programmable systems and components in nuclear facilities”.
• HAEA has established a dedicated group of experts to deal with the regulatory overview of the protection of programmable systems associated with the use of atomic energy.
• Hungary will assess the establishment of information sharing network of information security incidents.

National Progress Report: India

India’s National Progress Report
2016 Nuclear Security Summit

India looks at nuclear technology and nuclear materials primarily as a resource for meeting a part of its requirements for electricity. It considers nuclear power as safe, reliable, affordable and environmentally friendly and is engaged in developing nuclear technologies for deployment. Continuous evolution of the framework for governance of nuclear power including that for nuclear security has been given equal importance.  Nuclear industry and research centres in India have internalized security practices in their day-to-day working and have created a strong security culture in their respective organizations. In tune with the security requirements as perceived by India, the nuclear security architecture in the country has been strengthened and India has also participated in strengthening security architecture at the global level. Considering that it is the last nuclear summit in the current format, a consolidated report on nuclear security is presented here.

1.    International Legal Instruments: India is party to all the 13 universal instruments accepted as benchmarks for a State’s commitments to combat international terrorism. India is party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) and has ratified its 2005 amendment. India looks forward to its early entry into force. India is also party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. India supports efforts for promoting the universality of these two conventions.

2.    National Legal and Implementation Framework: The Indian Atomic Energy Act, 1962 provides the legal framework for all aspects related to development of nuclear and radiation technologies including their security. Rules and guidelines issued under this Act include those related to export controls, which are continuously updated, and include controls on export of related technologies. Guidelines have also been issued to ensure that companies manufacturing nuclear equipment based on any imported technology handle the technology with due sensitivity. India’s export controls list and guidelines have been harmonized with those of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and India looks forward to strengthening its contribution to shared non-proliferation objectives through membership of the export controls regimes. In 2005, India enacted the Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems Act, 2005. This gives effect, inter alia, to India's obligations under the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1540.

Institutionally, the security of nuclear and radiological material in India is ensured through robust oversight by India’s Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), which deploys a large pool of highly trained and specialised manpower for this purpose.  IAEA’s peer review mechanisms like the Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) have acknowledged the strength of AERB’s regulatory practices and capabilities.  At the same time, steps are being taken to convert the de facto independence of AERB into de jure autonomy through a Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority (NSRA), for which a bill is being finalised for introduction in the Indian Parliament. The draft bill has appropriate provisions related to national implementation of nuclear security. The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 was amended in 2012 to include offences within the scope of, and as defined in several treaties including CPPNM.  The National Investigation Agency (NIA) Act, 2008 establishes a central agency, the NIA, which acts as the central counter terrorism law enforcement agency. The schedule of this Act has reference to the Atomic Energy Act, the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act and the Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act.

The Nuclear Controls and Planning Wing set up in the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) in 2013 has taken robust strides towards implementation of India’s commitment related to nuclear safeguards, export controls and nuclear safety and security.  Other agencies housed in the DAE and having a role in nuclear security include a Crisis Management Group (CMG) and a Computer Information & Security Advisory Group (CISAG). At the national level, the National Disaster Management Agency (NDMA), an agency with manpower trained to respond to emergencies including radiological emergencies, has been set up through an Act of Parliament. 

3.    Setting up of an Inter-ministerial Counter Nuclear Smuggling Team: To devise a coordinated multi-agency approach to deal with the threat of individuals or group of individuals acquiring nuclear or radioactive material for malicious purposes, India has set up at the national level an institutional mechanism called a Counter Nuclear Smuggling Team. The team has representation from concerned Ministries/ Departments/ Agencies and meets frequently. It also conducts table top exercises for effective and coordinated response to threats involving use of nuclear and radioactive material for malicious purposes. 

4.    Nuclear Material: The use of Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) instead of High Enriched Uranium (HEU) to preclude the threat from the misuse of HEU is one of the aims of the global nuclear security community. The only reactor in India using HEU has been shut down and the planned replacement reactor will not use HEU.  India is setting up a facility for the production of medical grade Mo-99 by the uranium fission route using LEU targets. This will be used for the manufacture of Mo-99/Tc-99m generator for use in hospitals. The LEU targets will be made in India and irradiated in an indigenous research reactor. 

Pursuit of a closed fuel cycle and the manner in which India goes about it further ensures security of nuclear materials. India is strictly observing the principle of “reprocess to reuse” whereby reprocessing of the spent fuel and commissioning of fast reactors are being synchronized to preclude any build-up of a plutonium stockpile.  Cs-137, a useful isotope, is being recovered from the high level waste arising from reprocessing spent fuel from thermal reactors.  This is helping to meet the demand of radioisotopes for various applications.  India has submitted proposals in the NSS process on the technology dimension of nuclear security.

5.    Security of Radiation Sources and Facilities: India’s regulatory agency, the AERB, has instituted very robust regulatory mechanisms to ensure safety and security of radiation sources from ‘cradle to grave’. AERB has published two Guides on: (i) Security of Radioactive Sources and radiation Facilities (AER/RF-RS/RG1) and (ii) Security of Radioactive Material during transport (AERB/NRF-TS/SG-10).  In addition, AERB has developed a database of radiation sources utilized in the country and recently instituted a very successful e-LORA (e-licensing of Radiation Applications) platform for complete automation and   facilitate end-to-end licensing of facilities using radiation sources. Security of high activity sources during their transport are ensured by implementing elaborate security plan including continuous and real time tracking. AERB is also regularly conducting awareness programmes for various stakeholders/ law enforcement agencies for security of radiation sources throughout the country.

6.    SNM Detection Architecture: A network of 23 Emergency Response Centres, spread across India has been developed for detecting and responding to any nuclear or radiological emergency, anywhere in the country. All major sea ports and airports of the country are being equipped with radiation portals & detection equipment to monitor all vehicular, passenger and cargo traffic.

7.    Cyber Security: Addressing the growing challenges of threats to computer, network and information systems is a national priority. Utilizing the extensive expertise available in the country, a hierarchy of on-site Cyber security architecture has been deployed and also a number of sophisticated products and services like secure network access system (SNAS) have been developed and deployed for protection of the cyber infrastructure in the country.

8.    Strengthening International Cooperation: India had announced setting up of a Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership (GCNEP) during the NSS 2010 held in Washington D.C. The uniqueness of GCNEP rests on its holistic vision of nuclear energy through its five schools on (i) advanced nuclear energy systems, (ii) nuclear security, (iii) radiological safety, (iv) nuclear material characterization, and (v) applications of radioisotopes and radiation technologies, each specializing in an area that promotes an overarching vision of safe, secure and sustainable nuclear energy for global good. GCNEP has inked MOUs with IAEA, U.S.A., France, Russia and U.K.  For more than five years now, GCNEP has been steadily strengthening its portfolio of programmes and has conducted more than 30 international and regional programmes involving more than 300 participants from around 30 countries. Important and emerging nuclear security topics like insider threat, vulnerability assessment, transportation security, cyber security, detection, prevention and response to radiological threats etc. have been covered in these programmes. 

International cooperation also includes cooperation at the level of NGOs and a recent example includes a conference on India’s Role in Global Nuclear Governance organized during 24-26 February 2016 jointly by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) and Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). Earlier, a workshop on technical aspects of civilian nuclear security was held jointly with the U.S. National Academy of Sciences by the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru on October 29-31, 2012.

9.    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): India has consistently supported the IAEA’s central role in facilitating national efforts and fostering effective international cooperation to further strengthen nuclear security. Indian experts have been participating in various bodies established by the IAEA to draft and review documents related to nuclear security. India has supported the fifth revision of the document on nuclear security recommendations, INFCIRC/225, and included a reference to it in its nuclear cooperation agreements where applicable. India is a participant in the IAEA’s Incident & Trafficking Database (ITDB) and has voluntarily adopted the provisions of the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. 

IAEA has carried out review of Indian Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors under the “Operational Safety Review Teams” (OSART) mission. Additionally IAEA has conducted the “Integrated Regulatory Review Service” (IRRS) review of India's regulatory agency, the AERB. India will propose a workshop on IAEA’s International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) with the Agency experts during the year 2016.
India participated at the Ministerial level in the International Conference on Nuclear Security organized by the IAEA in 2013 and plans to participate at the appropriate level in 2016 as well. India also participated in the December 2012 Fukushima Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety. 

India contributed $ 1 million to IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund in 2013 and proposes to contribute a similar amount in 2016 as well. In addition, India made a voluntary contribution of US$ 100,000 in 2015 for the modernization of IAEA’s nuclear applications laboratories in Seibersdorf, Austria under the ReNuAL project.  

10.    United Nations and other Mechanisms: India fully supports the implementation of UNSC Council Resolution 1540, its extension resolution 1977, and the United Nations Global Counter Terrorism Strategy. India hosted, along with the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, a 1540 Workshop on Building New Synergies on Nuclear security in New Delhi in 2012. India is a Party to the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and participates in all three working groups of the GICNT in the areas of Nuclear Detection, Nuclear Forensics, and Response and Mitigation. India has proposed to host a meeting of the working groups of the GICNT in India during 2017. India will join the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation circulated at the IAEA as INFCIRC/869.
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National Progress Report: Indonesia

Indonesia's commitment to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy - the three pillars of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty - is total and absolute. The best way to stop proliferation and to ensure that nuclear and radioactive materials are not diverted for terrorist act is by realizing the goal of a world free of nuclear weapon. Indonesia calls upon all nations to promote universal adoption and full implementation of multilateral treaties whose aim are to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

The progress made by Indonesia in the field of nuclear security, have been among others:

A.     Non-Proliferation and Disarmament related issues

1. In the Southeast Asia region, efforts to realize nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation continue. During its Chairmanship in ASEAN in 2011, Indonesia had facilitated the conclusion of the negotiations on the revised Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ) Protocol between ASEAN member states and Nuclear-Weapon States (NWS). This year Indonesia encourages the convening of consultations between ASEAN Member States and NWS with a view to the signing of the relevant instruments that enable NWS ratifying the Protocol of SEANWFZ.

