Fact Sheet: Joint Statement on Sustaining Action to Strengthen Global Nuclear Security Architecture

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

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For Immediate Release                         

FACT SHEET

Gift Basket on Sustaining Action to Strengthen the Global Nuclear Security Architecture

As the biennial, leader-level meetings engendered by the Nuclear Security Summits come to an end, the international cooperation and focus on implementing the Nuclear Security Summits’ vision and agenda must continue.  The Nuclear Security Contact Group envisioned by this Gift Basket will create a mechanism by which senior officials routinely consult and synchronize national actions in support of the commitments expressed in Summit Communiqués, Action Plans, Gift Baskets, and the 2010 Washington Work Plan.  The Contact Group will meet at least annually, maintaining the network of senior officials and experts that has supported the success of the Summits.  Thirty-nine Summit participants, plus the United Nations and INTERPOL, have indicated their intent to participate in this Contact Group, and other countries who wish to promote nuclear security outcomes are invited to accept the terms of the Gift Basket and join the Contact Group.  The United States looks forward to participating actively in the Nuclear Security Contact Group to sustain the momentum of the Nuclear Security Summits.

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Fact Sheet: Nuclear Transportation Security

WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

________________________________________________________________

For Immediate Release

FACT SHEET

Nuclear Transportation Security

Nuclear material is most vulnerable while in transit and therefore additional measures are required to mitigate against these risks.  Whether via air, sea, road or rail, sharing methods to protect this material will help prevent nuclear materials from falling into the hands of terrorists, criminals and other unauthorized actors.    Moreover, each State Party to the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material bears the responsibility to protect and secure nuclear material in international transit. 

Through the Nuclear Security Summit, the U.S. has partnered with several other nations to publish best practices guide for implementing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recommendations to protect nuclear material while in transit.  In particular, the U.S. is sharing practical applications from the Department of Defense for securing nuclear material transported via air.  This guide, along with three additional guides covering road, maritime, and rail transport, are available to interested nations and accompanies the Transportation Security Gift Basket sponsored by Japan. 

The United States recently ratified the Amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials that, once it enters into force, would expand this scope to include domestic transportation and use.  The U.S. exceeds all international standards for the transport of nuclear materials and joined this Gift Basket to share its experience with international partners.

The United States is also working with the IAEA to develop technical guidance on Security of Nuclear and other Radioactive Material in Transport to supplement the two existing IAEA transport security Implementing Guides for nuclear and other radioactive material.  This technical guidance will address all modalities of transport security and assist member states in implementing robust nuclear security transport programs. 

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Fact Sheet: Status of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

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For Immediate Release                        

FACT SHEET

Status of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the

Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

The United States welcomes the recent ratifications of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM/A), which, once those countries to deposit their instrument of ratification with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), will bring this important treaty into force.  This treaty fills a gap in the existing international regime by modernizing the international legal framework for nuclear security, which is essential to our efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction or sabotaging nuclear facilties.  The 2005 Amendment strengthens the original Convention by imposing requirements for the physical protection of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in storage, use and domestic transport and security at related facilities.  Once the CPPNM/A enters into force, it becomes legally binding and will allow for the IAEA to convene regular review conferences on the implementation of the treaty.

The amendment will enter into force thirty days after two-thirds of the 153 states party to the CPPNM deposit their instruments of ratification with the IAEA.  As of April 1, 2016, 102 states party have deposited their instrument of ratification; two additional states party must deposit instruments of ratification for the amendment to enter into force.  The United States deposited its instrument of ratification for the amendment with the IAEA on July 31, 2015.  The United States has emphasized the importance of depositing the instruments of ratification and is offering assistance as needed to achieve the universalization of the Amended Convention, noting that 78 countries have ratified since April 2009. 

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Fact Sheet: U.S. Participation EC-US Counter Nuclear Smuggling Workshop

The United States is committed to preventing terrorists, criminals, and other unauthorized actors from acquiring nuclear and other radioactive materials.  Despite significant international progress in strengthening the security of these materials at facilities, seizures of weapons-usable nuclear material in Moldova (2011) and Georgia (2003, 2006, 2010) suggest these materials continue to be trafficked by transnational criminals.  Reporting from the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Incident and Trafficking Database also shows nuclear and radioactive materials are encountered out of regulatory control in all regions. 