2. Indonesia has ratified the Comprehensive-Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) by Law No 1 of 2012, and submitted its instrument of ratification to the United Nations Secretary General, as the depository of the Treaty, in February 2012. This is a significant step toward the global prohibition of nuclear-test explosions and through its ratification, Indonesia has called on the remaining Annex II countries to step out and start their own ratification process.

3. Since 2013 the Government has started the process of drawing up a draft law on nuclear security with the view to submit it to the parliament in 2016. The Government of Indonesia sees the importance to strengthen its national legislation which in turn can reinforce and complement existing law such as the Law No. 10 Year 1997 on Nuclear Energy. The law is expected to cover, inter alia, total prohibition of the use, possession and transfer of nuclear weapons; strengthening transfer control and nuclear and radioactive materials, and enhancing national nuclear security architecture.

4. Indonesia has acceded the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) by Law No 10 of 2014. The accession of ICSANT will strengthen the existing legislation regarding nuclear security, improve the legal framework and reinforce better national measures on nuclear security.

5. Indonesia has ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its amendment. Indonesia has ratified the CPPNM through Presidential Decree No 49 of 1986 and its amendment through Presidential Regulation No 46 of 2009.

B. Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and its relations with Nuclear Security

1. Indonesia has endorsed the implementation of the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources, supplementary to the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and has been incorporated through Indonesia National Single Window (INSW)

2. Indonesia has issued the Government Regulation No 54 of 2012 on the Safety and Security of Nuclear Installations and the Government Regulation No 2 of 2014 on Licensing of Nuclear Installations.

3. Indonesia continues to strengthen national coordination on the implementation of the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement with relevant stakeholders.

4. Indonesia recognizes the importance of developing strong co-operation in the Asia Pacific region to improve and strengthen the non-proliferation regime through the Asia Pacific Safeguard Network (APSN).

5. Indonesia has issued the Government Regulation No 58 of 2015 on Radiation safety and Security in transport of radioactive materials.

6. Indonesia continues to strengthen nuclear security legislation framework by initiating draft of Nuclear Security Law.

7. Indonesia has revised the National Design Basis Threat (DBT) in 2014. The DBT is reviewed regularly and the next revision of DBT will cover the security of radioactive sources.

8. Indonesia continues to strengthen the security of its radioactive sources at industrial and medical facilities. Indonesia will establish a national network on the security of radioactive sources.

9. Indonesia cooperates with the IAEA to strengthen the existing network of Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) in the key seaports. Indonesia plans to expand the monitoring program to selected border stations.

10. Indonesia has established a mobile expert support team (MEST) and developed a qualification program of related personnel in the detection and response to illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials.

11. Indonesia continues to develop an international action plan on nuclear security under the Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP). In addition, Indonesia continues to strengthen co-operation with other regulatory agencies in other countries on nuclear security.

12. Indonesia has declared the commencement of the Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) program to anticipate the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in 2015.

13. Indonesia has launched the Centre of Excellence on Nuclear Security and Emergency Preparedness (I-CoNSEP) in 2014 to contribute the development of nuclear security at national and regional level.

14. With the support of the IAEA and cooperation with various international partners, Indonesia has carried out self-assesment on nuclear security culture in accordance with implementation guidelines of the IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 7 to assess the implementation of nuclear security culture in all nuclear facilities.

15. Indonesia is currently implementing the Human Reliability Program (HRP) to ensure that all personnel who work at nuclear facilities meet the necessary requirements, especially with regard to nuclear security.

16. Indonesia, in cooperation with various international partners, has conducted performance test on physical protection system of nuclear facilities, which was aimed to ensure the effectiveness of nuclear security at those facilities.

17. Indonesia is now in the process of drafting guidelines of nuclear security culture tailored to national characteristics in order to foster the implementation of nuclear security culture.

18. Indonesia is committed to downblending HEU (High Enriched Uranium) to LEU (Low Enriched Uranium). At the time being, the licensing application of the aforementioned activity is under review process.

Other Initiatives

1. Indonesia has submitted the National Legislation Implementation Kit as house gift in the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit with the objective to help States with building blocks to develop Comprehensive national legislation in accordance with their own respective legal cultures and internal legal processes.

2. Indonesia has established and submitted Safeguards Implementation Kit in the APSN annual meeting in 2014. The objective of the legislation kit is to give good examples to the member states on the implementation on safeguards and additional protocol.

3. Indonesia has shared knowledge, among others, by sending its staff as lecturers or participants in expert missions (IPPAS and INSSP), participating in meetings (Member of AdSec), and has sent its staff as a cost-free expert in nuclear security (INSSP) to the IAEA.

4. Indonesia has recently welcome a IAEA mission related to nuclear security, which is a follow up IPPAS mission in 2014, to strengthen physical protection in nuclear installations and radiation facilities.

5. Indonesia has conducted and participated in meetings or workshops regarding Nuclear Security and Safeguards in 2015, such as:  

Trainings and Workshops

• Regulation Review on Security and Safeguard
• Regulation Review on Nuclear Emergency Preparedness
• Radioactive Source Security Officer
• Radioactive Source Security for Security Officer in BAPETEN
• Basic Training on Nuclear Security
• Training of Nuclear Security for Management Level
• Training of Nuclear Security and Emergency Preparedness
• Radioactive Source Security Inspector Simulation Training
• Regulations and Radiological Sabotage Training
• Safeguards by Design
• Search and Secure Training
• Nuclear Security Culture and Human Reliability Workshop
• Workshop on Security Culture for Senior Managers
• Workshop on Security Culture for Regulators
• IAEA Regional Training Course on Computer

Additional Activities

• Conducting National Safeguards Awareness Workshop, a collaboration with IAEA.
• Conducting National Roundtable on the Development of National Regulatory Guidance for Nuclear Security Culture (NSC), a collaboration with University of Georgia, USA, and supported by the IAEA and US Department of State Partnership for Nuclear Security (PNS)

. In cooperation with the IAEA and the Center for International Trade Security University of Georgia, establishing a Center for Security Culture and Assessment dedicated for nuclear security culture.

7. Indonesia is currently in the process of establishing Nuclear Cyber Security Specialization Doctoral Degree Programme incorporated within Computer Science Department of Mathematic and Natural Science Faculty in Gadjah Mada University.

8. Indonesia has installed seven RPM (Radiation Portal Monitor) in main harbours (Batam, Balawan, Makassar, Bitung, Tanjung Priuk, Tanjung Perak, and Semarang) to strengthen the nuclear security detection.

9. Indonesia has initiated the infrastructures in supporting the I-CoNSEP programme in creating regional center of exellence in nuclear security.

National Progress Report: INTERPOL

For the INTERPOL National Progress Report, click here.

National Progress Report: Italy

Italy is fully committed to strengthening nuclear security by reinforcing national measures and international cooperation along the lines agreed to in the Washington, Seoul and The Hague Communiqués and the Washington Workplan.

CONSOLIDATION OF THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

Italy is a founding member of the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and participates in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT).

In 2015, Italy ratified the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM), through Act n. 58/2015. The Act allocates specific responsibilities to competent authorities, and appoints the Ministry of Interior  as the National Authority for the active physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials, both in situ and during transportation. The Act is also inspired by the operational security model adopted before the ratification of the Amendment.

As to the Act of Ratification of the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), this has been recently approved by the first chamber of Parliament. It includes provisions to strengthen the security of radiation sources.   

Italy hosted the 2014 Gift Basket on Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres/Centres of Excellence (NSSC/CoE), which followed a 2012 Gift Basket sponsored by the United States. Both attracted a large number of co-sponsors (32 for the 2014 The Hague Gift Basket) highlighting the importance of these Centres in underpinning a strong and sustainable Global Nuclear Security Architecture. Striving toward implementation and sustainability, at the Washington Summit Italy willpresent a new and more focused 2016 Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres Gift Basket, which also takes on board the main outcomes of the High-Level Event organized in Bologna on “Nuclear Security Summit 2016 and beyond: the role of training and support centres and Centres of Excellence (CoE)”. The participants in this 2016 NSSC/CoE Gift Basket intend to support the following activities: strengthening of the IAEA NSSC Network; the establishment of regional networks to enhance regional coordination, promote best practices and share training experiences;  strengthening nuclear security training and technical support programmes; ensuring the sustainability of nuclear security training and support centres; enhancing cooperation with the IAEA, the United Nations, INTERPOL and GICNT and cooperation in the area of research and development with national and international institutes to promote scientific advancements in nuclear security.

STRENGTHENING THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

Italy is a major contributor to the IAEA regular Budget and actively supports the Agency through financial contributions to the Nuclear Security Fund and the Technical Cooperation Program. Italy also contributes to the IAEA activities related to the strengthening of the international nuclear security framework.

It actively participates in both the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee and the IAEA Nuclear Security and Support Centres (NSSC) Network. Moreover Italy is an active contributor to the drafting of the Nuclear Security Series.

Italy will attend the upcoming IAEA “International Conference on Nuclear Security: Commitments and Actions” which will take place in December  2016 including the ministerial segment.

NUCLEAR MATERIALS CONSOLIDATION AND MINIMIZATION

The Italian national inventory of special nuclear material currently consists of limited quantities of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and Plutonium stored in accordance with the CPPNM as amended. In an awareness of the importance of the timely removal and disposition of nuclear materials from facilities no longer using them, in accordance with the national programme for the decommissioning of existing nuclear plants, Italy has made significant efforts together with the United States to eliminate excess Highly Enriched Uranium and Plutonium. This cooperation resulted in the completion of three shipments in 2012, 2013 and 2014. Italy intends to carry forward its collaboration with the United States in order to remove the excess of HEU and Plutonium still present. In particular, Italy and the United States are jointly cooperating to implement technical activities on HEU material, preparatory to the development of other future repatriation projects.

Through these repatriations, Italy has contributed to the European HEU credits for the supply for research reactor needed for the production of medical radioisotopes and scientific research, in the framework of the Memorandum of Understanding agreed between the United States Department of Energy and the European Supply Agency.

The Italian national inventory has been further reduced with the shipment of Plutonium from the European Research Center located in the north of Italy.

In the framework of the abovementioned decommissioning process, in June and September 2015, the Ministry of the Interior carried out two successful multimodal transportations (road and train) of irradiated nuclear fuel from Northern Italy to France. These operations were facilitated by the well-established coordination between the central and local Authorities, before and during the transportation, in particular  with regard to the assessment of internal and international threats. The transfers were monitored by a dedicated “response task force” which followed the entire cycle of operations.

ENHANCING NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY CAPACITY

Nuclear security measures, including transport security measures, are implemented in accordance with the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM and INFCIRC 255/Rev.5, together with the relevant EU Directives and  in compliance with the IAEA Code of Conduct on Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. International transportations of national irradiated fuel and nuclear materials are currently carried out along the lines set out in the national programme for the decommissioning of nuclear installations.

Following the ratification of the 2005 Amendment to CPPNM, the Italian Administrations have envisaged a review of the Physical Protection Plans at different installations.

Italy has further improved the efficiency of the early warning radiation network which now includes more than 1200 stations throughout the national territory, 2 national centres and 16 regional centres. The network operates 24 hours a day and it has been tested during attack simulation exercises and cross-border emergencies. Italy is also working to develop a comprehensive emergency response system. The Firefighters Department has continued to carry out crisis management exercises, including those related to terrorist attacks with radiological materials.

ENHANCING EFFORTS IN COMBATING ILLICIT TRAFFICKING

In 2010 Italy and the U.S. signed a Memorandum of Understanding within the framework of the Megaports Initiative, to prevent the smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive materials through the global maritime system. Under a cost-sharing arrangement, the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration worked with the Italian Customs Agency to help secure cargo containers passing through several Italian ports. Since September 2013 the ports of Genoa and La Spezia have been equipped with mobile detection systems. Taking into consideration the key role played by Italian ports in the Mediterranean region, Italy’s participation in the Initiative is crucial to enhanced security in the area.

STRENGTHENING NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE

Since its G8 Presidency in 2009, Italy has paid special attention to education, training and institutional capacity-building as essential elements for an effective safety and security infrastructure. At the 2010 Washington Summit, Italy announced the creation of an International School on Nuclear Security with the IAEA and the International Centre for Theoretical Physics (ICTP) in Trieste. In 2016, the School is to hold its sixth annual training course. The School is highly regarded by the participants from both developing and emerging countries and is considered as a model for other Schools of Nuclear Security. Italy also worked closely with the IAEA and the ICTP for the realization of the pilot course of the new “School of Radiation Emergency Management” held in Trieste in September 2015.

Italy’s educational effort is further strengthened by Master’s courses offered by a number of Italian Universities. The Master’s Course on the “Protection against CBRN events”, organized at the University of Rome “Tor Vergata”, has gained an international status since the academic year 2014/2015, thanks to an agreement with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The original Course has been divided into two new Master’s Courses: a first-level course designed to train “CBRNe First Responders” and an advanced one for “Decision Makers CBRNe Advisors”. Both courses received the acknowledgment as “NATO Selected” and are held under agreements with several national governmental, scientific and academic institutions. The latest course started in March 2016.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ITALIAN NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY

In 2011 Italy decided to discontinue its nuclear energy programs. Nevertheless, Italy continues to maintain a strong commitment to nuclear safety and security. The Energy Strategy adopted in March 2013 acknowledged the important asset of high level expertise in nuclear technologies, including research reactors and R&D centres. Within the framework of this Strategy, national efforts are mainly devoted to decommissioning and management activities of radioactive waste and limited residual amounts of irradiated fuel and nuclear materials, including the preparatory activities of siting and construction of a national centralized repository for radioactive wastes.

The institutional framework on nuclear safety and radiation protection envisages the establishment of a regulatory authority, the National Inspectorate for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection (ISIN), responsible for nuclear safety, radiation and physical protection. 

National Progress Report: Israel

The Government of Israel praises the Government of the United States for convening the Washington Nuclear Security Summit. As the process of the Nuclear Security Summit comes full circle – from Washington 2010 to Washington 2016 – Israel believes that the commitments undertaken by the States that have participated in this initiative will further strengthen nuclear security and reduce the potential threat of nuclear terrorism worldwide, arising especially from non-state actors. Israel looks forward to the successful continuation and transition of this process based on the impressive outline reflected in the Action Plans and with the support of the IAEA and of States participating in the NSS.

Israel has in place a comprehensive nuclear security system for the protection of nuclear materials in storage and in use in its nuclear research centers, as well as radiological materials used in R&D, medicine, industry and other sectors. Advanced physical protection measures, human reliability programs, cyber security and material accounting and control in accordance with high international norms, form part of the system. Israel also maintains close cooperation with bilateral and international partners in this regard.

As part of its commitment to global nuclear security, Israel has ratified, in 2012, the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) and signed the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT).

Over the two years that have elapsed since The Hague Nuclear Security Summit, Israel has taken the following actions, among others, to strengthen nuclear security:

• Conducted (May 2014) a joint workshop with the United States on Human Reliability and Countering Insider Threats.
• Joined (August 2014) the IAEA Response and Assistance Network (RANET) and put its assets at the disposal of states facing a nuclear or radiological emergency as well as participating in periodic response exercises by the IAEA Incident and Emergency Center (IEC).
• Conducted (November 2014) a large-scale exercise ("Bright Sands") simulating a terrorist attack on a nuclear research reactor. The exercise was attended by a team of international observers, including from regional states and the IAEA.
• Launched phase II of the Soreq Applied Research Accelerator Facility (SARAF), an innovative accelerator which will replace an HEU-fueled research reactor (IRR-1).
• Established a national nuclear forensics laboratory at the Soreq Nuclear Research Center (SNRC) to enhance its nuclear forensics capabilities.
• Took an active part in the IAEA Nuclear Security Guidance Committee (NSGC).
• Participated in various exercises, workshops and activities by the IAEA, GICNT and the ITWG.
• Took part (January 2016) in Apex Gold exercise organized by the US.
• Launched a process to contribute 14 detector systems for the use of the IAEA's Division of Nuclear Security and Member States.
• Final draft of national procedure regarding combating and intervention in the case of Nuclear Terrorism event was distributed by the Counter Terrorism Bureau in the National Security Council. 
• Has joined the following gift basket initiatives:
  • Joint statement on the full and universal implementation of the United National Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540
  • Statement on Nuclear Detection Architectures
  • Joint Statement on Sustaining Action to Strengthen Global Nuclear Security
  • Mitigating Insider Threats
  • Joint Statement on Forensics in Nuclear Security
  • Joint Statement on Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres / Centres of Excellence
  • Supporting Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism Preparedness and Response Capabilities
  • 2016 Statement of Activity and Cooperation to Counter Nuclear Smuggling
  • Joint Statement on Strengthening the Security of High Activity Sealed Radioactive Sources

Israel is looking forward to further regional and international efforts to secure nuclear materials and to face the challenge of reducing the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism. It is Israel's hope that the successful implementation of the commitments undertaken by the participants in this Summit will greatly enhance the prospects for more secure world.

National Progress Report: Jordan

NSS 2016 - National Progress Report

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

Ratification of  ICSANT

On 9 February 2014, the Council of Ministers presented to the Parliament the bill for Jordan’s accession to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT). The Parliament approved the convention and a Royal decree was published in the official gazette, the instrument of ratification was deposited on February 28, 2016.  

Counter Nuclear Smuggling Team 

On 8 September 2013, the Council of Ministers took the decision to create a Counter-Nuclear Smuggling Team. The team is led by Jordan Armed Forces and comprising Ministry of Interior, the General Intelligence Directorate, Energy and Mineral Resources Commission, the Public Security Directorate, and the Customs Department. 

Jordan has, since the Seoul Summit, conducted intensive bilateral consultations and embarked on site visits to NSS countries that have made considerable progress in the area of Nuclear Security and Counter-Nuclear Smuggling.  

Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation

 On November 13, 2015, Jordan announced its commitment to “Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation” as contained in the International Atomic Energy Agency document INFCIRC 869

Bilateral and International Cooperation

Jordan -USA

Joint Action Plan between the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Government of the United States of America on Combating Smuggling of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials.

 On January 11, 2016, Jordan and the USA signed a joint action plan with the intent to cooperate to build and increase the capabilities of Jordan to prevent, detect, and respond effectively to attempts to smuggle nuclear or radioactive materials.  The plan focuses on building self-reliance capabilities of Jordan, while at the same time establishes a cooperative relationship with the US, where assistance is needed. 