Recognizing the need for strengthened international cooperation to counter nuclear smuggling, the United States and the European Commission co-hosted the “2016 Counter Nuclear Smuggling (CNS) Workshop” at the Joint Research Centre-Institute for Transuranium Elements (JRC-ITU) in Karlsruhe, Germany, March 8-10, 2016.  Experts from 28 countries and international organizations shared best practices and lessons learned in investigative and technical capabilities to counter illicit trafficking.  The workshop advanced commitments made at previous Nuclear Security Summits and included demonstrations of CNS capabilities outlined in the ‘Statements of Activity and Cooperation to Counter Nuclear Smuggling’ issued at the each Nuclear Security Summit since 2012.  Workshop instructors included experts from the JRC-ITU, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Energy, INTERPOL, and the IAEA.

Through a series of informational presentations, exercises, and demonstrations, the instructors guided discussions on state-of-the-art approaches and technical challenges associated with detection, investigative planning, radioactive crime scene management, and nuclear forensic analysis of nuclear smuggling incidents.  Workshop participants concluded that close interagency cooperation and international information sharing enable optimized use of investigative and technical capabilities to effectively counter nuclear smuggling.

The March 2016 CNS Workshop marked a significant step in the United States’ collaborative efforts to strengthen international capabilities to prevent nuclear and radioactive materials from falling into the hands of malicious actors.   

Fact Sheet: U.S. Participation in ITRAP+10

U.S. Participation in the Illicit Trafficking Radiation Program

The United States and the European Union understand the importance of nuclear security and embrace the shared international responsibility to develop, promote and enhance systems and measures to detect and respond to nuclear and other radioactive materials out of regulatory control.    The international partnership created to evaluate commercially available detection technologies was initiated through the Illicit Trafficking Radiation Program (ITRAP+10).  This joint test campaign between European Union and the United States has tested 79 models of radiation detection technologies from 26 world-wide manufacturers.  The ITRAP+10 report provides international stakeholders a robust assessment of technologies to assist resource planning in the deployment of more effective detection countermeasures.  Release of this report supports international efforts to combat the illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials out of regulatory control.  

Enhancing capabilities to detect nuclear and other radioactive materials out of regulatory control, both at borders and within States, is integral to bolstering global defenses against nuclear terrorism. In addition to this technical assessment,   the results of this joint test effort are expected to encourage industry to push technological advances, which will ideally result in better detection capabilities.

The ITRAP+10 report underscores the commitment of the United States and the European Union to support efforts to combat nuclear terrorism. Test results support evolving requirements and test methods for radiation detection instruments, guide industry towards product improvement, and promote better understanding of performance and limitations of current technologies. 

Fact Sheet: Update on Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation (INFCIRC 869)

THE WHITE HOUSE 

Office of the Press Secretary

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For Immediate Release                        

FACT SHEET

Update on INFCIRC 869

On October 9, 2014, the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, on behalf of its Government and 34 other countries (full list below), conveyed to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Secretariat the “Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation” from the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit and requested that it be circulated to all IAEA Member States.  The subscribing states pledged to take specific steps, including implementing key IAEA nuclear security guidance, accepting voluntary peer reviews, and committing that those responsible for nuclear security are demonstrably competent.  The Dutch note verbale  encouraged all States to meet the intent of these essential elements of a nuclear security regime and to commit to the effective and sustainable implementation of the principles therein.  The IAEA has circulated the 2014 Joint Statement as INFCIRC/869, to which all IAEA Member States could ascribe.

On November 13, 2015, Jordan pledged its commitment to the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation, as contained in INFCIRC/869.  Jordan is the 36th IAEA member state to subscribe to the statement, and the first to do so outside the Summit process.

The United States continues to encourage all IAEA member states to indicate their commitment to implement the provisions of INFCIRC/869, noting that such public commitments provide public assurances that nuclear materials are effectively secured and underscore support for the IAEA and its nuclear security efforts.

Full List of Subscribers

Algeria, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and Vietnam.

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Fact Sheet: Joint Statement on Certified Training

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

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For Immediate Release                       

FACT SHEET

Certified Training for Nuclear Security Management

The challenges associated with managing nuclear and other radiological materials are varied and complex, and it is essential that states to their utmost to maintain security over such materials.  Effective security relies upon the competence of management and personnel who are responsible for this work.  Therefore, it is crucial that managers and personnel responsible for nuclear security continuously maintain and improve their skills.  Much progress has been made in this area since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, particularly with the development of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Information Circular 869 and with the establishment of the World Institute of Nuclear Security (WINS) Academy Nuclear Security Management Certification Program.

The WINS Academy is a comprehensive training program for nuclear security professionals, with modules that cover a wide variety of disciplines.  Upon successful completion, students become Certified Nuclear Security Professionals.  Certification is valid for three years, after which time recertification is required.  The program is designed to develop a network of certified professional who are affecting meaningful and sustainable changes to nuclear security worldwide.

In support of this issue, Canada has sponsored the Gift Basket on Certified Training for Nuclear Security Management.  As a signatory to this Gift Basket, the United States commits to further support the WINS Academy, including through the provision of advocacy, peer review support, contributions, or by other means as necessary, and to promote cooperative efforts between the WINS Academy and the IAEA.  The United States has supported WINS through federal grants and works with the both IAEA and directly with partner countries to provide a wide variety of training to personnel responsible for securing nuclear and radiological materials.

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Fact Sheet: U.S. Participation in ITWG

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

________________________________________________________________

For Immediate Release                         

FACT SHEET

U.S. Participation in the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group

The United States and European Commission co-chair the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG), which is an informal, unaffiliated association of nuclear forensics practitioners from governments around the world.  ITWG works to identify, develop, and promote best practices in the field of nuclear forensics by holding annual meetings, conducting exercises, and publishing guidelines.  These efforts help strengthen national capabilities to investigate and prosecute illicit uses of nuclear and other radioactive material. 

In addition to co-chairing ITWG, U.S. experts help lead several ITWG task groups including those on evidence collection, exercises, guidelines, training, and national nuclear forensic libraries (NNFLs).  These efforts draw upon experts from several U.S. interagency partners, including the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration and national laboratory complex, the Department of Homeland Security, Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

ITWG held its twentieth annual meeting June 2015 in Budapest, Hungary, and will hold its next annual meeting in Lyon, France in June 2016.  The European Commission’s Joint Research Centre will host the 2017 annual meeting.  Experts from more than 50 countries have participated in ITWG meetings since it was established in 1995. 

ITWG completed its fourth collaborative material exercise March 2015, and it will initiate the next one in fall 2016.  During these exercises, experts from laboratories around the world are asked to analyze nuclear material as part of a mock investigation and then later review the effectiveness of the various techniques employed.  Lessons learned and techniques developed from these exercises have been published in peer-reviewed technical journals and used as the basis to develop ITWG guidelines.  ITWG has prepared guidelines on the use of a variety of technical tools.  The guidelines can be found on the ITWG website www.nf-itwg.org. 

ITWG also conducts a U.S.-sponsored, web-based, virtual exercise series on NNFLs called Galaxy Serpent.  An NNFL is an important nuclear security tool that helps a country determine if material found outside regulatory control is or is not consistent with material it produces, uses, or stores.  In its national statement, the United States announced it now accepts NNFL queries from other governments.  (More information on the query process is available on the Nuclear Security Summit website www.nss2016.org).

The United States and European Commission issued a joint statement at the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit regarding future ITWG efforts.  Contributions by the United States to future ITWG efforts include: 

• Continued co-chairmanship with the European Commission;
• Provision of experts to help lead task groups;
• Participation in ITWG collaborative material exercises, e.g. CMX-5;
• Provision of subject matter expert input to the development of new ITWG guidelines;
• Facilitation of future Galaxy Serpent exercises on national nuclear forensics libraries; and,
• Support for the participation of some foreign government experts in ITWG annual meetings and exercises.   