Jordan-IAEA:

During the period 31May to 11 June 2015, the IAEA conducted a Nuclear Security Peer Review Mission. The Energy and Minerals Resources Commission (EMRC) was commended by the IAEA for the cooperation and support the mission received.

Workshops and Training

CNS Teams in Volatile Regions

During the period 18 to19 November 2015, Jordan hosted an international workshop on CNS Teams in Volatile Regions in Amman on. It was designed to promote the initiative of His Majesty King Abdullah II on the Counter Nuclear Smuggling Teams that was declared during the Second Nuclear Security Summit held in Soul in 2012 and reintroduced in 2014 and 2016 summits respectively. 

The overall aim of the workshop was to raise awareness of cross border threats in volatile regions and to exchange experiences on current national level mechanisms for interagency and cross-sector coordination in security on nuclear material issues. During the second day of this workshop, Jordan presented itself as a case study on how it has been securing itself considering unprecedented border volatility with a special focus on how it has been dealing with the threat of infiltration of smuggled material including the possibility of smuggling nuclear and radioactive material. 

Jordan-Canada

Workshop “Towards Universal Implementation of International Legal Instruments for Nuclear Security”,

During the period 26 to 27 January 2016, Jordan organized in cooperation with Canada this workshop. It addressed entry into force and implementation of the International Convention on the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) and the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM/A). This workshop was dedicated to countries in the Arab region. 

Jordan-Canada-INTERPOL

INTERPOL organized and run Project STONE in Jordan with a contribution in kind from the government of Canada.

Project STONE is delivered in two phases, phase 1 comprises training in Radiological Nuclear investigations, intervention and  counter trafficking for law enforcement and other personnel and this is followed up a few months later with phase 2, which is a live counter trafficking operation at border crossing points, utilizing the same personnel. The first phase took place during the period 1-3 March 2016; the second follow up with the operational phase will be conducted in May 2016.

Jordan- United Arab Emirates, Morocco, GCC, GICNT, EU, & UNICRI

Inter-Arab Nuclear Detection and Response Exercise “ FALCON TABLE TOP EXERCISE”, 23-25 February 2016, Abu Dhabi

This exercise is regionally-oriented to partner nations in the Gulf Cooperating Council (GCC) with the participation of Jordan and Morocco. It focused on key aspects of the nuclear security activities related to detection and initial response to Radiological and Nuclear (RN) threats with an emphasis on national planning, information-sharing, operational cooperation, and decision-making in detecting nuclear material out of regulatory control and in managing the investigation of and response to an escalating nuclear security situation involving radioactive materials.

The exercise has been developed under the auspices of the EU CBRN Centers of Excellence, the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), the European Commission, the Governments of the UAE, Jordan, Morocco and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). One of its important outcomes is to strengthen regional cooperation in the field of nuclear security and the conduct of follow up activities in the future. 

2016 Nuclear Security Summit voluntary commitments:

Jordan introduced a new “Statement of Activity and Cooperation on Countering Nuclear Smuggling” to the 2016 Summit. 37 states, the UN and the INTERPOL have co-sponsored this Gift Basket. Additionally, Jordan joined five gift baskets:

1.        Joint Statement on Sustaining Action to Strengthen Global Nuclear Security

2.        Insider Threat Mitigation.

3.        Supporting Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism Preparedness and Response Capabilities

4.   Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540.

5.    Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres/Centres of Excellence (NSSC/CoE)”

National Progress Report: Kazakhstan

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Kazakhstan has taken a set of practical steps in the strengthening of nuclear security, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and peaceful use of atomic energy. Kazakhstan has undertaken all possible efforts on national, regional and international levels for the effective implementation of decisions made at the Nuclear Security Summits in Washington, Seoul and The Hague. 

Strengthening Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Security

• The new edition of the Law on the Use of Atomic Energy was enforced in January 2016. The basic law of Kazakhstan in the sphere of peaceful use of atomic energy, in which principles of regulation of nuclear safety and security, protection of the environment and population are established. The Law prescribes further enhancement of the state system for control of radioactive materials and other sources of ionizing radiation. The definition of nuclear security is also provided in Law, together with basic requirements for a state system of nuclear security.
• Physical protection systems in the Institute of Nuclear Physics and Ulba Metallurgical Plant were upgraded. Radiation monitors were mounted on two customs control points with corresponding personnel training for these points.
• Several training courses in safeguards and nuclear forensics were conducted with support of the National Nuclear Security Administration of US DOE for Kazakhstan experts.
• In August 2015 in Astana, table-top exercises (TTE) were conducted on the security of rail-road transportation of nuclear and radioactive materials. In December 2015 Kazakhstan experts presented the TTE results and developed recommendations in the Tokyo seminar on security of air, maritime, road and rail-road transportation of nuclear and radioactive materials.
• In December 2015, construction of the Nuclear Security Training Center began in the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Almaty. The conceptual design of the Training Center was developed in collaboration with the Los Alamos National Laboratory, USA, in 2010-2011. The Center construction will be completed in October 2016.
• Kazakhstan together with IAEA, USA and Russia is developing training materials, course programmes, presentations, brochures and other necessary materials for courses on nuclear security, physical protection, non-proliferation, control and accountancy of nuclear materials, etc.
• Further work is being done on the elimination of the legacy of nuclear tests on the territory of the former Semipalatinsk test site. In the frame of the programme “Global Nuclear Security” of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency of the US Defense Department, physical barriers and physical protection of some sensitive areas of the former test site were enhanced.
• New regulations in the field of nuclear security will be developed and enforced reflecting provisions of the new Law on the Use of Atomic Energy and recommendations of the IAEA documents on nuclear security.
• IPPAS missions for peer evaluation of physical protection of nuclear facilities will be invited and recommendations of the missions will be implemented for nuclear facilities in Kazakhstan.

Minimizing Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials

• Atomic research reactor VVR-K and critical stand (zero power reactor) of the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Almaty are converted to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel.
• All highly enriched uranium (HEU) from the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Almaty was downblended into LEU on the Ulba Metallurgical Plant.
• In support of the HEU-LEU conversion programme training seminars were conducted on technologies for the active core design of nuclear reactors. Workers of the National Nuclear Center of Kazakhstan took part in technical workshops in Idaho National Laboratory for consideration of further cooperation fields. In September 2015 in Kazakhstan, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed in which, inter alia, exchange of information on research reactors is defined as one possible cooperation field.
• With support of US DOE, spent fuel of BN-350 reactor of Mangistau Nuclear Power Combinate, Aktau, was transferred for safe and secure storage in Kurchatov.
• Facility for sodium coolant processing was designed for BN-350 decommissioning programme, the facility will be commissioned in June 2016.
• Round Table on problems of minimization of use of HEU in civil cycle was conducted in Almaty in December 2015.
• Kazakhstan will continue projects on transfer of research reactors IWG1.M and IGR from HEU fuel to LEU in National Nuclear Center in Kurchatov, Eastern Kazakhstan, and implement the transition were it will be technically possible. Remove remaining HEU and HEU spent fuel from the research centers.
• Kazakhstan will facilitate the exploration of possible ways of minimizing use of HEU in the civil cycle, including production of radio-isotopes, where it will be technically possible. One of the main and important possibilities for encouraging the industry to use non-HEU technologies is the development and introduction of economic incentives.

Countering Nuclear Smuggling

• Export control system is implemented including strengthened interactions and coordination of involved state authorities and introduction of internal compliance control for main nuclear exporters.
• National Response Plan is being enforced in the field of nuclear activities including issues related to illicit trafficking and other illegal actions with involvement of nuclear and other radioactive materials and radiation sources. The Plan is enforced under the provisions of the new Law on Use of Atomic Energy.
• In the National Nuclear Center of Kazakhstan, the establishment of the Identification Center for Nuclear and Radioactive Materials began. The Center will develop a database with passports for all nuclear and radioactive sources fabricated in or imported to Kazakhstan by which the sources will be identified including in cases of possible illicit use or trafficking. Also, radioactive wastes will be accounted in the Identification Center with the aim of developing a strategy for radioactive waste management.
• Kazakhstan will continue to strengthen export control system including internal compliance in companies exporting nuclear items. Implementation measures will be taken and training will be conducted for the National Response Plan.

Supporting Multilateral Instruments

• Kazakhstan joined and ratified practically all basic international conventions and agreements in the field of peaceful use of atomic energy. Kazakhstan ratified CPPNM and its Amendments, and we hope that the Amendments will be ratified by some other countries that will allow to enforce the Amendments. Adoption of the Amendments will be an important step in strengthening of nuclear security on national as well as on international global levels.
• Continue outreach efforts in a frame of Central Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. Kazakhstan together with member states of the Agreement on Central Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone will develop and adopt a multilateral agreement on cooperation in prevention of illegal trafficking of nuclear materials and combating of nuclear terrorism in the region of Central Asia.
• Kazakhstan will continue discussions with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), and UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA). Adoption of such agreement will give an important input into the strengthening of nuclear security in the Central Asia region.

Collaborating with International Organizations

• In August 2015, the Agreement with the IAEA was signed on establishment of the IAEA low-enriched uranium bank (IAEA LEU Bank). Also, technical agreements were signed between the IAEA and Kazakhstan Ministry of Energy on specific measures in implementation of the LEU Bank Agreement, and between the IAEA and Ulba Metallurgical Plant in Ust-Kamenogors, Eastern Kazakhstan, on the Bank Operator services. Practical work on establishment of the Bank began.
• Kazakhstan will finalize the construction of the LEU Bank storage facility in 2017, meeting all applicable safety standards of the IAEA for storage of LEU and nuclear security recommendations of the IAEA corresponding documents. In 2017 the IAEA LEU will be shipped for storage in Ulba Metallurgical Plant.
• Kazakhstan will strengthen cooperation with Interpol in the field of prevention and countering nuclear terrorism, smuggling, illicit trafficking and other illegal actions related to nuclear activities. Kazakhstan will take part in implementation of Action Plan in support of Interpol that is adopted on Nuclear Security Summit 2016.
• Kazakhstan supports the IAEA and underlines its leading role in the strengthening of global nuclear security, Kazakhstan will fully support implementation of activities included into the Action Plan in support of the IAEA.

Partnering with External Stakeholders

• Kazakhstan took part in all initiatives of the Global Partnership against Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP), and will take all efforts in implementation of the Action Plan in support of GP.
• Kazakhstan took part in all activities of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and will make every effort in the implementation of the Action Plan in support of GICNT.

Kazakhstan highly regards the comprehensive and fruitful work that was done during the Nuclear Security Summits. Good momentum is generated at the highest political level for further work on the strengthening of nuclear security and non-proliferation regime. Action Plans are adopted that form the basis for support of the necessary level of activities of the Nuclear Security Summit member states in the mentioned areas.

Kazakhstan commits its full support for implementation of the Summit objectives, continuation of work and efforts in support for strengthening nuclear security and nuclear weapon non-proliferation regime.

National Progress Reports: Lithuania

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Lithuania has strengthened nuclear security implementation and built up the global nuclear security architecture by 

Strengthening Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Security

• State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI) continuously carries out national regulatory activities and supervision of physical security of nuclear facilities, nuclear materials and all materials of the nuclear fuel cycle. VATESI experts review physical security documents, submitted by entities carrying out site evaluations of nuclear facilities, all licence and permit holders and applicants alongside other economic entities involved in any activities pertaining to nuclear materials. VATESI experts prepare comments, conclusions and supervise compliance with the regulatory legislation on physical security of the nuclear facilities, nuclear and nuclear fuel cycle material, and conduct physical security inspections.
• In 2015, State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI) revised the existing regulations on Physical Security (Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.6.1-2012 “Physical Security of Nuclear Facilities, Nuclear Material and Nuclear Fuel Cycle Material”) and issued an amendment to the regulation. The amendment specifies the process of development of physical security justification documents (i.e. Security Plan and Vital Area Identification documents) and coordination of those documents with the competent authorities. The amendment is in line with the recommendations defined in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series #13 (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5).
• In December 2015, a VATESI led Interagency Commission for Design Basis Threat Assessment held a meeting to review and make conclusions on the established Design Basis Threat documents, related to all nuclear facilities of the Republic of Lithuania and to the nuclear material transportation. The main objective of this review was to address changes in the regional geopolitical situation and determine possible changes in the threat assessment. A Design Basis Threat to the nuclear facilities and nuclear material was introduced in 2001 and is reviewed annually.
• Radiation Protection Centre (RSC) in its national capacity of radiation protection regulatory authority, carries out identification activities and prepares implementation recommendations on all principles and criteria that are relevant to the national radiation protection regulation - accounting of ionizing radiation sources, securing radiation protection and physical protection of ionizing radiation sources.
• Radiation protection national legislation reviews completed during the relevant period include:
  • New amendment to the Law on Radiation Protection with added emphasis on radioactive material security;
  • new National Guidelines for Security of Ionizing Radiation Sources, developed in accordance with the IAEA recommendations (IAEA Nuclear Security Series  #14 and  #11), approved by the Minister of Health, with additional provisions on design and implementation of physical protection systems, relevant to all respective categories of radioactive materials, and potential threat and consequence assessment. Licensees and temporary permit holders are now required to perform vulnerability assessments of their physical security systems in order to assess the system efficiency and guarantee sufficient quality of the physical protection measures deployed;
  • new amendments to the Guidelines on Import, Export, Transit and Transport of Radioactive Materials, Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel were approved by the Minister of Health and Head of VATESI on 24 December 2008, adding to new security requirements for transportation of radioactive materials. The Guidelines have been developed in accordance with the IAEA recommendations (IAEA Nuclear Security Series #9).
• Nuclear Security Centre of Excellence (NSCOE), established in Lithuania in the aftermath of the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul in 2012, has significantly developed its operational capacity. Main goal of the NSCOE is to support sustainability and effectiveness of the national nuclear security measures and their development through continuous assistance to the stakeholders in development of human resources. NSCOE develops and implements training programs tailored to the specific needs of various stakeholders, promotes and supports interagency collaboration and coordination and continues international cooperation in the nuclear security training.
• The Government of Lithuania shares integrated approach of the IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) as effective peer review of the regulatory technical and policy issues and an objective comparison of the national regulatory infrastructure against IAEA Standards and Guidance. Lithuania will welcome the IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission on April 17 – 29, 2016, with a part of the upcoming mission to be dedicated to the evaluation of safety/security interface module.
• Lithuania remains committed to the IAEA’s efforts of assisting the Member States in establishing and maintaining effective nuclear security regimes and protection against the unauthorized removal of nuclear material and the sabotage of nuclear facilities and material. Lithuania recognizes International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission as a fundamental part of these efforts and is convinced that IPPAS system is a very efficient asset in assisting the State in the assessment of its nuclear security regime and in the development of future activities in support of nuclear security issues. The Government of Lithuania has officially requested for the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission, confirmed by the IAEA to be conducted in the year 2017. The general purpose of the planned IPPAS mission is to assess Lithuania’s nuclear security regime.
• Lithuania is committed to continuous orphan sources search campaigns, organized by the RSC as part of its annual programs. Orphan sources search areas widen and include various sites of former industrial and military installations, medical treatment facilities, and municipal waste landfills throughout Lithuania.
• Lithuanian Nuclear Security Centre of Excellence (NSCOE) will continue to add to the international efforts in the face of growing threats of terrorism, focusing national training programs on nuclear security personnel capability development. The main goal of NSCOE is to support domestic sustainability and effectiveness of the nuclear security measures and their development through continuous assistance to the stakeholders in training. NSCOE will continue developing and implementing training programs that are tailored to the specific needs of the numerous stakeholders. The Centre also promotes and supports interagency collaboration and coordination and maintains international cooperation in the area of the nuclear security training. NSCOE will continue with its public awareness raising efforts on nuclear security measures and their impact to the national security, and promotion of robust nuclear security culture and integrity. 
• Lithuania participates in the Global Initiative to Counter Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and continues its cooperation with the Global Threat Reduction Initiative.

Prior to the Nuclear Security Summit 2016, Lithuania has confirmed support to the newly introduced and continuous gift baskets on: Sustaining Action to Strengthen Global Nuclear Security; Enhancing Radiological Security; Strengthening the Security of High Activity Sealed Radioactive Sources; Activity and Cooperation on Countering Nuclear Smuggling and Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres/Centres of Excellence (NSSC/CoE).

Lithuania intends to support relevant NSS joint statements and will duly contribute to the future development of these initiatives.

Minimizing Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials

• Activities involving radioactive materials may be authorized and conducted in Lithuania only when economic, social and other returns to individuals or society outweigh the detriment radiation causes to human health and the environment. Written verification of intent of the planned activities of the applicant with radioactive materials is one of the main documents required to be submitted with license or temporary permit application.
• Due to the efforts made and the new availability of alternative technologies based on X-ray generation, the number of sealed sources in Lithuania is declining annually. All sealed sources of ionizing radiation are required to be returned to the consignor after their use.

Countering Nuclear Smuggling

• Lithuania remains fully supportive of the information sharing initiative on illicit trafficking of nuclear material under the framework of the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database of Nuclear and other Radioactive Material. National nuclear regulatory authority (VATESI) is responsible for notifying the IAEA Database on all relevant events in Lithuania and for collecting all global data on illicit trafficking events involving nuclear and other radioactive material. Complete information on reported cases involving illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material worldwide is duly shared with other competent institutions of Lithuania.
• Bilateral cooperation in countering nuclear smuggling grows strong as the collaboration between the United States and Lithuania builds up in a comprehensive manner, contributing to deterrence of future smuggling attempts and strengthening global security. Bilateral Counter Nuclear Smuggling Joint Action Plan, signed in April 2013, is aimed at prevention, detection, and response to nuclear and radioactive materials smuggling incidents. On December 14, 2015, Lithuanian- U.S. Counter Nuclear Smuggling Joint Action Plan review was performed by the multiagency representatives from Lithuania and the United States as a continuous effort to seek ways to further strengthen joint endeavor to counter nuclear smuggling in areas of prevention, detection and response.
• Maritime supply chain security is coordinated by the State Border Guard Service (SBGS) of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Lithuania. SBGS continues close cooperation with the United States Department of Energy Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence program (NSDD): multiple Dual-Pillar RPMs and vehicle RPMshave been installed at the Klaipeda seaport, „Klaipeda Smelte“  terminal,  Klaipeda Container Terminal and near the „Draugyste“ railway station. Primary purpose of this new system is to monitor vast majority of marine containers shipped to and from the Klaipeda seaport and identify possible attempts of illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials. Secondary inspection of the suspected marine containers is performed by the trained border guard officers, following the approved procedures. Since 2013, the SBGS performs annual metrological verification of the handheld dosimeters that are used in secondary inspections.
• According to the U.S.-Lithuanian Counter Nuclear Smuggling Joint Action Plan, the multiagency representatives are committed to organizing future ad hoc reviews of counter nuclear smuggling activities in areas of prevention, detection and response. Bilateral cooperation in nuclear detection, law enforcement investigations, and other forms of collaboration will be continuous and will contribute to effective bilateral and international partnerships in the field within the framework of the Plan. Lithuania reaffirms its commitment to share expertise in the area with other international partners.