Cooperation between governments is critical to addressing transnational threats involving nuclear and other radioactive material found outside regulatory control.  U.S. collaboration with international nuclear forensics practitioners through ITWG has strengthened global nuclear security. 

Fact Sheet: Joint Statement on HEU Minimization

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

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For Immediate Release                       

FACT SHEET

Minimizing and Eliminating the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium

in Civilian Applications

Since the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, there has been considerable and tangible progress made toward the minimization of highly enriched uranium (HEU).  These efforts include converting reactors from HEU fuel to low enriched uranium fuel, HEU removals, technology substitution, and down-blending.  As of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, 29 countries and Taiwan have strengthened global nuclear security by eliminating all HEU from their territory.  Minimizing, and eventually eliminating, civilian HEU stocks represents permanent threat reduction by preventing sensitive nuclear materials from falling into the wrong hands.

At the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, Norway has sponsored a Gift Basket on Minimizing and Eliminating the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in civilian applications.  The States joining this Gift Basket have outlined a comprehensive five-point plan to minimize and ultimately eliminate HEU from civilian applications, including (1) limiting the use of HEU in new civilian facilities and applications; (2) converting to LEU or shuting down all HEU civilian reactors; (3) repatriating all civilian HEU to the countries of origin or otherwise permanently disposing of or down-blending excess HEU; (4) converting medical isotope production facilities to non-HEU technologies; and (5) meeting to review progress on this plan in 2018.

To support this effort, the United States will continue to work on new low enriched uranium (LEU) fuels to convert its six remaining High Performance Research Reactors, establish domestic non-HEU based molybdenum-99 production, and down-blend HEU declared as excess.  The United States will also support international efforts to convert HEU research reactors to LEU fuel, return or dispose of excess civilian HEU, and convert large-scale international medical isotope producers from HEU to LEU targets. 

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Fact Sheet: Joint Statement on Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

________________________________________________________________

For Immediate Release

FACT SHEET

Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence and Training Centers

Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence (COE) have emerged as an important part of the global nuclear security architecture.  A number of Summit participants have committed to establishing COEs since the first Summit in 2010.  This trend recognizes the importance of making sure that scientists, technicians, engineers, managers, and all others who work with and around nuclear materials are properly trained.  Areas of focus for training include physical protection, nuclear forensics, nuclear emergency preparedness and response, export controls, and nuclear detection.  COEs address the important “human factor” of global efforts to secure nuclear material. 

To promote communication and interaction, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) established the Nuclear Security Training and Support Center Network and portal in 2012.  This has resulted in greater coordination and collaboration amongst the COEs and is a venue to provide best practices to states interested in establishing a COE.

Italy has sponsored a Joint Statement at the 2016 Nuclaer Security Summit to support the continued development of the COEs.  This statement includes pledges to increase cooperation among COEs, both within the IAEA and regionally, as well as steps that the Centers will take to ensure continous improvemnet to circiulum and instructers. 

The United States has worked closely with many countries toestablish and support the missions of these Centers to train international audiences on nuclear security issues. 

The U.S. will continue to work with international partners on nuclear security training and education, helping to ensure a strong security culture and the building sustainability for the important work achieved through the Nuclear Security Summit process.

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Fact Sheet: Removal of HEU and plutonium from Germany

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

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For Immediate Release                         

FACT SHEET

Nuclear Material Removal from Germany

Germany is a global leader on nuclear security, working with the United States since 1996 to return more than 135 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU). 

At the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, the United States and Germany announced the successful removal of excess plutonium and HEU from Germany.  This shipment was completed through a multilateral effort involving the U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA), Germany’s Wiederaufarbeitungsanlage Karlsruhe Rückbau-und Entsorgungs-GmbH (WAK), and the European Commission Joint Research Centre’s Institute for Transuranium Elements (JRC-ITU).  This is the 19th shipment of nuclear material from Germany to the United States.

In order to execute this project, DOE/NNSA, WAK, and JRC-ITU overcame several technical challenges including:

• Design, construction and qualification of new gloveboxes for plutonium and HEU packaging;
• Development of processes for stabilization and characterization of materials for safe transport;
• Training and certification of personnel for specialized packaging operations; and
• Validation of packages for transport of plutonium and HEU material.