Supporting Multilateral Instruments

• Since Lithuania has ratified the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) in 2008 and deposited its instruments of ratification on May 19, 2009, all Lithuanian legislation, regulations and policies have been developed in coordination with the amended CPPNM.
• Lithuania remains committed to CPPNM and together with the IAEA community welcomes the international progress in ratification of the Amendment as an important step to bolster nuclear security worldwide. CPPNM is the only legally binding international undertaking in the area of physical protection of nuclear material, hence adoption of the Amendment to the CPPNM is the single most important step the international community can take to strengthen nuclear security globally.
• Lithuania will continue its support and contribute to all multilateral and regional efforts of the international community in raising sufficient awareness and securing additional ratifications that are needed in order for the Amendment to enter into force, with the goal of achieving this by the end of 2016.

Collaborating with International Organizations

• Lithuanian nuclear security experts submit contributions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Series document drafts, participate in the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Guidance Committee and are members of the Agency’s Working Group on Radioactive Source Security (WGRSS).
• RSC cooperates with and reports to IAEA on the source security status via web platform of Nuclear Security Information Management System (NUSIMS), designed for self-assessment, country-specific nuclear security information gathering, information management and sustainability.
• Lithuanian experts have participated in the Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) missions to Pakistan, Netherlands, Croatia and Armenia, led by the IAEA. Expert participants of these missions had a valuable opportunity to share their expertise internationally. Lithuanian institutions are preparing for the IRRS mission in Lithuania, which will be conducted on April 17 – 29, 2016.
• Lithuanian RSC co-operates with the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) and The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). RSC expert has participated in the Workshop on NSS Gift Basket “Enhancing Radiological Security” in Oslo in January 2016.
• With a view to assess the implementation progress of the new IAEA recommendations on both national and institutional levels, the Government of the Republic of Lithuania has invited and received confirmation of the IAEA for the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission to assess Lithuania’s nuclear security regime. The IPPAS mission is confirmed to take place in the year 2017. Lithuania has received IPPAS missions in 1999 and in 2001.

Partnering with External Stakeholders

• Promoting cooperation in the area of the prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and advancement in defense and military relations, the Government of Lithuania continues cooperation with Government of the United States. Several bilateral meetings on security of sources were organized during this period Visiting experts from the United States have reviewed existing national legislation on security of radioactive materials and prepared recommendations for improvement. Moreover, the demand for trainings for the officers of the Police Department under the Ministry of the Interior regarding detection of orphan sources issues was discussed and the repair and renewal possibilities for the RSC equipment used to detect orphan sources were considered. In 2014 and 2015, Police Department officers participated in detection training in Dubrovnik, Croatia, organized by the Sandia National Laboratory and in the United States Department of Defence equipment use and maintenance training.
• RSC continues its collaboration with the Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU) on various scientific issues in nuclear security – particularly, in combating illicit trafficking of nuclear or other radioactive materials. 
• NSCOE has become an important regional nuclear security training hub and is further expanding its activities: 34 training events have been organized in the actual period with 764 national and international participants. Productive cooperation network has been established between the NSCOE and the U.S. Department of Energy, the IAEA, Interpol, OSCE, GICNT, other international organizations and fora. The most significant cooperation is developing with U.S. Department of Energy Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence Program (NSDD). NSDD is the main NSCOE partner in developing national nuclear security detection infrastructure and building personnel capabilities. NSCOE achievements and progress were featured as a success story in the NSDD Program Review Conference, held in the Fall of 2015. 
• NSCOE provided training support to the Ukrainian and Moldovan law enforcement agencies, and continued cooperation with Georgia and Armenia.
• NSCOE is an active member of IAEA Nuclear Security Support Centre Network: national and regional IAEA training events were organized in cooperation with and utilizing the NSCOE infrastructure.
• In cooperation with the U.S. Export Control and Related Border Security Program (EXBS) and Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), trainings and workshops for national and regional audiences were organized. Global Initiative for Combating Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) Nuclear Forensics Working Group organized an in cooperation with NSCOE as a national response effort to illicit trafficking; and the IAEA training courses on Radiologic Crime Scene Management and nuclear forensics foundations were held in addition to the implemented national training program.  

National Progress Report: Georgia

Since the Nuclear Security Summit of 2014, Georgia has successfully continued to reinforce the implementation of nuclear security, and has lent substantial support to the build-up of the global security architecture by accomplishing relevant tasks in the following areas:

Strengthening Nuclear and Radioactive Material Security

1.    Georgia takes active steps to bolster its nuclear security regime. New amendments to the Law “On Nuclear and Radiation Safety” - that also envelop security tasks - were elaborated and adopted. These amendments consider the implementation of a new reform – namely, the Department for Nuclear and Radiation Safety under the Georgian Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources Protection was transferred to the Legal Entity of Public Law, The Agency of Nuclear and Radiation Safety (ANRS). The Regulatory Authority (RA) rights along with certain responsibilities to support the state’s nuclear security regime were also transferred from the Department to ANRS. This move increased RA’s effectiveness, independence, and efficiency to make decisions, including those related to nuclear security matters.

2.    As a part of the reform, the Department for Radioactive Waste Management was created under the ANRS. The Department was assigned a task of operating the radioactive waste centralized storage and disposal facilities to ensure the waste safety and security, including the disused radioactive sources, which reinforced the state system for control of radioactive waste A new Law “On Radioactive Waste” was adopted to put in place legal requirements for handling waste. The adopted legal instruments provide a clear distinction between the functions of the ANRS and the Department for Radioactive Waste Management

3.    The Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP) for the period of 2015-2019 was elaborated with the immediate support rendered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The plan was adopted by the Georgian government. The INSSP defines key activities that are essential for setting up a comprehensive nuclear security regime in the country, and for responsible Georgian state bodies to fulfill them. All those activities are divided into five functional areas with assigned objectives. The time table for the completion of each of those activities is fixed.

4.    Georgia had already formalized the Association Agreement with the European Union. According the Agreement’s Article 298, Paragraph “K” (Title VI Other Cooperation Polices), cooperation in the area of nuclear security may be pursued in accordance with the principles and standards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as well as relevant international treaties and conventions concluded within the framework of the IAEA and, where applicable, in compliance with the Euratom Treaty.

5.    The CSF security system – a special facility, where a number of Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources (DSRS) is stored (including recovered DSRS found as orphan radioactive sources) - was upgraded based on the program support provided by the U.S. Department of Energy own National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Radiological Security.

6.    The security system for radioactive waste disposal site was upgraded with the support of the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change and that of IAEA.

7.    The security entrance checkpoint at the Applied Research Center of the Institute of Physics was upgraded with the support of the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority.

8.    Georgia has established and currently operates the special inventory for the sources of ionization radiation and associated facilities. The inventory contains detailed information on any activities related to the source, including the tracking history, inspection and enforcement data. Moreover, the legal requirements are established to provide the inventory sustainability.

9.    Georgia had adopted the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Threat Reduction Strategy along with the action plan for its implementation (CBRN NAP) for the period of 2015-2019. The plan includes the activities in R&N fields, including those related to nuclear security, and citations of timeframes and responsible agencies.

10. The training for Georgian specialists in the field of nuclear and radioactive materials transportation security was provided with the U.S. support.

11. The Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA) operates training centers (a police academy, a border police training center, an emergency management training center) for human resources development in CBRN, border security, counter-smuggling, emergency response, management, and other spheres related to the nuclear security of the state. These centers primarily serve the MoIA personnel.

12. The new law “On Radioactive Waste” sets requirements for elaboration of the radioactive waste management strategy for a 15-year period and an action plan for its practical implementation. The strategy and the action plan also envelop handling with DSRS and accounting for the tasks of physical protection. The elaboration of the documents has commenced in collaboration with the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority. The working plan and working groups have already been established for this purpose.

13. Georgia has made significant efforts to improve its regulatory framework to also encase nuclear security issues. A new regulation for physical protection is currently being elaborated. The licensee is obliged to set forth and implement the physical protection plan. The requirements for inspection and enforcement activities have already been elaborated and implemented.

Comment: The implementation of the INSSP and related plans are directed to establish all 12 elements of a state nuclear security regime. Additional support is welcome, especially for the aim of developing a nuclear forensic capability.

Minimizing Nuclear and Other Radioactive Materials

1.    Georgia operated only one nuclear research reactor, which was shut down in 1989. The spent and fresh fuel was exported from Georgia in mid-1990s. The decommissioning of the reactor and its auxiliary systems is ongoing. The last nuclear installation known as the “Breeder-1” was situated in the Institute of Physics. The installation, containing 1833 grams of the 36%-enriched Uranium and the Pu-Be radioactive source, was used for the neutron-activation analysis. Due to some technical reasons, the installation became non-operable. Georgia fully complies with the existing international standards and requirements for non-proliferation and for safeguarding the nuclear security regime. Therefore, according to the statement of The Hague Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué, the decision was made to repatriate the nuclear fuel to the country of origin. The plan for decommissioning the installation and for the repatriation activities was developed in close collaboration with IAEA and U.S. experts. The plan was reviewed and adopted by the Georgian Regulatory Authority.. All operations, including the HEU repatriation were supported by the RRRFR program. As a result, Georgia is no longer in possession of a significant amount of HEU.

2.    Georgia applies a respective strategy to fully minimize the number of DSRS and unused nuclear materials that do not require additional resources for safe storage and physical protection. Every license applicant must demonstrate and guarantee that all radioactive sources imported by him will be repatriated to the country of their origin following their respective utilization. The requirement are set forth for reducing a number of DSRS and using the existing resources more effectively to provide physical protection of the already existent DSRS.

Countering Nuclear Smuggling

1.    In a formal letter addressed to the IAEA Director General, Georgia expressed its full support for the principles laid out by the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. In reality, Georgia conducts a stricter control compared to the existing standards, and the utilization as well as the exports and imports of all five categories of radioactive sources are subject to strict authorization.

2.    In cooperation with the EC, the Nuclear Forensics Laboratory in the Crime Forensics Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was provided a modernized equipment to conduct nuclear forensic investigations. This activity represents a yet another step towards attaining the highest standards in nuclear forensics and the starting point for launching effective worldwide communication with nuclear material libraries.

3.    To enhance the process of control over military and dual use commodities - and in addition to the law “On Control of Military and Dual Use Commodities” - the Government of Georgia issued special decrees in 2014 that define the list of military and dual use commodities and control measures.

4.    Georgia conducts a robust control over the export and import of nuclear and radioactive materials. The control system includes:

• Legal issues pertaining to the export and import of all five categories of sources that require the issuance of special permits;
• Technical issues pertaining to the movement of nuclear and radioactive materials through Georgian borders controlled by special portable radiation monitors and hand detectors;
• Administrative issues pertaining to special response actions through which responsible state bodies are defined for the alert cases on the borders.

To enhance Georgia’s border control, the Ministry of Internal Affairs has elaborated a 5- year Program for Modernization, Standardization and Unification of Georgian Border Police, which was adopted upon the Ministerial Order 404 on 8 June 2015. To improve the intelligence-led planning in the Border Management, a Concept of the Unified System of Analysis on Risks and Threats on the State Border of Georgia was approved by the Ministerial Order 92 on 31 January 2015.

5.    To increase the response effectiveness against the illegal movement of nuclear and radioactive materials, the legal act titled “The Procedure for Responding to the Illegal Trafficking of Nuclear and Radioactive Substances” was adopted.

6.    Sweden is committed for further work in the area reducing the risk or likelihood of smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials in the years come. Sweden plans to organize a conference in Tbilisi, Georgia together with partners of Georgia, USA and Poland for states of the wider Black Sea region on implementationof Nuclear Security Summit’s commitments and objectives

7.    In 2015 and 2016, two cases of illegal turnover of radioactive sources (Cesium-135 and Cesium-137) were detected. In total 8 people were held liable.

Supporting Multilateral Instruments

1.    Georgia supports the existing global nuclear security regime by implementing its requirements at the national level and demonstrating its commitment to the international legal instruments: Georgia is a party to the Convention on Physical Protection (CPPNM), its amendment (CPPNME) and Convention for Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT). The country is a signatory to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and fully implements UN Security Resolution 1540. Georgia is a non-nuclear weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The country actively participates in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT).

2. The Tbilisi Regional Secretariat of the EU CBRN Risk Mitigation Centers of Excellence (CoE) Initiative uniting 9 states – namely, Albania, Armenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia and Ukraine - has been successfully functioning since 2013. The secretariat was established through joint efforts by the Georgian Government, the EU Joint Research Centre (JRC) and the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) and is hosted by the MoIA Academy.

3. The Georgian Government, together with the Governments of Philippines and Morocco, initiated the establishment of the UN Group of Friends on the CBRN Risk Mitigation and Security Governance. The first meeting of the GoF, chaired by Georgia’s Permanent Representative, was held at the UN headquarters on 8 December 2015 and was attended by the representatives of 27 UN member states. 

4. Georgia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has officially addressed the Japanese Government for country’s membership in the G-7 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

Comment: According to INSSP, the following activities are planned for multilateral instruments:

• Accession to the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (ASSIST)
• Signing up to the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the IAEA (P&I)
• Joining and adhering to the obligations of States Parties in the 2005 Protocol to the 1988 SUA Convention 

Collaboration with International Organizations

1. Georgia obtains IAEA assistance in various fields related to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and contributes to several technical meetings by providing expertise for the drafting of the IAEA nuclear security series and other related documents.

2.     Georgia carries on its cooperation with the IAEA through implementing a national Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP), which functions as a roadmap for achieving the highest level of state nuclear security.

3.     Georgia actively cooperates with the IAEA ITDB (Illicit Trafficking Data Base) office by exchanging the relevant information. Cooperation with this international mechanism for global information flow helps Georgian authorities analyze more effectively the trends in worldwide nuclear smuggling. This, by itself, retains great importance for the relevant state agencies as they plan and execute counter-smuggling activities. The ANRS, acting as a focal point for the IAEA ITDB, cooperates with the state law enforcement agencies in this regard.

4.     The ANRS acts as a National Competent Authority (NCA) for the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and provides the IAEA through the USIE system notifications information on nuclear incidents, and also has access to the information provided by other countries. The established information exchange helps maintain confidence among the countries and define possible risks and support from other countries.

5.     The IAEA conventional exercises are conducted on a regular basis within the frames of the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident. These exercises enhance the capabilities of the Georgian team to respond and harmonize its activity with international experts.

6.     The IAEA provides through various projects support to Georgia in developing its national framework for nuclear and radiation safety and security. The technical collaboration is based on the Country Program Framework (CPF), which was officially adopted for the period of 2015-2019. Such support is usually provided through a) the knowledge and experience sharing; b) equipment supply; c) experts support; and d) elaboration and implementation of programs and activity plans.

7.     Georgia actively collaborates with the IAEA-supported International Network for Nuclear Security Training and Support Centers (NSSC) to define the needs and goals for trainings in the field of nuclear security.

8.     Georgia is an active user of the IAEA Nuclear Security Information Portal (NUSEC). This information sharing system helps Georgia systemize the information pertinent to its nuclear security regime as well as identify ways for effective implementation of the requirements for Nuclear Security Integrated Management System (NUSIMS).

9.     Georgia conducted the installation of several radiation portal monitors as a first step of collaboration with the EU in the field of nuclear security. The EU also provided nuclear forensic equipment to MoIA’s own criminalistics laboratory. The EU, through the initiation of the Center of Excellence, supports the regional activity aimed at strengthening the CBRN first response capabilities and regional cooperation in South East Europe, Southern Caucasus, Moldova and Ukraine. Another EU project to upgrade research capabilities to support the nuclear security regime is underway. 

Partnering with external Stakeholders

1.     Based on the support provided by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Georgia created and sustained the inventory of the sources of ionization radiation and related activities. The RIS computer program is used for this purpose.

2.     Georgia actively implements tasks and projects detailed in the Joint Document of U.S. and Georgian Delegations on Georgia’s Priority Needs to Improve Its Capabilities to Combat Nuclear Smuggling formalized on 2 February 2007 and amended in 2009. Various projects related to the agreement, which was funded by the U.S. DoE, the U.S. DoD, the U.S. DoS, US DTRA, EU and UK. These include strengthening Georgia’s nuclear RA (RA has been provided with equipment, vehicles, communication and office commodities); increasing patrols of green borders; supporting Georgian border police aviation; equipping mobile radiation detection patrols; sponsoring international cooperation in nuclear forensics; developing a joint maritime coordination center; and supporting maritime patrols of the coast guard.

3.     The implemented agreement between the U.S. Department of Energy (DoE) and the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources on cooperation to enhance the security of Georgia’s radioactive sources was signed in September 2011. Under this agreement, Georgia continues cooperation with the U.S. Department of Energy to enhance the security level and physical protection infrastructure for high-activity radiation sources. By the implemented agreement, nearly all disused high activity radiation sources have been consolidated and transported to the CSF, and the latter’s physical protection system was upgraded. The upgraded system was also installed on relevant other facilities. The installed equipment is covered by a long-term – namely, a three year-long - U.S. DoE warranty that includes maintenance.

4.     Georgia collaborates with the U.S. Department of State’s EXBS (Export Control and Border Security) program and receives assistance in human resource development and capacity building in this sphere. The EXBS program has initiated and funded a Joint Maritime Operations Center in located Supsa, western Georgia (Black Sea coast). The Center can, headed by the Border Police, hosts various agencies such as MFA, Customs, Patrol Police, MoIA’s Anti-Terrorist Center, and MOD. The purpose of the Center is to exchange intelligence information between the agencies to adequately address maritime threats and challenges.

5.     The U.S. DoE’s own NNSA supports training for the physical protection of personnel serving in the facilities with high-activity radiation sources and control of dual use commodities.

6.     The assistance provided by the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) encompasses various issues. The SSM supports participation of Georgian experts in a range of meetings. The SSM supported the regional office of Georgian RA, especially in terms of responding to illicit trafficking. The SSM participated in the upgrading of physical protection of the Applied Research Center of the Institute of Physics. The most recent important contribution by the SSM was its support thrown behind the elaboration of the national strategy for radioactive waste management, including the related security issues, for the next 15-year period.