Significant contributions were made by Germany’s Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building, and Nuclear Safety (BMUB) and its licensing authority, the Federal Office of Radiation Protection (BfS), which approved the necessary licenses to ensure safe and secure packaging and transport of the material; Germany’s Daher Nuclear Technologies GmBH, which provided the secure transport of the material within Germany; and the United Kingdom’s International Nuclear Services, which provided secure transport of the material from Germany to the United States.  The European Commission’s Euratom Supply Agency (ESA) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) played an important role in all aspects of the operation.  This material will be stored at safe and secure facilities in the United States.  The United States and Germany plan to continue to work together in the future to foster nuclear security and non-proliferation.

Fact Sheet: Removal of all HEU and plutonium from FCA

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

___________________________________________________________

For Immediate Release                         

FACT SHEET

Removal of All Highly Enriched Uranium and Plutonium from Japan’s Fast Critical Assembly

Japan has been one of the United States’ closest allies in the global effort to minimize, and when possible eliminate, the use of sensitive nuclear materials at research facilities.  This strong partnership has helped the international community ensure that these materials never find their way into the hands of criminals, terrorists, or other unauthorized actors.  

At the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, Japan and the United States announced that all highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium fuel has been removed from the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA)’s Fast Critical Assembly (FCA).  This announcement follows up on the joint pledge that Japan and the United States announced at the 2014 Summit, committing to remove the FCA material.  This effort will result in the elimination of hundreds of kilograms of sensitive HEU and plutonium.

The FCA came online in 1967 for the purpose of studying the physics characteristics of fast reactor cores.  With the technology available at that time, HEU and plutonium were believed to be required for these experiments.  Recent advancements in technology and decades of experience have opened the door for FCA continuing, and even expanding, its mission without the need for HEU or separated plutonium fuels. The United States and Japan have already started on a series of joint research collaborations that will facilitate the ability for FCA to continue to conduct important new research.   

Japan and the United States also announced at the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit that we will work together to remove all HEU fuel from the Kyoto University Critical Assembly (KUCA) to the United States for downblend.  The removal will take place after converting KUCA from HEU to LEU fuels. 

In 2010, the United States and Japan successfully converted the Kyoto University Research Reactor from HEU to LEU fuel.  Unlike HEU, LEU cannot be used to produce a nuclear weapon.  JAEA has also voluntarily promoted the conversion of several of its research reactors, successfully eliminating hundreds of kilograms of HEU from civilian commerce.

Fact Sheet: Apex Gold

Apex Gold Scenario-Based Policy Discussion

On January 27-28, 2016, the U.S. Department of Energy and the Kingdom of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosted a scenario-based policy discussion entitled Apex Gold, the first ever minister-level exercise to identify national and international actions to address a nuclear crisis.  The SBPD brought together ministers and other senior delegates from 37 nations, along with representatives from the International Atomic Energy Agency, the European Union, and the United Nations, to practice their ability to respond effectively to an emerging nuclear security threat.

During the discussion, the ministers were presented with a hypothetical nuclear terrorism scenario and then worked together to determine how each of their nations might respond at each step of the situation.  The participants also toured Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to better understand some of the technical tools available for detecting and analyzing nuclear material and making decisions in the event of a nuclear terrorism crisis.

The primary objective of Apex Gold was to prepare ministers to advise their heads of government during a nuclear security crisis or emergency.  Additionally, the exercise laid important groundwork for the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit.  At the Summit, national leaders will also be presented with a hypothetical scenario involving a nuclear security threat.

Fact Sheet: Belgium Highly Enriched Uranium and Plutonium Removals

Fact sheet: Belgium Highly Enriched Uranium and Plutonium Removals

Fact Sheet: Cooperation at Japan's Fast Critical Assembly

Fact Sheet: Cooperation at Japan's Fast Critical Assembly

Fact Sheet: U.S. Counter Nuclear Smuggling Activities→

Fact Sheet: U.S. Counter Nuclear Smuggling Activities