中国在核安全领域的进展报告

中国在核安全领域的进展报告

自2014年3月召开第三届核安全峰会以来，中国以习近平主席提出的理性、协调、并进的核安全观为指导，全面推进核安全工作，切实落实峰会成果，不断完善国家核安全体系，致力于加强国际核安全体系，并在国家核安全示范中心建设和运营、强化核材料及放射性材料管理、打击核材料非法贩运、提升核应急水平、加强涉核网络安全、建立辐射环境监测体系等方面取得重要进展。

一、完善国家核安全体系

各国对本国的核材料及核设施安全负有首要责任。中国致力于完善国家核安全体系，提高核安全能力，培育核安全文化。

（一）加强核安全顶层设计。2014年4月，中国将核安全纳入国家总体安全体系，明确了对核安全的战略定位。全国人大分别于2015年7月、2015年12月通过《国家安全法》和《反恐怖主义法》，从法律层面明确将核安全列为维护国家安全、反对恐怖主义的重要方面，并规定了具体的核安全任务和措施。《原子能法》、《核安全法》立法工作稳步推进，目前已列入全国人大立法计划。

（二）完善核安全法规标准。研究编制《核安保条例》，目前已上报国务院；颁布实施《核材料管制视察管理办法》、《核材料管制报告管理办法》、《核材料登记管理办法》等规范性文件；修订《核电厂核事故应急管理条例》。

（三）加强核安全能力建设。重点针对核设施、核材料、放射源安全及核材料出口管制、打击非法贩运等领域，加强基础设施和硬件设备建设，提高执法人员水平，提升从业人员核安全意识，推动核工业界采纳国际原子能机构相关导则和规范。建设核安全监管技术研发基地，加强核安全监管技术能力。

（四）培育核安全文化。2014年9月，中国环境保护部、国家能源局、国家原子能机构联合发布《核安全文化政策声明》，面向全行业、全社会倡导加强核安全文化。积极开展核安全文化专项宣传活动，逐步建立长效评估机制。

二、加强国际核安全体系

中国致力于构建公平、合作、共赢的国际核安全体系，为核能安全地造福人类提供强有力、可持续的制度保障。

（一）加强核安全国际法律文书

中国已批准《核材料实物保护公约》及其修订案，批准了《制止核恐怖主义行为国际公约》，一贯忠实履行所承担的国际法律义务，积极推动加强有关公约的普遍性和有效性。中国严格执行联合国安理会第1373号、第1540号、第1887号等反恐、防扩散决议，继续支持联合国大会通过核安全相关决议。

（二）支持国际原子能机构工作

中国支持国际原子能机构在核安全国际合作中发挥核心作用，并从政治、技术和资金等方面，为国际原子能机构提供全方位支持。

中国与国际原子能机构在核材料安保、放射源监管、核与辐射应急响应等领域积极开展合作，推荐专家参加国际原子能机构核安全文件制定，与国际原子能机构一道在中国举办核安全培训班，2014年至2015年累计培训国内外从业人员400余人次。中国并加入了国际原子能机构核应急与响应救援国际网络。

中国支持国际原子能机构开展核安全国际实物保护咨询服务。中国于2015年9月正式邀请国际原子能机构对中国在国家层面和设施层面开展国际实物保护咨询服务，相关项目于2016年正式进入实施阶段。中国并已邀请国际原子能机构于2016年对中国开展核与辐射安全监管综合评估后续行动。

中国持续向国际原子能机构核安全基金捐款，用于支持中国和亚洲地区其他国家的核安全能力建设。截至2015年底，中国已向该基金累计捐款115万美元。中国将积极考虑增加每年捐款数额，并继续捐赠中国研发的核安全设备。

（三）积极参与国际交流与合作

除国际原子能机构外，中国欢迎其他相关组织和机制根据各自授权，在核安全领域发挥重要作用，并加强相互间的协调和互补。中国深入参与联合国安理会1540委员会工作，于2014年10月接待该委员会代表团进行首次国家访问，并于2015年9月举办执行安理会第1540号决议亚太地区联络点培训班。中国还积极参与“打击核恐怖主义全球倡议”、国际刑警组织、东盟地区论坛、亚欧会议等框架下的核安全会议和演练活动。

中国高度重视国家间的核安全政策交流与务实合作。2015年9月，习近平主席与美国总统奥巴马同意建立两国核安全年度对话机制。双方于2016年2月20日在瑞典斯德哥尔摩举行了首次对话，进一步深化了两国在国际核安全事务中的协调与合作。中国还同俄罗斯、法国、英国、印度、韩国、巴基斯坦等国家，就核安全问题保持磋商和交流。

中国欢迎核安全峰会成员国提出的核安全自愿性倡议，将正式加入“加强核安全举措落实”、“加强全球核安全的持续行动”等倡议。

 三、建设和运营核安全示范中心

 中国与美国合作建设的中国国家核安全示范中心于2015年12月提前建设完工，并于2016年3月正式投入运行。示范中心集成国内外成熟先进的技术和仪器设备，包括展示培训楼、分析实验楼、环境实验楼、模拟核材料库、核材料衡算模拟设施、响应力量培训与演练设施、室外实物保护测试场以及国内外一流的培训教学设施及国际交流配套设施，涵盖核安全、核保障监督、核材料管制、实物保护等多个领域，具备人员培训、技术研发、国际交流、测试与认证等功能。该示范中心是亚太地区乃至全球规模最大、设备最全、设施最先进的核安全交流与培训中心。

 中国将积极落实习近平主席在第三届核安全峰会上的承诺，以该中心为平台，与其他国家及国际原子能机构等国际组织开展交流与合作，为提升中国及亚太、全球核安全水平做出贡献。

四、加强高浓铀安全

中国重视高浓铀安全，支持在技术和经济可行的情况下，最大限度减少高浓铀的使用。2015年9月，中国原子能科学研究院高浓铀研究堆卸出高浓铀堆芯；2016年3月，中国原子能科学研究院完成了高浓铀研究堆的低浓化改造工作。加纳高浓铀研究堆改造项目进展顺利。2014年9月，中国与加纳签署了《关于为研究堆协助供应低浓铀的协定》，项目正式进入实施阶段。2015年12月，中美签署相关商务合同，加纳研究堆低浓铀燃料元件开始加工。

中国愿本着自愿、务实的原则，与相关国家协商改造自中国进口的高浓铀研究堆，并与国际社会分享高浓铀研究堆低浓化改造技术经验。

 五、强化放射源管理

 中国支持在严格管理、确保安全的前提下，促进放射源在民用领域的应用，着力提升国内放射源安全水平。中国严格执行放射源安全管理标准，全方位涵盖放射源生产、销售、运输、使用、收贮等环节；全面推进中国各城市放射性废物库安保升级，完成《城市放射性废物库安全防范系统要求》，与美国开展放射源安保方面的合作；完成了1.5万多家放射源利用单位的安全检查，妥善处置了废旧放射源；加强放射源安全能力建设，积极开展人员培训和安保实战演练；推进放射源安保技术研发，开展高风险移动放射源跟踪系统、辐照装置安保技防措施等研究设计工作。

六、打击核材料非法贩运

    中国将打击核材料非法贩运视为防止核恐怖主义的重要环节，一贯高度重视防扩散出口管制工作。中国不断加强国家开放口岸防范核材料及其他放射性材料非法贩运基础建设，已在全国重要的海港、空港、公路及铁路口岸配备各类辐射探测设备1000余台；加强重点大型港口辐射探测覆盖面，在上海洋山港和天津东疆保税港区即将对进出口集装箱实现100%辐射探测；提高一线执法人员能力，利用中美合作建设的中国海关辐射探测培训中心，已成功举办辐射探测培训、出口管制商品识别培训班45期，培训国内外学员达1280名，海关兼职教师30余名；参照核供应国集团最新管制清单，及时修订并严格落实核及核两用品出口管制清单，于2016年1月1日起正式执行最新《核出口管制清单》；与美国、俄罗斯等就防范核材料及其他放射性物质非法贩运签署合作文件，并于2015年10月与俄罗斯成功举行中俄边境防范核材料及其他放射性物质非法贩运联合演习。

 七、提升核应急水平

中国已建立了较为完整的核应急法律法规和标准体系，不断完善核应急预案和协调机制，加强核应急能力建设，强化与公众沟通和交流，积极开展核应急演练，着力建设国家核应急技术支持队伍和救援力量，正在组建一支320人的核应急救援队伍。2015年6月，中国组织开展代号为“神盾-2015”的国家核应急联合演习，参演规模达2900人，并接待法国、巴基斯坦及国际原子能机构等代表观摩演习。2016年1月，中国发布了《中国的核应急》白皮书，全面介绍了中国核应急工作方针、取得成就和未来展望。

    八、加强涉核网络安全

中国高度重视涉核网络安全，不断加强相关立法工作，加强工业控制系统信息安全和互联网行业网络安全管理，提高行业信息安全和网络安全保障能力。明确工业控制系统网络安全管理要求，探索安全风险发布机制；加强网络基础设施和业务系统安全防护，定期开展风险评估；提升突发网络安全事件应急响应能力，组织开展网络安全应急演练；提高公共互联网网络攻击防范能力，强化网络数据保护。

九、建立辐射环境监测体系

    中国建立了比较完善的国家辐射环境监测网，开展辐射环境质量监测、国家重点监管的核设施监督性监测及事故应急监测。各省也建立了省级辐射环境监测网。国家辐射环境监测网包括辐射环境空气自动监测站和陆地、水体、海洋生物、土壤、电磁辐射共计1400个质量监测点位，所有监测数据向公众公开。

第四届核安全峰会将于2016年3月31日至4月1日在美国华盛顿举行，中方愿与各方一道，推动本届峰会取得成功。峰会进程结束后，中方将一如既往地深入参与国际核安全进程，致力于强化国际核安全体系，为提高全球核安全水平、实现共同核安全做出贡献。